



Theoretical Perspectives and Case Studies
Difference, diversity and variation among human beings, both as individuals 
and groups, and hence, the presence of the different Other together with the Self 
have always been one the main expressions and ramifications of the original 
identity and essential unity of the human species. Unity in diversity, or vice 
versa, is one of the wonders of the creation exemplified in the creature that has 
been given pre-eminence and glory in the cosmos as God’s trustee and 
vicegerent on earth. Whatever the manifestations of difference and forms of 
diversity and plurality obtaining in and among human societies might be, they 
in no way obliterate human original identity and essential unity emanating 
from a God-fashioned original nature or firah. Imbibed with this cosmic truth 
highly celebrated by the Qur’an as an expression of the unfathomable divine 
wisdom in the creation, the emerging new Islamic discourse of fiqh 
al-aqalliyyāt, or jurisprudence of minorities, is in search of a comprehensive 
approach and well-grounded systemic ijtihād combining knowledge of Text 
and Context to address the multiple and complex issues pertaining to 
minorities and affecting human relations at all levels in Muslim majority 
countries including non-Muslim minority groups and non-Muslim majority 
countries with Muslim minority presence. The present volume fairly reflects the 
theoretical and practical concerns of an increasingly growing world community 
of Muslim scholars, researchers and activists who strive to come to grips with 
an area of human relations that is prone to all kinds of misunderstanding, 
misrepresentation and manipulation, locally, regionally and globally. It is hoped 
it will consolidate and enrich the voices of wisdom on the path of promoting 
peaceful coexistence and positive interaction among majorities and minorities 
of all types.
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FOREWORD
In the wake of globalization humanity is living in a new world
and facing new socio-cultural and politico-economic circum-
stances affecting people’s lives so profoundly. Increasing close
social contacts and immediate cultural interactions among indi-
viduals and peoples previously far away from each other are the
rule rather than the exception thanks to the unprecedented speed
of means of transportation and the radical revolution in commu-
nications and information technology. In a world that has literally
become a global village, new forces of influence and novel modes
of human co-existence and interaction have emerged that face all
nations and countries in the world with new challenges and prob-
lems. In the forefront of these challenges and problems are issues
of how increasingly interconnected individuals and communities
of different belief-systems and religious faiths are would be able
to live together peacefully. A very central question is how majori-
ties and minorities of all kinds, especially religious ones, can cope
with their differences and discover common grounds that would
allow them to cooperate for the benefit and wellbeing of all and
each and every one in their respective societies. It is with this
general context in view that the Muslim World League (MWL)
has been involved in intellectual, cultural and social activities in
which issues related to Muslim minorities in the world have been
at the centre of focus.
Like other social and cultural groups, Muslim minorities in
many countries of the world have been experiencing serious
changes in their lives and status resulting as much from their in-
ternal developments as from the evolution of their relationships
with the other components of their societies be they majorities or
minorities. There are different factors that contribute to the shap-
ing of those relationships both positively and negatively. One im-
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portant factor that requires special attention pertains to the per-
ception of Islam by both Muslims and non-Muslims and the un-
derstanding of what it stands for in relation to other religions and
civilizations. This is more so in view of the ongoing debate that
has been sparked by clash of civilizations thesis over the last few
decades.
The problems and challenges facing Muslim minorities in the
world are of a complex nature involving social, cultural, economic,
legal and political aspects, and requiring a comprehensive approach
in handling them systematically by taking the special context and
circumstances of those groups into consideration. It has been one
major goal of the Muslim World League to assist Muslim minority
groups by different means in overcoming the challenges and prob-
lems facing them. While undertaking this task, special attention has
been given to striking a happy balance between the preservation
and consolidation of their Islamic identity and positive integration
into the societies to which they belong.
However, the concern of the MWL about minorities has not
been confined to Muslims only. Rather, and in line with the
teachings of Islam and the historical experience of Islamic civili-
zation, non-Muslim minorities living in Muslim countries have
also been of increasing interest in its discourse and reach-out ac-
tivities. It is indeed our view that the problems relating to Muslim
and non-Muslim minorities can only be properly addressed and
resolved when approached from the perspective of a unified sys-
tematic intellectual and methodological framework deeply
grounded in Islamic jurisprudence. Such a framework, we believe,
is provided by what has been described as jurisprudence of mi-
norities or fiqh al-aqalliyyÉt.
It was in this spirit that MWL deemed it necessary to dedicate
at least one international conference to studying and examining the
question of minorities from different angles. Thanks to the collab-
oration with the International Islamic University Malaysia (through
International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization, ISTAC
and the Department of Fiqh and Usul Fiqh), it has been possible
to coordinate our efforts and organize the 2009 international con-
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ference on “Jurisprudence of minorities in the Light of the objec-
tives of Islamic Law (MaqÉÎid al-SharÊÑah): Identity and Integra-
tion”. The publication of the present book consisting of selected
papers from the conference proceedings is a most welcome con-
tribution to an area of Islamic thought that is in need of more in-
depth scholarly efforts.
I pray to Allah subÍÉnahu wa-taÑÉlÉ to make this effort a fruitful
one that will benefit Islam, Muslims and mankind at large.







Its Meaning, Purpose and Scope
Mohamed El-Tahir El-Mesawi
As far back as history can teach us, human societies have never
been monolithic closed and static entities that are absolutely ho-
mogeneous in all existential aspects of their lives, be they essential
or otherwise. Indeed, the contrary has been mostly true. Mobility,
openness, and diversity have always been characteristic features
of dynamic historical societies in contradistinction with ‘primi-
tive’ human groups that are assumed by some anthropologists
and ethnologists and other social scientists to have been ‘mono-
lithic’, ‘homogeneous’ and ‘stagnant’, and hence ahistorical.
Likewise, processes of adoption, adaptation, assimilation, inclu-
sion and exclusion have been and continue to be part and parcel
of the dynamics of human societies’ development, sustainability
and self-regeneration in a continuous process of interaction with,
and adaptation to, their natural and human environment, thus
being guided by a certain view of the world and set of values and
ideals regulating their individual and collective conduct.
Likewise, what is always described as the minority-majority
question cannot be seen in a proper relief outside and beyond
this universal pattern governing mankind since it emerged on the
scene of the world history as a distinct species leading a collective
life and forming groups and societies. Rather, the minority-
majority question is none other than one of the manifestations of
those characteristics and processes of the human socio-historical
condition. The presence of the Other who might be different eth-
nically, linguistically, religiously, culturally or otherwise seems
therefore to be concomitant with the existence of the Self that is
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assumed to be monolithic and homogenous. This, in fact, is a re-
flection of a cosmic law governing human socio-historical exist-
ence ever since its early beginnings on earth, a truth of human
association (to use Ibn KhaldËn’s terminology) which the Qur’an
has cast in a picturesque manner. Thus we read:
O men! Behold, We have created you all out of a male and a female,
and have made you into nations and tribes, so that you might come to
know one another. Verily, the noblest of you in the sight of God is
the one who is most deeply conscious of Him. Behold, God is all-
knowing, all-aware. (49: 13)
And among His wonders is this: He creates for you mates out of your
own kind, so that you might incline towards them, and He engenders
love and tenderness between you: in this, behold, there are messages
indeed for people who think! And among his wonders is the creation
of the heavens and the earth, and the diversity of your tongues and
colours: for in this, behold, there are messages indeed for all who are
possessed of [innate] knowledge! (30:21)
Hence, difference, diversity and variation among human be-
ings and the presence of the different Other together with the Self
are no novel discoveries in human history; instead they have al-
ways been an expression and ramification of the fundamental
identity and essential unity of the human species that set it apart
from other beings on earth. Unity in diversity or vice versa, then,
is but one of the wonders of the creation exemplified in the crea-
ture that has been given pre-eminence and glory over other be-
ings as God’s trustee and vicegerent on earth (Q., 2:30, 17:55 &
33:72). Therefore, whatever the manifestations of difference and
forms of diversity and plurality occurring in and among human
societies might be, this should not in any way blur or make us
forget that fundamental identity and essential unity.
Indeed, it has been an aspect of the Divine creative will and
scheme of human existence that difference should persist among
human beings hand in hand with their original unity deriving from
their original common nature. Hence, the Qur’an clearly states that
“had thy Sustainer [God] so willed, He could surely have made all
mankind one single community, but [He willed it otherwise, and so]
they continue to hold divergent views.” (Q., 11:117). In other words,
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besides those aspects of natural diversity of tongues and physical
posture, the unceasing differentiation among human beings pertain-
ing to their views and persuasions “is not incidental but represents a
God-willed, basic factor of human existence;” the great and fathom-
less wisdom lying behind this fact is that if “God had willed that all
human beings should be of one persuasion, all intellectual progress
would have been ruled out.”1
It is therefore natural that human beings, both as individuals
and groups, will not behave and act merely out of the necessity of
their instinctual drives and natural physical needs, but most im-
portantly in accordance with their persuasions and intellectual
visions. In other words, the singularity of human beings in con-
trast with other species on earth is that they act in order to shape
their destinies by making decisions on the basis of ideals and
goals deriving from their views and persuasions. Likewise,
The very existence of different individuals and groups that
have this characteristic virtually guarantees that there will
be conflicts among them. And yet it is also human to want
to find common ground with others. When individuals or
groups emphasize their differences, the result is conflict;
when they find common ground, cooperation becomes
possible. However, even when it appears that cooperative
efforts have resolved the sources of conflict, not all con-
flict will disappear. Conflict is a natural part of all human
interaction. Both conflict and cooperation exist simultane-
ously. All social phenomena can ultimately be reduced to
the question of how these two human characteristics are
reconciled and allowed to coexist on the same plane.2
Put differently, it is the greatest test of humans (again as indi-
viduals and communities) to discover and embrace time and again
the eternal truth of their essential unity and to discover and re-
cover the “common ground” amongst them through and beyond
1Muhammad Asad, The Message of the Qur’an (Kuala Lumpur: Islamic Book Trust,
2011), p. 402.
2 Kazuko Hirose Kawaguch, A Social Theory of International Relations: International
Relations as a Complex System (Dordrecht: Springer Science + Business Media, 2003), p.
5.
THE QUESTION OF MINORITIES IN ISLAMxxii
the multiple forms and diverse manifestations of their socio-
historical existence, and to transcend their localities and tempo-
ralities in order to uphold the universality of their being. In fact,
an important aspect of the Divine wisdom in human differentia-
tion is to test human beings on how to appreciate, individually
and collectively, their differences and overcome them by ascend-
ing towards higher truths and sublime deeds on the path of what
is good and beneficial to all. Otherwise, they will remain impris-
oned to all types of socio-cultural and legal configurations whose
actual value should not be more than being means to enable them
to realize their potentials and fulfill their needs.
In light of the above, and regardless of the socio-cultural and po-
litical context in which the terminology of minority versus majority
appeared and where and when it first came into circulation, the
question of minority-majority relations is but an existential corollary
and natural expression of that unceasing differentiation among
human beings. Without delving into the historical dynamics of the
minority-majority question and how different societies and civiliza-
tions have dealt with it over the ages, it would suffice to just point
out that it has become one of the persistent and most explosive is-
sues in contemporary politics and international relations with far-
reaching social, cultural and political consequences, nationally, re-
gionally and globally. Increasing tensions and conflicts are on record
in the world wherein minority-majority relationships are among their
main causes if not the main cause. Military intervention justified by
the rescue or protection of minorities is not an uncommon fact in
modern history. International official and non-official organizations
and bodies have been in existence whose mission or part of it is to
oversee the cause of minorities in the world and promote their
rights and interests. There is no country or society in today’s world,
one would venture to proclaim with much certainty, which does not
face the question of minority-majority relationship one way or an-
other. In a globalized or globalizing world, minority related issues,
whatever their geographical locality or national boundaries, have be-
come a matter of universal concern of humanitarian, cultural, eco-
nomic, social, political and legal implications, regardless of their gen-
uineness or artificialness. Discourses have been formulated, posi-
El-Mesawi: FIQH AL-AQALLIYÓT: ITS MEANING, PURPOSE AND SCOPE xxiii
tions taken and laws promulgated all in the name of minorities. So-
cial, political and media campaigns have been staged for the sake of
minorities or simply on their behalf. Countries and governments
have been pressurized and individuals or groups prosecuted also in
the name of this or that minority.
Islam and Muslims have been increasingly criticized by many,
especially Western, writers and activists on account of allegedly poor
records in relation to the respect and protection of non-Muslim mi-
nority groups living in the midst of Muslim majority societies. Thus,
over many decades throughout the twentieth century many Muslim
scholars and thinkers devoted a good deal of effort to respond to
those criticisms and clarify Islam’s position concerning non-Muslim
minorities both theoretically (as enshrined in Scripture) and practi-
cally (as borne out by Muslims’ historical experience). A considera-
ble body of literature has accumulated under titles like the dhimmÊs
(ahl al-dhimmah), non-Muslims (ghayr al-MuslimÊn) or citizenship
(muwÉÏanah) in Islamic Law or under the Islamic state or in Muslim
societies. However, this is only one side of the question of minori-
ties for Islam and Muslims; another side has increasingly caught the
attention of many people both within and without the abode of Is-
lam. Unlike the classical and medieval periods when Muslims used
to live exclusively under Islamic rule except for limited cases of indi-
viduals or very tiny groups or under radical circumstances such as
after the fall of Granada in Muslim Spain, modern times, mainly
since the beginning of the twentieth century as most of Muslim
countries had fallen under colonial rule, have witnessed the growing
presence of Islam and Muslims outside that traditional abode, nota-
bly in the Euro-American Northern sphere. Many factors lie behind
this remarkably growing Islamic presence, whose enumeration and
analysis is beyond our purpose here.
Over the last two to three decades mainly, Muslim-minority re-
lated issues have come to the forefront and become the concern of
increasing numbers of Muslims and non-Muslims alike due to their
complex religious, moral, social, legal and political dimensions and
to the tensions they might create or have created in the relationship
between Muslims and the societies in the midst of which they live.
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For non-Muslims, especially in the West, their concern regarding
Muslim minority communities stems from the fact of what is con-
sidered as a worrisome rebirth and rise of religion and religious self-
assertion and identification in a supposedly secular or secularized
world, where belonging and identity would rather be determined by
mundane values and ideals and governed by state-regulated citizen-
ship based on secular man-made laws. Religious commitment and
religion-based socio-political membership and action in the public
sphere of conceivably secular modern states thus look as an aberrant
development detracting the almost taken for granted linear and irre-
versible process of universal progress and evolution in which the
secularization of life and the world is looked at as an essential and
determining phenomenon in the evolution of human society and
culture. Extreme views and positions of triumphalist secularists and
puritan nationalists notwithstanding, the question of Muslim minori-
ties for concerned thinkers, politicians and law-makers in many
Western countries is a serious matter requiring careful treatment to
arrive at appropriate strategies of accommodation and/or assimila-
tion in a manner that would not destabilize or alter the nature and
features of the existing socio-political and cultural system.
On the Muslim side, this concern over the conditions of Mus-
lims living in non-Muslim majority countries derives from the fact
that a Muslim’s destiny and salvation depends on the extent to
which one submits to God’s will by conducting one’s life according
to His decrees and realizing the ethical values of truthfulness and
goodness in all spheres of life as taught by the Qur’an, exemplified
by the Prophet, and elaborated by Muslim scholars over the ages.
This is no easy task indeed, and more so when the Muslim finds
him/herself facing a socio-cultural and political reality with its own
compelling norms, symbols, systems and priorities that may be indif-
ferent to his/her preoccupations, to say the least, and suspicious if
not hostile and aggressive, to say the most. Thus, between the two
limits of Muslim minority groups’ self-assertion and struggle to live
up to the principles and ideals taught by their religion on the one
hand, and the suspicion and/or aggressiveness of the non-Muslim
majority societies in whose midst they exist, a wide spectrum of in-
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creasing individual and collective problems arise that press for im-
mediate solutions of spiritual, moral, creedal, socio-economic and
political nature.
A great challenge is thus posed to Muslim minority groups and
their leaders in the first place and to Muslim scholars and Islamic
institutions at large in the second place to find the Islamically right
answers and efficient means to overcome those problems. This
situation has given rise to a new kind of discourse that has been
taking shape ever since and in the shaping of which many Muslim
scholars, thinkers and activists are involved. Aimed at developing a
theoretical and methodological framework whereby those issues
could be addressed systematically, one of the features of this new
discourse is the uneasiness and critical attitude its promoters ex-
press vis-á-vis the tradionalist approaches followed by many con-
temporary Muslim jurists and official and non-official religious
bodies in handling such issues. On the one hand, such jurists and
religious bodies are criticized for lack of holistic view of Islamic
teachings as a comprehensive integrated system as well as for defi-
ciency in taking account of the core values and higher goals of the
SharÊÑah (maqÉÎid al-sharÊÑah) underlying those teachings. On the
other hand, they fail to understand the Muslim minorities connect-
ed issues as part of dynamic socio-cultural and politico-economic
interrelated realities. Hence, they would simply lean on juristic
formulations and verdicts of past Muslim scholars of the different
guilds and apply them mechanically in disregard of both the socio-
historical context wherein they had been developed and the pre-
sent context surrounding Muslim minorities.
Realizing the complexity and sensitive nature of the question of
minorities, the contributors to the above-mentioned new discourse
seem to be one on describing it as jurisprudence of minorities (fiqh
al-aqalliyyÉt), that should have its own specific subject matter and
methodology, though not situated beyond or outside the general
framework of Islamic jurisprudence. Its purpose is to develop the
necessary theoretical and methodological means and formulate the
appropriate practical tools that would help in solving the problems
facing Muslims living in non-Muslim countries and enable them to
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preserve their Islamic identity and subscribe to Islam’s beliefs and
values without alienation or estrangement from the general socio-
political and cultural context surrounding them. Not only that; the
exponents of this new branch of Islamic jurisprudence also aspire to
equip Muslim minority communities intellectually and morally in
such a way as would make them active participants in their societies
and positive contributors to their overall wellbeing.
This double-sided nature of the question of minorities as depict-
ed above constitutes the theme to which the “International confer-
ence on Jurisprudence of Minorities in the Light of the Objectives
of Islamic law (maqÉÎid al-sharÊÑah): Identity and Integration” had
been devoted.1 This conference was specifically meant to assess the
current status of the Islamic discourse on minorities and open new
vistas for further reflection and research that should be guided by
MaqÉÎid al-SharÊÑah seen as a necessary fundamental framework for
revitalizing the creative practice of ijtihÉd and coming to terms
with contemporary problems and challenges.
The present volume consists of thirteen chapters (9 in English
and 4 in Arabic) the original versions of which were selected from
the thirty-three papers presented at the conference. The selection
was based on a set of criteria, including relevance to the main
theme of the conference, variation and topicality of issues treated,
appropriateness of methodology and approach, coherence of
presentation, originality of ideas, clarity and soundness of argu-
ment, substantiality and informative character of content, and
complementary relationship among the papers. In light of these
criteria and considering the general thematic unity of the material,
the chapters have been arranged in such a way that they would con-
stitute a coherent whole despite the diversity of issues discussed and
variation of methods employed, this having also been observed
within each of the two (English and Arabic) sections of the book.
1Organized by the International Institute of Islamic Thought, ISTAC, the Department of
Fiqh Usul al-Fiqh (both at the International Islamic University Malaysia, IIUM) and the
Muslim World League, Makkah, the three-day conference was held on 9-11 November
2009 (21-23 Dhu al-Hijjah 1430) at Renaissance Hotel, Kuala Lumpur and was officiated
by IIUM Constitutional Head Sultan Haji Ahmad Shah, the Sultan of Pahang.
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As is the general practice in introducing a book of this kind, I
shall here present an overview of each chapter, especially as the con-
tents of the Arabic section may not be easily accessible to all the
readers who might be interested in this book. Generally speaking,
the three first chapters by Muddathir ÑAbd al-Rahim, Muhammad
Sammak and Hishem A. Hellyer respectively may be said to be of
particularly theoretical nature. Likewise, they set out a general
framework that provides the philosophical and moral foundations
for the rest of the book.
In his paper which constitutes the first chapter, ÑAbd al-Rahim
highlights the metaphysical and ethical foundations of religious plu-
ralism in Islam. In his view, the cornerstone of those foundations
consists of “the contrasting positions in Islamic theology and
worldview of the oneness and uniqueness of God on the one hand,
and the diversity of His creation – animate and inanimate, human
and non-human – on the other.” Accordingly, while absolute one-
ness, uniqueness and inimitability can only be attributed to God, di-
versity, variety, and plurality are characteristic properties of human
beings, not only physically, ethnically and linguistically, but also,
more importantly, “in matters of faith and belief: up to, and includ-
ing, disbelief”, and this by the will of God Himself, their Creator.
Only by having this in view will one be able to appreciate and
explain that historical phenomenon characterizing Islamic civili-
zation that caught the attention of many scholars since the time
of John Locke and aroused their admiration at the same time.
This phenomenon consists of the fact that, as the German phi-
losopher Adam Mez put it, multi-ethnic and multi-religious
communities lived “side by side in an atmosphere absolutely un-
known to medieval Europe.” Thanks to the original pluralistic
vision of the human world enshrined in the Qur’an and exempli-
fied in varying degrees throughout Muslim history, Christian and
Jewish communities living in Muslim society “formed a state not
only within a state, but beyond the state,” as pointed out by eth-
nographer and historian Shelomo D. Goitein. According to ÑAbd
al-Rahim, this Islamic pluralism is sanctioned by the Qur’anic
“principle of inadmissibility of compulsion in matters of faith”
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and “respect for the dignity and integrity of all human beings – of
whatever faith or origin they may be.”
Sammak further elaborates in the second chapter some of the
basic principles underlying Islam’s view and approach in dealing
with human affairs which he summarizes in the formula “unity in
diversity”. Unwavering and manifest as the Qur’an’s insistence on
the common origin and essential unity of human beings is, its em-
phasis on diversity and plurality amongst them is as equally certain
and unambiguous. Its “frequent mentioning of diversity and plurali-
ty amongst mankind is meant to teach people to take it as a fact of
life and natural phenomenon so as to be tuned to realize what it en-
tails in terms of difference and variation in thinking, beliefs, values,
conduct and lifestyles.” But, as Sammak cautions, Islam’s acknowl-
edgement of diversity and difference amongst human beings as
“part and parcel of God’s cosmic scheme of creation” is not intend-
ed to make individuals and societies fall in the ‘narcissism of differ-
ences’, as Freud would have it. Rather, “open and enlightened dia-
logue becomes a pillar of human understanding and mutual respect
and cooperation among peoples and nations.”
From an overview of the changing world religious map since the
end of the nineteenth century, Sammak observes that a great religio-
demographic transformation has taken place whereby Islam and
Muslims have come into close contact with almost all the major reli-
gions of the world, especially Christianity with which Islam is in a
stiff competition notable in Asia and Africa, while it is making in-
roads into Europe and America. In his view, this unprecedented
global situation requires “an updated Islamic jurisprudence to deal
with the new realities of co-living” among people of different reli-
gious denominations. The purpose of this new jurisprudence, ac-
cording to Sammak, is to strike balance and equilibrium among mul-
tiples interests or set them up in order of priority based on profound
analysis and understanding of all aspects of reality as “manifested in
the external world,” from matters related to food and nutrition to
politics and political relations. Taking Lebanon as a miniature of
globalized and interconnected world of religious communities, the
writer argues that religious differences in this country “are not so
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much disputes about doctrine as about history and power-sharing.”
After many years of conflict and strife, the realization of this fact has
enabled the different components of Lebanon to develop a model
of democracy that is typically Lebanese: not ideal, not theoretically
perfect, but “compatible with the fundamental requirements of na-
tional unity.”
In his paper on religious diversity and multiculturalism which
constitutes the third chapter Hellyer takes up number of theoreti-
cal issues which have been at the centre of discussion mainly in
Europe over the last two to three decades. Starting by some con-
ceptual clarification, he states that being a multi-cultural country
does not necessarily mean that a country is multiculturalist, mean-
ing that the adjective ‘multiculturalist’ is rather “a normative label
that would be a judgment on the policies of the countries in-
volved rather than an expression of fact about the realities ‘on
the ground’.” For Hellyer, multiculturalism as a school of
thought with its distinctive theoretical and methodological
framework has been mainly concerned about ethnicity as “the
most contentious form of identity in Europe,” for which reason
little notice was taken of religious identities. And when this hap-
pens, especially in the case of Muslims, it is to portray them “as
ethno-cultural minorities,” an expression that almost obliterates
the typically defining character of religion in shaping Muslim
identity. However, “in the context of discussing the Muslim pres-
ence in Europe, it is rather difficult to get around an engagement
with multiculturalism,” no matter how different positions its the-
orists may take.
Crucial to the multiculturalist debate on minorities are the is-
sues of fairness, equity and citizenship. The basic question that is
raised is: “are the claims of minority groups just, justice being the
root attribute that every state should aspire to uphold?” In this
respect, Hellyer points out the secularist tensions and biases of
the multiculturalist school when it approaches matters related to
religion and religious communities including Islam and Muslims,
as clearly manifested in the position of Will Kymlicka, one of its
outstanding mouthpieces. This multiculturalist theorist “excludes
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religious groups without even any comprehensive justification, alt-
hough they are certainly relevant in Europe and North America.”
Despite that, Hellyer believes, “multiculturalism remains the school
where the issues arising from a multi-faith community are best dis-
cussed, particularly in Europe where many minority faith communi-
ties are also minority ethnic ones.” At this juncture, he reminds the
reader that whatever the possibilities and tools that multiculturalism
may provide to handle minority-religious groups related issues such
as those of rights, accommodation, citizenship, and assimilation into
the wider national communities in Europe and North America, the
fact remains that this will depend on the historical experience and
the type of political culture and brand of secularism prevalent in
each country. Finally, the author concludes by stating that,
Like Muslim juridical theorists who are trying to take into ac-
count the effect of modernity on their jurisprudence, Euro-
pean political philosophers are recognizing that traditional
conceptions of identity and belonging are no longer valid in a
Europe defined by new circumstances. The dynamics of im-
migration, EU integration and globalization have raised new
questions surrounding what is meant by the ‘European iden-
tity’, and the debate is still very much open.
In this context, he reminds us, the “major barrier to be over-
come in this regard is the requirement that the minority and the
majority consider themselves interchangeable in terms of their civic
responsibilities. The majority must view itself as individual citizens
of the overall community, and the minority must do the same; in
other words, as citizens.” But this should not mean that minorities
do not have to defend their rights and status as minorities.
Consciously or unconsciously building on some or all of the
general philosophical and ethical principles described above, the
next ten chapters rather deal with more specific topics and practi-
cal cases, though from different perspectives. In the following
account we shall attempt to synthesize as much as possible their
contents based on unity or proximity of issues raised and ap-
proach followed. Hence, Mohammad H. Fadel, Sayed S. Shah
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Haneef, Muhammad Amanullah and Kamal al-Saeed Habeeb de-
vote their papers to discussing different issues pertaining to non-
Muslim minorities in Muslim majority states. Conversely, Rama-
dan Ma Qiang, Abdul Rajiq Sohn Ju-young, Zaleha Kamaruddin,
Abdelmajid al-Najjar, Ahmed Jaballah and Mahmud Zuhdi Abdul
Majid deal with matters concerning Muslim minorities living in
non-Muslim majority states.
In chapters 4 and 5, Fadel and Haneef reflect on the non-
Muslims’ status in terms of citizenship in an Islamic state from the
perspectives of fiqh al-aqalliyyÉt and constitutional thinking respec-
tively. In Fadel’s opinion, the concern of Islamic law about the
rights and obligations of non-Muslims living in the territory of an
Islamic state went hand in hand with its concern with the rights and
obligations of Muslims living outside such territory. This concern
goes back to the very early moments of the establishment of the Is-
lamic state by the Prophet, and was manifestly expressed in the
MadÊnah Charter that provided the constitutional framework for
governing the social groups making up the emerging Muslim society.
This charter “set out a system of mutual rights and obligations that
bound the people of MadÊnah together on certain common pursuits,
regardless of their religion, while reserving only particular obligations
to those MadÊnese who were Muslims.”
In this context, Muslim jurists pondered the question as to
whether non-Muslim subjects of the Islamic state should be held
“liable in this world for breaching the substantive obligations of
Islamic law,” especially with respect to the penal code be it the
form of ÍudËd or taÑzÊr. According to Fadel, in struggling to re-
solve this issue which preoccupied Islamic legal thinking from its
early days, “Muslim jurists recognized that the application of Is-
lamic law to non-Muslims required a different kind of justifica-
tion than that underpinning its application to Muslims,” for
whom its application is “simply derivative of their acceptance of
Islam as being true.” However, in his opinion, there is a common
basis on which Muslim jurists elaborated their legal formulations of
the rights and obligations of Muslims living as subjects of non-
Muslim state and non-Muslims living under the authority of Islam-
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ic state. That is, “because of the absence of shared belief, the rela-
tionship must be built on the terms of an agreement (Ñaqd). Just as
the relationship of dhimmah was contractual and included mandato-
ry and permissive terms, so too the agreement of security pursuant
to which Muslims could legitimately live in a non-Islamic state had
to meet certain minimum conditions.” The legal tradition of ad-
dressing the status of Muslims living in non-Muslim territories,
Fadel argues, “has formed the basis of fiqh al-aqalliyyÉt.” This, in
his view, should be equally relevant to non-Muslims living in Is-
lamic states. That is, there is a great possibility of developing,
within the framework of fiqh al-aqalliyyÉt, an Islamic political and
legal discourse cutting across and complementing with modern
thinking on citizenship; a defining feature of it being that “it cre-
ates a relationship that is not only vertical in the sense that it is
between the individual and the state, but also horizontal extend-
ing to other citizens through a relationship of equality and shared
responsibility.” This tunes quite well with Muslim jurists’ concep-
tualization of the relationship of non-Muslims to the Islamic
state: “because of the absence of shared belief, the relationship
had to be built on the terms of an agreement (Ñaqd).”
Drawing on the sanctioning by contemporary Muslim jurists
and political thinkers of citizenship as a basis for Muslim minority
individuals and communities to live under non-Islamic govern-
ments, Fadel further argues that the fiqh al-aqalliyyÉt discourse
“provides substantial normative justification” for “generating a
modern system of Islamic law that is able of winning the support of
all citizens, whether Muslim or non-Muslim.” For him, any theoreti-
cal and practical treatment of the question of minorities based on
fiqh al-aqalliyyÉt must take into account both terms of the equation:
Muslim and non-Muslim minorities. Hence, “if we accept the con-
clusion of the emerging discourse of fiqh al-aqalliyyÉt that demo-
cratic political life is sufficient to protect the interests of Islam
and Muslims where they are a minority,” so too “consistent appli-
cation of the principles espoused in the fiqh al-aqalliyyÉt discourse
requires their application also to states in which Muslims form the
majority.” That is to say, non-Muslim minorities living in Muslim
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majority countries should enjoy equal rights and protection with
their Muslim co-citizens on the same basis. Put differently, to “the
extent that we accept fiqh al-aqalliyyÉt as representing a legitimate
interpretation of the SharÊÑah for Muslims living as minorities, it
would seem that Muslim majorities should also be required to treat
non-Muslims with the same level of equality that they demand of
non-Muslims when Muslims are minority.”
In his critical assessment of the issue of non-Muslims’ citi-
zenship in Islamic law, Haneef identifies at the outset of chapter
4 three different approaches or positions: “traditionalist, apolo-
getic and revisionist.” His purpose from engaging with these po-
sitions is to free the discourse on minorities in Islamic lands from
its paradoxes so as to pinpoint “the constitutional jurisprudential
foundations of an equality project within the parameters of Islam-
ic law.” To undertake this task, the author analyzes the different
and, at times, contradictory interpretations that have been given
to the concept of dhimmah by a number of modern Muslim and
non-Muslim writers, which has added much confusion to an al-
ready problematic situation due to the difference of episteme
within which each writer moves.
According to Haneef, the conflicting positions of Muslim tradi-
tionalists and apologists are plagued with inconsistency and con-
tradiction as a result of “their atomistic and out-of-context of the
Islamic legislation on dhimmah” and jizyah, their failure to realize the
constitutional principles underlying it, and inability to consider the
changing socio-historical circumstances that have brought Muslims
to the unprecedented realities of the modern nation-state and in-
ternational relations engulfing Muslim societies themselves. In con-
tradistinction to these two positions stands the third one to which
Haneef personally subscribes. Dubbing it as revisionist and consti-
tutionalist, he believes that by advocating citizenship for non-
Muslims under Islamic law, this third stance “has the strength of
moving ahead with modernity” thanks to its consistency with the
objectives of the SharÊÑah and to its “being grounded in general
egalitarian principles of the Qur’an and Sunnah.” However, he
both counsels and warns. On the one hand, the advocates of the
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constitutionalist approach need to refine their methodological tools
by taking stock of Islamic legal theory (uÎËl al-fiqh), as citing “textu-
al provisions of general import without uÎËlÊ argumentation would
hardly advance the cause of renewal in Islamic law.” On the other
hand, they must be clear “that their alternative concept of
muwÉÏanah does not imply wholesale borrowing of the liberal con-
cept of citizenship” whose underlying philosophy looks at humans
as mere “natural beings without regard to religious values.”
If these conditions are satisfied, the notion of non-Muslims’
citizenship and nationality in the Islamic context, according to
Haneef, “should not be bound by the parameters of the jizyah and
dhimmah, but should instead be grounded in some universal ethical
framework, such as respecting the other’s religious sensitivity, up-
holding the principle of public morality, avoiding subversion of the
established social order, being faithful to the cause of social har-
mony for the good of all the citizenry.”
In his paper entitled “The Issues of minorities in the Islamic
system: A maqÉÎid-informed view” (chapter 10; the first in the Ara-
bic section) Habeeb also discusses the status of non-Muslim mi-
norities in Islam by adopting an historical and constructive ap-
proach based on the theory of SharÊÑah objectives, maqÉÎid al-
sharÊÑah. At the outset, he observes the recentness of the terms mi-
nority and minorities in the social sciences which have been shaped
mainly by modern Western culture. In his opinion, these terms ex-
press the somewhat tensioned relationship in Western nation-
states between the dominant larger communities making up the
‘national bulk’ of those states and the smaller groups standing out-
side the borders of that ‘bulk’ as different ethnicities. In the Islam-
ic context, however, other terms with convergent connotations
were used to refer to the socio-cultural and religious variation in
Muslim society. They include such terms like ahl al-kitÉb (people of
the book), ahl-dhimmah (people of covenant), ghayr al-muslimÊn (non-
Muslims), ahl al-milal (people of different faiths), etc., and they their
usage is well-rooted in the fundamental sources of Islam.
For Habeeb, the widespread use of such terms in Islamic
sources over the ages reflects one important feature of Islamic
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civilization, namely the recognition and acknowledgement in Is-
lam of those individuals and groups who chose to be different
from the predominantly Muslim community and keep up with
their non-Islamic religious beliefs and traditions, be they based on
Divine revelation or not. As such, he maintains, they indicate the
objective realities on the ground and do not carry discriminatory
valuation. Thus pinpointing the diverse socio-cultural and reli-
gious components of Muslim societies, these and other similar
terms may be seen as a clear expression of the pluralistic view
that has characterized Islamic civilization over the centuries.
Likewise, he further argues, Muslim history has never knew the
idea of ‘melting-pot’ that would harness all people into one
overwhelming oppressive social model, neither did it harbor sys-
tematic racial and religious extermination, nor even entertain the
temptation of forcing others to convert to Islam.
In tandem with the Qur’an’s pluralistic vision of human be-
ings and coping with the diverse and dynamic nature of Islamic
society, Muslim jurists applied themselves to interpreting the tex-
tual sources of the SharÊÑah so as to derive from them the rules of
human conduct in all areas of life. They particularly labored to
develop the legal framework that would define the rights and du-
ties of the different groups and govern their relationships as part-
ners in the same society and subjects of the same political author-
ity, whether Muslim or non-Muslim and regardless of their par-
ticular ethnic or religious belonging or loyalties, so far as their ul-
timate belonging and loyalty are to the wider ummah and the high-
er authority of the caliphate. As the study of the Ottoman experi-
ence in dealing with non-Muslim groups clearly shows, it was
never part of the Islamic tradition of governance to resort to the
notion of “divide and rule;” an opposite maxim was observed
instead, that is “unite and rule.” This is because Islam does not
deny the particular and primary loyalties, communal values and
specific rights of such groups out of principled observance of the
values of dignity, justice and equality.
According to Habeeb, this situation, generally speaking, did con-
tinue under Ottoman rule until the late nineteenth century. Howev-
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er, drastic changes occurred mainly in the political realm with the
division of the Muslim ummah into separate nations and the advent
of the territorial nation-state as the main political entity and key
player, thus putting both Muslims and non-Muslims in the Muslim
world face to face with new socio-political realities and challenges.
The time-old equation that governed the relationship among the
different groups almost totally collapsed and the political formula-
tions and legal formulas underlying it, such as dhimmah covenant,
could no longer offer a sustainable framework to come to terms
with the new realities and challenges. A new political mind emerged,
and new political concepts and modes of governance came about
that mainly revolve around the sovereignty of the nation-state and
the idea of equal citizenship as defining factors of socio-political life.
Hence, reconsideration and reconstruction of Islamic politico-legal
categories have become necessary in which the theory of maqÉÎid al-
sharÊÑah should be the ultimate guiding frame of reference, by virtue
of the holistic and dynamic spirit with which it imbibes our thinking
on human interest and socio-political affairs, especially with regard
to the fundamental rights and duties of both individuals and groups.
On his part Amanullah sets out in chapter 8 to deal with a ra-
ther more specific and practical aspect of the question of non-
Muslim minorities; he reflects on, and assesses, the extent to
which the situation of non-Muslims of a particular Muslim major-
ity country and their treatment under its laws are in line with
maqÉÎid al-sharÊÑah, or objectives of the SharÊÑah, as being the em-
bodiment of the philosophy and universal values of Islamic law.
Following a brief exposition of the meaning and taxonomy of
maqÉÎid al-sharÊÑah which encompass “all human interests” what-
ever their level of importance and “reflect the hierarchical scheme
of values Islam has set up for human social life and existence,”
the author turns to the more practical and ‘empirical’ aspect of
his topic. His task is then to discuss “the implications of the doc-
trine of maqÉÎid al-sharÊÑah for non-Muslim minorities living in a
Muslim majority country, by taking Malaysia as an example.”
According to Amanullah, profound reflection on the implica-
tions for non-Muslim minorities of maqÉÎid al-sharÊÑah (as exempli-
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fied in the five universals protected by Islamic law, i.e., religion,
life, intellect, offspring and property) reveals “that the Islamic
system is the most suitable of all socio-political systems to such
minorities.” This is because “what Islam recognizes and legislates
as rights and obligations of human beings are not the result of
mere political arrangement, nor simply a matter of practical expe-
diency.” On the contrary, human rights as recognized by Islam
apply equally to Muslims and non-Muslims by virtue of being de-
rivative of its worldview which itself is “an embodiment of its
fundamental values which are grounded in its view of the original
human nature and dignity as fashioned by God Himself.” In light
of the above, Amanullah examines more closely Malaysian law in
an attempt to establish parallels between it and the Islamic
SharÊÑah with regard to the five universals constituting the funda-
mentals and foundation of human rights. He finally concludes
that, by and large, “non-Muslim minorities in Malaysia are able to
enjoy their basic rights to achieve the higher goals necessary for
the dignified preservation of their survival.” However, he sug-
gests, there is need to remove some ambiguities in the Malaysian
law pertaining to the issues discussed in the paper.
Turning now to the other group of contributions dealing with
Muslim minorities, we shall start with al-Najjar and Jaballah due to
the strong interrelatedness of their contributions, especially with
regard to the geographical and socio-political context which they
address. Both of them focus on Muslim minority communities in
(especially Western) Europe, subscribe to a maqÉÎid-al-sharÊÑah based
perspective, and are concerned with closely similar issues. Yet, al-
Najjar exhibits a strong penchant to systematic intellectual and
methodological theorization taking the experience of the European
Council for Ifta and Research (ECFR) based in Dublin as a practi-
cal model. As a background to his discussion, al-Najjar points out
that the relatively recent but fast-growing Muslim presence in Eu-
rope has undergone a great transformation over the years. He iden-
tifies two main stages which that presence has gone through: inci-
dental or temporal (ÑaraÌiyyah) and normalcy or stability (istiqrÉr).
The first stage concerns Muslim immigrants (usually married or
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unmarried individuals leaving behind their families) who moved to
certain European countries for temporary purposes, such as study
or work, not for permanent stay. As time went by, a new trend ap-
peared where increasing numbers of those immigrants started
building families and settling down in their host countries and end-
ed up not only with becoming permanent residents, but with ac-
quiring full citizenship; this marks second stage which is still in the
making. Likewise, by the coming of the new millennium, many
countries of Western Europe had at least the first generation of
their locally-born Muslim citizens, including many of European
descent. These new generations are involved in various aspects of
the social, economic, cultural and even political life.
This transformation gave rise to a new awareness among Mus-
lims in Europe of communal belonging that transcends their ethnic
origins and inspires them to express their Islamic identity practical-
ly in matters of personal conduct and social dealings. In other
words, Muslims became more seriously concerned about their reli-
gious commitment in their day-to-day life, and this led to an in-
creasing interest in the knowledge of Islamic teachings to meet that
concern. According to al-Najjar, these psycho-spiritual and socio-
cultural developments among Muslim minorities in Europe were
expressed in organizational and institutional forms aimed at giving
their self-assertion and religious identity a more systematic charac-
ter. Learned fatwa (Islamic legal opinion or advice) based on com-
bined knowledge of the scriptural sources and scholarly juristic
tradition of Islam as well as of the concrete realities of the specific
socio-political and cultural context surrounding those communities
thus became necessary. It was in response to such need that the
European Council for Ifta and Research was set up with a view to
establishing a European-based juristic authority that would satisfy
those requirements in order to cater for the specific needs of Eu-
ropean Muslims based on systematic research and collective deci-
sion making in the process of fatwa issuance.
But what kind of methodology should be adopted to fulfill
such a task? To answer this question, al-Najjar differentiates, for
methodological purposes, between two phases in the second stage
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of Muslim presence in Europe: the transitory phase that is still go-
ing on moving Muslims from a temporary incidental existence
whose main agents are scattered individuals and not well-
connected groups, and a settled and well-rooted permanent exist-
ence that is taking shape and whose main agents are more orga-
nized communities connected via a growing network of institu-
tions and socio-economic interests both among themselves and
with the rest of the societies in the midst of which they live. Each
of these interlaced phases requires, according to al-Najjar, a special
methodology of fatwa issuance that should take account of the spe-
cific problems, interests and goals each phase entails. Since in most
of the cases issues arising from the transitory phase are of individ-
ual, immediate and exceptional character whereby Muslims are
faced with pressing problems pertaining to personal, economic or
family matters, the issuance of fatwa would generally tend towards
consideration of license and indulgence, hence the notion of fiqh al-
tarkhÊÎ (license-based jurisprudence).
Differently from this, issues pertaining to the second phase of
permanent existence based on citizenship and increasing integra-
tion with the rest of the society require what al-Najjar calls fiqh al-
ta’sÊs, that is, a constitutive jurisprudence which is more compre-
hensive and holistic in approach and more compelling in terms of
the observance of firm SharÊÑah injunctions (ÑazÊmah). Furthermore,
this constitutive jurisprudence needs to be futuristic, meaning that
is has to consider in its fatwa production the possible future devel-
opments of the Muslim presence in Europe based on acquaintance
with both the trends of evolution emerging within Muslim minori-
ties at the present and the external national and ultra-national fac-
tors and circumstances in Europe that might favour or disfavour
one trend or another.
What al-Najjar is suggesting is a scholarly engagement of indi-
vidual jurists and institutions undertaking the task of fatwa for Mus-
lims in Europe based on serious systematic research. For him, the
two kinds of jurisprudence for Muslim minorities mentioned
above are not mutually exclusive, but complementary, and might
go hand in hand in the near future at least. However, reliance on
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fiqh al-tarkhÊÎ should be gradually receding while reliance on fiqh al-
ta’sÊs should be overtaking in tandem with the consolidation of
Muslim presence in all aspects of life towards normalcy, stability
and firmness. A set of methodological rules are outlined that must
govern the process of fatwa issuance to address European Mus-
lims’ needs. Both these two types of fiqh, al-Najjar clearly insists,
must operate within the framework of an overall strategy for the
future development of Muslims in Europe as original civilizational
partners and active participants in the building and wellbeing of
their societies.
In his turn, Jaballah indicates at the beginning of his paper “Is-
sues of fatwa for Muslim minorities in Western Europe between
practical needs and maqÉÎid-based directives” (chapter 12) that the
minorities’ demand in many Western European countries for equali-
ty of civic and political rights with the majority is not a demand for
something not warranted by the existing laws. What is at stake is the
actual realization of such rights on the ground. More importantly,
the struggle by Muslim and non-Muslim minority groups in those
countries for their civic and political rights is not driven by a minori-
ty-versus-majority logic, but is rather informed and supported by the
law which guarantees such rights, including the recognition of reli-
gious identities and values in increasingly plural and multicultural
societies. In Jaballah’s view, the concern about Islam and Muslims
in European countries today is not about something out there, or
about some individuals and groups standing on the periphery, but
about an essential component of Europe’s present that will continue
to be so in the future. Statistically bordering some 50 million people,
Muslim presence and status is of equal interest to both Muslims and
non-Muslims in Europe, especially as far as their integration in their
respective societies is concerned.
In this connection, Jaballah points out a major difference in the
situation of Muslims in the western and eastern parts of Europe
that has a direct bearing on fatwa issuance for Muslim minorities.
Since Islam in East-European countries has made its presence for
many centuries, Muslims there have developed local institutions
looking after their religious education and guidance. On the con-
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trary, Muslims in Western Europe lack such institutions due to
their recent appearance as visible communities that are conscious
and assertive of their religious identity. This means that West-
European Muslims do not have any established juristic tradition on
which to rely for fulfilling their needs. Over the many past decades
of Muslim presence in Western Europe those needs were attended
to either by reference to scholars from the Muslim world or by re-
liance on some individuals or small groups (such as imams in
mosques or council members of Islamic centres) whose knowledge
of Islam and its scholarly tradition is mostly limited. Likewise, in
his view, the founding of the European Council for Ifta and Re-
search is a landmark in the evolution of Muslims there. In this re-
spect, the author indicates four major areas that represent priority
needs for the majority of European Muslims, namely, family mat-
ters, rituals, economic and financial dealings, and social relation-
ships with non-Muslims.
In addressing issues arising in these areas, Jaballah suggests that a
number of considerations should be observed in fatwa issuance. In-
formed by a clear sense of priorities deriving from the doctrine of
maqÉÎid-al-sharÊÑah, these considerations include the following rules:
1. To strike a balance between immediate needs and pressing neces-
sities on the one hand, and the need to lay down solid foundations
for Muslims that will enable them to preserve their Islamic identity
and convey the values and ideals of Islam to their fellow citizens. 2.
To strike a balance between preserving Muslims’ religious and cul-
tural identity and their positive integration with their societies as Eu-
ropean citizens who should not be alienated from the rest of the
people. 3. To exert self-control and balance in expressing themselves
with high visibility by exhibiting their religious symbols, in order to
avoid provoking or clashing with the general mentality prevailing in
their societies. 4. To be attentive to the dominant way of life that
does not care about religion and may even be hostile to it. 5. To give
special attention to the preservation and strengthening of the family.
6. To look for common grounds between Islamic jurisprudence and
the laws of the land and build fatwas thereupon whenever possible. 7.
To foresee the implications of fatwa for the image of Islam and Mus-
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lims in the eyes of non-Muslims. These rules are to a great extent a
summary of the methodological tenets explicated by al-Najjar.
Moving from Europe to Asia we are presented with two cases
of Muslim minorities: China and South Korea. In his ethno-
anthropological study based on empirical research in five cities in
northwest, south and central China, Ma Qiang examines the trans-
formation that the lives of many Chinese Muslims have undergone
due to immigration from rural to urban areas. The phenomenon of
internal immigration by Chinese Muslims from their traditional
rural ‘habitat’ to the urban world of metropolitan cities happened
mainly in the 1990s as a result of China’s policy of opening-up to
the external world in the process of its rising as a world economic
power. Although this immigration movement availed Muslims of
many opportunities of economic enrichment and social betterment
at the personal level, it faced them with “many difficulties and di-
lemmas” that can be described in general terms as socio-cultural
dislocation. This situation required them to make strenuous ef-
forts in order to adapt to the new socio-cultural and economic
environment. According to Ma Qiang, this adaptation process
affected almost all aspects of those Muslims’ lives, especially
religious rituals and activities, food and accommodation, work
and occupation, and marriage and community relations.
The findings of Ma Qiang’s study reveal not only a drastic and
radical change reflecting the disintegration of traditional community
life of Muslims in urban China and the fading away of its attendant
religious education, but also the rise of a new phenomenon in Chi-
nese Muslim life that he describes as the “emergence of moving
communities.” Differently from the social organization based on
homogeneous and stable traditional community that used to charac-
terize Chinese Muslim life, a new composition of the Muslim popu-
lation in urban China is in the making which consists of “diverse
ethnic groups” including “both national and international immi-
grants.” This new socio-ethnic composition of Muslims in urban
China is accompanied by something quite unprecedented in recent
Chinese history, which is manifested in the emergence of religious
groups subscribing to the teachings of well-known Islamic move-
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ments in the Muslim world, such as the Salafiyyah, the JamÉÑat al-
TablÊgh and some kinds of new Sufism. The function of such groups,
one would think, may be seen as filling the religious and spiritual
void created by the dislocation pointed out earlier. In Ma Qiang’s
view, while the emergence of such religious and socio-cultural
tendencies among Chinese Muslims turns them into a more global-
ized community, they ultimately will have to undergo what he de-
scribes as a Sinization process if they were to be embedded “into lo-
cal society in China.”
As for Korea, Ju-young’s purpose in chapter 7 is to “correct the
misunderstanding of the cultural image of the Muslim minority”
there. His contribution provides a comprehensive historical account
of Korea’s Muslim community since its inception in the early 1950s
throughout all stages of its evolution up to the present. It also offers
a detailed description of its demographic and organizational struc-
ture, highlighting its educational, missionary, social, and welfare in-
stitutions and activities, mostly maintained under the auspices of the
Korea Muslim Federation, KMF. In his report-like portrait, Ju-
young is equally informative as to the external and internal factors
that have contributed to the spread of Islam and growth of Muslims
on the Land of the Morning Calm, as the Korean peninsula is usually
described. Of those factors he singles out “the support of a number
of Islamic countries and organizations, such as Malaysia, Saudi Ara-
bia, the Muslim World League and OIC” as well as the meaningful
“cooperation and special solicitude of the Korean government.”
However, some major barriers still remain on the way; they consist
of misconceptions by the Korean people about Islam and Muslims
that are mainly due “to the heavy influence of Western Christian
culture and media” and “Western educational philosophy.”
As a community “in its sprouting season”, Muslims in Korea
seem to enjoy, according to Ju-young’s exposition, an incompara-
ble status when seen in the wider context of other non-Muslim
majority countries in Asia. Even its diversity into different ethnic
and religious groups does not seem to have created serious internal
tensions or conflicts that may jeopardize its holding together and
smooth development. An important phenomenon characteristic of
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the Korean society may be invoked to explain this situation. As
indicated by Ju-young, “Koreans are a religious people,” the “reli-
gious scene is vividly pluralistic” and religious groups “are quite
liberal and tolerant,” thus allowing many religions and religious de-
nominations (such as Buddhism, Christianity, Protestantism, Ca-
tholicism, Confucianism and Islam), to coexist peacefully. Not only
that; it so happens that some individuals embrace “more than one
religion” at the same time, perhaps out personal expediency!
According to Ju-young, the supremacy of the right to “freedom
of religion” in the Korean constitution, “defined as the freedom of
a person to believe in the way he or she wishes,” has enabled “reli-
gious groups to flourish and build churches and temples” without
interference or constraint from the state authorities. In the context
of this highly diversified religious map, the author believes that the
advancement of Islam in Korea is in need of “a well-thought out
strategy and systematic approach for daÑwah activities with clear
priorities and sound understanding of the needs and problems of
the Korean society.” This requires “professional daÑwah workers
who have sound knowledge of Islam and good understanding of
the Korean society and culture together with a sense of the needs
and priorities of the Muslim community.” At the government level,
he advocates the need for setting up “a general policy” and “new
regulations” on religious matters, “in a systematic, well-thought out
and balanced manner.”
Let us now move to Zuhdi’s reflections on the question of mi-
norities in the context of Malaysia. At the beginning of his paper
which bears the title “The Malaysian experience in the light of fiqh al-
aqalliyyÉt” (chapter 13), he discusses the concept and meaning of mi-
nority in order to pave the ground for his main thesis. From his
study of contemporary Muslim scholars’ works, he concludes that
the term minority refers to two things: 1. A group of people that is
numerically smaller than the majority community outnumbering it,
and 2. Such a group is ethnically, racially, religiously, linguistically,
etc., different from the majority. In Zuhdi’s opinion, this delimita-
tion of the meaning of minority takes the numerical or statistical as-
pect as the defining factor of the status of minority groups, while
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considering other aspects, such as economic poverty, socio-political
marginalization and other forms of weakness in relation to the ma-
jority, as simply a corollary of the minority status.
However, according to Zuhdi, this understanding of the mean-
ing of minority based merely on numerical or statistical criteria is
not the only one, though it represents the majority view held by
Muslim thinkers. Another view is that, however numerically small,
a certain group (or groups) may be economically and politically
powerful, dominate over a majority and impose its will on it in
such a way that the numerical or statistical majority will suffer all
kinds of exploitation and marginalization. A case in point that can
be mentioned here is that of South Africa under the Apartheid re-
gime. Therefore, the author suggests, there is real need to revise
our thinking and way of evaluation regarding the question of mi-
norities by relying simply on statistical considerations.
Following a detailed discussion of the meaning, scope and
methodological rules of fiqh al-aqalliyyÉt, Zuhdi turns his attention
to the Malaysian scenario. Thus, he observes that Muslims make
up about 60.4% of the country’s total population and have a li-
on’s share in government and administrative positions. Yet, their
economic and financial power and social strength does not in any
way reflect their demographic weight. On the contrary, it is nu-
merically and statistically minority groups that actually control the
country’s economic wealth, thus holding sway over the numerical
majority and subsequently influencing all aspects of life in society.
In Zuhdi’s view, the Malaysian experience presents us with a case
of majority turned into an actual minority in terms of real power
and impact.
Last but not least, we come to Kamaruddin’s particularly fo-
cused study in which she looks at a more specific issue relating to
Muslim minorities in the USA and UK, namely violence against
women. Distinguished from other forms of violence by the domes-
tic or private context in which it takes place as well as by its perpe-
trators and victims, violence against women comes under the pur-
view of “the laws and legal administration of family relations.” Alt-
hough gender-based violence is a global phenomenon, it should be
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of special concern for Muslims since, as the author argues, “Islam
abhors violence, and women are to be regarded as amÉnah under
men’s responsibility.” Leaning on instructive survey and analysis of
a large body of literature and ample statistical data concerning ethnic
minority groups of Asian, African and Middle Eastern roots, it has
been an important task of Kamaruddin to locate violence against
women within Muslim communities in the wider context of this
phenomenon as it has been experienced in those two countries, es-
pecially among minority groups. One important aspect of the use-
fulness of the comparative perspective she adopted is that it has en-
abled her to assess to what extent Islam has affected the issue at
hand in contrast with non-Muslim minority communities.
However, due to the paucity of systematically collected infor-
mation on Muslim minority families in the USA and UK that can
provide precise statistical evidence on the causes of domestic vio-
lence, the writer has seen the almost similar backgrounds of the
Muslim communities in these two countries as acceptable justifica-
tion for combining the causes of domestic violence amongst them.
In her view, there “are many factors responsible for domestic vio-
lence among Muslim minorities, although they are not diametrically
different in that from the larger society.” As research works have
demonstrated, “Muslim families also experience social and personal
problems like the rest of the American society,” including “increase
in divorce rates, separation, domestic violence, child abuse, elder
abuse, intergenerational conflict, and teenage pregnancies.” As far as
violence against women is concerned, not less than 75% of Muslim
minority women, who are mostly Afro-American converts, suffer
from violence at the hands of their Muslim spouses. In the UK,
where Muslims constitute 3.3% of the total population, apart from
socio-economic problems facing the Muslim community in general,
such as low education, unemployment, poor working conditions and
overcrowded households, Muslim women particularly are victims of
forced marriage, ‘honour killing’ and domestic violence, especial-
ly within Muslim communities of Asian origins.
In Kamaruddin’s opinion, the causes of domestic violence
against women in Muslim minority communities in the USA and
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UK are traceable to external and internal cultural roots. On the first
level, Muslims have not been immune to the general cultural atmos-
phere of their societies. As noticed by social scientists, “the Ameri-
can society is becoming increasingly violent, aggressive, self-
destructive, narcissistic and uncaring towards those who are less for-
tunate, including members of the immediate family.” In the UK, it
has been found from some surveys that “one in five young men and
one in ten young women thought violence against women was ac-
ceptable. One of four young men thought it acceptable to hit a
woman if she had ‘slept with someone else’; one of five young men
considered it acceptable to force a woman to have sex if she was
one’s wife.” In a survey of 1,300 schoolchildren it was found “that
one in three boys thought violence against women was acceptable.”
These are some of the indicators of growing socio-cultural trends in
the wider context that are affecting women in particular.
On the second, that is, specific internal, level of Muslim com-
munities, cultural distortions of religious texts have led to using
them as a ground “to suppress and oppress women.” Debates in
Muslim religious centres across America and England continue as
to “the justification for a husband to hit his wife.” Although do-
mestic violence is “generally condemned,” women experiencing
“violence in their lives are told to be patient and to give in,” be-
cause of the misinterpretation and confusion in the understanding
of certain Qur’anic statements. The impact of this religious factor
is further augmented by ethnic and racial considerations that still
hold sway on many Muslims.
Despite this gloomy picture, Islamic organizations and religious
and cultural centres have been carrying out “impressive activities” to
educate, counsel, assist and guide large numbers of Muslim families
and individuals to overcome the endemic problem of domestic vio-
lence. In the face of extremely individualistic values promoting mere
egoistic concerns, many Muslims are discovering in the teachings of
Islam the significance of “meaning in group success, community
development, interdependence, and consensus.” For African Amer-
ican Muslim women who are largely converts to Islam, “the signifi-
cance of the ummah” has been edifying and they found in Islam a
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“‘safe social space’” from the racial, gender, and religious inequali-
ties they experienced in the larger culture.”
Having provided this overview of the contents of the present
volume, a few words need to be said on three counts. Firstly, this
volume and the 2009 conference from which it ensued are the out-
come of a fruitful cooperation between the Makkah-based Muslim
World League (Rabitah) and the International Islamic University
Malaysia (represented by International Institute of Islamic and
Civilization and the Department of Fiqh and Usul al-Fiqh). The
League’s moral and financial support and the personal interest of
its Secretary General Prof. Dr. Abdullah bin Abdul Mohsin al-
Turki in the theme of the conference were indeed very crucial to
the success of the conference and its fruition as exemplified in the
contents of the present work.
Secondly, notwithstanding my limited acquaintance with the
growing body of literature addressing various aspects of the minor-
ities question, the present volume will easily secure its prominent
place in a worldwide discourse on minorities which I claim is de-
veloping, especially among Muslim and non-Muslim intellectual
circles engaged in religious and civilizational dialogue. Two reasons
support this aspiration. On the one hand, the positions and out-
looks expressed in the book’s different chapters reflect to a great
extent the large spectrum of views and approaches that character-
ize the emerging new Islamic discourse on minorities. On the oth-
er hand, a distinctive feature of this book is its combining of theo-
retical, methodological and practical concerns with a high level of
grounded and balanced rationality, away from any tendency to sen-
timentalize or oversimplify the issues discussed.
Thirdly, getting the volume to where it now is has indeed been
taxing. The selection of the papers making up its chapters was not
in any way easy. It required careful reading and re-reading of all the
2009 conference proceedings to ensure that the set of criteria men-
tioned earlier are fully or at least reasonably met in deciding which
should be in and which would be out. Once the selection had been
made, then came the tedious task and process of streamlining the
selected papers and setting them in a logical arrangement manifest-
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ing their overall thematic unity based on serious inter-textual exam-
ination of their interrelatedness in terms of generality and specifici-
ty, theoretical and methodological orientation, etc. Likewise, the
thirteen chapters have been arranged in such a way that all of
them as whole as well as within each section (English and Arabic)
would constitute an integrated entity whose units complement
one another both methodologically and content-wise. All chap-
ters were then subjected to comprehensive and exacting editing
to ensure coherence of style, consistency of language, and
smooth flow of ideas.
Finally, I must thank all the authors of the chapters of the
book for their kind cooperation and understanding. Their seri-
ousness in revising their contributions according to the remarks
provided to them made my work much easier. I should also ex-
press my gratitude to the successive deans of ISTAC (Ibrahim M.
Zain, Hassan Ahmed Ibrahim and Mahmud Zuhdi Abdul Majid)
for entrusting me with the task of looking into the proceedings of
the 2009 conference and preparing this volume for publication.
Special thanks are equally due to the Research Management Cen-
tre at IIUM for the research grant that enabled me to work on the
project. The assistance of my at-Tajdid assistant and doctoral su-
pervisee Dr. Muntaha Artalim Zaim has been very instrumental
in enabling me to cope with the technical requirements of this
work, right from typing and computing up to index generating
and assorting. Any shortcomings, however, remain solely mine.
May Almighty God, our ultimate Sustainer and Guardian,
shower His blessings on us and guide our steps on the path of
truth and justice in both thought and action.

CHAPTER 1
The Metaphysical and Ethical
Foundations of Religious Pluralism in Islam*
Muddathir ÑAbd al-Rahim
Introduction
One of the most striking features of Muslim societies and states
down the ages – one which until recent times continued to be
distinctive of Islamic civilization and, as such, aroused the won-
der and admiration of such early modern Western thinkers as
John Locke – is that they were almost always multi-religious and
multi-ethnic. For, as the distinguished German Orientalist Adam
Mez noted many years ago, within the borders of Muslim socie-
ties unlike Christian Europe there lived a large number of peoples
of faiths other than Islam and that all these peoples, in Mez’s
words, lived “side by side in an atmosphere absolutely unknown
to medieval Europe.”1
* This chapter is based on material briefly considered in different parts of the author’s
book, The Human Rights Tradition in Islam, which constitutes volume 3 of the five
volume series Human Rights and the World’s Major Religions, edited by Prof. William H.
Brackney, published by Praeger, in the US and the UK, 2005. An insightful and critical
review of the book was published by Dr. Murad Hofmann in The Muslim World Book
Review, 28/3/2008.
1 Adam Mez, The Renaissance of Islam (London: Luzac & Co, 1937), p. 32. For a review of
the situation in Europe see the present author’s articles: “Muslim Minorities in Western
Societies – The Medieval Scene,” Al-Shajarah, Vol. 8, No. 1, 2003 and “Muslim
Minorities in Western Societies; Under Tsars and Commissars,” Al-Shajarah, Vol 9,
No. 2, 2004.
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Particularly intriguing for many was the question as to how a
state or civilization which was based on a particular religion (in
this case, Islam) – instead of doing its utmost in order to coerce
others into conforming to the dominant faith, as had often been
done, and continues to be done, elsewhere – evidently went out
of its way to guarantee those others extensive rights which made
it possible for them not only to live, work and own property but
also to freely exercise their religious faith under the protection of
the ruling state and its laws. In order to effectively approach this
question it is suggested here that we need to look, first of all, at
the roots of pluralism (here used as a synonym of diversity) in Is-
lam’s worldview and theological perspective and, secondly, at the
specific teachings of the SharÊÑah about the rights of non-Muslims in
Muslim societies. The principal features of the actual life experience of
non-Muslim minorities in history are then briefly reviewed.
To take the first point first, we need to consider in particular
the sharply contrasting positions in Islamic theology and
worldview of the oneness and uniqueness of God on the one
hand, and the diversity of His creations – animate and inanimate,
human and non-human – on the other. With regard to the oneness
and uniqueness of God the Qur’an states categorically and unequiv-
ocally (and humans, individually and collectively, are called upon to
testify) as follows:
Say: He is the One God, God the Eternal, the Uncaused Cause of all
that exists. He begets not, and neither is He begotten; and there is noth-
ing that could be compared to Him. (Qur’an, 112:1-5)
And again:
The Originator [He is] of the heavens and the earth. He has given you
mates of your own kind – just as [He has willed that] among the beasts
[there be] mates – to multiply you thereby: but there is nothing like unto
Him, and He alone is All-hearing, All-seeing. (Qur’an, 42:11)
It is thus repeatedly and categorically stated that God is One,
Unique, Eternal, Absolute, Creator of heavens and the earth and of
all that is in existence, All-hearing, All-seeing.
To those who claim that they do believe in Him, but persist in
believing also that there are other gods or deities besides Him, the
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Qur’an addresses a variety of uncontestable logical arguments as
well as some serious warnings and admonitions:
… [H]ad there been in heaven or on earth any deities other than God,
both [those realms] would surely have fallen into ruin. (Qur’an,
21:22)
Verily, God does not forgive the ascribing of divinity to aught beside
Him, although He forgives any lesser sin unto whomever He wills: for
he who ascribes divinity to aught beside God has indeed contrived an
awesome sin. (Qur’an, 4:48)
By contrast with the categorical and uncompromising asser-
tion, again and again, of the Creator’s Oneness, Omnipotence
and Uniqueness, His creatures – be they animate or inanimate,
humans or animals – are seen and described in the Qur’an as be-
ing always numerous, diverse and varied:
Art Thou not aware that God sends down water from the skies,
whereby We bring forth fruits of many hues – just as in the moun-
tains there are streaks of white and red of various shades, as well as
[others] raven-black, and [as] there are in men, and crawling beasts,
and in cattle, too, many hues? Of all His servants, only such as are
endowed with [innate] knowledge stand [truly] in awe of God: [for
they alone comprehend that,] verily, God is almighty, much-forgiving.
(Qur’an, 35:27-28)
And among His wonders is the creation of the heavens and the earth,
and the diversity in your tongues and your colours: for in this, behold,
there are messages for all who are possessed of [innate] knowledge.
(Qur’an, 30:22)
But the diversity and variations which God has vested in his
terrestrial creatures as signs of Himself along with the creation of
the heavens and the earth are not limited to mountains, animals,
plants and the variation in the colours and languages of men.
Even more significantly and directly in relation to the subject un-
der consideration is the fact that God tells us in several passages
in the Qur’an that the said diversity and variation applies also to
matters of faith and belief:
He It is who has created you: and among you are such as deny this
truth, and among you are such as believe [in it]. And God sees all
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that you do. (Qur’an, 64:2)
And again, and perhaps even more clearly and more emphat-
ically:
Unto every one of you have We appointed a [different] law and way of
life. And if God had so willed, He could surely have made you all one
single community: but [He willed it otherwise] in order to test you by
means of what He has vouchsafed unto you. Vie, then, with one anoth-
er in doing good works! Unto God you all must return; and then He
will make you truly understand all that on which you were wont to dif-
fer. (Qur’an, 5:48)
Whereas the oneness, uniqueness and inimitability are dis-
tinctive attributes of God the Creator, variety, multiplicity and
plurality are attendant characteristics of all created beings – ani-
mate and inanimate, human and non-human.
In so far as human beings are concerned, the variety and plurali-
ty that has been vested in them by their Creator is not limited to
such matters as language, pigmentation and ethnicity only. It is also
and more importantly manifested – by the will of the Creator Him-
self – in matters of faith and belief: up to, and including, disbelief.
It is in this profoundly and divinely ordained pluralistic
worldview that non-Muslims in Muslim societies and states were
granted and guaranteed such rights and privileges that they were, as
a rule, able not only to exist and survive, but also to prosper and
participate in the economic, social, cultural and even political and
diplomatic life of the Islamic states and societies in which they
lived. And it is to these rights and rules that we now turn.
Of cardinal importance for the treatment of non-Muslims
among the basic values and principles enshrined in the Qur’an is
the ruling evidently unparalleled in the scripture of any other reli-
gion that: “There shall be no coercion in matters of faith.”
(Qur’an, 2:256) This categorical statement forbids Muslims, be
they individuals, groups or states, from trying to impose their
faith on any person by force. Compulsion therefore is not only a
sin; it is also a crime punishable by the SharÊÑah law, the punish-
ment under the Ottoman Empire, being death- an injunction de-
rived from the Qur’anic precept that “oppression is even worse
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than killing.” (Qur’an, 2:190)
Other Qur’anic directives buttress and elaborate on the princi-
ple of inadmissibility of compulsion in matters of faith indicating
that the call to Islam must be directed to the intelligence, conscience
and sensibilities of men and women; that respect for the dignity and
integrity of all human beings – of whatever faith or race they may be
– is essential; and that compassion and courtesy should be observed
in all circumstances.
This brings us to another basic principle relating to the treat-
ment of minorities and non-Muslims in Islam. It is stated in Chapter
60 of the Qur’an:
God forbids you not with regard to those who fight you not for [your]
faith or drive you out of your homes from dealing kindly and justly with
them; for, God loveth those who are just. (Qur’an 60:8)
In other words, Muslims are not only to refrain from oppress-
ing others or forcing them to embrace a faith which they may not
freely wish to accept (an essentially negative ruling, though a very
important one indeed). Muslims are expected and called upon to
be positively kind and just to all those non-Muslims who do not
persecute them or commit acts of aggression against them, all
those who are peaceful and law abiding citizens.
The Status of non-Muslims in the Islamic Historical Expe-
rience
The founder and head of the first Islamic state, Prophet Mu-
hammad (peace be upon him), confirmed and elaborated on the
Qur’anically prescribed manner of just and kindly dealing with
non-Muslims not only verbally and in words, but also through his
actions and practice: and this in both his personal life and in his
management of public affairs. Thus, he unhesitatingly engaged in
business transactions with non-Muslims. Indeed, he parted this
world leaving his armor pawned to a Jew. More intimately, he
took two wives, of whom one was of Jewish, the other of Chris-
tian (Coptic) backgrounds.
Politically, furthermore, he endeavored, not without success,
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to establish what came to be the first characteristically multi-
ethnic and multi-religious Islamic state. Thus not only were the
AnÎÉr and the MuhÉjirËn welded, in the Charter of MadÊnah, into
“an ummah distinct from all other people in the world”, but the
Jewish clans who had then allied themselves with the Prophet
were described in the Charter of MadÊnah as “an ummah (i.e.
community) along with the Believers,”1 while each, of course,
continued to practise its own faith and culture.
Relations with non-Muslims beyond the realm of Islam too,
the Qur’an directs, should be peaceful and amicable unless ag-
gression is committed against Muslims:
And fight in God’s cause against those who wage war against you,
but do not commit aggression. (Qur’an, 2:190)
Even when thus fighting in self-defence furthermore, Mus-
lims are instructed to observe certain rules and rights of enemy
subjects and not to engage in indiscriminate destruction of life
and property. “Whenever the apostle of God sent forth an army
or a detachment,” it has been reported, “he charged its com-
mander personally to fear God, the Most High, and he enjoined
the Muslims who were with him to do good [i.e., to conduct
themselves properly]….. Do not cheat or commit treachery nor
should you mutilate anyone or kill children.”2
Following the Prophet’s example, AbË Bakr later instructed
fighters who were about to proceed against the Byzantines in Syr-
ia: “Do not commit treachery, nor depart from the right path.
You must not mutilate, neither kill a child or aged man or wom-
an. Do not destroy a palm-tree, nor burn it with fire, and do not
cut any fruitful tree. You must not slay any of the flock or the
herds or the camels, save for your subsistence. You are likely to
pass by people who have devoted their lives to monastic services;
1 Muhamad Hamidullah, MajmËÑat al-WathÉ’iq al-SiyÉsiyyah li’l-ÑAhd al-NabawÊ wa’l-
KhilÉfah al-RÉshidah (Beirut: DÉr an-NafÉes, 7th ed., 1422/2001), pp. 59-62.
2 Cited by al-Shaybani at the beginning of his classic KitÉb al-Siyar translated by Majid
Khadduri with the title: The Islamic Law of Nations: ShaybÉnÊ’s Siyar (Baltimore: John
Hopkins University Press, 1966), pp. 75-76.
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leave them to that which they have devoted their lives.”1
Another important directive is enshrined in the Qur’an. It
goes as follows:
And if any of these who ascribe divinity to aught beside God
[mushrikËn] seeks thy protection, grant him protection, so that he
might [be able to] hear the word of God [from thee]; and thereupon
convey him to a place where he can feel secure. (Qur’an, 9:6)
In his classic commentary on the Qur’an, Fakhr al-DÊn al-
RÉzÊ says that the essential meaning of the said passage is that any
one from among the enemy forces who seeks protection should,
together with his property, be fully and effectively protected by
Muslims and must thereafter be conducted to a place where he
would feel safe and secure.2
Likewise, prisoners of war are not to be killed, tortured or
humiliated. On the contrary, they should be well treated and safe-
ly kept until a final settlement of conflict is reached. In that re-
gard, the Qur’an, having commanded Muslims faced by injustice
and aggression to stand up and fight as best as they can, then says:
“But if they [the enemies who fight you] incline to  peace, incline
thou to it as well and place thy trust in God: verily, He alone is all-
hearing. And should they seek but to deceive thee [by their show
of peace] – behold, God is enough for thee!” (Qur’an, 8:61). Thus
Muslims are commanded, once their enemies indicate a desire to
make peace, to unhesitatingly also go for peace – even if they
thereby happened to run the risk of being tricked by their enemies.
In the light of what has already been said regarding the atti-
tudes of the Qur’an and the Prophet towards other faiths and
peoples, in conditions of both war and peace, it should not be
surprising that the predominantly Christian peoples of Egypt and
1 Ibn ÑAbd Rabbih, al-ÑIqd al-FarÊd (Beirut: DÉr al-KitÉb al-ÑArabÊ, 1983), Vol. 4, p. 247.
2 Fakhr al-DÊn MuÍammad ibn ÑUmar al-RÉzÊ, TafsÊr al-Fakhr al-RÉzÊ, known as al-TafsÊr
al-KabÊr and MafÉtÊÍ al-Ghayb (Beirut: DÉr al-Fikr, 1401/1981), Vol. 15, p. 235. See also,
Muddathir ÑAbd al-Rahim, “Asylum: A Moral and Legal Right in Islam,” Refugee Survey
Quarterly, Vol. 27, No. 2 (2008), pp. 15-23; also: Islam and International Relations: Peace,
Conflict and Diplomacy published in A-R Baginda (ed.) “Malaysia and the Islamic World,”
(London: ASEAN Academic Press, 2004), pp. 1-16.
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Syria, who were followers of Eastern churches and, as such, had
been subjected to discrimination and persecution by their Ortho-
dox Byzantine rulers, welcomed the conquering Muslim Arabs as
liberators from their oppressive co-religionists. The people of
Iraq, who had been similarly oppressed by dominant Zoroastri-
ans, reacted to the Muslim Arab conquest in a way not unlike that
of the Syrians and the Egyptians. Even as far away as the Iberian
Peninsula, the theologically sanctioned policies of repression and
forced conversion which were followed by the Roman Catholics
of Spain induced the Jews to welcome and aid the Muslim con-
querors as liberators.1
Two more points are worth noting at this juncture. First
amongst these is that the term ‘tolerance’ which is often used
with reference to the normally accommodating attitude of Mus-
lims towards others does not accurately reflect the nature of the
Muslim attitude in question. This was not only because ‘toler-
ance’ often implies a grudging or reluctant willingness to ‘put-up’
or coexist with others – which is quite different from the attitude
with which we are now concerned, but also because it misses the
reality that the Muslim commitment to respect and protect the
rights of non-Muslims who are willing to live in peace with them
is, in essence, an act of worship and religious devotion. Failing to
uphold the said rights is a sin as well as a crime punishable in law.
Upholding and protecting them, on the other hand, is an act of
piety and religious devotion through which Muslims, individually
and collectively, hope to merit divine approval and heavenly re-
ward. This is the psychological bedrock upon which the whole
system is so firmly anchored – a crucially important point that has
eluded many commentators including some who have expressed
great admiration for its actual working and practical results.2
Under Islamic law, non-Muslim residents, were traditionally
1 Norman A. Stillman, The Jews of Arab Lands: A History and Source Book (Philadelphia:
The Jewish Publication Society, 1979), p. 54.
2 For more elaboration on this point, see Muhammad al-Tahir Ibn Ashur, UÎËl al-
NiÐÉm al-IjtimÉÑÊ fÊ al-IslÉm, ed. Mohamed El-Tahir El-Mesawi (AmmÉn: DÉr al-Nafaes,
2001), pp. 353-362.
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described as dhimmÊs or ahl al-dhimmah, literally ‘people of the pact
or agreement’ in reference, that is, to the perpetual pact or
agreement in accordance with which Muslims, individually and
collectively, have undertaken since the days of the Prophet to re-
spect and protect the rights of non-Muslims to life, property, reli-
gious belief and practice, movement, marriage and the right to
bring up their children according to their respective faiths.
In addition, the dhimmÊs enjoyed a substantial degree of auton-
omy or self-government which enabled members of each religious
community [better known under the Ottomans as Millets] to man-
age their own affairs and to settle their internal disputes in accord-
ance with the rules and traditions of their respective faiths. If they
were dissatisfied with their own communal justice, they had the
right to seek justice and settlement of disputes in Islamic courts –
but that was an option which, it was always clearly understood,
they could take or leave as they saw fit.
Commenting on the latitudinous extent of the degree of self-
government that Jews and Christians in particular enjoyed under
the banner of Islam, the late Princeton University professor S. D.
Goitein began and concluded the second volume of his magiste-
rial study of the Jewish communities of the Arab world as por-
trayed in the Cairo Geniza by highlighting the fact that the said
Christian and Jewish communities living under Islam during the
High Middle Ages actually “formed a state not only within a state
but beyond the state, because they owed loyalty to the heads and
to the central bodies of their respective denominations, even
though these were found in a foreign, or even hostile country …
while [they] shared with their Muslim compatriots their language,
economy and most of their social notions and habits, their com-
munal life was left mainly to their own initiative.”1
It was in the light of such considerations that, some two cen-
turies earlier, the renowned English philosopher and political
theorist John Locke, one of the chief architects of modern West-
1 S.D. Goitein, A Mediterranean Society (California: California University Press, 1971),
Vol. 2: The Community, p. 1 & 407.
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ern liberal thought, urged his compatriots and coreligionists to
emulate the way Muslims tolerated Christians and Jews and made
it possible for their various denominations to worship freely as
they saw fit.1 Pointing out the absurdity of the fact that Calvinists
and Armenians, for example, could thus freely practise their reli-
gions in Constantinople but not in Christian Europe, Locke then
warned in his classic Letter Concerning Toleration (1689) that “the
Turks [would] meanwhile silently stand by and laugh to see with
what inhuman cruelty Christians thus rage against Christians.”2
More recently, and from a wider comparative perspective,
the Special Rapporteur of the UN’s Commission on Prevention
of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, succinctly stated
that, while in Western societies the protection of minorities with-
in the framework of municipal law “was achieved gradually and
fairly slowly from the eighteenth century onwards […] in The
Muslim countries the various Christian churches and Jewish
communities already enjoyed very considerable tolerance under
the Caliphs. Later, the Muslim states adopted the ‘millet’ system
which granted to non-Muslim religious communities complete
independence in the management of their affairs.”3
Conclusion
To be sure, the said system did not always run smoothly and sec-
tarian conflicts did occur sometimes.4 But these were essentially
aberrations in a situation where minorities5 - whose protection, in
1 Nabil Matar, “John Locke and the ‘Turbaned Nations’,” Journal of Islamic Studies, Vol.
2, No. 1 (1991), p. 72.
2 John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration, edited and with introduction by Patrick
Remanell (New York: Bob Merill, 1955), p. 25, cited in Ibid. See also The Works of John
Locke – A New Edition (Aalen, Germany: Scientia Verlorg, 1963), Vol. 6, p. 18.
3 Frencesco Capotori (Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities), Study On The Rights of Persons Belonging to Ethnic,
Religious and Linguistic Minorities, UN, Doc E/CN.4/Sub 2 384/Rev 1, New York, 1979.
4 Cf. Muddathir ÑAbd al-Rahim, The Human Rights Tradition in Islam (op. cit), Chap. 3,
“The Interplay of Theory and Practice – Questions of Gender and Minorities.”
5 It should be remembered that, historically speaking, minorities in Muslim societies
comprised Hindus, Janes and others as well as Christians and Jews of various
denominations.
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accordance with Islam’s worldview clearly and coherently reflect-
ed in the ethical and juridical injunctions of the SharÊÑah, was a
fundamental spiritual and ethical obligation of individual Muslims
as well as Muslim societies and states – were able, not only to
survive through even the hardest times until the present day, but
also to participate and prosper, sometimes in remarkably promi-
nent fashion, in the economic, social, cultural and even political
life of the larger Muslim community.1
1 For the life experience of minorities in Muslim Societies see chapter 3 of the
aforementioned book, The Human Rights Tradition in Islam.






There are many principles upon which pluralism in Islam is
based. Three of them can be considered to be major ones, namely
human dignity, diversity in unity among peoples, and difference
of opinion. Human dignity is grounded in Divine will and decree.
Thus the Qur’an (17: 70) says: “Verily we have honored the children of
Adam.” The honor bestowed by God on mankind, male and female,
is to be understood in an absolute sense.
The human being is divinely honoured whether he – or she – is
a believer or a disbeliever in God, and whether he – or she – sub-
mits to God or renounces Him. Thus, honour is not restricted to
one group of people to the exclusion of others. Human dignity,
which is derived from God’s will and benevolence, embraces all
peoples regardless of race, color, language or even faith and belief.
God is not the Lord of the Jews alone, or the Christians alone, or
the Muslims alone, or any other religious denomination. God is the
Lord of all worlds, the Creator of all peoples.
Mankind: Unity in Diversity
Human beings emanate from one common and single source,
being created by God “out of one living entity.” (Qur’an, 4: 1)
Thus they belong “to one human family, without any inherent
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superiority of one over another.”1 To this effect, the Prophet of
Islam is reported to have said in his sermon of the Farewell Pil-
grimage (Íajjat al-wadÉÑ), “O people, verily, your Lord is one and
your father Adam is one; there is no merit for an Arab over a
non-Arab nor for a non-Arab over an Arab, neither for a white
person over a black person nor for a black person over a red per-
son, except by God-consciousness (taqwÉ).”2
However, the common origin and essential unity of mankind
do not imply total sameness and absolute conformity among its
components, be they individuals or groups. The Qur’an rather as-
serts the opposite to be true. It has been God’s will to make human
beings “into nations and tribes” (Qur’an, 49: 13). It is further stated
that if God had so willed, “He could surely have made all mankind
one single community.” (Qur’an, 11: 118) Again the Qur’an (10: 19)
says: “And [know that] all mankind were but one single community,
and only later did they begin to hold divergent views.”
This entails that diversity among human beings with regard to
their “tongues and colours is” considered among God’s “wonders
in the creation,” next to the wonders of the heavens and the earth
(Qur’an, 30: 22). Behind mankind’s plurality in the form of nations
and tribes and diversity in terms of races, ethnicities, tongues and
beliefs, lies one of God’s great wise purposes in the creation of hu-
man beings clearly spelled out in the Qur’an (49: 13), “so that you
[human beings] might come to know one another.” As Muhammad
Asad rightly put it, “men’s evolution into nations and tribes is meant
to foster, rather than to diminish, their mutual desire to understand
and appreciate the essential human oneness underlying their out-
ward differentiations.”3
The Qur’an’s frequent mentioning of diversity and plurality
amongst mankind is meant to teach people to take it as a fact of
1 Muhammad Asad, The Message of the Qur’an (Kuala Lumpur: Islamic Book Trust,
2011), p. 951, note 16.
2Shuayb al-Arna’ut (chief-editor), Musnad al-ImÉm AÍmad ibn ×anbal (Beirut:
Mu’assassat al-RisÉlah, 2001), ÍadÊth No. 23489, vol. 38, p. 474; AbË Bakr AÍmad ibn
al-×ussain al-BayhaqÊ, al-JÉmi fÊ ShuÑab al-ÔmÉn (Riyadh: Maktabat al-Rushd, 2003),
ÍadÊth No. 4774, Vol. 7, p. 132.
3 Asad, The Message of the Qur’an, p. 951, note 16.
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life and natural phenomenon so as to be tuned to realize what it
entails in terms of difference and variation in thinking, beliefs,
values, conduct and lifestyles. Hence, as the Qur’an has clearly
indicated on different occasions, the only way to deal with these
differences and see through them and appreciate the essential
unity and commonness of humanity is through nurturing the de-
sire and predisposition for dialogue, rational argument and mutu-
al understanding (Qur’an, 3: 64; 16: 125; 29: 56).
Accordingly, ethnic differences do not constitute the basis
for either priority or inferiority. It is a difference in the totality of
human nature. One should respect the other as he is and as a dif-
ferent creation of God.
Sensibility towards others’ ethnicities and cultures is an es-
sential value and principle governing Muslim religious behav-
iour. Respect of others’ religions and beliefs is respect of free-
dom of choice, and of the principle of non-coercion in matters
of religion clearly enunciated in the Qur’an (2: 256) which also
states that “For every community faces a direction of its own, of which He
[God] is the focal point.” (Qur’an, 2: 148) In fact, though the
Qur’anic message is the last Divine revelation to mankind thus
representing “the culminating point of all revelation” and offer-
ing “the final, perfect way to spirirual fulfillment,” this does not,
however, “preclude all adherents of earlier faiths from attaining
to God’s grace.”1 Thus the Qur’an (5: 48) announces that:
Unto every of you We appointed a [different] law and way of life. And
if God had so willed, He could surely have made you all one single
community, but (His willed it otherwise) in order to test you by means
of what He has vouchsafed unto you. Vie, then, with one another in
doing good works!’
Thus, as mentioned above, Islam considers differences in
opinion and belief as a human and natural reality, and it treats it
as such. During the Prophet’s era in MadÊnah , cooperation was
established between Muslims and believers and adherents of oth-
er revealed religions (People of the Book), and they formed one na-
1 Asad, The Message of the Qur’an, p. 148.
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tion. The document of the Prophet acknowledged the belief of
the others and warranted their protection. The Madinan society
was based on the principle of embracing all diversities, not ignor-
ing it or trying to eliminate it. The Prophet conversed with the
Christian tribe of Najran in his home at MadÊnah and welcomed
them. And when the time came for them to perform their prayer,
the Prophet welcomed that and took no offense, according to an
authoritative tradition, to perform their prayer inside his home
which is now the great mosque of MadÊnah.1 Faith and belief in
Islam depend on internal conviction and acceptance and compli-
ance not on external compulsion. The Qur’an (2: 256) says,
“There shall be no coercion in matters of faith.” Hence, God ad-
dresses the Prophet saying, “Dost thou, then, think that thou
couldst compel people to believe?” (Qur’an, 10: 99)
Faith can never be whole and sincere if it is forced upon
men. Based on this founding principle, acceptance of freedom of
belief in the first state in Islam, we understand that Islam is not
narrowed by the different religious beliefs, nor does it believe in
ethnic purity. Moreover, the need for humanity to be one and
united is duly emphasized in the Qur’an which is explicit about
the fact that the existing differences (in whatever form they may
manifest themselves) will never negate or undermine the fact that
we are one family belonging to the one and only Creator. It also
affirms that our unity is based on our differences and not on our
similarities, because human differences reveal God’s wisdom and
testify to His greatness.
This unity is based on our differences and not on our con-
formities and sameness; human differences reveal and bear wit-
ness to the greatness of the Creator at the same time. This means
that accepting and respecting plurality as God created us, is in
itself an expression of believing in God.
The Islamic rule enunciated in the Prophet’s statement quot-
ed above means that ethnic differences do not form a base of
1 Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah, ÚÉd al-MaÑÉd fÊ Hady Khayr al-ÑIbÉd, ed. ShuÑayb al-ArnaÒËt
and Abdul QÉdir al-ArnaÒËt (Beirut: Muassasat al-RisÉlah, 1418/1998), vol. 3, pp. 549-
550 & 558.
Sammak: ISLAM AND MINORITIES: LEBANESE EXPERIENCE 17
preference or non-preference. It rather means that these differ-
ences are part of the nature of human unity, a fact that imposes
the doctrine of respecting the other as he is, as God created him,
and as he chooses to be.
If respecting others as they are in culture and ethnicity is
considered a pillar of Islamic doctrine and, consequently, a fun-
damental principle of Islamic behaviour and conduct governing
Muslims’ relations and dealings with them. Respecting their be-
liefs and religious doctrines is in a way respect to the principle of
freedom that God bestowed on all humans and is respect to the
principle of “no coercion”. The Qur’an (2: 148; see also the pre-
ceding verse No. 145) says:
[E]very vommunity faces a direction of its own of which He [God] is
the focal point. Vie, therefore, with one another in doing good works.
This means that human differences in ethnicities and in lan-
guages and cultures are a manifestation of God’s will and scheme
of creation . It was within the nature of God’s mercy that the
Lord afforded mankind with different divine laws and out ways.
In this the Qur’an (5: 48) says:
Unto every one of you have We appointed a [different] law and way of
life. And if God had so willed, He could surely have made you all one
single community: but [He willed it otherwise] in order to test you by
means of what He has vouchsafed unto you. Vie, then, with one anoth-
er in doing good works! Unto God you all must return; and then He
will make you truly understand all that on which you were wont to dif-
fer. (Qur’an, 5:48)
And again it states (3: 55),
In the end, unto Me you all must return, and I shall judge between
you with regard to all on which you were wont to differ.
The unity of race, colour or language is not an inevitable ne-
cessity without which mutual understanding cannot be achieved. It
is therefore necessary in order to establish relations built on the
basis of love and respect to engage in dialogue based on the
acknowledgement and realization of these differences which are part
and parcel of God’s cosmic scheme of creation, and which Freud
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called “the narcissism of differences,” no matter how small they
are, as they are one aspect of the core of our personality.
Here, it is worth mentioning that the Qur’an calls for hold-
ing fast to God’s bond and not falling apart when it says (3: 103),
“And hold fast, all together, unto the bond of God, and do not
fall apart from one another.” It did not say “do not differ”, be-
cause holding fast to God’s bond can be achieved with differing
but not with falling apart because falling apart is one thing and
differing is something else.
In a multi-etnic, multi-religious, and multi-sectarian world,
continuous open and enlightened dialogue becomes a pillar of
human understanding and mutual respect and co-operation be-
tween peoples and nations. For dialogue cannot be except with
the other who differs; otherwise it will become a monologue, i.e.
a dialogue with oneself. The other can only be different, or else
there is no need for him or for dialogue. Therefore, the first con-
dition for dialogue is accepting both facts of life: plurality and
difference. This acceptance is one of the characteristics of Islamic
jurisprudence.1
The Need for New Islamic Jurisprudence
According to official statistics:
1. About 1/3 of Muslims live in non Islamic countries, or
among a majority of non-Muslims (USA, India, EU, China, etc.).
2. In 1900, the beginning of what American Protestants
described “The Christian Century”, 80% of Christians were either
Europeans or North Americans. Today 60 percent are citizens of
the two-thirds of the world - Africa, Asia and Latin America. The
center of Christianity has thus shifted southward.
As a result, for the first time in its history, Christianity has
become a religion mainly of the poor, the marginalized, the
powerless and – in parts of Asia and the Middle East – the
1 For more elaboration on the issues discussed above, see Mohammad al-Sammak,
MaqÉlÉt fÊ al-×iwÉr al-IslÉmÊ al-MasÊÍÊ (Jounieh/Lebanon: al-Maktabah al-Paulsiyyah,
2007), pp. 23-75.
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oppressed. Its face has also changed. Christianity is no longer a
white man’s religion. For most Asians, however, what makes Jesus
attractive is his identification with the poor and the suffering.
If any continent holds the future of Christianity, many
Christian missionary experts believe, it is Africa. There they see
history doing a second act: just as Europe’s northern tribes turned
to the church after the decay of the Roman Empire, so Africans
are embracing Christianity in face of the massive political, social
and economic chaos.
As is well known, Islam is already deeply rooted in Asia and
in Africa. And, at the same time Islam is also a new comer to the
West (Europe and USA). This means that we should expect more
religious friction between the two religions unless bridges of
mutual understanding, recognition and respect are erected.
These religio-demographic changes in globalized
communities require an updated Islamic jurisprudence to deal
with the new realities of co-living. To do this we should entertain
the following points:
First, Islamic jurisprudence and its fundamentals focus so far
on two pivots: a) the relationships among Muslims themselves,
and b) the relations of Muslims with non-Muslims in Islamic
states. This means that the compendium of Islamic jurisprudence
puts down the rules of conduct either to a pure Muslim society or
a society with a Muslim majority.
Second, there is a dire need for developing a new jurisprudence
of conduct for the new situation: that is, the existence of Muslim
minorities in non-Islamic societies. Classical jurisprudence does not
contain any sufficient number of precedents that can serve as
founding ground for contemporary new Muslim realities.
Third, Muslim minorities in non-Islamic states and societies are
of two categories: a) formations made up of the indigenous and
native people who converted to Islam, b) formations made up of
immigrants who left their Islamic countries for economic, social,
cultural, or political reasons, and not for religious reasons.
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Fourth, Islamic jurisprudence provides a wealth of
jurisprudential principles and practices on rights and duties of
non-Muslims living as citizens in Muslim countries. On top of
these rights stand the right of religious freedom, both
theoretical and practical, and the right to follow and adjudicate
one’s religious law and regulations on personal matters, such
as marriage, divorce, inheritance, religious holidays, and so
forth.
Non-Muslim citizens can even produce wine for their own
use, though Muslims are prohibited from doing that –
sometimes these principles are violated. However, when non-
Muslims exercise such rights, they are supposed to respect the
feelings and sensitivities of Muslims.
Fifth, there is a great difference between religion as a law and
jurisprudence, on the one hand, and customs and traditions, on
the other. Social customs, for instance, are not part of religion,
and adhering to them is not equivalent to adhering to religion.
Every society has its own customs and traditions about food and
etiquette, and ceremonies of birth and death and sorrow and joy.
Also, different societies love diverse kinds of music, singing,
drawing, literature and other human arts and crafts. Thus, what a
Muslim may appreciate well in Bangladesh may not be
appreciated at all by a Muslim in Malaysia. Or, what a Muslim in
Pakistan loves may be very disliked by a Muslim in Somalia.
Sixth, when Muslims migrate to non-Islamic states such as
Western Europe, Canada, USA, Australia, etc., it is natural that
they find themselves in an alien culture that has its own features,
religions, customs and traditions, and even social priorities.
The lack of that branch of Islamic jurisprudence that
regulates the behaviour of Muslims in non-Muslim societies goes
back to the end of Islam in places like Spain and Sicily. It is
correct to say that the courts of inquisition were persecuting,
oppressing, and sentencing Muslims to death. But it is also true
that after the passage of that period Muslims who stayed there
and lost power did not develop a jurisprudence that reorganized
their relations as minorities living with Christian majorities.
Sammak: ISLAM AND MINORITIES: LEBANESE EXPERIENCE 21
Perhaps the main factor in liquidating the presence of
Muslims in Europe’s Mediterranean shores was the Muslims’
view of the necessity to migrate back to dÉr al-IslÉm (abode of
Islam), in an attempt to emulate the historic deed of the
Prophet’s migration from Makkah to MadÊnah. Again, such a
view spread again when Europeans, French and Italian, invaded
the southern shores of the Mediterranean (Libya, Tunisia, Algeria
and Morocco): Calls for migration to dÉr al-IslÉm spread since
Muslims were not the rulers and were subjected to Western
(Christian) colonialism. Similar calls in India under the British
occupation were spread but were less effective. Fortunately, the
same did not happen in Palestine, or else no Muslims were to be
found in the Holy Land.
Early in the eleventh century, a new transformation of the
world balance of power took place, leading to turning Muslims
from rulers to ruled, and from majorities to minorities in
Southern Europe. Today, the dawn of the twenty-first century is
witnessing a new radical transformation of that equation,
including globalization that interconnects states’ interests and
peoples and subjects all to the same economic, cultural, political
and social influences. The number of Muslims living in Europe is
on the rise, from Scandinavia in the north to Italy, France and
Spain in the South. Also, increasing numbers of Muslims have
migrated to the United States, Canada, Latin America, and
Australia. But differently, the world is witnessing a reverse and
voluntary migration: from dÉr al-IslÉm to the non-Islamic world.
The question now is how Muslims should behave and act
within these new non-Muslim societies which they migrated to.
To answer this question, we must not forget that any Muslim, or
for that matter any individual, who wants to enter a foreign state
usually obtains a visa. So what does that visa mean and
symbolize, and what does it entail? The mere fact that a person
applies for a visa indicates that person’s willingness to respect
and to abide by the laws of that state. The granting of the visa
means that that state trusts the applicant’s commitment to abide
by and respect its laws. Thus, the application for and the granting
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of the visa constitute the agreement of two committed parties to a
solid contract between the applicant and the state. When the
applicant is a Muslim, such a contract becomes a source of diverse
duties that should be upheld and could not be ignored. For no
default on such duties would constitute a breach of a substantive
principle of the Qur’an, that is to fulfill one’s contract and
commitment.
In addition to the individual contract, there is a contract
between the state that the individual is leaving and the state he is
migrating to. The mutual political and diplomatic recognition is a
recognition of state sovereignty and legitimacy of its laws all over
its land and over people residing on it, whether natives or
immigrants. A passport commits the individual to abide by the
mutual contracts between the states and respect its traditions.
The Qur’an asks the Muslims to fulfill their commitments with
all parties, Muslims or non-Muslims, even at times of war. To this
effect, it (8: 72) says,
Those who believe, and have migrated and struggled for God’s sake with
their property and persons, as well as those who have given them asylum
and support, [will find] some of those are friends of one another. You do
not owe any protection to those who believe and have not migrated, until
they become refugees. If they should plead for support however from you
concerning religious matters, you must support them except against any folk
with whom you have made a treaty. God is Observant of anything you do.
This also means that fulfilling a contract between Muslims and
non-Muslims precedes even another commitment that is to fight
with other Muslims who call for support from their fellow Muslims.
The Qur’an also prohibited even killing the hypocrites who claimed
to be Muslims if there was a contract, the Qur’an (4: 89-90) says:
They would love for you to disbelieve just as they disbelieve, so you will
be exactly like them. Do not adopt sponsors from among them until
they migrate along God’s way. If they should ever turn against you,
then seize them and kill them wherever you may find them. Do not
adopt any sponsor nor supporter from among them, except those who
join a folk with whom you have a treaty or who come to you because
their breasts shrink from fighting you or fighting with their own people.
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If God so wished, He would have given them authority over you so that
they would have fought you. Yet if they keep aloof from you and do not
fight you, and they propose peace to you, God does not grant you any
way against them.
Therefore, Muslims’ respect for contracts with non-Islamic
states to which they migrate is a sacred obligation and thus
should not be violated. Islamic jurisprudence has considered such
a contract as the instrument that turns a non-Islamic state into dÉr
al-Ñahd or al-muwÉdaÑah (abode of contract or friendship). All of
this requires that the immigrant respects the security, laws,
beliefs, and customs of such non-Islamic countries.
On one level, such a commitment to a non-Islamic state still
poses for the individual Muslim a clash between his Islamic social
traditions with the new ones, as well as the notions of what is
prohibited in Islam and allowed in non-Islamic states. The
Muslim immigrant should give up some of his socially inherited
customs that are not related to the religious creed and values.
Such an act allows the Muslim to easily adapt to his/her new
environment and to positively contribute to the new society as
well as to bring forth a positive image about himself and other
Muslims.
However, Muslims cannot and should not give up or
compromise any precept of their religious faith and values.
Therefore, if a Muslim migrates to a country where he has to give up
his/her faith, such a migration is legally and religiously forbidden.
Economic success has no value if it means giving up what one
believes in.
For plural societies, either the notion of diversity or the goal
of integration must give way. After all, safety and prosperity is in
the diversity of these societies. The nation state has not led to a
homogeneous culture, and it will not.
After all, cultures, as the anthropologist Ernest Geller has
pointed out, are not our “choice” but our “fate”. Changing
choices might be easy or difficult, but it is always possible. But
changing fate is something else. It is like changing ethnicity which
is beyond normal or surgical capabilities.
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It is obvious from all that preceded that there is an urgent
need to update Islamic jurisprudence to deal with issues of
interest to Muslim immigrants to non-Muslim countries, and to
non-Muslim immigrants to Muslim countries, so that wisdom and
dialogue, as Islam commands, prevail.
Therefore, the agreement of Muslim scholars over what is
called the jurisprudence of “balances” and jurisprudence of “reality”
is of utmost importance. The jurisprudence of balances creates
equilibrium among multiple interests or prioritizes them. The
jurisprudence of reality sets out to profoundly analyze and
comprehend all aspects of factual realities as manifested in the
external world. An example of the jurisprudence of balances could
be what happened during the peace treaty of ×udaybiyah. The
Prophet gave priority to the real solid interests of the community
over people’s religious zeal and anger. The people considered the
treaty as unjust and degrading to Muslims because of is
stipulation to not start the treaty with “In the name of God” and
to not describe Muhammad as the Prophet. Here the Prophet
accepted the practical interest vis-a-vis religious references.
However, the other jurisprudence, the jurisprudence of reality,
rests on choosing the lesser evil, when it is faced with two evils or
more, like the Prophet’s alliance with an infidel tribe to fight
another tribe. Lesser evil is tolerated and legalized to prevent
greater evil. Thus in prioritizing different realities, this
jurisprudence gives more weight to the practically most important.
Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi notes that the problem with many
Islamic movements is that they do not follow the jurisprudence of
prioritizing realities and cannot distinguish between fundamentals
and particulars and the clear and the ambiguous.
When the great jurist Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya discusses the
best form of work, and whether it is the most difficult or the most
beneficial, he concludes that there is no absolute best but the best
depends on place and time. In time of famine, for instance, food
would be the best; in war, fighting the aggressor; and when
scholars are rare, the best is study and innovation.
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Thus, Muslim minorities in non-Muslim societies are in need to
benefit from the jurisprudence of balance and reality in order to
make its survival possible while adhering to its religious principles.
And it is natural that Muslim minorities face diverse and different
complications, ranging from Halal food, veiling, bank interest, to
education, marriage, divorce, and inheritance. The general rule
agreed upon by religious scholars is that harm must be lessened as
much as possible, and that harm should not be eliminated by
another similar or greater harm. And a Muslim must put up with the
lesser harm in order to prevent the greater, and with the private and
individual to prevent the public and common.
The Case of Lebanon1
It is almost impossible to talk about Lebanon regardless of the
Middle East, or to talk about the Middle East regardless of
Lebanon. Lebanon is a mini Middle East in the sense that almost
all religious communities of the region are in Lebanon and they
together form the Lebanese community of communities. The co-
existence of these communities makes Lebanon different. This
difference is behind the belief of H. H. John Paul II that Lebanon
is more than a country, it is a message.
This message is needed not only to safeguard Lebanese
national unity, but is needed as a basis for Arab-Muslim-Christian
dialogue, which in its turn forms the axis for a better Christian-
Muslim understanding on the international level.
Lebanon has 18 different religious communities. In this little
more than 10,000 square kilometers, the destiny of the people as
well as their choice is to live together. Lebanon is a special case in
the Middle East, in the sense that it is a free country with a free
press, free economy and free speech. Because of the multiplicity
of communities, it is impossible to survive without freedom, in
particular freedom of religion, not only of belief but also of
practising religion openly and freely.
1 For a more detailed discussion on the Lebanese diological religious experience and
the author’s thereof, see al-Sammak, MaqÉlÉt fÊ al-×iwÉr al-IslÉmÊ al-MasÊÍÊ, pp. 115-223.
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That is why, in a sense, Lebanon is a human laboratory
where religious social scientists are eager to prove that it is
possible for a plural society, for a multi-religious society to live
together. It is in Lebanon that pluralism in the Middle East is
credited as a future way of life where one can live with the
different in respect, harmony and love; to build one nation where
the rights of the individual as well as the rights of the
communities are recognized in the constitution and in the
national entente.
Sometimes the Lebanese do not succeed; but they do most
of the time. Success here is a matter of daily challenge. It is a way
of life. There is a common belief among the Lebanese that their
small country of 4 million people is entitled to play a major and
important role in the making of a more harmonious and peaceful
Middle East, in trying to prove that a plural society can survive
and flourish. There is no future for the Middle East without it.
The success of the Lebanese way of life or dream is extremely
important not only for the Lebanese themselves, but also for all
the peoples of the ME, Christians, Muslims, Jews, Arabs, Kurds,
and Berbers. It is only through dialogue that such dream becomes
reality. I believe that dialogue is the art of searching for truth in
the point of view of the other.
To be different does not mean to be against, or to be an
enemy. Differences in opinion, culture, religion, race, language,
etc. are part of the human heritage; they are expressions of God’s
greatness as the Creator. We have to accept and to respect all
these differences the way we believe in God and respect His will.
Truth is not on one-sided. To believe that you are right; does
not mean that the other is necessarily wrong.
There are many forms of dialogue:
a. Dialogue of life, meaning to take care of the other, and to
understand his background and to recognize his special
characteristics and then to build a common living with him on
the basis of understanding, recognition and respect.
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b. Dialogue of action, meaning to work together socially,
economically and educationally. This will help in building
relations on the basis of intermingled interest.
c. Dialogue of discussion, not with the intention to unite
religion, but to make it transparent to the others, and to reveal
common factors in morals and ethics.
d. Dialogue of experiences, including religious experiences. Not
with the intention to worship God like the other, but to realize the
fact that it is possible to worship God, the same God, differently.
Religious and national education should focus on the
necessity of the disengagement between historical conflicts and
religious ethics; between day to day politics and everlasting
foundations of common belief.
The relation between religion and politics can be defined in
many different ways; I shall focus on two contradictory ways:
One, ignoring the frontiers between man’s inner life and his
public actions.
Two, on the contrary, proving that religion can (or even should)
be the force that persuades people to rediscover a connection
between day-to-day life and moral order. The idea of articulating the
essential principles of morality, a global ethic that can apply to
everybody everywhere, is spreading with increasing insistence. It is
the other side of the awareness, often aggrieved, that globalization of
economics and technology is no longer a contentious thesis but an
irresistible reality with concrete effect on people’s lives.
Political, social, and cultural expectations and demands are
dragged along in this vast new transformation, impersonal forces
of the market are rocketing societies out of control. The
constraints of religion and tradition are here shattered, with
nothing solid to replace them, there asserted with aggressive,
mindless violence in the attempt to cope.It turns out that it is a
lot easier to recognize evils that are universal than the universal
good to which all should feel committed.
The definitions of religion and politics are at odds. Religion
is the belief in the sacred; religious teachings are absolute. On the
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other hand, politics, as President Chirac of France once said, “is
not the art of the possible, it is the art of making possible what is
necessary.” Politics is the work of men, while Religion is the work
of God who created man. That is what makes religious politics
dangerous in the sense that political decisions are figured as
orders from God.
When religious leaders are part of the decision making in any
country, or when they influence the process of decision making,
they do so not as representatives of the people, but as
representatives of God. This means that opposing them is an
opposition to the sacred and to the holy. In Lebanon, with its
eighteen religious leaders, opposition to the sacred and the holy
comes also from the sacred and the holy. And in both cases, what
is really at stake is simply day to day politics.
Religious differences in Lebanon are not so much disputes
about doctrine as about history and power-sharing. The Taif
National Agreement of 1989, sought to rewind the history of co-
living in order to bring brotherhood and unity to the people of
Lebanon, and to balance religious and confessional interests
rather than eradicating them.
Each one of the eighteen religious communities on its own was
weak enough to start or stop a war meant to be a Middle-Eastern
war by proxy. Regional and international powers were strong
enough to pull the legs of this or that Community to this or to that
side of the war. Financing a war for more than fifteen years was
beyond the economical capabilities of Lebanon and the Lebanese
people. Hard currency and advanced armaments and ammunitions
poured into Lebanon from different sources - Israel, Arabs and
non-Arabs. Just after the fire was ceased and, foreign assistance
consequently stopped, the Lebanese economy almost collapsed.
Rebuilding Lebanon was impossible without rebuilding the
national unity among the Lebanese people. This is not a simple
story of peacemakers versus bigots. It is also about aid donors,
who help shape the conditions that await the return of the
displaced and crucially those who are likely to respond as much
to economic signals as to political ones. All of these groups have
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mixed feelings. The return of the displaced so far has been all
“push” with no “pull”. The “pushers” are mainly official and
non-govermental organizations believeing in co-living as the only
way to a unified and prosperous Lebanon.
As for the pull, it is clear that all displaced Lebanese want, by
all means, to return to their original homes, but traumatized
families on the receiving end are far from being brain-washed to
stretch a well-come hand.
The national reunification of Lebanon seeks to subdue
without conquest, to brainwash without force, to accomplish
social evolution without a common historical memory. The
Lebanese have to get to know one another better and to discuss
ways and means of managing our disagreements with greater
civility.
In politics, civility is an overrated virtue. It is desirable, of
course, that political debate be conducted in a spirit of mutual
respect rather than enmity. But too often these days, the plea for
more “civility” in politics is a high-minded way of pleading for less
critical scrutiny of illicit campaign contributions or other misdeeds.
From families and neighborhoods to cities and towns to
schools, congregations and trade unions, the institutions that
traditionally provided people with moral anchors and a sense of
belonging are under siege, not only in Lebanon but almost in
every other democratic country.
Taken together, these forms of community are sometimes
described as the institutions of ‘civil society’. A healthy civil
society is important not only because it promotes civility
(although this may be a welcome by-product), but also because it
calls forth the habits, skills and qualities of character that make
effective democratic citizens. Above all, civil society institutions
pulled the Lebanese out of their private, self-centered interests
and concerns and engaged them in the habit of attending to the
common good.
A century and a half ago, Alexis de Tocqueville praised
America’s vibrant civil society for producing the “habits of the
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heart” on which democracy depends. If de Tocqueville were right,
there is reason to worry about the health of civil society, even
beyond its effect on the manners that people display in stores and
on the streets.
For if families, neighborhoods and schools are in ill repair,
they will most probably fail to produce the active, public-spirited
citizens a successful democracy requires regardless of his or her
religion. Lebanon is a country of four seasons. Seasons teach us
two lessons that both steady and chastise: all things must pass,
and all things shall return.
They tell us that every new beginning brings us closer to an
end, and every elegy has within it the echo – and the promise – of
a future celebration.
Happy peoples have a little or no history, as the French
philosopher Montesquieu said. In this sense, the Lebanese as a
people have a long history. The Lebanese have learnt many
lessons from their experiences. They learned that there is no
favorite wind for those who do not know their destination. They
learned too that mistakes are sometimes better teachers than
achievements. But maybe the most important lesson they learned
is this: When they want, they can.
Democracy in Lebanon, one could say, is very Lebanese. It is
not ideal nor is it theoretically perfect, but it is compatible with
fundamental requirements of national unity. Democratic politics
properly conducted is filled with controversy. It is desirable, of
course, that political debate be conducted in a spirit of mutual
respect rather than enmity. But too often these days the plea for
more civility in politics is a high-minded way of pleading for less
critical scrutiny of illicit campaign contribution or other misdeeds.
With respect, love, and understanding, a society of eighteen
religious communities of Christian and Muslim denominations
can function like an orchestra; each community playing its part,
while attending to a common score. A society with a sense of
seasons has greater respect for the old and clearer sense of
tomorrow.
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The Lebanese have now a clear sense of their situation in the
Middle East, which seems to be that they are like that great
Gericault picture (the Raft of the Medusa) that they are on this huge
piece of floating wreckage. It is not going to sink, but they have the
choice of cooperating with one another with the scarce resources on
this piece of floating wreckage or of eating one another. They can
no more follow the un-sacred rule of politics, where “one man’s
hope is another man’s fear.” They have to learn and to behave in
accordance with a sacred rule, where “one community’s dream is
not necessarily another community’s nightmare.”
Isaac Newton said: “If I have seen further, it is by standing
on the shoulders of countless ordinary humans, even of
pygmies.”1 Lebanon can see further by standing on piles of
accumulated miscalculations and disappointments. It can see that
the trick in a successful society is for minority citizens to be able
to feel that they are more than one thing at once: to be able to
feel Arab and Christian, Lebanese and Muslim.
It is not that multi-ethnic societies are impossible; it is just
that they are often rather delicate. Divisions of race, of language,
of class, of religion can be accepted, tolerated and even enjoyed:
They add to the complexities and the possibilities of life. But they
also make a society more vulnerable, especially when the divisions
all line up the same way, and one group can be racially, religiously
and economically distinguished from another. Societies with such
internal divisions do not seem to stand up well to external shocks.
Unless we give people of diverse religious backgrounds a sense of
belonging, unless we give them a sense that their identity and
heritage are valued threads in the tapestry of the Lebanese
society, real community is impossible.
The Lebanese learned, and are still learning, to oppose a
notion of diversity that becomes a substitute for neighborhood
and community, where Maronites, SunnÊs, etc. have their corners,
1 The correct statement of the great physicist is rather: “If I have seen further, it is by
standing on the shoulders of giants,” in a letter to Rober Hooke dated 5 February
1975. H.W. Turnbull (ed.), The Correspondence of Isaac Newton: 1661-1675
(Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press, 1959), vol. 1, p. 416.
THE QUESTION OF MINORITIES IN ISLAM32
equal but separate. Diversity without a spirit of community leads
to tribalism. Community without a spirit of diversity leads to
alienation for all groups.
It is difficult to feel the tension if you live in your separate
corner or walled community. And it is difficult to feel the tension
if the majority so overwhelms the minority that it is brought into
silence.
You will only feel the tension when groups are rubbing
against each other, trying to express their unique religious (or
ethnic or linguistic) identities, and at the same time trying to keep
those identities sufficiently in check to maintain the common
bonds of community. That is the hard work of nation-building.
The question that imposes itself is: Is Lebanon now in the
stage of nation-building? Posing this question is as helpful as
using a mechanical typewriter to access the Internet. Yet, if we
look at the latest developments, it is easy to notice that Lebanon
came out from the trenches of war in the year 1989, and started
its march towards national reconciliation – a process that does
not stop, and should never stops.
Lessons from the Past and Requisites for the Future
Religion is the Word of God. God is the complete and absolute
truth. What comes from God is complete and absolute knowledge.
God taught man and preferred him over most of His creatures, even
over the angels. In spite of this, human knowledge is partial,
meaning that it is part of God’s whole knowledge. The part cannot
cope with the whole, and cannot include it, and cannot fully
understand it, so how can he/she criticize it?
When man tries with his partial knowledge to interpret or
explain the scripture, the word of God (The Torah, the Bible, or
the Qur’an), this interpretation – or explanation – is and should
be subjected to the common rules of criticism like any other
human text. Because human understanding is open to being right
or wrong, and consequently, criticizing this understanding and
criticizing the human behaviour based on it, is a sort of correcting
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what is thought to be wrong, and re-adjusting what is considered
to be improper behaviour. Criticism here is of great importance,
because its intention is to readjust the interpretation of God’s
word, towards what is hoped to be closer to the whole truth
embodied in God’s word.
From here on, we deal with the human understanding of
religion, and not with religion itself, i.e., we deal with the human
touch on the religious scripture and not with the whole and
complete truth of the Word of God. Criticism here, and self-
criticism, opens the door to a process of continuous
understanding, interpretation, and transcendence of what is
human in order to come closer to God’s original intentions.
Therefore, religious scripture (the word of God) is sacred and
holy, permanent, and absolute. But the interpretation of the
scripture (as a human endeavour), like any other human thinking,
is neither sacred nor holy; it is changeable, and relative.
It is always possible to misunderstand the meaning of the
scripture, and consequently it is always possible to behave religiously
incorrectly. The first step towards correcting the misunderstanding
and misbehaviour, is to revise and to reconsider the interpretation of
the scripture, and this in itself requires a process of continuous
criticism and self-criticism. In Islam this is one of the missions of
innovation (ijtihad and tajdÊd) not reformation.
Through innovation, understanding the religious scripture is
subjected to a process of evolution by which religion can, and
should go, side by side, and hand in hand with the changing
personal and social priorities and developments.
Early religious Muslim leaders practised openly religious self-
criticism. Here I will refer to two cases: The first is the case of the
first caliph (Ruler) AbË Bakr al-ØiddÊq. He confessed that he had
committed three mistakes:
1. That he accepted to be nominated as caliph. “But I am not
sure that this is what the Prophet Muhammad really wanted.”
The prophet used to say to us, “Ask me before you miss
me.” We did not ask him.
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2. I condemned a multi-murderer to be burnt to death.
“God only punishes with fire.”
3. I ordered a share from a family heritage to a grandson less
than what he deserves. I should have corrected myself and
ordered a share for him equal to that of the father.
Here we see that the caliph practised self-criticism in three
respects: 1. in politics as a political leader; 2, in justice as a judge; and
3, in interpreting a religious text, that is as a scholar.
The second case is of the second caliph ÑUmar Ibn al-KhaÏÏÉb
who was known for being just, and for his self-esteem, and self-
confidence. ÑUmar was lecturing in a mosque about the negative
social consequences of the high financial burdens of marriage. He
said that a man should not pay more than a thousand dirham (the
currency unit at that time) to the bride. A woman interfered from
the floor saying: “O leader of the believers, you have forbad people
from exceeding four handred dirhams in women’s dowry; didn’t you
hear what God sent down in the Qur’an which says,
But if you desire to give up a wife and to take another in her stead, do
not take away anything of what you have given the first one, even if it be
a qintar [however much it may have been]. (Qur’an, 4: 20)
Then, Omar said: “O God, forgive me, all people are more
knowledgeable than Omar,” and revoked his decision.1
Religious criticism was founded after that on two major
principles. The first principle says: My point of view is right, but
it might be wrong. And the point of view of the other is wrong,
but it might be right. This means that,
1. A point of view (any interpretation of the religious
scripture) is open to be right or wrong.
2. Nobody has the right to aclaim that he possesses (or that
he knows) the whole truth.
3. Nobody has the right to exclude a point of view different
from his, as completely and absolutely false and wrong.
1 Ahmad Muhammad Shakir, MukhtaÎar TafsÊr Ibn KhathÊr titled ÑUmdat al-TafsÊr (al-
Mansourah/Egypt: DÉr al-WafÉ’, 2003), vol. 1, p. 478.
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4. Seeking the truth requires a dialogue with the other, who
has a different opinion, either to convince him or to be
convinced by him. If not, then there is no other way but to accept
and to respect the other as he is, with his beliefs, and as he wants
himself to be.
The second principle says: “He who interprets, if he is right,
deserves two rewards from God: one for his effort of
interpretation, the other for being right. And he who interprets
and turns to be wrong, he deserves one reward only, that of
interpretation and he will not be punished for being wrong.” This
means that,
1. Interpretation is a must.
2. Encouraging interpretation by God’s rewards and by not
punishing – even with good intention – for being wrong.
3. Interpretation is open to be right or wrong. Discovering
the truth requires criticism. One way to criticism is openness to
the different views of the other i.e. to dialogue with the other, on
the basis that the art of dialogue is to search for truth in the point
of view of the other.
Conclusion
I would like to conclude by making the following remarks:
1. Interpretation in Islam is a process of understanding the
religious scripture. This interpretation is not a sacred religious
text, i.e. it does not deal with the principles of the doctrine of
belief, to change this doctrine completely or partially.
2. Criticising the results of interpretation is a criticism to a
human contribution; not to God’s words. Also, to criticise
scholars themselves is a criticism to human beings, not to super-
humans.
3. Sometimes the religious scripture, and the human
interpretation of this scripture, are confusingly considered sacred
of the same degree. The real distance between the sacredness of
the first and the desecration of the second is demolished by
simple minded, innocent believers.
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These people become staunch followers to certain scholars;
they behave as if siding with these scholars - is siding with God
and with his message which is not. I am afraid that this is the
starting point of manipulating religion. Jurisprudence is not and
should not lead to manipulation. The first responds to the needs
of the Ummah, while the second reflects selfish aspirations that






At the moment, it is taken for granted by most observers that the
countries of the European Union, EU are multi-cultural; this is
not a value judgement, but a descriptive statement of fact. There
is no state within the EU (or, indeed, anywhere in the world) that
is truly mono-cultural; there exist a number of different cultural
groups within each of them.1
A multi-cultural country is one where there is more than one
culture; a multiculturalist country is something rather different. Nazi
Germany might have been a multi-cultural country, but it certainly
was not multiculturalist; that is a normative label that would be a
1 The Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain (CFMB), in its report The
Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain, outlined five possible models that states could emulate in
order to cope with diversity: 1. Procedural: the state is neutral vis-á-vis culture, and
only a few basic procedures are common in society. 2. Nationalist: the state promotes
a single culture, and those who do not assimilate into it are second-class. 3.
Liberal/constitutional patriotism: there is a uniform political culture in public life,
which provides for cohesiveness, but diversity in private life. 4. Plural: in the public
and private spheres, there is both unity and diversity; the public realm is ‘continually
revised to accommodate cultural diversity in society at large’. 5. Separatist: the state
permits and expects each community to remain separate from others, confining itself
to maintaining order and civility. No state is composed of only one of these models,
whether in the past or present, but rather, shares features from all of them in different
ways. CFMB, The Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain (London: Profile Books Ltd, 2000).
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judgement on the policies of the countries involved rather than an
expression of fact about the realities ‘on the ground’.
Theorists of the multiculturalist school have taken up the is-
sues that emanate from this reality in light of the needs of states
and communities in the twenty-first century. They have recognized
that the needs and rights of ethno-cultural minorities must be high-
lighted in order to ensure that they are not marginalized in modern
societies. Ethnic identity and ethno-cultural identity are used here
as synonyms, perhaps with the epithet ‘ethno-cultural’ being more
exact, but they refer generally to the same concept: an identity that
is assumed by a particular group of people who associate them-
selves with a particular ethnicity. Ethnicity in this context is de-
fined as something that is, presumably, inherited, rather than as-
sumed. Religion, in the manner defined here, is not ordinarily an
ethnic identity, although it may be reinterpreted to construct one,
as will be discussed below, and even if it is not reinterpreted to
construct one, it may still be considered relevant for multicultural-
ism, which we will also discuss.
Though the approach we follow is broadly within the school
of multiculturalism, this does not however mean that all the posi-
tions suggested below are always, or even commonly, held by
multiculturalist theorists. Indeed, there are points where ques-
tions are raised on topics that many multiculturalists do not: for
example, on secularism, or on the need for a national identity.
The discussion below is designed to raise some of those ques-
tions, and point out some of the challenges facing European so-
cieties in the twenty-first century.
It is not, however, designed to be an exhaustive or encyclope-
dic discussion; that would require another work entirely. Neverthe-
less, in the context of discussing the Muslim presence in Europe, it
is rather difficult to get around an engagement with multicultural-
ism, and a critical assessment of what the challenges posing it are.
Two main reasons may be invoked for this here. The first is that
Muslims as immigrants and descendants of immigrants are prime
candidates for recognition under multiculturalism; in fact, they are
the prime candidates in most parts of Europe. The majority of eth-
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nic minority communities in many (if not all) European states are
Muslim by religion. So, for practical reasons, multiculturalism is
definitely a subject we must engage with.
The second reason is philosophical. Most of the discussions
on multiculturalism in the late twentieth-century were primarily
(although not exclusively) concerned with what was the most
contentious form of identity in Europe at the time: ethnicity. As
such, the debates and analysis took little notice of religious identi-
ties, which were not viewed as important in the context of mid-
twentieth-century history. That has caused a number of political
philosophers to attempt to examine the issues involved through
the prism of ethnic relations, by portraying Muslims, or other
religiously-defined minorities, for purposes of theoretical debate,
as ethno-cultural minorities. They had to discuss Muslims, be-
cause Islam is, as mentioned above, the religion of the largest
communities that are the prime candidates for recognition by
multiculturalism today. Other political philosophers refuse to re-
gard them as candidates for recognition by the state altogether:
these are philosophical tensions that also have to be dealt with, as
we see the growth of Muslim communities in Europe (both the
‘old’ and the ‘new’) that are not ethnic minorities but part of the
ethnic majority through conversion (either recent or historical).
It is clear that the mere presence of Muslims has added to the
multicultural climate in the EU, and it has precipitated a number of
developments. As one might expect, multiculturalism debates in Eu-
rope have often been centred on Muslims and the ‘difficulties’ of
integrating them into the EU, and their presence has forced the is-
sue with growing momentum.1 It does not appear that this is going
to change anytime soon; on the contrary, the signs are that the de-
bate will deepen in the coming years. The fact that Islam has a long-
running history in Europe, with many European identities having
been formed at least partly in contradistinction to Islam,2 makes the
1 Stefano Allievi, “Relations and Negotiations: Issues and Debates”, in Brigitte Marechal
et al. (eds.), Muslims in the Enlarged Europe: Religion and Society (Leiden: Brill, 2003), p. 364.
2 Timothy J., Winter, British Muslim Identity: Past, Problems, Prospects (Cambridge: Muslim
Academic Trust, 2003), pp. 6-10.
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challenge even more complex. To put it another, somewhat ironic,
way, to discuss about Muslims in Europe today in a practical fash-
ion, we have to discuss multiculturalism. To discuss multiculturalism
in Europe today in a theoretical fashion, we have to discuss Mus-
lims. They are, whether we like it or not, joined at the proverbial hip.
The Multiculturalist Debate: Fairness, Equity and the Citizen
One must be careful at this early juncture to be clear as to the na-
ture of multiculturalism as an idea. It is not a mere political phi-
losophy, as that might imply; it is a comprehensive theory of poli-
tics.1 Modood’s most recent work is perhaps the most explicit
piece of evidence that multiculturalism is a project that is con-
stantly developing itself in light of new circumstances, and cer-
tainly not a comprehensive political philosophy.2 Neither those
who attack the school, nor those who reject it, do themselves any
service by failing to recognize this fact. Nor does it belong
squarely and solely within liberal political philosophy, although it
is undeniable that liberalism has instigated some of the institu-
tions which multiculturalism seeks to influence. It is a project, or
a school of thought. The basic question that theorists of this
school pose to themselves is relatively simple: are the claims of
minority groups just, justice being the root attribute that every
state should aspire to uphold?
If we were to view this school and its antecedent thinkers
some decades ago, we might see the answers to that question
neatly dividing the ‘multiculturalists’ and their opponents. The
multiculturalists would answer ‘yes’; and their opponents would
answer ‘no’. Critics of multiculturalism would insist that justice
demanded that the state be ‘colour-blind’ and, by extension, treat
every single individual precisely the same way, with no regard –
positive or negative – for the individual’s unique attributes. Any
other course of action would be considered to be necessarily dis-
criminatory and, hence, unjust. These criticisms would generally
1 Tariq Modood, Multiculturalism: A Civic Idea (Bristol: Polity Press, 2007), p. 7.
2 Ibid.
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belong to the nationalist and, to a greater degree, a particular view
on the liberal theory of governance.1
The multiculturalists have also formulated support for their po-
sition in the language of justice, and insist that differential treatment
is sometimes not only permitted by the concept of ‘justice’, but also
demanded it. Perhaps to differentiate this concept of ‘justice’, we
might call it ‘equity’ or ‘fairness’: a more nuanced and sophisticated
form of justice. To treat every single individual precisely the same
way would necessarily result in occasional injustice. The multicultur-
alists noted that, in fact, no state institution is remotely ‘procedural’
(i.e. culturally neutral); rather, they are all actually favourable to the
majority group, consciously or unconsciously, and might therefore
discriminate against minority groups, even if unintentionally. The
standard multiculturalist position noted that with the growth of di-
versity in terms of language, identity and culture in modern states,
the notion of ‘justice’ must take seriously the possibility that ‘blind’
justice might create injustice. Thus, ‘real’ justice must be fair and
equitable, which necessarily must take into account the specifics of
those that justice is supposed to serve.2
However, as the political philosopher Kymlicka insightfully
notes, the debate has shifted. Few thinkers, if any, in contempo-
rary western political philosophical thought, promote the idea
that justice can be achieved through ‘difference-blind rules’.3
Critics have generally accepted that injustice is likely if notice of
pluralism is not taken, but they now focus “on the way that the
general trend towards multiculturalism threatens to erode the
sorts of civic virtues, identities and practices which sustain a
healthy democracy.”4 The burden of proof has, in fact, shifted
dramatically, to the point where it is assumed that the status quo,
if it does not consider minority groups, is discriminatory and un-
just. Hence, the proponents of multiculturalism have, to date, ef-
1 CFMB, The Future Multi-Ethnic Britain, pp. 42-45.
2 Ibid., pp. 42-45
3 Will Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2002), pp. 355-366.
4 Ibid., p. 366
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fectively made their case, and it is now the second phase of dis-
cussion that is underway, even though die-hard opponents to
multiculturalism still continue to complain about their failure to
counteract that first phase.
The last ten years have witnessed a remarkable upsurge of in-
terest in two topics amongst political philosophers: the rights and
status of ethno-cultural minorities in multi-ethnic societies (the
‘minority rights-multiculturalism’ debate), and the virtues, prac-
tices and responsibilities of democratic citizenship (the ‘citizen-
ship-civic virtue’ debate).1
To put it another way: if fairness and equity are to be the basis
of the state, then who and what gets to define fairness and equity?
This is, in reality, leading to the question as to ‘what is the real
basis of citizenship’, for it is the collective body of enfranchised
citizens that gets to define fairness and equity in a state. Other au-
thors argue that this in itself is a sign that multiculturalism is being
pushed back, particularly as many commentators frequently attack
‘multiculturalism’ in the public sphere by name. Yet, even while
many figures do in fact attack ‘multiculturalism’, they accept, in
spite of themselves, many of the key doctrines that the multicultur-
alist school argued for in the 1990s. There may be fears, particular-
ly as some commentators linked terrorism to the failure of multi-
culturalism after the London bombings in 2005, but these fears
have caused neither actual government policies nor political theory
to simply do away with the principles of that school. Modood dis-
agrees with Cesari’s assertion that “multiculturalism is now the rul-
ing idea of Western cities” 2 (and this author would tend to agree),
but both Modood’s writings and political events seem to indicate
that multiculturalism is still at the core of how policy is developed
in modern Western societies. One might wonder why the name is
not simply replaced by something else: a discussion still ongoing in
multiculturalist circles.
At this point, we now reach the citizenship-civic virtue debate,
1 Ibid.
2 Modood, Multiculturalism, p. 15.
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and this is where the Muslim presence is creating the most practical
and philosophical tension for multiculturalism. Before, the two de-
bates operated in parallel; now, they could be mistaken for the
same debate, inextricably linked together. Any debate where multi-
culturalism becomes discussed leads to the citizenship-civic virtue
discussion, and any debate where an inclusive citizenship is pro-
posed inevitably discusses multiculturalism. The ‘citizenship-civic
virtue’ and ‘minority rights-multiculturalism’ debates are precisely
where the rights of the minority over the majority, and vice versa,
are discussed in today’s world.
The Next Phase of the Discussion: the Citizenship-civic
Virtue Debate, and defining the Multiculturalist Society
The ‘citizenship-civic virtue debate’ has two opposing models that
are offered to societies and states to implement, each of which em-
phasizes certain rights, and which both find their theoretical ances-
tors within the debate surrounding multiculturalism before it:
1. The right to assimilate to the majority or dominant culture
in the public sphere, and toleration of ‘difference’ in the pri-
vate sphere alone.
2. The right to have one’s ‘difference’ (minority, ethnicity, etc.)
recognized and supported in the public and private spheres.1
One could argue here that there is sufficient evidence to say
that the following definition I propose here of a tolerant and just
society is one of consensus now:
A just society is one where society as a whole removes unfair
and unnecessary barriers to access, respecting reasonable plu-
ralism without unrestricted relativism, and where the individ-
ual is freely able to become an integral part of it, identifying
the said society as the main field of participation.
This definition places most of the onus of ‘integration’
squarely on society as a whole, even while leaving the specifics
1 See, Tariq Modood, “Multiculturalism, Muslims and the British State,” 2000.
http:www.theamericanmuslim.org/2003may_comments.php?id=134_0_20_0_C (Visited on
21/01/2004).
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open to fruitful debate. The pursuit to become ‘integral’, howev-
er, is an interest of the integrated subject, whether individually or
communally, as will be discussed later in the final pages of this
work; here we are generally interested in possible philosophies for
the state, not civil society from an internal perspective. These are
two wholly different spheres of activity.
To repeat an observation: there is an important shift towards
multiculturalist principles in the above definition. That is a rather
bold assertion to make, particularly after the 7th July (2005) bomb-
ings in London, which marked the beginning of the end of multicul-
turalism as a viable political philosophy in the public sphere. And
yet, it is one that is hard to deny. Multiculturalism did not succeed in
converting everyone to a new political philosophy, which it never
was in the first place, but it did succeed in ensuring certain basic
principles became part of the mainstream establishment.
The first model is generally portrayed as the inheritor of the ‘as-
similationist’ model, while the latter could be perceived as the ‘inte-
grationist’ model. This is certainly oversimplifying matters, but it
establishes the basic parameters, and shows how the debates have
shifted, while also showing where the new ‘battleground is’. Classi-
cal assimilationist thought prior to the success of multiculturalism
would assume that even in private spaces, a degree of assimilation
should take place. Yet in this newer debate, both models recognize
that those who are different from the majority may be accepted by
the mainstream, but they differ on what this might mean in practice.
How far must the minority go before being accepted? What differ-
ences should the majority accept? What sort of compromises should
each side make, and on what bases should they be made? In other
words, what are the bare requirements of citizenship?
Here, the lines begin to blur. Both models are unrecognizable
without recalling classic liberal political thought, even though they
might be slightly different on that corpus of ideas. Both models
(if we adhere to the formulation of multiculturalism as per multi-
culturalists such as Modood or Parekh) can also assume that par-
ticipation in the public or national culture is necessary for the ef-
fective exercise of citizenship (although multiculturalists might
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also make the case that equal treatment does not mean assimila-
tion to the national culture in all things, and the national culture
should gradually change to incorporate the culture of ethnic mi-
norities as time goes on).
Even those theorists who would be considered nationalists no
longer demand full assimilation of their minority groups; they are, at
the very least, tolerated, if not equally considered. The old multicul-
turalists, the ‘pluralistic-integrationists’, now tend to favour a cos-
mopolitan definition of citizenship in order to facilitate the incorpo-
ration and integration of ethno-cultural minorities. Their old critics,
the ‘neo-assimilationists’, stand as the proponents of a strong, nar-
rowly-defined national identity that is the basis of citizenship, while
still respecting difference:
While I respect ‘difference,’ and submit that coping with it
is an essential element of tolerance and pluralism, I also
maintain that it is unacceptable to stop at simply acknowl-
edging difference, as cultural relativists do, without provid-
ing prescriptions for how to deal with it.1
The above is written by an author who is generally a neo-
assimilationist, but it is clear that on an abstract level, he also accepts
certain basic principles that multiculturalism sought to make integral
to the public sphere. Neither of the protagonists in the ‘citizenship-
civic virtue debate’ rejects the idea of ‘toleration’, including the neo-
assimilationists. Indeed, it is often part of the equation for neo-
assimilationists. But where the lines are still clearly drawn is the in-
terpretation of ‘equality’:
Grounding equality in uniformity also has unfortunate
consequences. It requires us to treat human beings equally
in those respects in which they are similar and not those in
which they are different.2
Now, precisely what does that mean in our discussion? For
1 Bassam Tibi, “Muslim Migrants in Europe: Between Euro-Islam and Ghettoization,” in
Nezar AlSayyad and Manuel Castells (eds.), Muslim Europe or Euro-Islam: Politics, Culture,
and Citizenship in the Age of Globalization (Oxford: Lexington Books, 2002), p. 31.
2 Bhikhu Parekh, Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory (Lon-
don: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000), pp. 239-240.
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what we are interested in is clearly this: how do we construct the
public culture of diverse societies? And in that question lies another
question, for the answer is surely “the ‘how’ is to be defined by the
citizen”: on what basis is one considered a citizen? What is the basis
of citizenship?
Both sides in this debate uphold tolerance: the terms of how
that toleration is to manifest itself are quite distinct, however.
Neo-assimilationists insist that the predominant culture has the
right of continual dominance, as it is the most viable candidate to
ensure social stability and cohesion: as such, citizenship refers to
only the majority, and not the minority, and the minority be-
comes more of a full citizen by becoming more like the majority.
For the pluralistic integrationists, on the other hand, the emphasis
is not only on the right of the minority to remain different, but
also for those differences to be recognized, and even publicly de-
clared, by the mainstream.
Nevertheless, even in the modern age, the concept of citizen-
ship is a disputed ground, which is perhaps why multiculturalists are
not yet quite ‘there yet’ in terms of constructing a theory. When cit-
izenship is spoken of, it is in reference to integration; full integration
in the Western meaning of the word means full rights of citizenship.
Conversely, without citizenship, full integration in the Western idi-
om is impossible.
For now, we should ask: how have the different models of citi-
zenship manifested themselves in practice? The answer to that ques-
tion is what defines the difference for current multiculturalists; and
to really understand what that means in practice, we must move be-
yond theory, and into a case study which history will likely record as
one of the key theoretical tests for multiculturalist citizenship. It is
not at all surprising, as we will see time and time again below, that
the test involves Muslims and Islam.
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Multiculturalism and Muslims: Secularist Tensions
From the outset, before moving on to what multiculturalism gener-
ally posits itself with regards to Muslims, it is relevant to say where it
generally does not posit itself. Multiculturalism has predominantly
been concerned with cultural groups per se; not specifically religious
groups. Where religious groups have been considered, they have
been viewed through the prism of culture and designated as cultural
groups. For this reason, the question whether Muslims are truly
candidates for designation as a cultural group remains either misun-
derstood or misinterpreted. For some reason, even Kymlicka (one
of multiculturalism main theorists) excludes religious groups without
even any comprehensive justification, although they are certainly
relevant in Europe and North America; a bias that Modood refers to
as possibly a “secularist bias”1 in one place, and an “ignorance-cum-
prejudice about Muslims that is apparent amongst even the best po-
litical philosophers” in another.2
Some Western trends of thought do identify Muslims in the
way Jews were identified in the nineteenth century – as an ethnic
group. This primarily ethnic identification reached the point where it
was possible to begin speaking of an atheist Jew. This, it might be
said, is the ethnicisation of spirituality, where a politicization of an
essentially spiritual commitment creates an ethnic identity. This new,
startlingly modern identity is not a development that Muslim intel-
lectuals have noted without some unease:
In the universe of Islam, the same transposition of the vo-
cabulary of faith into the vocabulary of identity is well un-
derway. What would Averroes have made of the common
modern practice of defining the Hajj as the ‘annual confer-
ence of the Muslims’? Why do social scientists increasingly
interpret the phenomenon of veiling in terms of the affir-
mation of identity? Why does congregational prayer some-
times suggest a political gesture to what is behind the wor-
1 Modood, Multiculturalism, p. 27.
2 Tariq Modood, “The Recognition of Religious Groups”, in Will Kymlicka and
Wayne Norman (eds.), Citizenship in Diverse Societies (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2000), pp. 187-188.
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shippers, rather than to what lies beyond the qibla wall?
The instrumentality of religion has changed, in important
segments of the world faiths. God is not denied by the slo-
ganeers of identity; rather He is enlisted as a party member.
No such revivalist can entertain the suggestion that the new
liberation being recommended is group liberation in the
world that marginalizes the more fundamental project of an
individual liberation from the world; but his vocabulary none-
theless steadily betrays him.1
Having elaborated on that, there is an important proviso to be
made here. While one may have some philosophical sympathy for
those who are apprehensive of what they deem to be ‘identity poli-
tics’ masquerading as religion, it does not necessarily follow that
such an apprehension must automatically result in the exclusion of
religious groups in the discussion of multiculturalism. While it is
very true that, for many, religion is simply and solely ‘pietistic’
(which might therefore be rather inconsequential to any political
multiculturalism), for many others it is a deep component of identity
which serves to inform their ethics, morals, values and how they
participate in society at large. The diversity they adhere to might be a
different type of diversity, but they are still appropriate, and distinct,
candidates for inclusion in this discussion of multiculturalism.
Some feel uncomfortable about this, as contemporary West-
ern societies, particularly in Europe, are secular, and have a histo-
ry with religion and religious institutions which define how they
relate to religion. They are also generally liberal, not particularly
conservative, and this may also serve to show why they are reluc-
tant to allow the incorporation of religious groups that hold less
liberal views. This is not entirely justifiable either, however. To be
consistent, we would have to similarly marginalize other religious
groups (including Christians), and put the same questions about
values to all groups. We uphold gender as a worthwhile candi-
date, even though there might be some trends in feminist thought
1 Abdel-Hakim Murad, “Muslim loyalty and belonging: some reflections on the
psychosocial background”, in Seddon, M.S., Hussain, D. and Malik, N. (eds.), British
Muslims: Loyalty and Belonging (Leicester: Islamic Foundation, 2003).
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that the majority might find distasteful; the same can be said for
some militant Black nationalists in the African-American com-
munities of North America. But we do not use such examples as
a reason to exclude the larger communities; why then for the
Muslim communities of Europe? A respect for that different type
of diversity, specifically religious, has to be considered.
In the United Kingdom, a number of problems arose after
anti-discrimination legislation did not take account of the differ-
ence between considering Muslim populations as faith communi-
ties or as ‘ethno-cultural minorities’. Converts to Islam are not
considered to be ethno-culturally different from the majority;
thus, they are unprotected since they are not considered racial
minorities under race relations laws. With what justification then
are the issues emanating from a multi-faith society considered in
the context of multiculturalism?
[W]e must not be too quick to exclude religious communi-
ties from participation in the political debates etc. of a mul-
ticultural state. Secularity should not be embraced without
careful consideration of the possibilities for reasonable dia-
logue between religious and non-religious groups.1
Most discussions about multiculturalism focus on ‘ethnici-
ty’. As a side effect, the recognition of religion and religious
identity is marginalized or not considered, yet research
shows that religion ‘still’ plays a significant role in groups’
relations among each other and the society at large.2
These are not inconsequential abstract issues. If the point of
multiculturalism was to combat racism and ensure that unfair dis-
crimination be removed from communities in their efforts to cre-
ate just societies, then we must now also realise that bigotry and
discrimination now certainly encompasses religious communities
as religious communities. Perhaps once it was the ‘Paki’ who was
targeted; but now, certainly, the ‘Muslim’ will do, at least in many
1 Tariq Modood and Colin Buchanan, “Should the Church of England Be
Disestablished?” theguardian.com, Saturday debate, 15 April 2000.
2 Martin Baumann, cited in Sophie Gilliat-Ray, Religion in Higher Education: the Politics of the
Multi-Faith Campus (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000), p. 4.
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parts of Europe, and increasingly, in North America.
One could add another aspect to this, which is that both secu-
larism and religion should be properly understood in their own
contexts, and a healthy co-operation should exist between them.
Religion is religion, secularism is secularism, and neither should
dictate what the other means. But it does not follow that they
should not co-operate, and indeed, this is part of where the tension
lies. The priests need not run the state, but if the state needs expert
advice on what Christianity means to its adherents in order to
properly accommodate them in the state (for example, days off on
religious holidays), should the state not consult with the priest-
hood? And should the priesthood not co-operate with the state in
such a consultation? Or should the state simply decide, and arro-
gate itself to be the voice of religion? The same logic might apply
equally to Muslims, although Islam has different modes of con-
structing religious authority, which we shall also come to.
None of this should be interpreted to mean that there is a
monolithic, homogenous community of Muslims who reside in
Europe. There are numerous communities within the entire Mus-
lim population of Europe; different according to sex, race, age
and so forth. In this sense, there are certainly several Muslim
communities in Europe, but insofar as all these communities exist
in Europe, they also simultaneously constitute a single ‘communi-
ty’, distinct from other Muslims outside of Europe, or non-
Muslims in Europe, defined according to their religious identity
as Muslims, regardless of their practice.
But in so far as they represent a common religious communi-
ty, there is a need to entertain a particular application, which may
be quite close to liberal theories of multiculturalism, but with a
corrective lens placed upon the viewpoint that eschews focusing
on religion. Kymlicka discusses the ‘rights’ of minority groups in
relation to public policies, legal rights and constitutional provi-
sions, which are ‘sought by ethnic groups for the accommodation
of their cultural differences’. These, apparently, are the main are-
as of concern; if these are settled, then the barriers of the main-
stream to their incorporation are removed.
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These issues, i.e., the ‘rights’ that groups outside of the
mainstream have in relation to ‘public policies, legal rights and
constitutional provisions’, are similar to a certain degree for all
demographic minority groups. From a political philosophical per-
spective, multiculturalism remains the school where the issues
arising from a multi-faith community are best discussed, particu-
larly in Europe where many minority-faith communities are also
minority ethnic ones. What is not the same is the different ways
these communities view themselves in relation to each other on
an individual level, but this is more a sociological affair rather
than a political philosophical one. If there is anything to be dis-
cussed, it is whether we can authentically describe this school as
‘multi cultural’ rather than some other label that would not take
for granted the concept that religion is a ‘culture’.
If we return to the original debates of ‘multiculturalism’ and
‘citizenship-civic virtue’, adopting Kymlicka’s model for ethno-
cultural groups, there emerges an intriguing route that can be tak-
en, which should be examined more closely. There are two im-
portant features common to all minority rights; if we apply them to
religious minority rights claims in general, and Muslims in particu-
lar, keeping the above considerations in mind, the following can be
noted: these rights go beyond the familiar set of common civil and
political rights of individual citizenship which are protected in all
liberal democracies, and they are adopted with the intention of
recognizing and accommodating the distinctive needs of religious-
ly-defined groups. What religious minority rights advocates aspire
to do is to reach a point whereby existing legal rights, public poli-
cies and constitutional provisions accommodate and facilitate their
community’s religious practices in the same way that liberal multi-
culturalists might do for ethnic communities.
There are a number of general characteristics about Muslim
minorities that can be noted from the outset. In general, like oth-
er religious minority groups within the EU, Muslims are not con-
cerned with territorial separatism (which might interest some de-
mographic minority groups). Their debate is how one should in-
tegrate with the mainstream; the alternative to incorporation of
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any sort for the Muslim minority is exile – a position some take in
theory but seldom practise. Nor are they to be counted among
isolationist religious groups according to one definition, which
describes members of groups such as the Amish in America and
the Hutterites in Canada1 as ‘partial’ citizens’ due to their volun-
tary waiving of rights and responsibilities in the country. While
some Muslim groups, as well as other religious minorities, may
shy away from participating in voting and holding office2 – as the
Amish do – Muslims generally support active participation in so-
ciety, but on terms sometimes different from the mainstream.
They are considered a ‘non-isolationist religious group’ to con-
tinue using an analogized version of Kymlicka’s terminology, as
they seek to participate ‘without having to compromise their be-
liefs for the sake of an arbitrary regulation’.
Within the British context, which is perhaps the ‘flag-bearer’
of a style of secularism which is sensitive to the idea of co-
operation between religion and state, a pertinent episode recently
took place. The leader of the established Church (but a type of es-
tablishment which generally seeks to assist minority religions with-
out necessarily relativizing the truth of the message of the Church)
delivered a speech to an assembly of lawyers on the issue of
‘sharÊ‛ah courts’. Now, the lawyers appear to have generally under-
stood the Archbishop of Canterbury’s statements within the con-
text of arbitration law, which allows any two parties to voluntarily
submit to the ruling of a third party, as long as such a ruling did
not break any law. One cannot seriously cast doubt on the legal
validity of this: yet, the public reaction was one that indicated it
could be invalid in terms of the public political culture.
This can only be explained if we take seriously the claim that
some types of secularism are unequal to others, for at no point did
the Archbishop’s statements go against the laws of the UK. One
understandable objection is that such ‘sharÊÑah courts’ (which are
not courts at all, but arbitration contracts) will reify Muslim identity
1 Kymlicka and Norman, Citizenship in Diverse Societies, pp. 22-23.
2 A trend  which seems to  be  losing  ground as SharÊ‛ah experts are  advocating active
participation, thus removing the ‘religious impediment’.
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in a way that will subject all Muslims, whether they like it or not, to
particular interpretations of Islamic jurisprudence. But while this
objection is understandable, it is not justifiable. These arbitration
contracts are only entered into properly if voluntarily: Muslims, or
any other group, can choose not to enter into them, or enter into
them on their own terms. That is a type of secularism that no
secularist objects to.
The above discussion outlines some reflections on the ques-
tion of secularism that any workable system multiculturalist citi-
zenship will have to deal with. Now, we should turn our attention
to how some of these abstract and theoretical issues actually play
out in the two models for citizenship in Europe today. That leads
us to our next topic, which is entirely relevant, practical, and
highly controversial: the hijab or the Muslim headscarf.
The challenge of the ×ijÉb and two models of citizenship
In the EU specifically, there are currently two main expressions
of citizenship, with some variations. A good example of the first
expression (descended from the assimilationists) is found in the
dominant French paradigm, which has found its most recent and
poignant manifestation in the l’affaire du foulard in September
1989. For those who demanded that Muslim school-girls take off
their headscarves, France was ‘a single and indivisible nation
based on a single culture’. The state was to positively and aggres-
sively pursue a policy of assimilation; differences were to be ac-
cepted only if they were not judged to be against the principles of
French culture, which are claimed to be universal. To follow a
different path would be to deny the universal nature of French
culture and, further, to threaten it. In practice, this meant the
French state would ban ‘ostentatious symbols’ being worn in
school; what ‘ostentatious’ referred to, however, was well-
known. Yet, until December 2003, individual schools were given
the freedom to choose or not to choose to enforce this particular
interpretation; the French state then formally decided to ban the
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headscarf1 in public schools, with ten federal states in Germany
following suit shortly thereafter.
Theoretically, from a particular standpoint (that of the majori-
ty), the idea of ‘sameness’ or ‘blind justice’ might seem like the
perfect basis upon which to base educational policy. What the
French in particular were offering was indeed ‘equality’, but on the
basis of uniformity – a typical assimilationist model. Practically,
however, as the pluralistic critique emphasizes (more evident in the
second model of the ‘citizenship-civic virtue debate’), the world is
most certainly not uniform. Were the world, the EU or a single
state homogenous in every way, equal treatment would involve
identical treatment; yet, in every state, not least the EU, there are
differences according to sex, ethnicity and religion, as well as a
number of other characteristics. Once this is taken into account,
identical treatment does not result in equal treatment; rather, it
provides for a situation where certain members are ‘more equal
than others’, even if wholly unintentionally.
Let us come back to the practical example, and see how the
mainstream political establishment justified its logic. As far as
they were concerned:
1. The French state (the Republic) is based on French culture;
2. French Republican cultural values are universal;
3. Anything opposing universal values must be proscribed;
4. The subjugation of a gender (women) is in opposition to uni-
versal values;
5. The headscarf is a symbol of female subjugation; and
6. The headscarf must be proscribed.
Put simply, this logic permeated most of the discussions re-
lating to the headscarf – even if the content was sometimes al-
tered to include the scarf as a symbol of political activity against
the secular republican state – in France and elsewhere, including
1 Other religious symbols were similarly proscribed, but it was clear from the history of
the debate what was being targeted. For a thorough examination of this issue, see John
R. Bowen, Why the French Don’t Like Headscarves: Islam, the State, and Public Space (Prince-
ton: Princeton University Press, 2007).
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Turkey and Germany.
It can best be described as a ‘liberal’ model of governance
with some ‘nationalist’ elements, and it also accounts for the his-
torical reasons why the UK and other European countries would
not fund Muslim schools. Until recently, the UK government had
consistently rejected funding Muslim schools, although thousands
of Anglican, Catholic and Jewish schools were so funded. Some of
those that defended this disparity insisted that the state should not
be funding religious schools in general, or that funding Muslim
schools would provide support to a reactionary religion that would
then attack the state. Furthermore, they argued that while other
religious schools managed to find a balance between secular and
religiously-inspired knowledge after a long struggle, Muslim
schools would not able to do so. It is important to note that in
most of these and other similar cases, students of Muslim back-
ground were not forbidden education. On the contrary, they were
enthusiastically invited to participate in education, but only on the
terms acceptable to the authorities. They might look different and
behave differently in their private capacities, but in the eyes of the
state, they would be the same as their non-Muslim counterparts
and be treated ‘equally’.
Those who made such arguments often thought they were
being fair, as they did not ask the minorities to pursue a course
they themselves would not be willing to pursue. In the UK, this
argument was slightly different, for there the positions were
based on a particular discriminatory attitude; non-Anglican
schools had been funded for many years, so it was not merely a
question of the narrow vision of the national culture. Pluralism
did exist for Catholics and Jews, but not for Muslims.
Yet the assumptions articulated therein are far from proven.
A number of questions arise here: were the French legislators
correct in assuming the headscarf was a symbol of female subju-
gation? If they were correct to oppose it on moral principle,
would this moral abhorrence be justifiable in terms of universal
validity such that it would necessitate a ban? Even if the head-
scarf was against the emancipation of women, a key concept of
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French Republican thought, was it the jurisdiction of the French
state to proscribe it? Are French, German, or for that matter,
Western values truly universal, to be upheld at any cost? If these
suppositions are correct, the headscarf should have been banned
completely and not simply in schools. Moreover, if the supposi-
tions were correct in the British case, then the privately funded
Muslim schools should also have been banned.
The issue at hand that cannot be overlooked is what consti-
tutes the basis of French political tradition. The French state is
the expression of the French nation, and the French citizen is
simultaneously integrated into the French state and the French
nation by an act of will to embody and protect French culture,
which just happens to be universal in its validity. In this manner,
the French ‘nation’ and French ‘citizenry’ are identifiably the
same, and both partake of ‘universal values’.1
It is undeniably the case that many women who wear the head-
scarf are mistreated. Some wear it out of choice, some wear it out of
fear; but women and men alike are often mistreated, often do things
out of choice, and often do things without choice. The question is: is
there a direct correlation between the donning of the headscarf and
oppression? Where is the evidence to that effect, particularly when it
is obvious that the women who were struggling to wear the hijab
during protests in the run-up to the law were not struggling to re-
main in the home under the proverbial thumbs of their husbands?
Rather, the evidence suggests that these women were at least seeking
to interact with mainstream society, whether in education or in pub-
lic service, while remaining true to their Islamic obligations. Indeed,
one of the greatest arguments against the ban is that it will create a de
jure exclusion of devout Muslim women from mainstream life; a
measure which is discriminatory on the basis of religion and of sex,
hindering integration, as opposed to aiding it. Symbols are simple
articles representing complex concepts; it is important to understand
what the latter are before banning the former. A scarf does not al-
ways mean female subjugation and a beard does not always express
1 Parekh, Rethinking Multiculturalim, pp. 6-7.
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political rebellion.1
If, however, it is accepted that the correlation is genuine, it
does not necessarily follow that the state would be justified in
imposing a ban. The French state justified its actions in the man-
ner followed by most liberal anti-multiculturalists: using the fear
that social cohesion will fall apart when communities are given
too much recognition by public institutions. In contrast, the
commission2 advising the French President Jacques Chirac that
endorsed the ban on headscarves seemed to think that it was a
measure that would aid integration rather than work against it. To
this end, within the same report, Chirac was advised to add Mus-
lim and Jewish festivals to the calendar of observed public holi-
days and introduce ×alÉl and kosher meals for Muslim and Jewish
students, respectively. In addition, discreet symbols, such as me-
dallions, small crosses, Stars of David or small Qur’ans would not
be banned.
Such advice, however well-intended, demonstrates some awed
thinking, even among the experts advising the President of France.
Providing ÍalÉl food for Muslims and designating Muslim holidays
as public ones might very well be a welcome reflection of the influ-
ence that Muslims have in French society. However, if one views
these measures from within the French Muslim community, the im-
portance of these measures compared to the banning of the head-
scarf is questionable. Under Islamic law, the eating of food that is
not prepared by Muslim butchers under the correct procedures
might be sinful, but there might be certain dispensations, especially
1 Admittedly, this is not the case in the EU at the moment, but the same logic applies.
2 The headscarf issue in France is deeply complex and cannot be discussed in sufficient
detail here. For further information see, Dominic McGoldrick, Human Rights and
Religion: the Islamic Headscarf Debate in Europe (Oxford, UK: Hart Publishing, 2006); Joan
Wallach Scott, Politics of the Veil (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010); and
Bowen, John R. Why the French Don’t Like Headscarves? Islam, the State, and Public Space
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007).
 Reference is here made to the Satsi commission formed by the French governemt in
July 2003 under the name Commission de Reflexion sur l’Application du Principe de Laïcité
dans la République to look into the “intrusion of religion in public life.” Its 67-page
report provided the ground for banning Muslim females from wearing the headscarf
in public institutions. - Editor.
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in the MÉlikÊ school of Islamic law which many French Muslims fol-
low. Moreover, the observance of Muslim holidays is strongly rec-
ommended but it is not a mandatory religious obligation.
The wearing of the ×ijÉb, however, is recognized by all tradi-
tional schools of Islamic jurisprudence to be a religious obligation
for all Muslim women past the age of puberty, except within certain
company.1 Thus devout Muslim women who consider it obligatory
to wear the ×ijÉb would be faced with a choice: disregarding a reli-
gious obligation (which would not take them out of the faith, but
which devout Muslim women might consider to be sinful), or disre-
garding their education. If the French state embarks on such a
course of ‘secular fundamentalism’ as the French interior minister
characterized an outright ban on headscarves, why would Muslim
French citizens favour it over their religion?
It is rather difficult to view the report’s recommendations
without seeing a reflection of the interior minister’s fears, as well as
a deep misunderstanding of what certain similar symbolism means
for different communities. The report identifies Islam as almost an
Arabic version of Christianity and, as long as it remains in that
mould, it is acceptable, just as Christianity is acceptable. Hence, Ara-
bic language is to be taught, Muslim chaplains are to be recruited
into the armed forces, prisons and hospitals, and so on. However,
just as the Catholic Church prescribes what Catholicism is and is not
for its followers, Islam has certain mechanisms which delineate what
is vital and what is optional for its own followers. There remains an
urgent need, and not simply in such large-scale issues, to understand
what values and symbols of a particular context mean to people of
that context before ‘translating’ them into our own. It is not enough
to recognize what the headscarf is as we understand it; rather, the
understanding of those who wear it must be understood first.2
1 This has become a subject of some debate in recent years.
2 The headscarf issue in France is deeply complex and cannot be discussed in sufficient
detail here. For further information, see Dominic McGoldrick, Human Rights and
Religion: The Islamic Headscarf Debate in Europe (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2006); Joan
Wallach Scott, Politics of the Veil (Priceton: Princeton University Press, 2007); and
Bowen, Why the French Don’t Like Headscarves, op. cit.
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Without addressing these two concerns, any sort of citizenship
project is likely to fail and cause a great deal of damage in the pro-
cess. Such concerns arose as a reaction to the ‘head-scarf affair’ in
France, as articulated by Madame Mittérand – who ‘saw no reason
for banning the ×ijÉb and advocated the right to be different and the
concomitant celebration of plurality’1 – and others. Whether they
realized it or not, such calls meant that the French state would have
to take the step of recognizing that this narrow version of French
culture was not universal, and that the state did not have to battle
against any difference with the ‘mainstream’ interpretation of that
culture. The French political elite were unwilling to admit either and,
thus, the headscarf affair continues to reappear in France and in
other EU states every so often. The objective truth of the matter is
quite simple: there is no neutrality here at all. Rather, one party has a
symbol (the headscarf), with a meaning it holds quite sincerely as a
matter of faith (modesty and piety in front of God), with another
party objectifying that symbol with quite a different meaning (a form
of aggression, as the President Jacques Chirac said in 2003).
The fact that this commission argued for a variety of typically
multiculturalist measures only shows that some multiculturalist
values have truly become embedded in public life. Twenty years
ago, such a commission would never have argued for these types
of measures, on the basis that it was not the business of the French
state to recruit Muslim chaplains into the armed forces, for exam-
ple. But the logic of the commission was certainly not multicultural-
ist, for it still tried to interpret the minority (Muslims) through the
prism of the majority (Christians). Christians need chaplains, so do
Muslims. But since pious Christian women do not need to cover
their hair, why should Muslims? Obviously, they should not, unless
they are trying to proselytize and create public disorder, or so it is
claimed. The second model of citizenship, which we might call
‘multiculturalist citizenship’ with more of an emphasis on plural-
ism and with its own problems emanating from its structural pecu-
liarities, is represented by the current British example.
1 Parekh, Rethinking Multiculturalism, p. 250.
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Generally, although not entirely, this type of paradigm does
not include an invasive assimilation process, and has more of a
resemblance to pluralistic and separatist models than national-
istic ones. It is here that we can see more practical evidence as
to why multiculturalism in Britain is still, even after the 7th July
bombings in London, a reality. The subsequent fear relates to
social cohesion and whether the concept of citizenship is con-
structed strongly enough to sustain a stable and cohesive socie-
ty, the bare minimum requirement of any real civil society as
mentioned above.
Two examples illustrate this system at work: the exemption for
Sikhs from wearing crash helmets, and the funding of faith schools.
In 1972, the British Parliament empowered the government to legal-
ly require motorcyclists to wear crash helmets; however, this meant
that Sikhs would have to remove their turbans, a measure they were
reluctant to take. Four years later, the Parliament amended the law,
allowing Sikhs to keep their turbans, but they did not use the princi-
ple of ‘cultural pluralism’ to exempt Sikhs from the measure. Ra-
ther, they decided that since the primary concern of the law was to
ensure safety for the driver, and that the turban was a sufficient sub-
stitute from a safety perspective, it would be permissible from that
standpoint to allow turban-wearing Sikhs to drive motorcycles. Such
a solution was not theoretically too problematic: the purpose of the
law was safety and Sikh turbans were sufficient substitutes. In 1989,
however, the Employment Act exempted Sikhs from wearing safety
helmets on construction sites, with the proviso that, should any inju-
ry occur, the injured party should accept responsibility for any addi-
tional injury that occurred because of the lack of a helmet. This solu-
tion took the standpoint of ‘safety’ to a new level, one that created a
situation whereby “[t]he burden of additional injury is borne by
those who for cultural reasons choose to meet the minimum re-
quirement in their own different ways.”1
The law took the position that in a limited fashion, the indi-
vidual might choose to place his or her own health in jeopardy in
1 Parekh, Rethinking Multiculturalism, p. 244.
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order to safeguard his or her ethnic identity. It is important to
note that the law did not allow this as an absolute right; this solu-
tion would likely never have been endorsed had the turban not
provided some substitute protection.
We should also recall the argument that led to the British Gov-
ernment finally funding Muslim-faith schools from the public treas-
ury. Currently, a limited number of Muslim schools are funded by
the UK on a basis similar to Catholic, Jewish and Anglican schools;
however the risk of the spread of ‘fundamentalist Islam’ is being
cited as a reason for withholding funds. At best, this claim is an ex-
aggeration and, at worst, a fallacy. As mentioned previously, if it
were true, non-state funded Muslim schools would have been closed
down a long time ago. The state, however, carried out its policy on a
basis of equal opportunity in recognition of difference. The principle
was to provide for a good education that would allow students to
pursue their lives in the UK on par with the majority, while still
providing for variations according to their chosen belief system.
The curriculum would be set according to certain standards which
are sufficiently universal enough for both the mainstream and the
Muslim minority to agree upon – a situation that would satisfy all
parties involved. Some actors within the state are now questioning
how best to carry this philosophy out, and at the time of writing
this chapter, the UK’s Department of Communities and Local
Government were beginning a review of training for faith leaders
in the Muslim community, but the fundamental principles hopeful-
ly remain the same.
The UK approached its diversity issues in these two cases
according to the following principles:
1. Equality was to mean ‘equality of opportunity’, which
meant respecting differences to a point, and not insisting upon
complete uniformity. Hence, safety and education were the
red lines, but within them, allowances were made. A good ex-
ample of seeing how the British legal establishment viewed
this principle can be found within the case surrounding
Shabina Begum in Luton; her right to wear a headscarf was
never questioned, although her freedom to dress as she
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pleased was curtailed in other ways.1
2. Where it was accepted that the state did have a role to play,2
it was to be based on a position that displayed a certain ‘neu-
tral standpoint’. There was to be a very basic ‘minimum re-
quirement’ which could then incorporate a great deal of diver-
sity, but past that line, the state would not budge. As such, had
the schools insisted on teaching a curriculum that would have
resulted in students being unable to compete in the general
market, the state would likely have rejected funding. Such a re-
jection would not have been unequal, as the other schools did
meet that criterion.
3. But we are still left wondering: what is a ‘neutral stand-
point’? Are to assume something is ‘neutral’ just because it
is claimed to be so? Or do we have a system by which we can
argue it to be so? If we do, in order for it to be consistent,
will it not have to be based on some sort of set of principles?
In which case, is it still neutral?
And here, we find the same weakness of many multicultural-
ists as mentioned before, for while they identify the key falsehood
(there is no such thing as ‘neutrality’), they have nothing to pro-
vide in its place that can be sustained. It is not sufficient to de-
construct lies: the establishment of truth must also be provided.
This is the job of the next generation.
Multiculturalist citizenship: the next generation of multi-
culturalism
Kymlicka notes, quoting other philosophers, “Policies which in-
crease the salience of ethnic identities act ‘like a corrosive on
metal, eating away at the ties of connectedness that bind us to-
gether as a nation’.”3 Kymlicka himself, a multiculturalist par excel-
1 McGoldrick, Human Rights and Religion, pp. 180-204.
2 The concept that the state did  not have a role to play does not appear to have been a
serious point of contention in this particular instance, although it would have been a
pertinent point to raise; this reflects a fundamental ‘liberal’, and to some extent
‘nationalist’, point of view.
3 Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy, p. 366.
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lence, admits that this is a “serious concern.”1 Whether it is the
salience of ethnic identities or religious identities, the fear is that
it will displace and make irrelevant the common identity that is
the basis of citizenship, leaving the state to crumble into a “spiral
of competition, mistrust and antagonism.”2 In this sense,
Kymlicka’s liberalism overrides his pluralism, and justifiably so:
but still a multiculturalist liberal.
We have discussed above how the analysis of the multicul-
turalist school has been generally correct, but that there is a key
weakness. In its desire to properly deconstruct that which is un-
justifiable, it has left out one key task: the construction of that
which is justifiable. And here, plainly speaking, the de-reification
of the ‘national identity’ by the multiculturalist school has left a
huge gaping hole where national identities used to be.
We do not live in a world where identities have been made
completely irrelevant, and indeed, it does not follow that a stable
society really needs that to happen. On the contrary, identities are
the means by which values are sustained and morals are passed
on to individuals who become citizens. As yet, nothing better
than the overall concept of ‘national identity’ has really been
proposed – perhaps, just as democracy ‘is the worst form of gov-
ernment, except for all those other forms that have been tried
from time to time’ (Winston Churchill), so ‘national identity’ is
our best alternative.
The question is: who gets to define that national identity?
Now, obviously, not everyone in the world is going to be
able to. On the contrary, if that were the case, then we would
stop to see countries and cultures. It does not make sense that
Chinese who live in Beijing are able to define the culture of Lon-
don, for example.
On the other hand, what about Chinese who live in Beijing
who want to migrate to the UK? This seems like a simple enough
question. If they come, under the law, then they should be able to
1 Ibid.
2 Ibid.
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come into a country that allows them rights and responsibilities
and if, over time, they contribute and so on, they will become citi-
zens and then become part of the story of the UK.
But there are two things here that are also questions, which
we do not always see. The first is: who gets to have the ‘original
blessing’ (opposite of original sin) of setting the parameters of
that national story (that defines the national identity)? And if one
asks, why is this important? The answer is predictably: because
we must start from somewhere. To repeat the point again, there is
no such thing as neutrality in this regard. There is always going to
be an inbuilt kind of preference, even in things like public holi-
days being on some days (owing to historical, cultural or religious
reasons). So, who gets to do it? The second is a corollary ques-
tion: are all people in any given country ‘equal’ in terms of com-
munity capital to define the national story?
Now, the standard assumption is: the majority gets to decide
that national story. But this is not particularly good enough. Who
will protect the minority from the tyranny of the majority? Also,
what sort of majority are we talking about? Is it demographic ma-
jority? Political and economic majority (which can also be in the
hands of the minority)? These are questions to be pondered on.
If we admit that today’s pluralistic world requires that each na-
tion state have some kind of multicultural citizenship, we can
move beyond that to talk about who gets to formulate the public
political culture of that multicultural society. For me, it is rather
self-evident that we need one – if we do not have one, we run the
very real risk of ethnic and civil strife, the likes of which we have
seen so far in the world through genocide and ethnic cleansing
(and lesser destructive forces). So we get to: who gets to formu-
late that? Any sustainable public political culture must be under-
pinned by values, and values come from historically based na-
tional cultures that already have stories behind them.
Note: one political culture, but plural values, and also in terms
of historically based national cultures as well as stories, both with-
in the same culture, groups of cultures and complete distinct cul-
tures. This is the point of the multiculturalism process – that we
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have respect for those different stories, and that each of those
different stories can provide us with values for the public political
culture. Multiculturalism without that public political culture, that
single, national story, is just a process without any sustainable
output. It is like a factory line that keeps on running, but with no
product actually in sight – because no one knows what the final
product is supposed to remotely look like.
Those different stories are characterized by a historical identity
that relates to values. This is perhaps the most important thing. I
would not limit it to ethnic groups, but also to religious groups, as
well as gender – it is not sufficient that there are simply a number of
people. They have to have a history, because history is the test that a
culture is actually a sustainable set of ideas. This presupposes, inci-
dentally, that each community that relates to each of those stories is
actually sure of itself. It is insufficient having a community that just
labels itself, without knowing its history and what has actually pro-
duced them in terms of their past. Otherwise, how can they pro-
mote their values, and what makes them special (just as special as
anyone else) in this family of peoples and individuals? This applies,
for example, to the Malays in Malaysia and to the English in Britain
– they do not have the same sense of ‘self’ that the Chinese in Ma-
laysia and the Scots in Britain do. They certainly have an identity and
a story that should be part of the national story of each of their
countries (Malaysia and Britain), but if they do not know it and edu-
cate themselves in those identities and stories, how can they proper-
ly engage in a process of creating and recreating the nation, which
should be a continuous process in any society?
But this still does not get us to the final query: who gets to
define the public political culture?
If we assume that:
a) the public political culture should be based on cultures
(whether ethnic, religious or whatever else in terms of what is
based in a set of ideas encased in history), b) each of those cultur-
al groups have to be sure of themselves and their own stories,
and c) the cultural groups have to be resident within the countries
themselves then, d) does it follow that all of those groups become
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a part of that process of defining the public political culture?
Yes, with a sense of proportion, and with an awareness of how
those groups came to be there: proportion meaning that the starting
position (and there is a starting point, that is not neutral, no matter
what we try to fool ourselves into believing) of the public political
culture belongs first to the original inhabitants of the land. Then, it
becomes a point of democratic inclusion of the later arrivals – and
those later arrivals should have a legitimate arrival point. Other-
wise, their ‘nation-capital’ (i.e., their ‘wealth’ in creating the na-
tional culture) is diminished.
Let us make the point clear with a fictitious example: Stan is a
country of Stanians. They have a fully active historical memory as
Stanians, although they (like pretty much everyone in this world)
have known diversity as a natural way of life. In their history, there
are plenty of records to suggest that many Nonstanians came into
the country, and settled there, adding to the diversity of the country.
The Nonstanians generally kept to their identity as Nonstanians, but
Stanian culture was sufficiently tolerant that it allowed them to gen-
tly and organically become part of the story of Stan. Now, Stanians
are the majority, and rightfully so; they did not kill off the indige-
nous inhabitants, even if through time they changed religions and
thus affected the culture. Nonstanians are the minority, but if not
for the fact that they are demographically the minority, they would
have as much right as Stanians to define the story – they also did not
come except with the permission of the inhabitants.
But then, for example, Stan is invaded by Imperium. Imperium
then brings in a huge amount of Antistanians, who then begin to
demand the right to define the public political culture of the country.
Now, if the Antistanians became the majority, this becomes a
moot, academic discussion. After all, this is what happened to the
United States – the majority of present citizens originate in settle-
ments which did not have the welcome (let alone the permission)
of Native Americans. That is the unfortunate reality of the Native
American story – it essentially disappeared as a powerful reality in
its own land. But as long as the Antistanians are not the majority,
then, I would argue, the Stanians have the moral and strategic right
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to resist the changes to their public political culture due to inva-
sion. If, for example, G.W. Bush had settled millions of Americans
in Iraq, I would argue multiculturalism would reject any accommo-
dation of them or their symbols in the national story. Their ‘na-
tion-capital’ is by force of arms – and that cannot be the basis for a
just and sustainable nation, for as long as is humanly possible.
Now, how does that apply in Europe? Does it apply to the
‘demographic invasion’ of Muslim communities? Is the fear of
Eurarabia a justifiable one, and should European countries con-
sider themselves similar to Stanians before being invaded by Impe-
rium, or Iraqis in the above scenario?
I would argue that Europe is more in the former category. If
the Muslim communities of Europe were actually white, Christian
and well-off, and we should be honest, none of this talk about
‘identity crisis’ and ‘Eurarabia’ would even be a subject of dis-
cussion, even if they did originate in Arabia or Timbuktu for that
matter. The real issues occur because of a historical relationship
with Islam as a powerful neighbouring civilization (which some-
times did come into conflict with non-Muslim parts of Europe),
and lack of capacity in European societies in terms of dealing
with racial diversity (which it never has before, although many
other societies have done very well in this regard in history) and
because of the fact that most of the communities that arrive from
the Muslim world are poor, which creates a grassroots backlash
from indigenous people who lose their jobs in this free-market
economy of competitiveness.
In the European situation, the invasion occurred the other
way around. Had colonialism never taken place, it is doubtful that
more than a fraction of migrant Muslims would have come to
Europe. One can look at the numbers right now: most migrants
in Europe in general are themselves or their descendants an out-
come of colonial subjects. Take them away, and you have very
homogenous societies in Europe. Beyond that, and this is also
important, these communities were welcomed to come to Europe
because Europeans wanted them to fill in the gap with regards to
cheap labour. Put these two factors together, and it is rather un-
conscionable for indigenous Europeans to now remove the right
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of migrants and their descendants to play a role in the construc-
tion of the national story and the public political culture based on
that national story, even while indigenous Europeans have the
historical right of defining the ‘starting position’.
Thus, one key thing remains for our discussion. What is the
‘mainstream’ basis of? Who decides what the basic values of the
state actually are? We no longer live in a certain moral universe,
where the Church can lay down those limits (or any other reli-
gion); such an approach simply no longer applies in this time and
certainly not in post-Christian Europe. But we cannot be fooled
into thinking that there is not some sort of void there; it exists
and if any political philosophy is to go beyond theory and exist as
action, it has to take that into account.
As Olssen notes regarding the fourth principle of the Parekh
Report on multi-ethnic Britain (the first being ‘equal worth’, the se-
cond identifying citizens as both individuals and members of com-
munities, and the third affirming the principle of ‘difference’):
But, just as diversity is important, so, a fourth principle as-
serts, every society needs to be cohesive, ‘and must find
ways of nurturing diversity while fostering a common
sense of belonging and a shared identity among its constit-
uent members’.1
European societies have generally, through a variety of histori-
cal processes, found a way by which this social cohesion can be ac-
complished. The liberal concept of the ‘citizen’, as a way to ensure a
formalized link between two completely different types of individu-
als in a particular territory, is the latest stage. This concept is taken
seriously all over the EU and affects every institution in some way or
another. In institutions in France, the ‘liberal state’ par excellence, it
means that citizens are treated as individually equal, in the sense that
they are the ‘same’, without note to difference or differential treat-
ment (save in some instances vis-á-vis gender and age). This is in
contrast to the type of citizenship in other EU states (such as the
1 Mark Olssen, “From the Crick Report to the Parekh Report: Multiculturalism,
Cultural Difference and Democrcy: The Re-Visioning of Citizenship Education,”
British Journal of Sociology of Education, Vol. 25, No. 2 (2004), p. 184.
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UK where the concept is not yet fully developed). It is the driving
force, for example, behind the ×ijÉb issue, but it is also the impetus
behind the duty in French law that a citizen is legally liable to help
another citizen when his life is in danger.
The citizen is the basis of society and, thus, fraternity between
citizens is demanded, although in different ways than it is in other
communities. In general, the liberal definition of a good citizen as
an individual that seeks the promotion of his own interests without
infringing upon the rights of any other citizen holds water in Eu-
rope. If the citizen is the basis of the community, then likewise, the
full member of a community is a citizen.
Therefore, the logical and necessary next step, as identified
by the progression of the classical multiculturalist discussion to
the citizenship-civic virtue debate, is to identify what it means to
be a citizen. It is not sufficient to declare that justice demands
that differential treatment be employed in certain cases for it to
occur; the central axiom of liberal concepts of citizenship requires
adjustment. In his academic work on the issue, Olssen cites the
scholar Young 1 saying:
[T]he ideal of universal citizenship embodied in the social
democratic conception incorporates a sense of universality as
(a) generality, and (b) equal treatment.2
‘Generality’ in Young’s thought means ideals that transcend
the differences of the groups; what those ideals are remains con-
tested. Indeed, it is doubtful that any final answer can be unequiv-
ocally reached; different contexts refer to different things. Some
answers refer to institutions. For example, the final test of a citizen
in the United States is his or her acceptance of the American Con-
stitution. Even murderers and rapists remain citizens; but a person
who rejects the constitution is, theoretically, no longer a citizen. In
the EU, the basis of citizenship is very much a topic of discussion.
1 Iris Marion Young (1949–2006) was Professor of political science at the University
of Chicago and affiliated with the Center for Gender Studies and the Human Rights
programme there. Her research covered contemporary political theory, feminist social
theory and normative analysis of public policy. – Editor.
2 Ibid., p. 181.
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As noted elsewhere, a recent Charter of Rights is designed to set
the baseline by which an individual can be judged a European citi-
zen. What this baseline is or should be remains a subject of great
debate: what values are truly European?
In a world where geography has become less and less de-
scriptive of culture and belonging, where communication over
vast distances has become ever more instantaneous, and where
cultural borrowing and replication has exponentially increased
(and not, as some might erroneously say, just begun), the world
may be in dire need of those minimum standards to be drawn,
whether globally or regionally.1 As Olssen states, “Certain com-
mon provisions, then, must underpin difference.”2
However, while it might be relatively easy to arrive at consensus
on procedural values (i.e. basic preconditions for democratic dia-
logue), substantive values are not so easily agreed upon; hence,
Olssen’s criticism that the Report did not identify in detail what
those values are.3 The French and German ban of the ×ijÉb in cer-
tain areas of public life may be unjust, but the French, in particular,
would disagree; obviously there is a problem with using the idea of
justice in abstraction if it means quite different things to different
peoples. A national identity, built on common values, is a vital ne-
cessity for a sustainable theory of multiculturalist citizenship.
This is particularly relevant for our context in European so-
cieties, where the far-right is gaining prominence again, in part
precisely because there has not been an adequate alternative pro-
vided for the narrow national vision that the inheritors of the as-
similationist perspective have provided as the basis for citizen-
ship. That is why multiculturalist citizenship has to take into account
the need for a national identity for the majority: for the minority, it
also provides them with something to integrate into. Without such a
national vision that properly incorporates both the minority and the
majority, we find minority communities at a bit of a loss in terms of
1 Olssen notes Andrew Sharp’s thought in this regard. Olssen, “From the Crick Re-
port to the Parekh Report”, p. 186.
2 Ibid., p. 186.
3 Ibid., p. 185.
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satisfying their need for belonging in their society.
This search for common values is already underway in many
quarters;1 the Crick Report notes that it is a ‘main aim’ of the whole
British community2 and presumably for all societies that seek social
cohesion on a liberal pluralistic platform. In this truly difficult task,
the minority and the majority often meet as equal partners, as
they should. Without equal access for all sectors of society to
contribute, the search for common ‘civic values’ becomes a pub-
lic relations exercise of the dominant segment of society; each
group must have the power to contribute to the discussion in or-
der for it to be authentic and credible.
This is predicated, however, on the assumption that not only
should the majority recognize the rights of the minority, but the
minority should also consider the duties it owes the majority. Or to
put it another way, a consideration for the stability and cohesive-
ness of the community must be balanced by respecting difference
and diversity; otherwise, social disorder is likely and, in such a situ-
ation, respect itself becomes irrelevant. The two concerns do go
together; they cannot exist without each other; the difficulty, which
we must all admit from the outset, is deciding what those concerns
actually entail in real life. From this author’s standpoint, the least
negative way to do this is to increase democratic participation, so
that all voices can be heard, but that all voices are given the power
to speak, and to speak in the way that they choose to speak, with-
out being forced to sound like someone else. This is not semantics,
but a very real and fundamental issue; the power to be heard in the
public sphere as a representative of a national vision is currently
held by a very select few in society.
It is at this point that multiculturalist citizenship has to make a
choice: it either becomes the process by which that national vision
can be arrived at or it can contain within it the philosophy behind
that national vision. On the other hand, even if multiculturalist citi-
zenship stops at the demand for a national vision behind a national
1 See ibid., for an attempt to locate a thoroughly multiculturalist approach to a liberal
citizenship educational curriculum.
2 Cited in ibid., p. 183.
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identity without actually formulating some thoughts for that vision,
one can still offer some thoughts of their own in that regard as
food for thought. That national vision cannot simply be a list of
legal requirements: it must be something that can satisfy the hu-
man need, displayed so many times in history, and no less today,
for belonging to a story larger than themselves. One could argue
that here, religion in general does in fact have a pertinent role to
play, with religion fairly widely defined. Religion, historically, has
been the repository of core values which all civilizations have had.
This is, ironically, what many assimilationists have been saying all
along: belief in religion may not be necessary, but some of the val-
ues of religion (in the European context, pre-eminently displayed
in the idea of ‘love of neighbour’) are virtues that are not meant to
be kept solely within the church, the synagogue, the mosque or the
temple, and are not discriminatory towards non-believers, or even
rejecters of faith altogether.
What is required in that national vision is a weltanschung: a
worldview that is rooted in the story of the country; that is no
small demand, and we have to be cognizant of that. Modernity
has successfully managed to kill the idea of a weltanschung based on
some set of sacred values in some way, and post-modernity has
provided the burial casket.1 But now it is difficult to ignore that
there is a void in its place, and which has provoked a reaction
among philosophers in the West and the Muslim world.2
That void is not about to be filled overnight, but one might
posit a way forward in that regard. At present, not in the UK, nor
anywhere else in the European Union, has any continuous or per-
manent institution been set up for precisely the purpose of elabo-
rating upon a world view that is suitable for a European country in
this day and age. There is no reason why such an institution could
not be established, whether on the national level or on the Euro-
1 Syed Muhammad Naqib Al-Attas, Prolegomena to the Metaphysics of Islam: An Exposition
of the Fundamental Elements of the Worldview of Islam (Kuala Lumpur: International Insti-
tute of Islamic Thought, ISTAC, 1995), pp. 25-27.
2 See the works of Al-Attas for an Islamic representation (ibid.) and Guenon for a
more Western reaction (Guenon, Crisis of the Modern World), although Guenon died a
Muslim.
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pean level. In the UK, the heir to the throne and thus the head of
the Church of England, Prince Charles, has already announced that
he would prefer to be the ‘defender of faith’ rather than ‘defender
of the faith’, indicating his pluralistic attitude as the heir-apparent to
the British head of state. Now, leaving aside what this might mean
for Anglicanism (and one can imagine it would have some effects
which should be accounted for), perhaps such a figure could pre-
side upon the foundation of some sort of institution that would
bring together humanist philosophers and theologians of various
persuasions committed to the idea of a national identity. One
would hope there would be enough common ground to come to
something of a worthwhile philosophy behind a national identity.
Such an effort would not suddenly turn the UK into a theocracy,
but it would add a voice, that would be plural in nature, in the dis-
cussion around the question of ‘what does it mean to be (fill in
European country identity of choice).’
One might argue that both the idea of a national identity, as
well as the thoughts above that might underline the philosophy of
the national identity, go against many multiculturalist theorists, par-
ticularly those with a ‘secularist bias’. That would be true: many do
indeed argue, both in support of multiculturalism and as evidence
of how awed the school is, that multiculturalism’s final victory is
the creation of a post-national (i.e., the absence of a national identi-
ty) state. But just as culture itself is made through change, the same
can be said (even more so) for multiculturalism. The project of
multiculturalism is not revelation or revealed religion: it is interpre-
tation and reason, and as such continues to be developed. This in
itself is no sign of weakness, but of strength, if it has a sense of
continuity. So far, it shows that continuity in the writings of the
multiculturalist school as shown above.
Not too many years ago, multiculturalism was concerned
with critiquing the traditional demand directed at ethnic minori-
ties to culturally assimilate: no more is that the emphasis. Multi-
culturalism used to focus its energies on finding a space within
liberalism for the consideration and recognition of groups: that is
no longer required as much as it was before. Now, the main chal-
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lenge for multiculturalism is finding a space within the concept of
citizenship for multiculturalism, and within multiculturalism the
space for the concept of citizenship, which might be called the
struggle for ‘multiculturalist citizenship’.1
A Framework for Multiculturalist Citizenship
In light of all of the previous discussions, it is clear that three
fundamental questions must be posed in order to come to an ap-
propriate theoretical framework: 1. Should states be multicultural-
ist? 2. If so, how should they be multiculturalist, in light of the
diversity of the multiculturalist school? 3. If the state is multicul-
turalist, what is the basis of citizenship?
On the first question, it seems there is little in the way of an
alternative at hand for the modern age in Europe. Multicultural-
ism is, to date, the most developed framework in European socie-
ties for managing this diversity, and the current trend is heading
firmly in that rather broad direction: the idea of a narrow and
forced assimilation process is no longer entertained as a viable
option in the EU. Even the historical detractors of multicultural-
ism have to make their arguments in the contemporary arena
within the broad tradition of multiculturalism. To put it another
way, multiculturalism in principle is not under debate; what is un-
der debate is precisely what sort of multiculturalist political
framework should be employed, even if we no longer refer to
‘multiculturalism’ as a name. When commentators advocate the
‘end of multiculturalism’, they will not get further than the rein-
terpretation of multiculturalism, which is already happening from
within the multiculturalist school.
But we cannot go further without understanding how these
states should be multiculturalist. We have discussed above how it is
1 Modood has argued for the term ‘multicultural citizenship’ which essentially means the
same thing in his terminology: see, Tariq Modood, “Multiculturalism and Groups”, Social
and Legal Studies, vol. 17, no. 4, 2008, p. 549. Nevertheless, I choose to use ‘multiculturalist
citizenship’ for two reasons: it is grammatically more consistent with my usage of ‘multicul-
turalist’ and ‘multicultural’ above, and it also distinguishes it from the ‘multicultural citi-
zenship’ proposed by other authors who do not share the view of secularism outlined here.
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rather impractical to consider that religiously inspired identities are
not suitable for inclusion in the considerations of a plural society.
Individuals are not made up only of certain types of identities; they
have several, co-existing identities, on different levels. Any identity
that might affect the cohesion of the community must be consid-
ered. The only question, therefore, is whether or not religiously-
inspired identities are important enough with regard to the individ-
ual. If they are negligible, then neither justice nor social cohesion
demands they be considered in any event. Otherwise, secularism
need not be so reactionary to exclude them; that is neither fair nor
equitable. Certainly, it may be necessary to oppose and reject some
types of diversity; ‘tolerance’ of difference is not an absolute hu-
man right. In all things there are excesses, and respect for diversity
must be balanced by a concern for the cohesiveness of the com-
munity upon certain common and consensual values that provide
for a stable and secure society. This includes, in the medieval era,
the killing of baby girls (because of the desire to have sons), or, in
the modern world, forced marriages (without consent, as opposed
to arranged marriages with consent). Such differences are not tol-
erable, and do justify state intervention, but in this we are fortu-
nate, because in general, such extremes are extremely rare.
The ‘eight ways’ scheme of the philosopher Jacob Levy1 is a
useful example of how the more pluralistic branch of the liberal
tradition can be employed in order to ensure that the distinctive-
ness of all communities is respected within a concept of citizen-
ship. This scheme includes: 1- exemptions from those laws which
penalize or burden their religious practices; 2- assistance in doing
things the majority does unassisted; 3- self-government for certain
types of communities (including national minority groups); 4- ex-
ternal rules restricting non-members’ liberty in order to protect
members’ culture; 5- internal rules for members’ conduct that are
enforced by ostracism and excommunication; 6- incorporation and
enforcement of traditional or religious legal codes within the dom-
inant legal system; 7- special representation within government in-
stitutions; and 8- symbolic recognition of the group within the
1 Kymlicka and Norman, Citizenship in Diverse Societies, pp. 25-30.
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larger state community.
The European and Muslim context in this effort provides cer-
tain examples. Legal exemptions have already been provided to
some groups, the most commonly quoted being special considera-
tion for Jewish shopkeepers with regards to Sunday-closing laws.
Some Muslim groups have also requested exemptions from certain
educational regulations, in order to raise their children in an educa-
tional setting that is not against their religion.
Muslim groups around the EU often seek assistance, particular-
ly with regard to education and the establishment of faith schools.
Some scholars, such as Callan,1 support such policies on the ground
that public funding only for secular schools is discriminatory, and
that the current ethos of ‘common schools’ (i.e. non-religious secu-
lar state schools) may promote bigotry vis-á-vis minority groups. In
his work, Callan quotes the Swann Report, which suggested that in
the UK, existing state schools should include a pluralistic religious
ethos, so that Muslim children would have no reason to go to sepa-
rate schools. To this end, another academic, Haldane, ripostes that
“if the host society has so little respect for its own culture as no
longer to require transmission of its religious traditions and the as-
sociated system of values, might one not doubt the seriousness of its
regard for Muslim and other essentially religious immigrant cul-
tures?”2
However, Callan’s suggestion can easily counter Haldane’s
objections in an appropriate manner, which do not really have
much resonance unless there is no role whatsoever for the state
in education. As it stands, there are minimum curricula imposed
on all schools funded by the state, regardless of whether they are
‘state’ or ‘faith’ schools, in order to ensure certain minimum
standards of education. This can continue to be the case, without
detriment, even if the emphasis on certain subjects differs from
school to school, provided that all children have realistic and
equal access to any school that possesses state funding. This al-
1 Eamonn Callan, “Discrimination and Religious Schooling”, in Kymlicka and Nor-
man, Citizenship in Diverse Societies, pp. 45-67.
2 Cited in ibid., p. 57.
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ready exists, in part, in the Indian educational system, where if
there is partial funding of the school, there can be no discrimina-
tion vis-á-vis entry requirements, and no compulsory religious
education; the caveat, however, is that the more the state funds,
the less religious education is permitted.
If the middle ground means, as scholars such as McConnell
suggest,1 that there would be partial funding from the state only fi-
nancing the non-religious classes (such as mathematics), then so be
it; but such a policy would have to be applied across the board, both
to ‘secular’ and ‘religious’ schools. The importance of ensuring that
children are well-educated, as McConnell notes, is great. Such an
arrangement would, however, absolve the religious schools from any
responsibility to focus the religious education in a manner that as-
sists social participation rather than marginalization.
Other scholars, including Borrows,2 argue that assistance is
not only justified on the basis of the existence of racism or histor-
ical disadvantages, but also on the ground that such policies
might enhance the sense of citizenship among minority groups,
thereby making integration easier. Again, this is a reasonable posi-
tion provided that the minority groups ensure that they use their
particular and specific agenda to further integration into the
mainstream or, at a minimum, do not advocate the reverse. In
this way, the concern that ‘minority rights will crowd a common
citizenship identity’ may be alleviated.
How all of this will progress in the future is uncertain. It is
certainly not beyond imagination that a single political entity will
have a plurality of legal systems in some cases. Some regulations
that apply to women (e.g. maternity leave) do not apply to men
and, more directly analogous, Israel and India differentiate per-
sonal status laws according to religious affiliation. This is how
religious diversity has been accommodated in those states to
some degree, but not without difficulty: in Israel for example, one
1 Cited by E. F. F. Spinner-Halev, “Extending Diversity: Religion in Public and Private
Education”, in Kymlicka and Norman, Citizenship in Diverse Societies, pp. 80-82.
2 John Borrows, “Landed Citizenship: Narratives of Aboriginal Political Participation”, in
Kymlicka and Norman, Citizenship in Diverse Societies, pp. 326-342.
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of the most poignant points of friction in the Jewish community
is the objection of secular Jews to the near total control of the
Orthodox Rabbinate over personal laws for Jews, regardless of
individual religious commitment or following.
Special representation within government institutions for par-
ticular communities, Levy’s ‘seventh way’, is a particularly contro-
versial measure, which finds opposition in various forums. The
Cypriot case takes community identification as the basis of all gov-
ernment, following as it does from British colonialism and the Ot-
toman state system. In its modern form, such identification means
that, at present, there is no place for non communal citizens in the
state structure. Muslims as a religious community, and other reli-
gious communities in the EU, are not calling for similar quota-
based political representation in democratically-elected bodies.
However, where appointed bodies are also a part of the system,
such as the House of Lords in the UK, in order to reflect the
makeup of society as a whole (rather than only those who come
out to vote), a number of entities have called for Muslim represen-
tation. Modood suggests that such a measure may not necessarily
be damaging; on the contrary, it may be ‘more conducive to social
stability and intergroup harmony’ in certain cases. Various groups
have already sought political representation by sectional represen-
tation in existing political parties or institutions, in the same way
that other groups, such as women, Jews and Africans have at-
tempted.1
Less difficult measures to recognize religious communities in
order to induce social cohesion are also wide open. Going be-
yond Europe and looking at the Coptic community in Egypt, for
example, reveals a community that has long had the right to take
their religious festivals as additional days off from employment –
the bare minimum, some might say, that a state that respects and
appreciates its pluralistic citizenry can do. Recently, however, the
Coptic festivals were designated as national holidays, further rec-
ognizing Copts not only as a tolerated minority, but as an integral
1 Modood and Buchanan, “Should the Church of England be Disestablished?” p. 187.
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part of Egyptian society. The effect measures such as these may
have on the enthusiasm of minority communities to participate in
the mainstream should not be underestimated, as they serve a du-
al purpose: getting the mainstream to appreciate the minority, and
getting the minority to accept itself as part of the mainstream.
In order to remain consistent to what has already been written
here about the need for a national story, one could and, indeed
should, assume the need for a national identity based on a national
story. The ‘ninth way’, thus, is a prescription about how to include
(and not exclude or ignore) the full participation of minorities in
the continual construction, and reconstruction, of the national sto-
ry. That national story must be based on inclusion, as well as fair-
ness, which brings together majorities and minorities, and it should
also assume that this story is necessary for both the majority and
the minorities: this is the mechanism by which societies in crisis are
stabilized. And if we have learnt anything from our discussion, it is
that societies in modernity are indeed in crisis. The security discus-
sion only goes to show how the concerns can be made even more
manifest in a time of a crisis.
Conclusion
Like Muslim juridical theorists who are trying to take into ac-
count the effect of modernity on their jurisprudence, European
political philosophers are recognizing that traditional understand-
ings of identity and belonging are no longer valid in a Europe de-
fined by new circumstances. The dynamics of immigration, EU
integration and globalization have raised new questions surround-
ing what is meant by the ‘European identity’, and the debate is
still very much open.
In general, the multiculturalists have ‘won’ the first argument:
there is almost a consensus that there should be genuine respect for
diversity in societies. The second phase is now underway: how much
respect should be given, and how does this relate to the need for a
common citizenship? On what is that common citizenship, a com-
ponent of a cohesive society as far as Europe is concerned, to be
based? Such questions are certainly relevant for Muslim communi-
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ties which are diverse in and of themselves, and which often pose
the greatest challenges to the debate through their various ethnic
origins and also their value systems. We have here considered the
application of a form of liberal pluralism, whereby a useful interpre-
tation of multiculturalism is used to uphold the principle of respect
for diversity, as well as a concern for a sustainable common citizen-
ship, necessary for the cohesiveness of modern European societies.
The deeper question of what that common citizenship should be
based upon, however, has been left unanswered. Nor have we cho-
sen to go far beyond what states and politicians should do. The civil
and social roles in this regard are not our specific concerns here.
At this point in the debate, however, some observations can
be made. First: societies are, at once, collectives of citizens and col-
lectives of communities. Classical liberalism addresses the former,
whereas pluralism addresses the latter; hence, a combination of the
two may be most appropriate in European societies. This would
mean there is both unity and diversity in both public and private
life, but a single, national political culture in the public sphere that
is nevertheless drawn from a consensus of societies’ many com-
munities. In the final analysis, the concept of ‘minority’ relates to
power, not numbers, and at present, every citizen is a minority, and
the state, as it has power, is the majority. The progression towards
a citizen-based polity within the EU, as European citizens, but also
as citizens of individual member states, provides an opportunity
for full Muslim integration into the European sphere. For there is,
if properly deployed, a concurrent point of agreement between Is-
lamic principles, as illustrated by Muslim intellectuals and scholars,
and between constitutional provisions of civic commitment, as ex-
emplified by European scholars and intellectuals. Tariq Ramadan,
the Swiss academic, proposes that by deriving a ‘civic ethic’ from
the teachings of Islam, Muslims will not only find workable agree-
ment with the mainstream, but also be able to go far beyond that.1
It is difficult to see what alternative to some sort of type of
national identity actually exists, which is essentially what we are
1 Tariq Ramadan, Western Muslims and the Future of Islam (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2004), p. 168.
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discussing here. For some small minorities, other concepts may
serve to hold sway, such as some sort of abstract cosmopolitan-
ism, but for the wider group of people in any given society, these
are not going to be given wide credence.
The major barrier to be overcome in this regard is the re-
quirement that the minority and the majority consider themselves
interchangeable in terms of their civic responsibilities. The major-
ity must view itself as individual citizens of the overall communi-
ty, and the minority must do the same; in other words, as citizens.
This is important to note, for it is all too easy for communities to
go only half way; to become engaged voices in their societies, but
only on behalf of their particular groups. Such usage of citizen-
ship is often abusive, designed to perpetuate the estrangement of
such groups from society using other means.
It is true that all minorities must sometimes defend their rights
in a group fashion, for otherwise their concerns, as groups, may be
ignored. Within limits, this is not only acceptable, but mandatory.
In a world where globalization is redesigning cultural expression in
societies every day, one cannot expect social mainstreams to adjust
without representation of some sort from groups who require ac-
commodations. These adjustments are often the subject of misun-
derstanding or misinterpretation, but the need exists nonetheless.
The risk is that these exceptions may be exploited to the point that
a ghettoization effect takes place, reducing the citizenship-based
identity to a mere convenience, recognized rarely, if at all. One side
of the equation seldom solves the problems of communitarianism,
sectarianism and ‘identity politics’; both the majority and the mi-
nority should contribute to its resolution.
Likewise, full integration should not be about groups as groups
or individuals as individuals, but rather about both. But even this
paradigm is not necessarily sufficient for a truly healthy civil society.
In coming to an understanding about such a resolution, whether
from the point of view of the state or civil society, it is necessary to
understand the theoretical framework underpinning the approach of
both the majority and the minority to the situation. The reader will
probably understand by now that the author’s perception of how
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these issues are dealt with is fundamentally pragmatic; there are no
grandiose programs outlined here for monumental shifts and chang-
es in policy. Nor do I intend here to create one; the interest I have
here is a political type of multiculturalism.
All that can really be said of that is that an appreciation of
both approaches is appropriate, necessary and valuable for the
demographic majority as well as the demographic minorities. The
plural of ‘minority’ is not meant as a throwaway; there are differ-
ent approaches for different minorities, and no one size fits all in
these equations. But all of those equations have to be able to fit
into a wider idea of multicultural citizenship which incorporates
difference, under a common, national umbrella.
CHAPTER 4
The Implications of Fiqh al-AqalliyyÉt for
The Rights of non-Muslim Minorities in
Majority Muslim Countries
Mohammad H. Fadel
Introduction: When can non-Muslims be Bound by
Islamic Law?
Islamic law has shown concern with the rights and obligations of
Muslims living outside the territory of an Islamic state from the
very moment the Prophet (peace be upon him) established a city-
state in MadÊnah. The Qur’an (8: 72), for example, stated that the
Muslims of MadÊnah did not have any political obligations toward
Muslims who had not performed hijrah, unless those Muslims
sought their help on account of religious persecution. Even in
that case, however, the Muslims of MadÊnah were excused from
such an obligation if they were bound by a treaty of peace to the
tribe that was guilty of persecuting Muslims in their midst.
Conversely, Islamic law was also concerned with the rights
and obligations of non-Muslims living in the territory of an Is-
lamic state, a concern that also began with the establishment of
the Islamic state in MadÊnah. Thus the Charter of MadÊnah set out
a system of mutual rights and obligations that bound the people
of MadÊnah together in certain common pursuits regardless of
their religion, while reserving only particular obligations to those
Madinese who were Muslims.1 It is important to note in this re-
1 Ali Bulaç, “The Medina Document,” in Charles Kurzman (ed.), Liberal Islam: a Reader
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 169-178.
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gard that the Charter of MadÊnah pre-dates the concept of
dhimmah in consideration for payment of a tax, jizyah, which is
alluded to in Surah al-Tawbah (Qur’an, 9: 29).
Whether considering the obligations of Muslims in an Islamic
state toward Muslims living in a non-Islamic state, or the obligations
of non-Muslims to an Islamic state, Islamic law deemed the exist-
ence of a compact, or agreement, to be decisive. This distinction, i.e.
between individuals who are governed by a compact and individuals
who are simply governed by Islamic law on its own terms, gave rise
to the historical conceptions of the d r al-isl m and d r al-Íarb, the
former being a territory in which Islamic law applies of its own by
virtue of the existence of a Muslim community possessing control
over a certain territory with the ability to defend it against hostile
invaders. By virtue of a combination of their political independence
and moral commitment to Islam, a legitimate basis is given to en-
forcing law on Muslims.1
But what about non-Muslims who reside in that territory?
On what basis could Islamic law legitimately apply to them?
While they could in principle enjoy the political benefits of residence
in an Islamic state, they could not, because of their failure to be
Muslims, share in its moral commitments, and accordingly, their
commitments to following Islamic law were necessarily political ra-
ther than moral, meaning, their obligation to follow Islamic law was
an incident to the terms of the political agreement they entered into
with the Islamic state. To be clear, non-Muslims were morally
obliged to obey Islamic law in the sense that God would hold them
culpable for failing to adhere to Islam in general,2 but we are con-
cerned here with another issue: to what extent did Muslim jurists
believe it legitimate to hold non-Muslims liable in this world for
breaching the substantive obligations of Islamic law?
As evidenced by the controversies among Muslims jurists re-
1 Mohammad Fadel, “International Law, Regional Developments: Islam,” in Frauke
Lachenmann et al. (eds.), The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (Oxford:
Heidelberg and Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 10.
2 See Badr al-Dīn MuÍammad b. Bah dur ibn ÑAbdall h al-Zarkashī, al-BaÍr al-MuÍÊÏ, edited
by Muhammad Muhammad Tamir (Beirut: DÉr al-Kutub al-ÑIlmiyya, 2000), vol. 1, p. 36.
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garding the extent to which non-Muslims residing in an Islamic
state were bound by the substantive rules of Islamic law, it was
clear that non-Muslims were subject to only some rules of Islamic
law, but not all. The general answer given by Muslim jurists was
that non-Muslims could legitimately be expected to obey those
rules of Islamic law which were not based exclusively on an as-
sumption of belief in Islam. Accordingly, non-Muslims could not
be held liable for failing to perform Islamic rituals. Likewise, the
application of ÍudËd to non-Muslims was controversial: some, like
Im m M lik, exempted non-Muslims from the Íadd on zinÉ (forni-
cation and adultery) on the grounds that the main purpose of this
Íadd was repentance, and accordingly it would be nonsensical to
apply it to someone who does not accept Islam as true. Others
permitted applying the Íadd on zinÉ to non-Muslims such as Chris-
tians and Jews on the grounds that adultery was forbidden to them
under their own religions, and accordingly, they were being pun-
ished for conduct that they themselves held to be immoral pursu-
ant to their own beliefs.
As for ordinary discretionary criminal law – taÑzÊr – I know of
no dispute that this body of law applied equally to non-Muslims and
Muslims. So robust was the conviction that taÑzīr applied to Muslims
and non-Muslims alike that Im m M lik, despite his argument that
non-Muslims were not subject to the Íadd for adultery, held they
could be punished for adultery under the principle of taÑzÊr. Similar-
ly, Im m M lik treated the Íadd punishments for sariqah and Íir bah
as forms of taÑzÊr in order to apply them to non-Muslims, arguing
that these punishments are necessary for the protection of property
and life, an interest binding both Muslims and non-Muslims. Like-
wise, civil law – property, contract and tort – applied equally to Mus-
lims and non-Muslims although tort law, according to all the Sunnī
madhhabs other than the ×anafīs, provided different levels of com-
pensation in cases of wrongful death where the victim was a non-
Muslim.1
1 Mohammad Fadel, “The True, the Good and the Reasonable: The Theological and
Ethical Roots of Public Reason in Islamic Law,” Canadian Journal of Law and
Jurisprudence, Vol. 21, No. 1 (2008), pp. 61-65.
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I provide this brief background simply to point out that the
question of the extent to which non-Muslims in an Islamic state
are politically subject to Islamic law is a question that has preoc-
cupied Muslim jurists from the earliest days of Muslim legal
thinking, and Muslim jurists recognized that the application of
Islamic law to non-Muslims required a different kind of justifica-
tion than that underpinning its application to Muslims. Applica-
tion of Islamic law to Muslims was simply derivative of their ac-
ceptance of Islam as being true. For non-Muslims, the justification
had to be more complex, and accordingly, Muslim jurists struggled
in formulating principled limits to the application of Islamic law to
non-Muslims. And while they generally proceeded to analyze this
problem using a case-by-case method, it is clear that they sought
out a rationale that would be legitimate from the perspective of
non-Muslims. In other words, they articulated reasons for the ap-
plication of Islamic law to non-Muslims which they thought non-
Muslims could reasonably accept for their own reasons.
Accordingly, non-Muslims could legitimately be expected to
be subject to Islamic civil law because pursuant to those doctrines
they receive the benefits of trade and protection from assault; they
were exempt from Islamic ritual law because it would be absurd to
ask someone to pray in a fashion whose format they subjectively
reject as false; they were subject to the taÑzÊr rules of Islamic crimi-
nal law because taÑzÊr rules, unlike Íadd rules, are based on the pub-
lic interest, not solely the vindication of the claims of God, and
thus does not imply any belief in Islam as such; and, they were ex-
empt from Islamic requirements of marriage formation and disso-
lution since they had their own beliefs that governed the legitimacy
of marriage formation and dissolution. In short, Islamic law strove
to provide shared justifications for the application of Islamic law to
non-Muslims in circumstances where shared belief in Islam could
not provide the basis for legitimacy.
Muslims Living in non-Muslim Territory, Fiqh al-AqalliyyÉt
and Democratic Citizenship
Muslim jurists, just as they articulated theories for binding non-
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Muslims to a subset of the rules of Islamic law, also theorized the
conditions under which Muslims could live in a non-Islamic state, or
put differently, what were the conditions that rendered emigration
from a non-Islamic state to an Islamic one obligatory. This too was
a question that entered Muslim juristic discourse from the earliest
days of Islam. As was the case with the question of the extent to
which Islamic law could bind non-Muslims, so too Muslim jurists
differed on the question regarding the conditions on which a Mus-
lim could live in a non-Islamic state. Some jurists articulated a strong
rule prohibiting it outright, e.g. the M likīs, while others, e.g. the
×anafīs and the Sh fi‘īs, produced a more nuanced position which
permitted Muslims to continue living in a non-Islamic state if certain
minimum conditions were satisfied regarding the ability of Muslims
who are resident there to manifest Islam (iÐhÉr al-dÊn).
Muslim jurists conceptualized the legal basis on which Mus-
lims would live in a non-Islamic state using concepts similar to that
which they used in analyzing the relationship of non-Muslims to
the Islamic state: because of the absence of shared belief, the rela-
tionship had to be set forth pursuant to the terms of an agreement
(Ñaqd). Just as the relationship of dhimmah was contractual and in-
cluded mandatory and permissive terms, so too the agreement of
security pursuant to which Muslims could legitimately live in a
non-Islamic state had to meet certain minimum conditions, i.e. the
ability to express Islam, but it could go beyond that as well. In the
pre-modern period, however, Muslim jurists were mainly con-
cerned with ascertaining whether the minimum conditions for the
security of Muslims and the practice of Islam were satisfied so that
the Muslim community in question could remain where they were
or whether they were under an obligation to migrate to a territory
more hospitable to the practice of Islam.1
In the modern period this historical tradition of analyzing the
status of Muslims living in non-Islamic territories has formed the
basis of the fiqh al-aqilliyyÉt – the jurisprudence of Muslim minori-
1 Khaled Abou el Fadl, “Islamic Law and Muslim Minorities: the Juristic Discourse on
Muslim Minorities from the Second/Eighth to the Eleventh/Seventeenth Centuries,”
Islamic Law and Society, Vol. 1, No. 2 (1994), pp. 141-187.
THE QUESTION OF MINORITIES IN ISLAM88
ties.1 It is my belief that the doctrinal developments being articu-
lated in the domain of the fiqh al-aqalliyyÉt – at least with regards
to Muslim minorities living in democratic states – should be in-
creasingly relevant to Muslims’ understandings of the rights of
non-Muslims in Islamic states.
At the outset it should be understood that the modern rela-
tionship of citizen is radically different from the relationship of
security which dominated pre-modern Islamic conceptions of the
relationship between Muslims and a non-Islamic state. In the lat-
ter relationship Muslims promised the non-Islamic state to refrain
from violence and obey the non-Islamic states law in exchange
for an undertaking by the non-Islamic state to recognize the invi-
olability of Muslims’ religion, lives and property. So too, the con-
tract of dhimmah that Islamic law offered to non-Muslims is ex-
tremely circumscribed in scope relative to the modern conception
of citizenship. Thus, pursuant to the relationship of dhimmah, the
Islamic state agreed to protect the non-Muslim for outside ag-
gression as well as to grant her all the substantive protections of
Islamic law internally in exchange for the dhimmÊ’s undertaking to
obey Islamic law to the extent that it applied to him.2 Because
neither the Muslim living in a non-Islamic state nor a dhimmī liv-
ing in an Islamic state had any political rights to participate in the
government, however, the relationship described by pre-modern
Muslim jurists of the Muslim to a non-Islamic state, and of a
dhimmÊ to an Islamic state, resembles modern discussions of alien-
age more than it does citizenship.
The defining feature of citizenship is that it creates a rela-
tionship that is not only vertical in the sense that it is between the
individual and the state, but also horizontal extending to other
citizens through a relationship of equality and shared responsibil-
ity for collective governance of the state. A Muslim living in a
non-Islamic state pursuant to a grant of security, by way of con-
trast, was in a subordinate position relative to the legal order
1 See Andrew F. March, Islam and Liberal Citizenship: The Search for an Overlapping
Consensus (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009).
2 Fadel, “International Law, Regional Developments: Islam,” pp. 12-13.
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there. So too a dhimmÊ in the Islamic state was subordinate be-
cause he suffered numerous political disabilities: not only was a
dhimmÊ ineligible for public office, but even in areas of civil law he
suffered certain forms of inequality, at least according to some
Muslim schools of law.
As a citizen of a non-Islamic state, however, the minority
Muslim is now an equal and not only enjoys equal rights but is
also bound by the same legal duties as those that apply to the
non-Muslim majority. Likewise, the non-Muslim dhimmÊ, once he
becomes a citizen of the Islamic state, is assumed to be in a posi-
tion of equality with the majority Muslim population. Or, to put it
differently, in a modern state, the concept of citizen is non-
sectarian, and accordingly, rights and duties apply to all citizens
simply by virtue of their status as citizens without regard to their
religious beliefs.1
It is the defining feature of democratic citizenship that because
of the relationship of equality inherent in the idea of citizenship,
laws must respect the equality of the citizens, with the consequence
that laws, to be legitimate, must be of such character that they are
capable of being justified to the citizens in terms they can under-
stand and accept as individuals having an equal share of public sov-
ereignty. Again, to contrast this feature of modern citizenship to the
pre-modern relationship of protection, becoming a “citizen” of the
non-Islamic state would have required the Muslim to abandon Is-
lam, because in states such as Catholic Spain, Catholicism defined
the state. Likewise, for a dhimmī to be an equal to a Muslim, he
would have to abandon his religion and become a Muslim. In dem-
1 Humayun Kabir, the great post-independence Indian Muslim politician, observed that “In
Muslim political thought... lawgivers had allowed for two kinds of situations, a situation in
which there is a Muslim ruler and a large number of non-Muslim subjects and also the
situation in which there is a non-Muslim ruler and Muslim subjects. But Muslim political
thought had not provided for the situation which developed in India today, the situation in
which Muslims are citizens in a secular State. In this situation, they are neither the sole rulers nor
merely the ruled. We can put it another way and say that that they are the rulers and ruled
simultaneously… There are not merely ruled, but neither are they merely rulers. They are
rulers and the ruled at the same. Further they are not rulers by themselves; they are rulers in
association with people of many different religions.” Humayun Kabir, “Minorities in a
Democracy,” in Kurzman, Liberal Islam, p. 150.
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ocratic citizenship, however, such requirements are deemed to be
impermissible because it is believed that it is impossible to justify
adherence to one religion on grounds that are inconsistent with the
equality of the citizens, meaning it is impossible for the state to pro-
vide compelling reasons that all citizens can accept to make them
adhere to the same religion, unlike, for example, a law that regulates
their secular well-being, as is the case with legislation pertaining to
traffic laws or laws regulating the market.
Democracy then requires a basis for shared justification as a
condition for laws to be legitimate. This condition – the need
for shared justification – places limits on the kinds of laws de-
mocracies can legitimately promulgate. This desire for a shared
basis of justification provides an important point of overlap be-
tween modern democratic conceptions of legitimacy and pre-
modern Islamic conceptions of legitimacy. I have already dis-
cussed the limitations Muslim jurists placed on the application
of Islamic law to non-Muslims and how that should be under-
stood as a resolution of the problem of legitimacy: on what
grounds is it legitimate to require non-Muslims to adhere to Is-
lamic conceptions of justice? The answer Muslim jurists gave
was that it is just to hold them to Islamic standards when those
standards are comprehensible to them without regard to the
truth of Islam. In a similar fashion democratic legislation is con-
sidered to be just – even as against the minority who rejected
the legislation at issue – because it is limited to matters which all
citizens can reasonably accept regardless of whether they pro-
fess the truth of certain controversial metaphysical doctrines,
e.g. the truth of Christianity.
Accordingly, the possibility of democratic citizenship – rather
than mere protection, i.e. alienage – presented Muslim communities
living in democratic societies both new possibilities and new chal-
lenges. On the positive side of the ledger, the prospect of democrat-
ic citizenship offered them the possibility to share positively in the
governance of their societies on a basis of equality with non-Muslim
citizens. Democratic citizenship also made Muslims’ position within
non-Islamic states more secure: as citizens instead of aliens, they en-
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joyed inviolable rights that could not be compromised, e.g. they
could not be deported. At the same time, however, their obliga-
tions to non-Islamic states would correspondingly increase: where-
as under a regime of alienage they were freer to negotiate what
specific commitments they would make to their host state, whether
in terms of service in national armies or even the right to apply Is-
lamic law to their family disputes (often times effected through
doctrines of private international law), as citizens they would be
treated as any other citizen and would only be entitled to exemp-
tions from national law to the same extent as other non-Muslim
citizens enjoyed such exemptions.
Muslim Reactions to the Demands of Democratic Citizenship
Because democratic citizenship is a richer relationship than the
mere protection contemplated by Muslim jurists in the pre-modern
period, whether Muslims could in good faith accept the offer of
citizenship raised novel issues in Islamic law. These issues have
occupied the attention of a good many Muslim jurists since the
early part of the 20th century. The most fundamental issue is that of
loyalty (wal ’) to the non-Islamic state. It was certainly a settled
doctrine in the pre-modern period that a Muslim could not give
wal ’ to a non-Islamic state, and that doing so was a virtual repudi-
ation of Islam. On the other hand, in the pre-modern period states
were not democratic, and many in fact were organized around ad-
herence to a specific religion, e.g., Catholicism, or after the Refor-
mation, a national church, e.g. The Church of England.1
Given this reality, it is easy to understand why Muslim jurists
would conclude that a Muslim who pledged loyalty to such a state
necessarily repudiated Islam. That this should also be the case for
democratic citizenship does not appear to be clear: a democratic
state makes no religious demands on its citizens in the sense that it
does not require citizens to profess one faith or even faith in gen-
eral. Accordingly, and unlike the case of Hapsburg Spain, Muslims
1 See generally, Andrew March, “Islamic Foundations for a Social Contract in Non-
Muslim Liberal Democracies,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 101, No. 2 (2007),
pp. 235-252.
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could become citizens and retain their adherence to Islam, at least
in a prima facie sense. The pre-modern discourse, however, was
concerned with more than just the ability to maintain the name of
Islam; it also was desirous of protecting the dignity (Ñizzah) of Mus-
lims and Islam, and was concerned that by living in a non-Islamic
state, a Muslim would subject himself to humiliation (dhull) because
the legal system of the non-Islamic state would not protect his dig-
nity. Finally, there was the concern that by living under the protec-
tion of a non-Islamic state, a Muslim would become subject to the
“rules of infidelity” (aÍkÉm al-kufr), something that would entail
both humiliation and injustice.
In analyzing whether it is permissible for Muslims to be citi-
zens of democratic states, Muslim jurists writing in the field of
fiqh al-aqalliyyÉt have had to analyze these three issues in the light
of two concerns: the first is determining what was the purpose
(maqÉÎid) of the various rules of Islamic substantive law which
either prohibited or discouraged residence in non-Islamic states,
and the second is determining the nature of kinds of claims dem-
ocratic states can legitimately make upon Muslims, and whether a
Muslim could accept those obligations consistently with his Is-
lamic commitments.
Starting with the first question, that of walÉ’, Muslim jurists
developed a distinction between walÉ’ as a political concept and
walÉ’ as a religious one. They argued that what Islam prohibits is
expressing loyalty to falsehood.1 Accordingly, a Muslim could not
have loyalty to a Catholic State anymore than he could have loyal-
ty to the Roman Catholic Church, because in both cases he
would be endorsing falsehood.
Democratic constitutions, however, do not require loyalty in
this sense. Rather than requiring loyalty to a specific religious doc-
trine, citizenship requires loyalty to a set of principles that are ac-
cepted as just and which form the basis of the state’s legal system,
most notably, its constitution. This kind of loyalty is acceptable be-
cause it does not contradict loyalty to Islam as a religious doctrine.
1 Ibid, p. 249.
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In other words, loyalty to a system of law that is not derived from a
false metaphysical doctrine but is instead limited to just principles of
law does not require Muslims to reject their belief in Islam or their
continued religious solidarity with the Muslim community and ac-
cordingly is consistent with Islamic commitments. So too the kind
of love and affection that arise between Muslims and non-Muslims
living together in a just society is also permitted because it is love
and affection that is civic in nature and born of mutual cooperation
for one another’s welfare; it does not require or imply acceptance or
recognition of the legitimacy of whatever false views non-Muslims
hold about God.1 The terms of democratic citizenship, however, do
far more than simply allow Muslims to be citizens without renounc-
ing Islam. The inherent limits of legislation in a democratic state en-
sure that Muslims, at a minimum, will be permitted to fulfill certain
fundamental Islamic obligations, specifically the open fulfillment of
the most fundamental ritual obligations of Islam (shaÑÉ’ir) as well as
open teaching of Islamic doctrines to both Muslims and non-
Muslims (daÑwah).
Norms of democratic legitimacy are also responsive to Muslim
concerns about dignity. Because democratic states respect the
norm of equality in legislation, Muslims can be assured that they
will not be singled out for a set of specific norms intended to stig-
matize them as separate from, and as less worthy than other non-
Muslim citizens.
Finally, democratic legislation does not result in Muslims’
submission to aÍkÉm al-kufr because the rules governing a demo-
cratic state are the product of the deliberative assemblies of the
citizens who apply their collective reasoning as citizens to ques-
tions of the public good, not questions of religious belief. Such as-
semblies therefore are not the equivalent of an ecclesiastical coun-
cil promulgating rules for their followers pursuant to false religious
doctrines. In other words, because democratic citizenship does not
make claims on a Muslim that require him to repudiate Islam,
whether explicitly or implicitly; pledging loyalty to a democratic
1 Ibid., p. 250.
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state as embodied in the terms of democratic citizenship does not
constitute a repudiation of Islam in a way that pledging loyalty to a
Catholic regime or a Communist regime, for example, might. Two
observations are in order here.
First, implicit in this theoretical justification of Muslim citi-
zenship in democratic states are several assumptions. Perhaps the
most fundamental is that Islam cannot only survive, but also
flourish in a pluralist regime simply by virtue of its inherent ap-
peal as a rational doctrine. Accordingly, a Muslim community in a
democratic state will be able to pass on Islam to future genera-
tions by teaching them about Islam using methods of rational
persuasion. The survival of the Muslim community in a demo-
cratic state therefore does not depend on the threat of coercive
state sanctions to deter Muslims from exiting the community.
Not only is the inherent appeal of Islamic teachings assumed to
be sufficient to preserve the Muslim community over time, so too
Muslim jurists assume that they are sufficient to attract non-
Muslims to Islam on condition that Muslims are in fact given a
fair opportunity to present their beliefs to non-Muslim society, a
condition guaranteed by democratic society.
Second, Muslim jurists assume the existence of a certain kind of
justice that is not derivative of religious conceptions, including Is-
lamic conceptions, but instead can be derived from rational delibera-
tion. This assumption is implicit in the justification of democratic
politics as a legitimate kind of lawmaking in contrast to false claims
of other religions which claim an ability to disclose the will of God
to human beings, e.g., the Catholic Church. Yusuf al-Qaradawi, for
instance, refers to such a non-sectarian conception of justice in a
fatwÉ of his in which he explains how it is possible for Muslims to
engage in political co-operation with non-Muslims despite the fact that
non-Muslims entertain false beliefs about God.1 Al-Qaradawi gives
many reasons, some of which amount to explaining why difference
in belief does not constitute an obstacle as such to political coopera-
tion, but he also explains that it is the Muslims’ love of justice (qisÏ)
1 Yusuf al-Qaradawi, FatÉwÉ MuÑÉÎirah (Beirut: al-Maktab al-IslÉmÊ, 2003), Vol. 3, pp.
189-191.
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which motivates them to cooperate productively with non-Muslims,
despite the latter’s adherence to false doctrines.1
While al-Qaradawi does not explain what he means by justice in
that fatwÉ, it can safely be assumed that it must entail a form of jus-
tice that is autonomous of revelation, or else it would not form a
common basis for cooperation with non-Muslims. At the same time,
however, its autonomy from revelation does not mean that is re-
pugnant to revelation. Rather, this system of non-sectarian, rational
justice must in a certain sense be consistent with Islamic concep-
tions of justice or else Muslims could not appeal to it.
What then would be the relationship of this autonomous version
of justice to Islamic conceptions of justice that derive directly from
our knowledge of God’s will as revealed in the Qur’an and Sunnah?
It seems that the answer is that it supplements the non-sectarian
conception of justice which is common to human beings regardless
of their religious (or non-religious) commitments. In the first in-
stance, this supplementary knowledge binds Muslims in their inter-
actions with one another because they have shared knowledge of
these additional (religious) obligations. Obviously, this includes
such requirements of Islamic law as ritual law and rules regarding
the etiquette of intra-Muslim personal relationships. Negatively,
this places limits on the kinds of demands non-sectarian justice can
make upon Muslims, in particular, it cannot claim to compel Mus-
lims to disobey God.
What is significant about these arguments is that they go be-
yond narrow utilitarian-based justifications for Muslim citizenship in
non-Islamic (but democratic) states. A utilitarian argument would
run along the lines of the following: it is distasteful or even prohibit-
ed for Muslims to accept citizenship in a democratic state because it
requires them not only to tolerate a non-Islamic state, but also to
support it actively. Nevertheless, these harms are outweighed by the
benefits accruing to Muslims from living in a democratic state, at
least until such time as Muslims are present there in large enough
numbers that would allow them to Islamize the host regimes’ legal
1 Ibid.
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systems more thoroughly so as to make them more systematically
compatible to Islamic substantive law. In other words, the kinds of
justifications recently articulated by Muslim jurists in connection
with the concept of fiqh al-aqalliyyÉt go well beyond a justification
that rests on a conception of necessity that is, at least conceptually,
only temporary and will be revised once the circumstances giving
rise to the necessity (the minority condition) are resolved, i.e. Mus-
lims become a majority of the population or otherwise obtain po-
litical power.
Non-Muslims in Modern Muslim-majority States
If democratic states fulfill a certain moral ideal of political society
that is compatible with Islamic commitments in a non-contingent
manner, however, the question arises as to whether the justifications
for Islamic endorsement of democratic citizenship set out in the fiqh
al-aqalliyyÉt discourse are not applicable to states with Muslim majori-
ties? While Muslim states, as a matter of their national legal systems,
have made much progress in creating legal systems based on equal
citizenship, they can still be criticized for retaining substantial ele-
ments of sectarianism in their legal systems that are substantially in-
consistent with the democratic ideal of equal citizenship. The most
obvious traces of sectarianism in the legal systems of Muslim states
are constitutional declarations that the state’s religion is Islam, a
statement that immediately gives the polity a sectarian character;
other instances of de jure sectarianism in Muslim states include rules
imposing religious tests for certain public offices, e.g. that the presi-
dent or the prime minister must be Muslim; and, provisions in a
state constitution affirming that the Islamic SharÊÑah is “a” or “the”
principal source of the state’s legislation.
Less controversial, but still problematic, are the existence of
sectarian-based personal status laws pursuant to which the applica-
ble rules of family law are determined by the sectarian identity of
the citizen rather than his status simply as citizen. (In other words,
many Muslim states lack a law of personal status that applies to all
of its citizens, and instead, applies different laws to its citizens de-
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pending on how the state classifies their sectarian identity.) While
this is often times in conformity with the wishes of the non-
Muslim minority, it can often be inconsistent with the equal citi-
zenship rights of non-Muslims. Thus, a non-Muslim woman who
otherwise cannot obtain a divorce because of her sectarian identity
has an incentive to convert to Islam solely to obtain the benefit of
a divorce, which might be immediate if her husband refuses to
convert to Islam as well during her Ñiddah, or deferred in the event
of his conversion by petitioning for a judicial divorce as a Muslim
woman. The ideals of equal citizenship in this circumstance would
appear to require recognition of a right to a judicial divorce simply
on the grounds of her status as a citizen without regard to her sec-
tarian affiliation which, as a matter of her subjective belief, she may
or may not accept.
Another way to understand this point is that the concept of
equal citizenship requires a positive conception of toleration, not
simply a negative one. While pre-modern Islamic law accepted a
negative concept of toleration, meaning that it would allow non-
Muslims to preserve many aspects of their ways of life even though
Muslims believed them to be erroneous, Islamic law did not con-
template positive tolerance of non-Islamic ways of life in a manner
that the views of non-Muslims in the Islamic state should be in-
cluded in formulating the laws of the Islamic state. Another way of
putting this is that under traditional Islamic conceptions of tolera-
tion of non-Muslims, non-Muslims did not have any right to for-
mulate the terms of the general rules of society, and to that extent,
they were completely objects of the law rather than its subjects.
This is evidenced by numerous rules of pre-modern Islamic law,
e.g. the bar on non-Muslims serving as witnesses in court (shuhūd);
the prohibition on non-Muslims being judges; and, the prohibition
on Muslims serving as a policy-making minister (wazīr tafwīÌ). Even
the right to grant security to a non-Muslim from a hostile state – a
right guaranteed to even Muslim slaves, women and minors – was
denied to non-Muslim dhimmīs.
The political marginalization of non-Muslims eventually led to
THE QUESTION OF MINORITIES IN ISLAM98
severe problems in historical Islamic states such as the Ottoman
Empire, most prominently in the form of a sectarian consciousness
that allowed outside powers to manipulate one group against an-
other to further its own imperialist interests, even leading to exten-
sion of the infamous capitulations to non-Muslims who were nom-
inally citizens of Islamic states.1 For this reason, one of the main
objects of legal reform in the Ottoman Empire was to create a
more unified legal system that would be in greater conformity with
the ideal of equal citizenship with the goal of creating national soli-
darity that transcended sectarian affiliation, something that was
deemed necessary if Islamic states were to resist (or liberate them-
selves from) imperialist encroachment. Throughout the 19th centu-
ry, haltingly at first, and then more systematically, Muslim govern-
ments took steps to narrow the distinction between Muslims and
non-Muslims in their legal systems. Mehmet Ali Pasha in Egypt,
for example, after introducing universal conscription quickly de-
cided to impose that obligation on Egypt’s Christians as well as its
Muslims. The Ottomans, through the Tanzimat reform, likewise
enshrined legal equality for Muslims and non-Muslims throughout
its territories and also began to require non-Muslims to serve in its
armies.2
While the political reforms of the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries were often driven by practical necessity and had a certain
ad hoc character to them, a more systematic approach to this prob-
lem of reconciling Islamic commitment to justice with a non-
sectarian conception of justice was one of the driving factors be-
hind the new Egyptian civil code. According to Abd al-Razzaq al-
Sanhuri, Egypt could not be genuinely independent unless its legal
system had an organic tie to its indigenous legal system, i.e. the
SharÊÑah. At the same time, however, its legal system had to be
modern and thus required a recasting of the substantive values of
historical Islamic law that would make them workable for the
1 Fadel, supra note 80 at p. 35 and pp. 41-43.
2 See, for example, Butrus Abu-Manneh, “The Islamic Roots of the Gülhane
Rescript,” Die Welt des Islams, Vol. 34, No. 2 (1994), pp. 173-203.
Fadel: THE IMPLICATIONS OF FIQH AL-AQALLIYYÓT… 99
needs of a modern Islamic state. Significantly, al-Sanhuri believed
that non-Muslim jurists were equally competent in working out the
details of a modernized Islamic civil code. This was because, in al-
Sanhuri’s opinion, Islamic law was a universal legal system that had
to be able to justify its rules to both Muslims and non-Muslims.1
Its rules regarding the interactions of citizens, however, had to
be revised to make them compatible with modern life, both sub-
stantively and in terms of their justifications. One of the methodo-
logical innovations al-Sanhuri introduced in the course of his at-
tempt to develop a modern Islamic legal code was the principle
that, because Islamic law is universally valid, it was capable of
adopting any principle of law that was not repugnant to its funda-
mental commitments. This principled accommodation of non-
Muslims in the juristic project of a modern Islamic code is reminis-
cent of justifications offered by Muslim jurists as to why Muslims
can accept the terms of democratic citizenship in good faith: be-
cause democratic commitments do not require Muslims to affirm
articles of faith, for example, that are repugnant to Islam, its results
are substantially equivalent to Islamic conceptions of justice. Al-
Sanhuri’s desire to include non-Muslims in his project of a re-
newed and modernized Islamic legal system, however, was also in
his view good practical politics. He recognized the danger to na-
tional independence that alienated religious minorities posed, and
accordingly, he believed that those elements within the Egyptian
religious establishment who opposed full integration of the Copts
into the structure of the Egyptian state were just as dangerous to
the future of Islam as those Egyptian intellectuals who had become
secularists in the mould of Kamal Attaturk.2
1 For more on Sanhuri and his contributions to modern Islamic law, see Enid Hil, “The
Place and Significance of Islamic Law in the Life and Work of Abd al-Razzaq al-Sanhuri
Egyptian Jurist and Scholar”, Parts I and II, Arab Law Quarterly, Vol. 3, No. 1 (1988), pp.
33-64 and Arab Law Quarterly, Vol. 3, No. 2 (1988), pp. 182-218, and Amr Shalakany,
“Between Identity and Distribution: Sanhūrī, Genealogy and the Will to Islamise,” Islamic
Law and Society, Vol. 8, No. 2 (2001), pp. 201-244.
2 See, for example, Nadiya al-Sanhuri and Tawfīq al-Shawi, al-Sanhūrī min Khil l Awr qihi al-
ShakhÎiyya (Cairo: D r al-Shurūq, 2002), pp. 134-135 and pp. 150-151.
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Implications of Fiqh al-AqalliyyÉt for Non-Muslims in
Muslim Majority States
Al-Sanhuri, despite his brilliance as a scholar of comparative law
and his substantial expertise in Islamic law, in the final analysis
lacked the Islamic scholarly credentials to carry the day, and as is
well-known, there continues to be substantial controversy wheth-
er al-Sanhuri’s code is sufficiently Islamic. What is significant
from the perspective of this chapter, however, is that the current
discourse of fiqh al-aqalliyy t provides substantial normative justi-
fication for al-Sanhuri’s project of generating a modern system of
Islamic law that is able to win the support of all citizens, whether
or nor Muslim. Just as al-Sanhuri imagined an abstract body of
substantive Islamic law that he described as universal and immu-
table but whose practical and detailed manifestations could
change based on time and place, so too jurists involved in the
practice of fiqh al-aqalliyy t go beyond the particular historical rul-
ings of Islamic law and try to derive from them abstract rules that
allow them to argue that the principles protected by these ab-
stract rules are in fact being satisfied by democratic principles.
So, the question naturally arises: if it is permissible to argue that
the fundamental goals of Islam are met in a democratic society, why
should democratic constitutions be limited to non-Muslim states?
Isn’t it the case that if Muslim-majority countries adopted legal or-
ders that satisfied standards of democratic legitimacy that such poli-
ties would be equally capable to satisfy the requirements of Islam for
a just order, if not more so? The concluding part of this chapter will
make the case that indeed, just as Muslim jurists have argued that
democratic states satisfy the goals of Islam with respect to political
organization, so too would a democratic legal order satisfy Muslims’
obligations even in contexts where they are majorities.
The first step in making this case is that the distinction be-
tween the obligations of Muslims in a minority context and when
they are in a majority context ought not to be relevant from the
perspective of what Islam deems to be the minimum conditions
required for a state to earn the political loyalty of Muslims. Giving
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too much weight to the empirical fact that Muslim minorities are
politically weak at the present time reflects the continued influence
of the juristic division of the world between dÉr al-IslÉm and dÉr al-
Íarb, a classification that has come under increasing criticism by
Muslim jurists in the post-World War II era. As Wahba al-Zuhayli
argued in his book Islam and International Law,1 the fact that con-
temporary international law guarantees the most valuable rights in
the eyes of Islam – namely, the right to preach Islam peacefully
without active opposition by governments who are to take an offi-
cially neutral position vis-á-vis Islam – means that offensive jihÉd is
no longer an Islamic requirement. He goes on to argue that the
spread of norms of peaceful relations among states, religious free-
dom, the self-determination of peoples and the prohibition against
aggressive war means that the world as become the equivalent of
one territorial jurisdiction (dÉr), implying that law (at least public
law) ought to be universal. Accordingly, what is significant to fiqh
al-aqalliyyÉt arguments is not the numbers of Muslims in a given
non-Islamic state, for if that were the case their obligations would
vary depending on the percentage of Muslims in the general popu-
lation; rather, what is significant is whether the legal order of the
state itself guarantees the security of Muslims and guarantees their
ability to practise, teach and call to Islam. Once those conditions
are satisfied, Muslims are Islamically bound to maintain their ties of
loyalty to that state even if they gain numbers and thus become
politically more powerful.
The same argument applies to states in which Muslims com-
prise a majority of the population: if the state provides the same
guarantees then the interests of Islam are sufficiently protected and
there is no need for the state to be structured expressly as an in-
strumentality for the protection of Islam or Muslims. Just as
Zuhayli argued that the need for offensive jihad has been rendered
obsolete because of the realities of the post-World War II interna-
tional order, namely, its protection of the independence and sover-
eignty of states, its commitments to human rights, and govern-
1 Wahba al-Zuhayli, al-ÑAl q t al-Duwaliyyah fi al-Isl m MuqÉranah bi-l-QÉnūn al-Dawlī al-
×adīth (Beirut: MuÒassasat al-Ris lah, 1981).
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ments’ neutrality with respect to Islam,1 it would seem that the
need to have a state dedicated to the protection of Islam would
also be obsolete. Ironically, this argument is confirmed by various
rules that in the pre-modern period prohibited non-Muslims from
exercising power (wilÉyah) over Muslims.
The juristic assumption motivating this rule was that the non-
Muslim would rule based on his or her (false) conceptions of reli-
gion, not that he would be applying just law. This would imply that
where a non-Muslim citizen is applying or enforcing the rules of
what is a just legal system, the mere fact that its officials are non-
Muslims does not transform the legal system into an unjust order.
The fact that the disbelief of legal officials is not relevant to the
justice of the non-Islamic legal order is obvious in the case of
western democracies which despite the fact that the overwhelming
majority of its political decision makers are not Muslim, the jurists
who have developed the fiqh al-aqalliyy t discourse have not allowed
that fact to derogate from the normative justness of these coun-
tries’ political and legal institutions. There is also a pre-modern Is-
lamic precedent in support of this approach: while al-M wardī
holds that non-Muslims are not eligible to serve as wazÊr tafwÊÌ,
they are eligible to serve as wazÊr tanfÊdh. The reason is that the
former exercises discretion in the name of the Muslim community,
whereas the latter simply enforces rules that Muslims themselves
have already made.
The same analysis applies to non-Muslim citizens of a demo-
cratic state; whether Muslims are majority or minority of that popu-
lation, all officials are bound to enforce a law that applies to all citi-
zens and that is the product of their collective deliberation. Such an
official, whether he is Christian, Jew, Hindu or Buddhist, is bound to
apply this body of democratic law and is not permitted to apply his
or her own religious conception of what is true or right. If such an
official did so, it would constitute an abuse of power for which the
law would provide a remedy. In short, a democratic state provides
protections against the threat that non-Muslims would use their po-
1 Fadel, supra note 80, pp. 46-48.
Fadel: THE IMPLICATIONS OF FIQH AL-AQALLIYYÓT… 103
litical power to discriminate against, dominate, or persecute Mus-
lims. If that fact can be relied upon to legitimate Muslims’ residence
in democratic states in which they are the minority, it applies a fortiori
to states where Muslims are the majority since minoritarian religious
communities would be extremely concerned, from a practical per-
spective, to do anything that would suggest they wish to use their
political power to oppress Muslims.
In short, if we accept the conclusion of the emerging dis-
course of fiqh al-aqalliyyÉt that democratic political life is sufficient
to protect the interests of Islam and Muslims where they are a
minority, then a fortiori it is sufficient to protect them in circum-
stances where they constitute the majority. In this latter situation
they are even in less need of special privileges from the state to
maintain the health of the Muslim community, teach Islamic doc-
trines, and call others to it.
Not only does consistent application of the principles es-
poused in the fiqh al-aqalliyyÉt discourse require their application
also to states in which Muslims form the majority, so too does
prudent politics. Muslim-majority states should recognize that the
existence of flourishing and prosperous Muslim communities in
the developed world is in the interests of Muslim-majority coun-
tries. Yet, the failure of Muslim-majority countries to adhere to the
equality requirements of democracy serves to undermine the ability
of Muslim citizens of non-Muslim states to exercise fully their
rights as citizens.
Elements of those countries hostile to Islam and Muslims use
the persistence of political discrimination against non-Muslims and
rules criminalizing or penalizing apostasy are used to argue that
Muslims are not morally committed to the prevailing democratic
order and therefore are not entitled to its protections. Even though
such an argument reduces Muslims to a group rather than treating
them as individuals, and as such represents a violation of democratic
commitments to equality, this argument has gained and is continu-
ing to gain attraction, especially in Europe. Indeed, the European
Court of Human Rights in two decisions, Refah Party v. Republic of
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Turkey1 and Shahin v. Turkey,2 has essentially taken the position that
Islam is inherently anti-democratic and therefore governments are
permitted to take steps to regulate it that would not be permissible
with respect to other religions or associations. Recently, a prominent
Oxford-based philosopher of law, John Finnis, has begun to make
open calls for European governments to create incentives for Mus-
lims to leave Europe, again based on the argument that Islam is in-
herently opposed to democratic politics.3
Public discussion of such policies, even if they are not adopt-
ed in the short-term, are extremely dangerous, not just for the
long-term interests of Muslim communities living in the west, but
also for international relations. To the extent that jurists like al-
Zuhayli have argued that doctrines such as dÉr al-Íarb and offen-
sive jihÉd are obsolete, it was based on the notion that non-
Islamic states are capable of treating their Muslim citizens with
respect and equality. To the extent non-Muslim states adopt laws
that are overtly hostile to Islam and Muslims, however, al-
Zuhayli’s argument concerning the secure place of Islam in to-
day’s world will appear less and less convincing to Muslims who
might begin to listen to more radical voices.
Given the fact that the underlying logic of fiqh al-aqalliyyÉt’s
justification of democracy also applies to Muslim-majority states,
and the importance of diffusing even the appearance of a conflict
of civilizations, it appears critical that Muslim-majority states take
decisive steps to incorporate their non-Muslim citizens into the
decision making structure of their states in a manner consistent
with democratic norms of equality. The Islamic movements in
Muslim states too should make this one of their own priorities.
Many individuals in Islamic movements have benefitted from the
freedoms of liberal democracy; they should have the unique
combination of theory and practice to carry the day against ele-
1 Refah Partisi (The Welfare Party) and Others v. Turkey, nos. 41340/98, 41342/98,
41343/98 and 41344/98, CHR 2003-II – (13.2.03) (Feb. 13, 2003).
2 Layla Sahin v. Turkey, no. 44774/98 (Nov. 10, 2005).
3 John Finnis, “Endorsing Discrimination between Faiths: A Case of Extreme
Speech?” (2008), available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1101522.
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ments in the Islamic movement who would wish to continue, if
not enhance, the marginalization of non-Muslims for the domes-
tic politics of Muslim-majority states.
Conclusion
Islamic law, from the earliest days of the Prophet’s migration to
MadÊnah, has been careful to distinguish between rules that are ap-
plicable in Muslim territory and non-Muslim territory. Islamic law
permitted Muslims to live in a non-Muslim territory provided cer-
tain conditions were met, specifically that Muslims could manifest
their religion. Conversely, Islamic law allowed non-Muslims to live
permanently in Islamic territory as protected pereons provided
they agreed to abide by the non-religious elements of Islamic law.
In the post-World War II era, with the spread of international
law, human rights and global norms of governance, the rights of in-
dividual citizenship have supplemented the rights of communities.
Accordingly, Muslims living outside of Islamic territory enjoy, theo-
retically at least, rights equal to those of their non-Musim country-
men. In return, however, Muslims are expected to bear equally the
duties of citizenship in the non-Muslim state.
The new circumstances, in which Muslim minorities find them-
selves, particularly in Western democratic countries, have given rise
to a new juristic discourse known as fiqh al-aqaliyyÉt or jurisprudence
of minorities. This body of jurisprudence has attempted to normal-
ize the relationship of Muslim minorities as citizens to their states of
citizenship, even though the majority of the population is non-
Muslim. Significantly, jurists engaged in this discourse have stressed
the fact that the array of rights guaranteed in democracies are suffi-
cient to ensure that Muslims live with honour and dignity, and the
right to express Islam, including, by calling others to it. On this ba-
sis, they have agreed that the presence of Muslim minorities as citi-
zens of democratic states is religiously perrimissible.
On the other hand, the same logic these jurists have used to
legitimate the presence of Muslim citizens in non-Muslim countries
implies that even in Muslim-majority situations, a democratic state
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that is religiously neutral, provided it is otherwise just, ought to suf-
ficiently protect the honour and dignity of Muslims, and their right
to manifest Islam and call others to it.
This calls into question the need for an explicitly Islamic state
to protect Muslims’ interests as Muslims. To the extent that we
accept fiqh al-aqalliyyÉt as representing a legitimate interpretation of
the SharÊÑah for Muslims living as minorities, it would seem that
Muslim majorities should also be required to treat non-Muslims
with the same level of equality that they demand of non-Muslims
when Muslims are minority.
Not only is this demand normatively just, at least in light of
the claims of fiqh al-aqalliyyÉt, it is also a good policy in today’s in-
terconnected world, which some jurists have said ought really to be
deemed one legal jurisdiction (dÉr). It undermines the security and
well-being of Muslim minorities for Muslim majority jurisdiction to
claim a right to subject non-Muslim minorities to discriminatory
legislation – such as qualifications for public office or access to di-
vorce – while demanding that the Muslim minorities enjoy the
same rights as their non-Muslim majority co-citizens.
While this would represent a departure from the traditional
logic of the relationships of dhimma, it would nevertheless be
consistent with the higher goals (maqÉÎid) of Islamic law which
seek to maintain peaceful co-existence with non-Muslims who are
prepared to live in peace and mutual respect with Islam.
.
CHAPTER 5
Non-Muslims’ Citizenship in Islamic Law: A
Critique from a Constitutional Perspective
Sayed Sikandar Shah Haneef
Introduction
The discourse on the position of non-Muslims in an Islamic state
has been one of the most contentious issues for no less than one
century now. Two factors have triggered this. First, both tradi-
tionalists and some non-Muslim researchers insist that non-
Muslims in a Muslim state are ipso facto dhimmÊs (or second class
citizens). Second, the fear that attempts by some Islamists at rein-
stating the SharÊÑah Law,1 will inevitably involve the restoration of
dhimmÊ status to non-Muslim inhabitants in Muslim states. To un-
lock this mystery, the recent literature embodies three divergent
approaches, traditionalist, apologist and revisionist. Consequently,
1 In his in preface to Ye'or’s book, the French Christian philosopher Jacques Ellul
expressed this fear when he said: “Half a century ago the issue of non-Muslim status as
dhimmi was one of historical discussion of interest for the specialists… Muslims had no
power, extremely divided and many of them were subjected to European colonialism…but
the failure of secular states and the rise of Muslim revivalist with slogans, such as Islam as
‘alternative’ or ‘a solution’…the question is how to stop this…” Bat Ye’or, The Dhimmi:
Jews and Christians under Islam, translated from French by David Maisel (London/Toronto:
Associated University Press, 1985), pp. 25-28. Feldman was apprehensive when he stated:
“No matter how much of a dead letter the concept of dhimmi has become, in   practice
during times of weakness in the Islamic world, this doctrine of Islamic supremacism was
never reformed or rejected.” J. Esposito & N. Feldman, “Is There a Role for ShariÑah in
Modern States?,” http://www.jihadwatch.org/2008/10/john-esposito-noah-feldman-working-to-make-
the- world-safe-for-shariah.html (accessed 29/10/2009).
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beyond religio-political rhetoric, the discourse needs to move
from the divisive communalist versus universalist1 squabble to
that of constitutional discussion in Islamic jurisprudence. The
chapter represents an attempt to articulate the traditional para-
digm of the issue, to delineate the alternative construct for advo-
cating equal citizenship to non-Muslim minorities in modern
Muslim majority states, and to critically unpack the paradoxes
which have tainted the whole discourse on the issue with the ul-
timate end of pointing to constitutional jurisprudential founda-
tions2 for equality project within the parameters of Islamic law.
The Traditionalists’ Conceptualization
Within this paradigm we can place the vast majority of pre-
modern, modern and contemporary Muslim jurists. They are of the
view that non-Muslim minorities are protected people who cannot
be treated equally with Muslims not only as a symbol of Muslim
political superiority over them, but also for religious reason as en-
shrined in authoritative texts of the Qur’an and Sunnah. For in-
stance, the Qur’an (2:110) declares Muslims as superior to any oth-
er religious groups by virtue of being the followers of Islam: “You
are the best community that has been raised up for mankind.” To give effect
to such a different treatment, the Qur’an explicitly imposes a trib-
ute poll tax known as jizyah on non-Muslim groups under Islamic
rule: “Fight against those who have been given the scripture and... follow not
the religion of truth until they pay the tribute readily, being brought down.”
(Qur’an, 9:29) The following Prophetic tradtion reiterated the
same principle when it stated:
1 This problem has been incidentally seen as such by Senturk. See Recep Senturk,
“Sociology of Rights,” in Abdul Aziz Said et al. (eds.), Contemporary Islam (London and
New York: Routledge, 2007), pp.138-139.
2 This dimension represents a complex question, which, if not tackled, the traditional
understanding  of  the  issue  will  continue  to  reign  the  juridical  landscape. This
intellectual hurdle was sensed by Mokhtari when she presented her critical review of
the book under the title, Islam and the Challenge of Human Rights, authored by Abdulaziz
Sachedina. See Shadi Mukhtari’s book review, “Islam and the Challenge of Human
Rights by Abdulaziz Sachedina,” American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences, 2010, Vol. 27,
No. 4 (2010), p. 92.
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Fight in the name of God and in the way of God. Fight against those
who disbelieve in God. Make jihÉd; do not embezzle the spoils; do
not break your pledge; and do not mutilate (the dead) bodies; do not
kill the children. When you meet your enemies who are polytheists, in-
vite them to three courses of action. If they respond to any one of these
you also accept it and withhold yourself from doing them any harm.
Invite them to (accept) Islam; if they respond to you, accept it from
them and desist from fighting against them…. If they refuse to accept
Islam, demand from them the jizyah. If they agree to pay, accept it
from them and hold off your hands. If they refuse to pay the tax, seek
God’s help and fight them.1
Accordingly, this pattern of articulation of the issue has been a
major theme not only in classical juristic treatises but also features
prominently by way of reproduction by jurists of the same genre
and tendency up to our time. Two major issues detailed by these
jurists include non-Muslims’ duties and rights in a Muslim state. As
for duties, the most highlighted restrictions2 imposed on non-
Muslim subjects include wearing of distinctive dress and sounding
of bells discreetly, which allegedly initially were legislated for the
Christians of Syria by caliph ÑUmar Ibn al-KhaÏÏÉb, by a virtue of
an alleged pact known as al-shurËÏ al-Ñumariyyah (ÑUmar Ibn al-
KhaÏÏÉb’s terms).3
As regards rights, it is however, argued that non-Muslim sub-
1 Fazlul Karim, MishkÉt al-MaÎÉbÊÍ (Delhi: Islamic Book Service, 1994), vol.. 2, p. 389.
2 The books on Islamic international relations list a number of other discriminatory
laws against non-Muslim minorities, which are out of the ambit of this study to be
delineated. But one instance is a report by Ibn KhathÊr who reported that the Chris-
tians who made this pact with ÑUmar said: “We made a condition on ourselves that we
will neither erect in our areas a monastery, church, or a sanctuary for a monk, nor
restore any place of worship that needs restoration nor use any of them for the pur-
pose of enmity against Muslims.” Sobhi Mahmasani, al-QÉnËn wa al-ÑÓlÉqÉt al-
Dawliyyah fÊ al-IslÉm (Beirut: DÉr al-ÑIlm lÊ al-MalÉyÊn, 1982), pp. 101-102.
3 In spite of controversy surrounding the authenticity of this document by ÑUmar, both
classical and modern conservative jurists have detailed them in their works. For details see,
MuÍammad ibn AbË Bakr Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyah, AÍkÉm Ahl al-Dhimmah, edited by
Sobhi al-Salih and with a foreword by Muhammad Hamidullah (Beirut: DÉr al-ÑIlm lÊ al-
MalÉyÊn, 1983), Vol. 1, p. 121; Mahmasani, ibid. For criticism of`‘Umar’s terms see,
MuÍammad ibn AÍmad al-DhahabÊ, al-MughnÊ fÊ al-ÖuÑafÉ’ (Beirut: DÉr al-Kutub al-
ÑIlmiyyah, 1997), Vol. 2, p. 524.
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jects of an Islamic state enjoy full protections in terms of their
life, property, faith and worship, trade, and personal law. For in-
stance, modern conservatives such as Abd al-Karim Zaydan
proudly state that:
When non Muslim citizens live under Islamic sovereignty,
they enjoy a special status and are known along with other
minorities as ahl al-dhimmah (dhimmÊs). Dhimmah in Arabic
means safety, security, and contract. Hence, non-Muslims
are called dhimmÊs because they have agreed to enter into a
contract of protection by God, His Messenger and the Is-
lamic community, which grants them security. This security
granted to dhimmÊs is like the citizenship granted by a gov-
ernment to an alien who abides by its constitution, thereby
earning all the rights of a natural citizen. Thus, upon the
preceding basis, a dhimmÊ is a citizen of the Islamic state, as
described by Muslim jurists.1
To some researchers outside the Islamic faith, the above per-
spective is monolithically paradigmatic of the Islamic stand on
non-Muslim minorities which has to be feared and deplored.2
To call a non-Muslim dhimmÊ citizen (a protected person) by
itself is not only unoriginal but also a misnomer as it implies that
the dhimmÊ has never been prosecuted or maltreated “except acci-
1 Abdul Karim Zaydan, AÍkÉm al-DhimmiyyÊn wa al-Musta’minÊn fi’l-IslÉm (Beirut:
Mu’assassat al-RisÉlah, 1985), pp. 49-51 & 63-66. Other noted modern scholars from the
Arab world adopting the same approach include Abbas Shuman, al-ÑAlÉqÉt al-Dawliyya fi’l-
SharÊÑah al-IslÉmiyyah (Cairo: DÉr al-ThaqÉfah, 1999), pp. 37-38; Subhi Mahmasani, al-QÉnËn
wa al-ÑÓlÉqÉt al-Dawliyyah fÊ al-IslÉm, pp.101-102; Shawkat Muhammad Ulyyan, al-NiÐÉm al-
SiyÉsÊ fÊ a-IslÉm (Beirut: DÉr al-Fikr, 1998), p.163; Muhammad Sadiq Afifi,, al-IslÉm wa al-
ÑAlÉqÉt al-Dawliyyah (Beirut: DÉr al-RÉ’id al-ÑArabÊ, 1986), p. 293
2 One of the most well-known authorities among them is Bat Ye’or in a number of
works, especially her book The Dhimmi: Jews and Christians under Islam. Esposito described
her as “the great historian of jihad and dhimmitude.” See John Esposito & Noah Feldman,
“Is There a Role for ShariÑah in Modern States?” in http://www.jihadwatch.org/2008/10/john-
esposito-noah-feldman-working-to-make-the-world-safe-for-shariah.html (accessed 29/10/2009).
Nevertheless, sympathetic voices within Orientalism, such as Thomas Arnold and
Gustave Lebon, who saw the institution of dhimmah in a somewhat positive light, could
be regarded as faint voices. See T.W. Arnold, The Preaching of Islam: A History of the Propa-
gation of Muslim Faith (London: Constable & Company Ltd., 2nd ed., 1913); Gustave
Lebon, Hadarat al-Arab, translated from the French by Muhammad Adel Zuaytar (Cairo:
Hindawi Foundation for Education and Culture, 2013).
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dentally.” For instance, in his preface to Bat Ye’or’s book, Jacques
Ellul maintains that such an assertion is dubious on many
grounds, including the following:
1. Etymologically a “protected person” is a concept which
existed in ancient Rome. A protected person was called a client or
protégé. This applied to the alian who was had always under the
fear of aggression that any Roman citizen could commit against
him, unless he became a protégé of a patron from among the in-
fluential Roman citizens.
2. Juridically, the dhimmÊ status accorded to the non-Muslim
residents by virtue of a treaty (Ñaqd al-dhimmah) between him (and
his group) and Muslims by itself was a “concessionary charter.” As
such it, was both arbitrary and inequitable in its purport; arbitrary
in the sense that only the grantor could decide what to concede in
it and when to rescind it. Inequitable as well, as it supplanted “the
natural rights of non-Muslims as humans “to those defined and
timed by the charter. Accordingly, legally speaking, the rights en-
joyed by non-Muslims in a Muslim state were “conceded rights”
(in contradistinction to fundamental rights).1
Claiming to analyze the issue from the dhimmÊ vantage point,
and not as “how his master saw him,”2 Ye’o starts her premise by
coining her own operational definition of dhimmÊ as being “the
non-Arab and non-Muslim nations and communities that were
subjected to the Muslims’ domination after the conquest of their
territories by the Arabs.” 3 She went on to say that dhimmÊs were the
victims who were vanquished by force, after a war or after a defeat
and tolerated in their own homeland of which they were dispos-
sessed. The dhimmah status in short represented the behavioural
pattern and way of thinking that the “conquerors” displayed to-
wards the “conquered.”4 To her, the dhimmÊ contract “represented
the institutionalization of oppression by a military organization”5
1 Ye’or, The Dhimmis, pp. 30-31.
2 Ye’or, The Dhimmis, p.38.
3 Ibid., p. 35.
4 Ibid., pp. 37-38.
5 Ibid.
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or “a formal expression of a legalized persecution.”1
Furthermore, Ye’or dismisses the idea that the dhimmÊ pact in
terms of protection of rights has been specific to Islam. To her,
such privileges were copied from Roman and Greek emperors
who accorded them to the Jews but the clergy endeavoured to
curtail them.2
To Esposito and Feldman, modern Islamic apologists, how-
ever, commit gross factual error when mentioning the Qur’an’s
recognition of Jews and Christians as distinct religious communi-
ties in order to equate the stipulations of Islamic law with mod-
ern-day notions of freedom of thought and tolerance.3 Non-
Muslims were in fact decidedly second-class citizens as men-
tioned in the Qur’an (9: 29): “to humiliate the non-believers.”4 In
the SharÊÑah such a state of submission is known as the dhimmah
(under the protection of the Muslims) and those within it are
dhimmÊs (protected (or guilty) people).5
To support this conclusion, they marshal the views of most
famous classical authorities on the subject, such as Ibn KathÊr. To
them, Ibn KathÊr maintained that the dhimmÊs must be “disgraced,
humiliated and belittled. Therefore, Muslims are not allowed to
honour the people of dhimmah or elevate them above Muslims,
for they are miserable, disgraced and humiliated.”6 Likewise, they
1 Ibid.
2 Ibid. See also, Dhimmi, http://www.readingislam.com (accessed 22/03/2010).
3 Ibid.
4 More often than not, the portion of the verse in question is taken out of context and
then all types of interpretation and extrapolation are made. The immediate context of
the verse and its text, however, make it clear that the alleged “humiliation of non-
bilievers” is actually qualified by being the outcome of Muslims’ victory of them in
war. The verse thus reads: “[And] fight against those who – despite having been
vouchsafed revelation [aforetime] – do not [truly] believe either in God or the Last
Day, and do not consider forbidden that which God and His Apostle have forbidden,
and do not follow the religion of truth [which God has enjoined upon them] till they
[agree to] pay the exemption tax with a willing hand, after having been humbled [in
war].” Even under such circumstances, according to interpretations by outstanding
exegetes, only people of financial ability (yad) “are liable to the payment of jizyah.”
Asaad, The Message of the Qur’an, p. 315. – Editor.
5 Esposito & Feldman, “Is There a Role for SharÊÑah in Modern States?”
6 Ibid.
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quoted al-SuyËÏÊ who held that the verse “to humiliate the non-
believers” is a clear proof that the jizyah should be taken in a hu-
miliating way from dhimmÊs, namely the taker sits and the dhimmÊ
stands with his head bowed and his back bent. The jizyah is
placed in the balance and the taker seizes his beard and hits his
chin. He concedes, however, that al-NawawÊ dissented by saying
that ‘This manner of taking jizyah from non-Muslims is invalid.”1
Nevertheless, the tolerant dicta by al-NawawÊ cannot carry any
weight which was also refuted by eminent Qur’anic exegetes like
al-ZamakhsharÊ, who argued that the jizyah should be collected
“with belittlement and humiliation.”2
Nevertheless, others like Bernard Lewis3 have taken some-
what a positive view of the concept by criticizing Ye’or and simi-
lar exponents of sheer generalization, exaggeration of persecution
incidents and ignoring the highest levels of cultures that non-
Muslims achieved under Muslim rule.4
However, such sympathetic voices are dismissed by branding
them as “glamorizers” of the past and refuting them as selective
and failing to understand the juridical implication of dhimmÊs as
people with ‘conceded rights’. Even in terms of right to profess
their own religion or economic rights, dhimmÊs were not different
from the slaves in the first century AD, who also held position
and made personal achievements.5
The quasi-Revisionist Model
This camp encompasses apologists from both human rights advo-
cates particularly those from outside the seminaries,6 and their ju-
1 Ibid.
2 Ibid.
3 Others who criticized Ye`or include S. D. Goitein and N. Stillman. See Ibid, p. 32.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid. p. 33.
6 By way of example see, Saeed Ismail Sieny, Muslim and Non-Muslim Relation (Riyadh:
yadh: King Fahd National Library, 2005), pp. 28-29; Report of Seminar held in Ku-
wait, December 1980, Human Rights in Islam (Kuwait: University of Kuwait,
1982), p.17; Muhammad Taqi Jafari, A Comparative Study of the Two Systems of
Universal Human Rights (Tehran: ALHODA International Publishers,1999), pp.284-
285; Abdulaziz Othman Altwaijiri, Islam and Inter-religious Coexistence on theThreshold of
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rist’s counterparts from the fiqh community. The shared core of
their methodology is their “back projection” of human rights notion
into the Islamic framework but with varied approaches. For in-
stance, the human rights’ strand of this approach, being ignorant of
the complexity of the issue in question, tends to make absolutist claims,
such as ‘Islam guarantees equal rights to all of its citizens irrespec-
tive of their creeds’. The fiqh literate ones, on the other hand, strug-
gle to negotiate between the traditional notion of dhimmah and mod-
ern concept of citizenship. In this process of accommodation, they
have no choice but to be apologetic by emphasizing the dhimmÊs’
rights by purposely avoiding or downplaying the hard question of
dhimmÊs’ obligations in a majority Muslim state. For instance, Su-
zanne Haneef as a representative of the absolutists’ camp states:
Islam does not permit discrimination in the treatment of
other human beings on the basis of religion or any other cri-
teria... it emphasizes neighborliness and respect for the ties
of relationship with non-Muslims ... within this human fami-
ly, Jews and Christians, who share many beliefs and values
with Muslims, constitute what Islam terms Ahl al-KitÉb, that
is, People of the Scripture, and hence Muslim have a special
relationship to them as fellow upholders of Scriptures.1
To Haneef, the word dhimmah (pl. dhimam) literally means “pro-
tection, care, custody, covenant of protection, compact, responsibil-
ity, answerableness, financial obligation, liability, debt, inviolability,
security of life and property, safeguard, guarantee, security.”2 Tech-
nically, people designated as ahl al-dhimmah consist of “the free non-
Muslim subjects living in Muslim countries who, in return for paying
the capital tax, enjoyed full protection and safety.”3
Conversely, apologists, by and large, are defensive by contend-
ing that the dhimmah status is more privileged than citizenship
fastered by man-made constitutions. For instance, Jamal Badawi
the 21s t Century (Riyadh: ManshËrÉt al-Munazzamah al-Islamiyah wa-al-‘UlËm wa-al-
ThaqÉfah (ISESCO), 1998), pp.19-25.
1 Suzanne Haneef, What Everyone Should Know about Islam and Muslims (Lahore: Kazi
Publications, 1979), p. 173.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
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argues that dhimmah, means covenant and dhimmÊ a covenanted per-
son, and that the dhimmÊ is more protected than a citizen whose
rights could be violated as a minority by the majority in Western
societies. The reason is that the dhimmÊ has a covenant with God,
His messenger and the community of believers; hence his rights
are stipulated in the primary sources of Islamic law, namely the
Qur’an and the authentic Sunnah.1 The fact that dhimmÊs have to
pay jizyah does not make them second-class citizens as it is com-
mensurate with the obligation of zakÉh which Muslims have to
pay. The reason is that dhimmÊs enjoy social security provided by
the state on the same footing as Muslims. To Badawi, “the term
jizya literally comes from the word jazÉ’, which means something
in return for something, i.e. services, defense and social security in
return for financial contribution.”2
However, being aware of the controversy over the concept of
dhimmah, he acquiesces that historical instances of religious disso-
nances were warranted by political hostilities which some caliphs
took on the basis of al-siyÉsah al-sharÑiyyah (SharÊÑah-based policy);
they were circumstantial decisions and cannot be regarded as part of
basic and sustained legislation in Islam.3
Joining him al-Zuhayli maintains that the jizyah non-Muslims
pay corresponds to the zakÉh (enjoined upon Muslims) as a re-
turn for protection that state accords to them; it is wrong to as-
sume that dhimmÊs become second-class citizens on this account
and by virtue of some other restrictions placed on them. It is nat-
ural for every state to impose restrictions on some of its citizens
if the situations warrant so. Nevertheless, being conscious of the
restrictive notion of dhimmah, he advances the view that dhimmÊs in
fact enjoy several rights and not full protection as enjoyed by Muslim
citizens of an Islamic state.4
In an attempt to harmonize the dhimmah concept with the





4 Wahba al-Zuhayli, al-IslÉm wa Ghayr al-MuslimÊn (Beirut: Mu’assassat al-RisÉlah, 1981),
pp. 139-142.
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could be replaced by some other taxes as ÑUmar called it charity
(Îadaqah) instead of jizyah in the case of the dhimmÊs of BanË al-
MuÎÏaliq,1 who disliked its name.2 However, he is constrained by
his traditional episteme which makes him fall back on apology by
submitting that the term dhimmah is the name given for non-
Muslim nationals similar to the concept of constitutional citizen-
ship in modern times. The jizyah imposed on dhimmÊs is neither a
symbol of humiliation nor a penalty for non-conversion to Islam
as skeptics try to conceive. Instead, it is a substitute for not pay-
ing the zakÉh and not taking part in jihÉd.3
One may not necessarily agree with the analogy between the
obligation of Muslims to pay zakÉh and the imposition of jizyah
on non-Muslims on one obvious ground: that the former is an act
of worship while the latter’s ratio legis, according to classical ju-
rists, lies in the fact that it serves as a fee in return for the exemp-
tion of dhimmÊs from military service. Moreover, al-Qaradawi’s
interpretation may not offer any reform proposal to reformulate
the law of dhimmah.
Another quasi-renewal attempt was made by some revivalists
like Mawdudi who considered the natural born non-Muslim sub-
jects as a distinct category from dhimmÊs (conquered ones). He
maintained so when answering to aninterlocutor as to whether
jizyah can be imposed upon the non-Muslims of Pakistan.
Mawdudi asserted that “since they (natural born ones) have neither
been conquered nor made subjects as a result of a treaty, there-
fore, they form a different class.”4
The Equal Citizenship Legislative Construct
This group represents those who call for a fresh thinking of the
non-Muslims’ fiqh of nationality in a Muslim state albeit their var-
iant frame works, which is hailed and lauded as alternative ap-
1 Yusuf al-Qaradawi, Ghayr MuslimÊn fÊ al-MujtamaÑ al-IslÉmÊ (Cairo: Maktabat Wahbah,




4 See Dhimmi.http://islamicworld.net/slamicstate/non_muslim.htm (accessed 23/03/2010).
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proach by some modern thinkers.1
The thrust of the arguments pridiced by this group is that all
the textual evidences detailing the legislation on dhimmah are con-
textual and situational, hence representing contingent Islamic
laws in a historical setting which no longer exists today. Stressing
this, Javed Ahmad Ghamidi says:
Certain directives of the Qur’an were specific only to the
Prophet Muhammad against peoples of his times, besides
other directives. The campaign involved asking the poly-
theists of Arabia for submission to Islam as a condition for
exoneration, others for jizyah… Therefore, after the
Prophet and his companions, there is no concept in Islam
obliging Muslims to wage war for propagation or imple-
mentation of Islam.2
Taking note of the historicity of the concept, Fathi Osman,
also pointed out that:
The precepts relating to Ahl al-Dhimmah or the non-Muslim
inhabitants of the Muslim state are very advanced in terms
of achieving justice and good treatment, in case they are
placed within their historical context, and compared with
what was happening in the major states at the time. Howev-
er, our age has witnessed democracy, which affirms com-
plete equality between the citizens, and the Islamists should
espouse the political rights of non-Muslims, and not only
the rights traditionally given to Ahl al-Dhimmah.3
Ahmad Kamal Abu al-Majd also expressed similar view by say-
ing that there no doubt about the dhimmah being a historical expres-
sion of rights and duties guaranteed by the founding sources of Is-
1 Nielson maintains so. See Jorgen S. Nielson, “Contemporary discussions on Religious
Minorities in Muslim Countries”, Muslim-Christian Relations, Vol. 14, No. 3 (2003), p. 29.
However, Saeed still regards this voice as apologetic which we discuss later. See Abdullah
Saeed, “Rethinking Citizenship Rights of Non-Muslims in an Islamic State: Rashid al-
Ghanushi’s Contribution to the Evolving Debate,” Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations, Vol.
10, No. 3 (1999), p. 319.
2 Dhimmi.http://readingislam.com (accessed 22/03/2010.
3 Fathi Osman, Sharia in Contemporary Society (California: Multimedia Vera International,
1994), p. 73.
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lamic law but today the “conditions originally necessary for this in-
stitution no longer exists. Thus a constitution which today guaran-
tees full civil and religious rights to all would be fully in harmony
with the SharÊÑah.”1
Giving force to this aspect, Amman’s Royal Academy for Is-
lamic Civilization Research Report concluded that,
The dhimmÊ covenant should be looked upon in a different
light today, for the systems that define and organize rela-
tions have changed and are now governed by international
law. Moreover, those who were once called dhimmÊs are
nowadays an integral part of their country’s whole popula-
tion. They participate in defense of their country on equal
footing with Muslims and pay the various taxes imposed
under the new systems by modern states which supersede
the jizyah.2
In defending this perspective, El-Erian argues, in his intro-
duction to Ghannushi’s book, that the normative and permanent
position of Islam as embodied in the unity of mankind, justice,
equality and other egalitarian principles does not discriminate be-
tween Muslims and non-Muslims in matters of nationality.3 This
is lucidly clear from many textual evidences including the follow-
ing verses and Prophetic traditions:
1. Let there be no compulsion in religion: truth stands out clear from er-
ror (Qur’an, 2: 256), and: Wilt thou (Muhammad) then compel
mankind, against their will, to believe! (Qur’an, 11: 99).
2. He who unfairly treats a non-Muslim who keeps a peace treaty with
Muslims, or undermines his rights, or burdens him beyond his capacity, or
takes something from him without his consent; then I am his opponent on
the Day of Judgment.4
1 Quoted in Nielson, “Contemporary Discussions on Religious Minorities in Muslim
Countries,” p. 300.
2 Amman Royal Academy for Islamic C ivilization Research, Treatment of non-
Muslims in Islam (Jordan: Albait Foundation, 1992), p. 28.
3 Rashid Ghannushi, The Right to Nationality Status of Non-Muslim Citizens in a Muslim Nation,
tans. M.A. El-Erian, (New York: Islamic Foundation of America, 1990), pp. 11-12.
4 Karim, MishkÉt al-MaÎÉbÊÍ, Vol. 2, p. 404.
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3. He who harms a non-Muslim who keeps a peace treaty with Mus-
lims has harmed me, and he who harms me has harmed God.1
4. He who kills a non-Muslim who keeps a peace treaty with the Mus-
lims will not smell the scent of Heaven, though its scent can be traced to
as far as a march of 40 years.2
This position was fully taken into account by sensible voices
among classical jurists like al-QarÉfÊ when he emphatically said, “He
who transgresses against them (dhimmÊs) – even with a mere word of
injustice or backtalk – has jeopardized the covenant with God and
His Prophet (SAS) and the covenant of the religion of Islam.”3
El-Awa is more constitutionally methodological when he
states that,
The basic principle of citizenship was founded by the
Prophet when he declared a collective concept of citizen-
ship for both Muslims and non-Muslims in the Constitu-
tion of MedÊnah, i.e., Muslims and the Jews of Medinah are
one single community with no place for second-class citi-
zens. This together with the general Qur’anic commands
on kind treatment of people irrespective of their religious
affiliation represents the de jure position of Islamic law on
this point. Hence, specific injunctions sanctioning unjust
treatment were meant to cater for specific circumstances.
Modern nation-states represent a new kind of Islamic sov-
ereignty to which much of traditional jurisprudence cannot
apply. Reasoning based on ijtihÉd must be used to deduce a
new system. The modern Muslim state is the result of a
joint struggle for independence and nation building in
which Muslim majority and non-Muslim minority both
have participated. In this way, it differs sharply from the
early Muslim imperial state that was based on conquest.
Now the discourse has changed from the contract of pro-
tection (Ñaqd al-dhimmah) to one of constitution (dustËr) and
1 Ibid., p. 403.
2Ibid., p. 494.
3 AÍmad ibn IdrÊs al-QarÉfÊ, al-FurËq (Beirut: DÉr al-Gharb al-IslÉmÊ, 1994), Vol. 3, p.
14.
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from dhimmah to citizenship/nationality (muwÉÏanah).1
He continues by asserting that
[t]he dhimmah was a contract (Ñaqd) and not a posited rule
(waÌÑ/immutable law). Every contract, unlike the popular
belief, is amenable to nullifications. ÑAqd al-dhimmah as such
was repudiated with the demise of the state which formulat-
ed it, namely the Prophetic state and subsequent Islamic Ca-
liphates. The nation-states of today are not the successors of
the founding Islamic state (established by the Prophet). Its
continuation was disrupted by colonization. Post-colonial
Muslim states were established on the basis of a joint strug-
gle by all the citizens, Muslims and non-Muslims alike, on
the basis of a social contract (Ñaqd ijtimÉÑÊ) unknown to our
ancient jurists.2
In juxtaposing the traditional status of protected community
with the concept of modern citizenship, Fahmi Huwaydi stated
that,
The term dhimmah in spite of being regarded as originating
from the Prophet’s usage was part of the vocabulary of pre-
Islamic Arab tribes in their tribal relations. Thus, its use by
the Prophet could not add any juridical connotation to it ex-
cept that he employed it with a great sense of trust and ac-
countability. But it lost its sense of responsible use in treating
non-Muslims in the course of history. As such, he does not
see any reason for adhering to its name in relation to non-
Muslims today.3
In a series of sermons delivered in 1984 at the mosque of
his Burj al-Roumi prison in Tunis, Rached al-Ghannouchi also
joins Huwaydi in considering the dhimmah concept as an historical
1 Muhammad Salim El-Awa, FÊ al-NiÐÉm al-SiyÉsÊ Li’l-Dawlah al-IslÉmiyyah (Beirut: DÉr al-
ShurËq, 1989), pp. 255-258. See also h i s account of t h e historical utility of Ñaqd
al-dhimmah in protecting t h e d h i m m Ê s ’ r i g h t s in countries like P a l e s t i n e
and Egypt, “Non-Muslim Citizens in an Islamic State,” http://www.arabnews.com/?
page=5&section=0&article=25871&d=8&m=5&y=2003& pix=islam.jpg&category=Islam
(accessed, 24/03/2010).
2 El-Awa, MabÉdi’ al-NiÐÉm al-SiyÉsÊ al-IslÉmÊ, pp. 255-258.
3 Fahmi Huwaydi, MuwÉÏinËn lÉ DhimmiyËn (Beirut: DÉr al-ShurËq, 1990/1410), pp.
110-111.
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expression of Muslims’ relations with non-Muslims which is no
longer valid. He, like other scholars, expounds his view on the
basis of a number of Qur’anic provisions stressing justice, unity
of mankind, non-compulsion in religion, etc. For instance, God
commands justice to all:
God enjoins justice, and the doing of good, and generosity towards
[one’s] fellow-men; and He forbids all that is shameful and all that
runs counter reason, as well as arrogance. (Qur’an, 16: 90)
Quoting the great theologian Fakhr al-DÊn al-RÉzÊ, al-
Ghannouchi asserts that this Qur’anic provision is the key princi-
ple for which the rest of the Qur’an is a commentary and explana-
tion. The Qur’an (49: 13) also declares humans as one single race:
O men! Behold, We have created you all out of a male and a female,
and have made you into nations and tribes, so that you might come to
know one another.
It (2: 256) also unambiguously establishes the principle of
‘no compulsion in religion’:
There shall be no coercion in matters of faith. Distinct has now be-
come the right way from [the way of] error.
In light of the above, al-Ghannushi suggests that these gen-
eral laws should be taken as the de jure position of Islam in the
context of present day situation to accord equal citizenship to all
residents of a Muslim state. On the issue of jizyah, he maintains
that the Qur’anic ruling that it should be collected “with submis-
sion” is linked to one particular event (Jews of Khaybar). Even if
we universalize it, its ratio legis was that it was paid in lieu of mili-
tary service. Since the modern state is one of shared citizenship,
military duty could be shared by all, in which case the require-
ment to pay the jizyah definitely falls away.1
By analyzing the constitution of MadÊnah in which the
Prophet declared Muslims together with the Jews as one millah or
ummah, Muhammad Imara sheds a new light onto the issue. To
him, communities and states are founded on shared belongings,
1 Rached al-Ghannouchi, ×uqËq al-MuwÉÏanah: ×uqËq Ghayr al-Muslim fÊ al-MujtamaÑ al-IslÉmÊ
(Herndon, Va: International Institute of Islamic Thought, 1993), pp. 30-53 & 101-102.
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which include creed, family, tribe, ethnic group, locality, etc.
Non-Muslims can equally be full citizens though they do not
share with Muslims in one element, namely the creed which they
have their own.1
In a nutshell that, the core of the arguments by this group is
that in the absence of “reasons for the existence of circumstances
defining dhimmah conditions originally necessary for it,” the mod-
ern concept of citizenship is the option and is in harmony with
Islamic law because: first, key constitutional principles of justice,
oneness of mankind, dignity of humans, religious diversity, equi-
table treatment, no forced conversion to Islam, etc., as embodied
in the Qur’an and the Sunnah do not recognize such dichotomy;
second, constitutional precedent of the Prophet (known as
wathÊqat or ÎaÍÊfat al-MadÊnah), predating the law of dhimmah is an
ipso facto evidence of the original position on non-Muslims’ equal
nationality status in Islam.
Critical appraisal: Towards an Alternative Paradigm
The above conflicting perspectives by traditionalists and apolo-
gists are suffer from many contradictions and paradoxes pursuant
to their atomistic and out-of-context application of the legislation
on dhimmah. Like others, they have failed to appreciate the follow-
ing foundational constitutional principles necessary for the appli-
cation of dhimmah and jizyah.
1. The Qur’an (9: 29) clearly declares that dhimmah is a direct
consequence of jihÉd:
[And] fight against those who – despite having been vouchsafed reve-
lation [aforetime] – do not [truly] believe either in God or the Last
Day, and do not consider forbidden that which God and His Apostle
have forbidden, and do not follow the religion of truth [which God has
enjoined upon them] till they [agree to] pay the exemption tax
[jizyah] with a willing hand, after having been humbled [in war].
Any insistence squarely on the dhimmah institution without ad-
1 Quoted in Nielson, “Contemporary discussions on Religious Minorities in Muslim
Countries,” p. 301.
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vocating a policy of armed force engagement with others is not only
unwarranted but also ultra vires in the Qur’an unless and until the
orthodoxy concedes that this legislation was situational suitable for a
set of circumstances which were radically different from ours.
It may be contended without hesitation that the legislation of
dhimmah was circumstantial in many respects. First, the novice state
of MadÊnah was besieged by hostile forces and the local non-
Muslims were collaborating with them;1 the law of dhimmah as pos-
tulated by the orthodoxy was designed to contain such betrayals on
the part of enemy insiders. Second, in those days communal differ-
ences were resolved by means of violence; there was no effective
global body to establish dialogue and mediate between the warring
tribes or nations hence every community had its own law of war so
had Muslims. In the global world of interconnectedness the whole
world including Muslim nations have committed themselves to
abide by moral visions of co-existence as stipulated in the provisions
of international law2 on matters of civil rights; resorting to violence
is no more a norm, thus any attempt to preserve such a concept is
not only futile but impractical and unrealistic.
2. Another stark reality neglected by the traditional school is
the fact that dhimmah was a type of nationality anchored in a kind
of political form of the government which was established by the
Prophet, and replicated under different configurations, such as caliphate, sul-
tanate etc by the subsequent Muslim rulers. Modern Muslim nation-
states, some with constitutional monarchies others with republican
forms of political system or even Islamic democratic forms of gov-
ernments, have emerged as totally different types of political land-
scapes to which many features of the traditional Caliphate System
1 The Jews in MadÊnah would hurl Muslims with “death upon you” greetings (al-sÉmu
Ñalaykum), instead of saying to them “peace be upon you” (al-salÉmu Ñalaykum). The
Christians built the mosque of mischief making (masjid ÌirÉr) with the intention of
luring the Prophet to come and assassinate him.
2 The nation states of today, among others, are under an international obligation
to accord equal citizenship to their nationals and not to discriminate against them on
account of their religious beliefs by virtue of articles 15 and 18 of the Universal Dec-
laration of Human Rights, 10 December 1948. For details see, Jack Donnelly, Internation-
al Human Rights (Boulder: West view Press 1998), p. 6.
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do not apply. For instance, with the exception of a few countries,
the public laws of most Muslim states consist of either Anglo-
British Common law or French Civil law. Moreover, most of these
states have embraced the idea of an elected government via popu-
lar voting system which perforce binds them to the idea of human
rights, fundamental liberties, etc. In the context of entwining prin-
ciples of international laws and institutions in a village-like globe,
an Islamic state does not have the locus standi to re-impose dhimmÊ
laws on its non-Muslim citizens.1 Practically speaking, according to
Abdullah Laroui, the re-establishment of an Islamic State within
the frame of modern territorial states cannot be regarded (constitu-
tionally) as reinstatement of Islamic Caliphate, mainly because of
the non-existence of one of the two essential pillars of such a tradi-
tional political structure, namely solidarity (ÑaÎabiyyah) of the pledg-
ees (mubÉyiÑn) as stipulated by Ibn KhaldËn.2
Realizing the new and changing realities of the present, Abu
al-Majd and El-Awa are methodologically consistent when they
conclude that the dhimmah law is fixed at the level of its textual
proof, but elastic (open to ijtihÉd) at the level of its application. This
is a point which the conservative jurist fails to capture. Al-ShÉÏibÊ
rebuked such an approach to fiqh when he said: “Any attempt at
understanding a textual proof and its application without regard to
its context for application would be counterproductive.”3
Likewise, the Islamophobia which has led some non-Muslim
scholars to present a demonic picture of Islam and Muslims by co-
opting the orthodox version of dhimmah though understandable
cannot be accepted as an authentic position on two grounds. First, it
1 Emphasizing this point, Evans rightly pointed out that to reproduce constitutional
protections while being oblivious of their ineffectiveness in today’s context will not
provide a framework for negotiating between reigious values and principles of human
rights. Carolyn Evans, “Religion, Law and Governance: Comparative and Human
Rights Perspectives,” a paper read at International  Conference on  Religion, Law and Govern-
ance in South East Asia, Kuala Lumpur: 29, January 2010, pp. 1-2
2 Khaled Ziyadeh, book review of Abullah Laroui’s “MafhËm al-Dawlah”, Majallat al-IjtihÉd
(published by DÉr al-IjtihÉd, Beirut), Vol. 15, No. 16 (1992), p. 359.
3 AbË IsÍÉq IbrÉhÊm ibn MËsÉ al-ShÉÏibÊ, al-MuwÉfaqÉt (Beirut: DÉr al-MaÑrifa, 1999),
Vol. 4, p. 98.
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eternally fixes a juridical concept which Muslims themselves are not
unanimous. Stressing this, Edward Said indicates that one may ques-
tion the Orientalists’ notion not only as selective, namely drawing
on most orthodox voices among the array of interpretations based
on ‘denominational schisms’, but also on sociological ground of
continued attempt to paint Islam as anti-modern since the era of
Western imperial colonization of the Muslim lands.1 Such an antag-
onistic presentation cannot be sustained if problematized against the
backdrop of divergence of perspectives2 among the legal scholars
which is too obvious to negate. Second, it tends to revive historical
scores which not only gives rise to suspicion of malice afore thought on
their part but also renders it less contemporary. Or else the dictum
that “objectivity cannot be claimed in humanities” may hold true in
their case as well.
The new approach, dubbed as advocating muwÉÏanah for non-
Muslims has the strength of moving ahead with modernity. Being
consistent with the purposes of the SharÊÑah; and being grounded
in general egalitarian principles of the Qur’an and the Sunnah, it
is a sensible approach but with some qualifications. It has to im-
prove on its methodological sophistication in terms of Islamic
legal theory. Citing textual provisions of general import without
uÎËlÊ argumentation would hardly advance the cause of renewal in
Islamic law. Some of such principles which may be invoked in its
support include: 1- consistence with the spirit and goals of the
SharÊÑah (objectives of Islamic law) as it reconciles the SharÊÑah
with contemporary constitutional norms and removes prejudices
against Islam, 2- consideration of consequences (iÑtibÉr al-ma’ÉlÉt)
whose neglect results in reckless ijtihÉd, and 3- prevention of draw-
ing fallacious analogies from situations with different circum-
1 Heristchi quotes one of the most vocal critics of the Orientlist tradition, namely Ed-
ward Said (1993-1995). See Claire Heristchi and Andrea Teti, “Rethinking the Myths
of Islamic Politics,” in Jeff Haynes (ed.) Religion and Politics: A Survey (London: Europa-
Routledge, 2006), p. 2.
2 Claire and Andrea were conscious of this fact when they pointed that since the
scriptural  texts  are  subject  to  a  variety  of  constructs  by  different  sects  and
contemporary religious thoughts, to conclude that Islam presents unified system of
values and a monolithic vision on politics and civilization is untenable. Ibid., p. 4.
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stances (tanqÊÍ al-manÉÏ).1
It is to be noted, however, that what distinguishes most this
approach is its time-spatial appreciation of the issue of dhimmah, a
dimension which has been universally agreed by reform-minded
thinkers of variant orientation. For instance, Abd al-Wahhab
Khallaf pointed out that with the exception of clearly defined text
proofs and consensus anchored on them, the bulk of the legal cor-
pus was formulated in the light of requirements and conditions of
the past, hence today’s jurist must reconsider them in the light of
their own needs and requirements.2 Even a most authentic Pro-
phetic tradition can be followed only if it is concomitant with pub-
lic interest (maÎlaÍa). In the same vein, AbdulHamid AbuSulyman
pointed that to ignore the time-space factors of fiqh and Sunnah
would be an exercise in wrong abstraction which is likely to lead to
flawed conclusion.3 To him to avoid such reckless legal hermeneu-
tics, the fiqh legacy has to be understood within its historical and
social context. Mohammad S. Ashmawi, a contemporary Egyptian
writer, emphasized that it is paramount to consider the dialectical
relationship between divine text and context, a reality which was
not grasped by pre-modern jurists fully.4 To conclude this point,
the conservative camp failed to acknowledge the structural trans-
formation (this epistemic element) which has changed the dis-
course from one of the two camps constantly at war to that of
constitutional states bound inextricably to a set of global legal
frameworks unknown to tribal sub-structures of medieval times.
Its advocates must explicitly indicate that their alternative con-
cept of muwÉÏanah does not imply wholesale borrowing of the lib-
eral concept of citizenship as intended by its exponents without
being bound by ‘non-negotiable’ parameters of the SharÊÑah, as
1 Al-ShÉÏibÊ, al-MuwÉfaqÉt, vol. 4, p. 46.
2 Abdelwahhab Khallaf, MaÎÉdir al-TashrÊÑ al-IslÉmÊ fÊmÉ lÉ NaÎÎa fÊh (Cairo: DÉr al-Fikr
al-ÑArabÊ, 1987), p. 7.
3 AbdulHamid A. AbuSulayman, Towards an Islamic Theory of International Relations: New
Directions for Islamic Methodology and thought (Herndon, Va.: International Institute of
Islamic Thought, 1993), p. 5.
4 Muhammad Saeed Ashmawi (1932-), quoted in Wael B. Hallaq, ShariÑa: Theory, Practice
Transformation (Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 523.
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Scott pointed out.1 Advocating liberal equation of Islamic notion
of nationality with that of Western model of citizenship has far-
reaching implications for Muslims since the underlying philosophy
behind it is unbridled liberty of humans as natural beings without
regard to religious values. This is evident from one standard defini-
tion of citizenship which reads:
A social relationship that arises between individuals and
the political community ‘state’ whereby the state provides
economic, political and social protection for the individuals
by means of the law and constitution which equalize be-
tween the individuals as natural human entities, while the
individuals owe allegiance to the state and take recourse to
its law to get their rights.2
The immediate implication, therefore, is that all individuals are
equal “before the law and the constitution irrespective of their reli-
gious, sectarian, ethnic and class affiliations.”3 As such from the
very inception, its raison-d’être lied in its unifying denomination for
preventing religious dissention arising among various groups on
account of “dissipation of the authority by Catholic Church in Eu-
rope during seventeen century” and to subsequently serve as a ve-
hicle for social integration and laying down “the foundation for
democratic systems.”4 As a launching pad for creating public con-
sciousness among the citizenry, it “transcends the obstacles
spawned by traditional pre-citizenship affiliations,” such as reli-
gious, ethnic etc. towards national integration.5
1 See Rachel M. Scott, “Contextual  Citizenship  in  Modern  Islamic Thought” at
http://www.alwasatparty.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=314(access ed
10/05/2010). Esack dubs uncritical borrowing of such modern concepts as citizenship as a
kind of “ad hoc accomodotionist response” to placate Empire (Western Powers). Farid
Isack, “The Contemporary Democracy and the Human Rights Project for Muslim Socie-
ties,” in Abdul Aziz Said et al. (eds.), Contemporary Islam: Dynamic, not Static (London/New
York: Routledge, 2006), p.118.
2 Abdul Kareem Qasim Saeed, Citizenship and the Issue of the State in Islamic Thought
(published online in PDF form by The Women’s Forum for Research and Training, n.
d.), p. 9.
3 Ibid., p. 17.
4 Ibid., p.18.
5 Ibid.
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To Bernard Lewis and Mohammad Arkoun, Islam and citi-
zenship are averse to each other as to the latter “the concept of
political community in Islam is devoid of any attempt for devel-
opment of citizenship as a prerequisite for not only the emer-
gence of the rule of law, but for the emergence of civil society
which can dominate the authority of the state.”1 Abdullahi An-
Na‘im concedes such discrepancy between the two nations when
he opines that the notion of dhimmah as evolved historically was a
‘personal’ concept of citizenship and it has to be replaced by a
‘territorial’ concept of citizenship. He says:
Whereas the personal concept of citizenship would confer
this status on the basis of some personal attribute or quality
such as religion or ethnicity, the territorial conception of cit-
izenship, which has now become the norm, the territorial
one confers the benefits and burdens of citizenship on all
those born and permanently resident within the territory of
the state, as well as those naturalized under the relevant pro-
visions of the law of the land. It is morally repugnant and
politically inexpedient, I submit, to deny a full citizenship to
any person who was born and permanently resident within
the territory of the state unless such person opts for and re-
quires the citizenship of another state.2
However, representing the advocates of full adoption of the
concept, Qasim Saeed maintains that there are ample textual evi-
dences in primary sources of the Qur’an and the Sunnah which
supports the idea of oneness of human race, creation of Ummah,
a political community based contracts between citizens of varying
religious affiliations as was exemplified in the SaÍÊfat al-MadÊnah
(the MadÊnah covenant/constitution) between the Muslims and
the Jews.3
1 Ibid., p. 19.
2 Abdullahi Ahmed An-NaÑim, Toward an Islamic Reformation (New York: Syracuse Uni-
versity Press, 1996), p. 84. See also Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, “A Theory of Islam,
State and Society,” in Keri Vagt et al. (eds.), New Directions in Islamic Thought (London:
I.B. Tauris, 2009), pp. 159-160.
3 SaÍÊfat al-MadÊnah was a document drawn up by Prophet Muhammad immediately
after the establishment of the state of MadÊnah. Its essential feature was that it was
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Nevertheless, this primary meaning of ummah as a political
community could not be sustained and ended up being limited to a
specific religious community or group (the Muslims) due to the
Jews’ breach of the MadÊnah covenant.1 In Saeed’s view, the origi-
nal message of Islam provides enough space for the notion of citi-
zenship, but it was the logic of history which constrained its juridical
evolution.2 He went on further rationalizes his stand by saying that
the underlying assumption behind this concept of citizenship is that
it derives its legitimacy from the theory of social contract between
people and rulers as propounded by European Enlightenment
thinkers during the 1970s.3 In this legal parameter, the individual
rights are paramount from which the state derives its sovereignty.
To Qasim Saeed, this notion of citizenship entrenched in the tripar-
tite of social contract, state of human nature, and dutifulness to the
law is in harmony with Islamic principles of bayÑah (pledge of alle-
giance to state authority).4
The point made by Qasim Saeed appears to be valid in spite
of his flawed analogy between bayÑah and theory of social contact,
while conceding that over individualism implied in the concept
cannot be acceptable in the Islamic framework. Otherwise, this
project would be regarded as another apologetic stance, for which
reason it has been criticized by Abdullah Saeed for whom,
The apologetic discourse also applies to Ghannoushi as
well, who sees the concept of equal citizenship rights as de-
contractually agreed between Muslims and Jews. It, among others, stipulated that the
believers and Muslims from among the tribe of Quraysh and Yathrib and their fol-
lowers and those who strive with them, are a single community, while the constitution
of MadÊnah recognized the signatory parties as multiple social covenants, such as the
Jews “and those who follow us from amongst the Jews we shall support them…”,
“the Jews of Bani ÑAuf are a nation from amongst the believers”, “to the Jews is their
religion and to the Muslims is their religion.” See Saeed, Citizenship and the Issue of the
State in Islamic Thought, pp.19-20 & 70-71.
1 Ibid., pp. 20-21.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid., p. 10.
4 He proffers historical evidence where people bound themselves to abide by com-
mand of rulers through mubÉyaÑah (pledge taking), Prophetic statement of wholesome-
ness of humans upon birth and al-FÉrÉbÊ’s formula of moral perfection though social
interactions. Saeed, Citizenship, pp. 12-13.
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rived from Islamic heritage (turÉth). Thus, it is argued that
seemingly Western notions would be considered to have an-
tecedents that are essentially Islamic: they appear to come
from the West, but are not necessarily Western, and em-
phatically do not represent a ‘succumbing’ to the West.1
One may agree with Scot that the wholesale adoption of the
concept of citizenship leads to a frontal clash with perennial values
which Muslims endear and are not prepared to compromise. For
instance, to her, Christian Copts in Egypt are never prepared to ac-
cept the idea of interfaith marriages or apostasy, a sensitivity which
Muslims also share with respect to apostasy in particular and partly
with regard to interfaith marital ties. To Scot the alternative frame-
work, therefore, is a contextual idea of citizenship, as people of dif-
ferent faiths will not bow to universalization of the Western model
of citizenship. However, she left us without any clarification out as
to what would the Muslim formula be if not dhimmah in the changed
situation of a globalized landscape.2
The notion of non-Muslims’ nationality should not be bound
by the parameters of the jizyah and dhimmah, but should instead be
encapsulated within some universal ethical framework, such as re-
specting the other’s religious sensitivity, upholding the principle of
public morality, avoiding subversion of the established social order,
being faithful to the cause of social harmony for the good of all the
citizenry etc. These are restrictions which all the modern states im-
pose on their subjects, irrespective of their status whether citizens
or ordinary residents. This proposition somewhat supports Bryan
Turner’s thesis when he criticized the obsession by some
Orientlists with issues like dhimmah in the context of today’s glob-
alized world and cultural milieu of post-modernist discourse as fu-
tile. The reason is that ethnic diversification and multicultural poli-
tics of the present day, defy subordination of local diversity to the
brute power of nation-states. In effect, the discourse has now
shifted from that of national ethnic cohesion (citizenship) to that
1 Saeed, “Rethinking Citizenship Rights,” p. 319.
2 See Rachel M. Scott, “Contextual Citizenship in Modern Islamic Thought,” Islam and
Christian-Muslim Relations, Vol. 18, No. 1 (2007), pp. 1-18.
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of minority protection.1
Conclusion
The central idea emerging from the foregoing discussion is that the
question of dhimmah in terms of its expanded juridical construction
unlike the popular belief represents the mutable part of Muslim ju-
ridical legacy. Irrespective of its origin, a Muslim configuration of
minorities within the historical abode of Islam (dÉr al-IslÉm) or an
offshoot of protégé of the Roman empire as claimed by orientalists,
from the fiqh standpoint it was a policy-oriented mechanism of relat-
ing to others in the context of the binary division of the world into
two hostile camps in the ancient time. It was justified as a matter of
expediency and de facto arrangements to treat minorities differently in
dÉr al-IslÉm particularly when they subscribed to a way of life which
was upheld by Muslims’ adversaries from the hostile abode (dÉr al-
Íarb). With the collapse of that kind of binary geographical division
of the world, the replacement of The Caliphate system with that of
nation states; and the emergence of radically different norms in rela-
tions between nations, insistence on the replica of the ancient time
would be fatalistic.
The de jure position as embodied in the universal message of
the Qur’an, such as unity of mankind, mercy, justice, and as
expressed by the Sunnah through the Prophet’s egalitarian
treatment of the Christians of Najran and Jews of MadÊnah, prior
to the law of dhimmah, does not recognize such a dichotomous
notion of citizenship for the inhabitants of a Muslim state at
present time. In order to establish a case for such a re-
interpretation of this notion and the attendant juristic rules, its
advocates must rise above simplistic approach by addressing the
issue from constitutional jurisprudential episteme. The
traditionalists also need to wake up from their slumber to the
present realities of contemporary life so as to avoid the folly of
1 Bryan S. Turner, Oreintalism, Postmodernism and Globalism (London/New York:
Routledge, 1994), p. 201.
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abstract identification of historical concepts such as dhimmah with
certain politically loaded concepts such as citizenship. However, it
is conceded that among the fiqh community the juristic discourse is
heavily tilted towards maintaining the traditional status quo, the
deconstructionist project on citizenship rights of non-Muslim
minorities, however, practically may prevail, thanks to the
pragmatic electoral alliance of Muslim revivalists with non-Muslim
political parties in several countries including that of Muslim
Brotherhood in Egypt since 1987.1
1 The Muslim Brotherhood unequivocally and expressly declared that the Coptic
Christians in Egypt, and the 'People of the Book' in general, are full citizens in an Is-
lamic state, and that they have the same rights and obligations as Muslims. Saeed, “Re-
thinking Citizenship Rights,” p. 320.
CHAPTER 6
Muslim Immigrants in Urban China
Between Confrontation and Adaptation
(Ramadan) Ma Qiang
Introduction
After the Chinese government launched its reformation policy of
“opening-up to the outside world” in the 1980s, more and more
Muslims immigrated to cities and urban centres which are not
traditionally Muslim residential areas. The commercial cities like
Shenzhen and Guangzhou of Guangdong province, and Yiwu of
Zhejiang province have become the most attracting places for
Muslims to establish companies, export goods, open restaurants,
start small ×alÉl food stores, and manage small shops to sell Mus-
lim commodities, etc. There are also cultural and technological
attractions for foreign Muslims to study Chinese language, Chi-
nese medicine, engineering, manufacturing and other disciplines
in Chinese universities, or work with factories and companies in
different provinces in China.
Immigration to metropolitan centres or economically and
technologically prosperous cities emerged as a significant phe-
nomenon, particularly since 1990s. Being strangers to the origi-
nal Han Chinese societies, the immigrants are confronted with
many dilemmas and difficulties in the process of embedding in-
to such a heterogeneous social milieu. This study focuses on
these confrontations they encountered and adaptations they
adopted, which mainly manifested in their religious activities,
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×alÉl food, accommodation, occupations, communities, mar-
riage, inhabitation, etc. and analyze their cultural tactics in these
occasions accordingly.
Since 1990s China has experienced a rapid process of urbani-
zation, prompted mainly by a spirit of reform and opening to the
outside world and a series of political and economical reform pro-
grammes that originated in 1980s. As ethnic minority groups in
China, Muslims consist of ten ethnic groups numbering more than
twenty million1 people who have clearly benefited from this histor-
ic period. However, this quick process of change and moderniza-
tion, though offering Muslim good opportunities, has faced them
with many difficulties. For urban Muslims particularly, these diffi-
culties can be ascribed to many factors.
These factors can be summarized in the following things: 1-
Immigration domestically and internationally in the process of
urbanization; 2- Closer connections and communication between
China and Islamic world; 3- The attractions of thriving and pros-
perous commodities of some cities; 4- Rapid development of all
sorts of high quality but low price markets alongside the coastal
areas, especially, in the earliest open cities, such as Guangzhou,
Shenzhen, both of them are near Hong Kong and Macao, etc.
Urbanization has become a complex and important issue that
requires to be studied on many accounts. This chapter, however,
is not concerned with the phenomenon of urbanization itself in
China; it rather focuses on the influence of urbanization on Mus-
lim communities and organizations based on the writer’s many
years of fieldwork on urban Muslim society in China.
1 This figure is most probably based on official statistics provided by the Chinese au-
thorities, which are known for their tendency to downplay the size of minorities, espe-
cially with regard to Muslims. Due to severe restrictions on academic research on eth-
nic and religious groups, it is quite difficult to get an accurate estimate of the size of
Muslim population in mainland China. Some attempts, however, have estimated that
size at no less than 40 million based on the number of mosques calculated by the Chi-
na Islamic Association. – Editor.
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Background to the Study
There are many anthropological, sociological and ethnographical
works published in China which focus on Chinese Muslim com-
munities. The research on urban Muslim Chinese can be summed
up as follows.
1. Urban Muslim communities in Northwest China
Zhang Zhongfu and Gao Zhanfu cooperated in studying the
Hui Muslim ×alÉl food enterprises, religious practices, marriage
relationships, cultural renaissance, the Shaykh’s tomb and reli-
gious rituals in Lan Zhou and Lin Xia of Gan Su province. Their
work can be regarded as the earliest anthropological research on
urban Chinese Muslims. Gao Yongjiu, who also did research on
minority communities in northwest China, focused on China
eastern cities. Ma Huilan has studied one of the Hui Muslim
communities in Yin Chuan, the capital of Ning Xia Hui autono-
mous region. Zang Xiaowei did sociological research on Hui
Muslim community in Lan Zhou, the capital of Gan Su province.
Yang Wenjiong selected Lan Zhou, Xi An, Xi Ning and Yin
Chuan as his fieldwork sites in order to take a comparative study
on the Muslim communities in northwest China, laying emphasis
on issues of community, ethnic identity, and the impact of geo-
graphical location on ethnic relationships and identity.
Ding Kejia carried out his doctoral research on Xi Ning (capi-
tal of Qing Hai province), Lin Xia (a famous Muslim city in Gan
Su province) and Wu Zhong (in Ning Xia), in which he mainly
addressed Islamic issues specific to these areas. Shu Xihong dealt
with the situation of Hui community in northwest China and its
encounter with modernization. Yang Zhijuan focused on Hui
Muslim’s marriage, particularly on intermarriage in the cities of
northwest China. Zhang Jianfang studied Islamic culture change in
Wu Zhong. Zhou Chuanbin studied on Hui Muslim communities
in Yin Chuan and Shi Zui Shan of Ning Xia.1
1Ding Kejia, “Micro and Macro Aspects of Observed Phenomena in the Contemporary
Hui Nationality: Issues of Research Approaches in Three Recent Works in Ethnographic
Studies,” Journal of Hui Muslim Minority Studies, No. 2 (2003), pp. 60-65; “Rethinking the
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2. Chen Dai Hui Muslim community of Quang Zhou city in Fu Jian
province
This is a Muslim community that is very much assimilated
with the local Han Chinese. Therefore, Pan Hongli studied its
acculturation from an anthropological perspective; he has
demonstrated that the cultural identity of the Hui people, includ-
ing Muslims, has been considerably shaped by common historical
memories, differently from the Muslims living in northwest Chi-
na who clearly and simultaneously profess a double identity:
Muslim and Chinese. Lan Jiongxi focused on issues population,
land, market and enterprise in the same region. Fan Ke devoted
his doctoral research to the question of Hui identity in Chen Dai
and Bai Qi of Quan Zhou.1
study and attitude towards the problems of urban Hui nationality: An interactive viewpoint
on ‘community’ and ‘modernization’,” Proceddings of the Fourteenth National Symposium on the
Hui Nationality, 2003, pp. 618-626; Taiwan National Chengchi University, Department of
Ethnology, “Muslims in the Loess Plateau: A Field Investigation Report on Northwestern
Chinese Muslim Communities,” 2004 (Internal data); Gao Yongjiu, “Urbaniaztion
Research on Northwest Minority Areas,” Lan Zhou University Press, 2003; Gao Yongjiu &
Zhang Xiaolei, “The Analysis of theSituation of Different Social Groups’ Religious Life in
Tian Mu community,” Journal of Hui Muslim Minority Studies, No. 1 (2007), pp. 69-74; Ma
Huilan, “The Urbanization Process among the Hui community: A Case Study of the Bei Ta
village of Hong Hua township in the Suburbs of Yinchuan,” Journal of the Second Northwest
University for Nationalities, No. 2 (2004), pp. 53-57; Zang Xiaowei, “Ethnic Differences in
Neighboring Behavior in Urban China,” Social Focus, vol. 36 (2003), pp. 197-218; Yang
Wenjiong, Interaction, Adaptation and Reconstruction: The Hui Communities of the Northwest cities of
China and Research on their Culture Change (Beijing: The Ethnic Publishing House, 2007); Ding
Kejia, “Islamic Research in the Process of Contemporary Urbanization in the Provinces of
Gansu Ningxia and Qinghai,” (Ph. D. dissertation, Central University of Nationalities,
(Beijing, 2006); Su Xihong, News Explorations on Modern Practices of Northwest Hui Community
(Beijing: The Commercial Press, 2004); Yang Zhijuan, “Research on Urban Intermarriage
among the Hui nationality in Ningxia,” Journal of Hui Muslim Minority Studies, No. 1 (2002),
pp. 39-47; Zhang Jianfang & Wang Lihong, “Adjustment and Development of the Hui
Islamic culture in the Context of Urbanization: A Case Study of Wuzhong city in the
Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region,” Journal of Hui Muslim Minority Studies, No. 1 (2007), pp.
60-68; Zhou Chuanbin, “Urbanization in the Hexi region of Ningxia and Social Change
among the Hui community: The Case of the Yingchuan and Shi Zuishan cities,” Journal of
The Second Northwest University for Nationalities, No. 2 (2007), pp. 5-12.
1 Pan Hongli, “A Study on the Acculturation of the Huis in Quranzhou Chendai,” in
Studies on Chen Dai’s history of Huis (Beijing: China Social Sciences Press, 1991), pp. 258-
273; Lan Jiongxi, “On the Process of Urbanization among the Hui community in Fujian:
A Case Study of Seven Hui Villages in Jingjian city,” The Fourteenth National symposium on
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3. Studies on Guang Zhou (Guang Dong province) and San Ya (Hai
Nan province)
Based on several years of fieldwork, Ma Jianzhao studied the
Hui communities in San Ya from both a historical and
anthroplogical perspective. Sun Jiuxia carried out his work by focus-
ing on ethnic identity and ethnic relationship. Ma Qiang studied the
history of the Muslim community in Guang Zhou, by examining
the processes of socio-cultural change, the multi-ethnic character of
the different groups constituting it, the concept of jamÉÑah and its
relationship with the universal ummah as perceived by the Guang
Zhou Muslims, theoretical issues of spiritual communities, etc.1
4. Works on Bei Jing
Zhou Chuanbin and Ma Xuefeng took Bei Jing as a case
study, and discussed the structure of Muslim community there.
Liang Jingyu, selected one of the famous Muslim community,
namely, Niu Jie in Bei Jing, undertook anthropological research.2
5. Studies on Nan Jing (capital of Jiang Su province) and Shang Hai
Bai Youtao studied the Qi Jia Wan Hui community in Nan
Jing, through the analysis of social and cultural activities and
functions in the context of urbanization. He carried out a socio-
logical study on the Muslim communities in Shang Hai, Hang
Zhou (in Zhe Jiang province), and Yi Wu (in Zhe Jiang province)
on the issue of succession, and compared his findings with simi-
the compilation of Hui nationality, 2003, pp. 79-87 (internal data); Fan Ke, Identity Politics in
South Fujian Hui Communities, (Ph. D. dissertation, University of Washington, 2001).
1Ma Jianzhao, “The Historical Origins and Social Change among the Hui nationality in
Hainan: A Historical and Anthropological survey on two Hui ethnic villages of Yanglan
township in Sanya, Hainan,” Journal of Hui Muslim Minority Studies，No. 4 (2001), pp. 27-
33; Sun Jiuxia, “Ethnic Identity and Relationships in the Modern Context: The Case of
the Hui nationality in Fenghuang township of Sanya, Hainan,” Ethno-National Studies, No.
3 (2004), pp. 61-67; Ma Qiang, The Flow of Spiritual Community: A Study of Guangzhou Mus-
lim groups from an Anthropological Perspective (The Social Sciences Press, 2006).
2 Zhou Chuanbin & Ma Xuefeng, “A Paradigm Discussion on Social Structure of
Urban Hui Muslim Minority: As the Case of Beijing,” Journal of Hui Muslim Minority
Studies, No. 3 (2004), pp. 33-39; Liang Jingyu, Niu Street: The Vicissitudes of an Urban Hui
Community (Ming Zu University of China Press, 2006).
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lar studies done on Muslims of northwest urban China.1
6. Research on other cities
Shui Jingjun studied on Shui Nan Guan Hui community of
Qin Yang city in He Nan province, in which she combined meth-
odology of Sociology and Anthropology. Ma Shourong investigat-
ed Shun Cheng Street community in Kun Ming of Yun Nan prov-
ince. Yang Wenjiong also studied on the scattered urban Muslim
communities in eastern China. Dru Gladney selected four com-
munities as his research fields in Bei Jing (2), Yong Ning (in Ning
Xia) and Quangzhou, from which he induced all of Muslim com-
munities in urban China in such four stereotypes that can not in-
clude the diversity of urban Chinese Muslim communities practi-
cally.2
We can classify the above-mentioned studies into two catego-
ries. The first category mainly focused on cities in northwest and
southwest China, where traditional and major Muslim communities
are located, such as Xi An, Lan Zhou, Lin Xia, Yin Chuan, Wu
Zhong, Xi Ning and Kun Ming. The second category focused on
the issues related to Muslims in the eastern cities, such as Bei Jing,
1 Bai Youyao & Pan Gengcao, The Hui Community in the Context of Urban Modernization
(Ningxia people’s Publishing House, 2005); Bai Youtao & Chen Yunchang, “Migrant
Muslims and Metropolitan Hui Community in Nanjing: A Case Study of Shanghai,”
Journal of Hui Muslim Minority Studies, No. 4 (2007), pp. 77-84; Li Xiaoyu & Bai Youtao,
“A Study on Social Adaptation among Migrant Muslims in China,” Journal of Qinghai
Nationalities Institute, No. 1 (2009), pp. 80-84.
2 Shui Jingjun, “The development and  cultural change of Shui Nanguan village of
Zhong Yuan region,” Journal of Hui Muslim Minority Studies, No. 2 (1999), pp. 41-47; Ma
Shourong, “Cultural Change in the Social Structure of Urban Hui Muslim Minority:
The Case of the Hui community of Shun Chen street in Kun Ming city,” Journal of Hui
Muslim Minority Studies, No. 4 (2003), pp. 33-38; “The religious Life and Cultural Iden-
tity of Urban Ethnic Communities: A Study on the Hui community of Shun Chen
street,” Thinking, No. 4 (2003), pp. 89-92; “The change of the economic  activity of
ethnic communities in the process of urbanization: A Case Study of the Hui Ethnic
Community of Shuncheng Street of Kunming City,” Journal of Yunnan Nationalities
University, No. 6 (2003), pp. 52-55; Yang Wenjiong & Fan Ying, “On the Regional
Differences of Hui Ethnic Group Culture and Dislocation of Ethnic Identity: An
Investigation into Hui People in Lianyungang, Jiangsu,” Journal of The Second Northwest
University for Nationalities，No. 2 (2009), pp. 30-35: Dru C. Gladney, Ethnic Identity in
China: The Making of a Muslim Minority Nationalism (Florida: Wadsworth Publishing,
1997); Wadsworth Publishing (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2004).
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Shang Hai, Quang Zhou, Guang Zhou and San Ya, etc. Compara-
tively speaking, Muslim issues of cities in central China are still out
of observation from the scholars.
These works mainly dealt-with the changes taking place
among Hui communities, their religious and economic life, cul-
tural identity, marriage, education, and employment and adapta-
tion of immigrants, etc. This kind of academic preference indi-
cates that the eastern cities, especially the coastal and commercial
ones, especially traditional Muslim communities and new Muslim
immigrants to cities, are confronted with many dilemmas and
difficulties of religious nature because of the rapid development
and high degree of opening to the outside world. The western
cities where Muslims live in special areas are also confronted with
such dilemmas, though to a lesser degree. Actually, these urban-
related issues in the western cities have stimulated by China’s
rapid development of urbanization opening up to the outside
world over the last 30 years, which has led to great changes
amidst the Muslim communities in this country.
Methodology
I have been involved in the study of Chinese Muslim urban com-
munities since 1999. I focused my fieldwork on five cities, namely,
Lan Zhou and Xi An in northwest China, Guang Zhou and Shen
Zhen in south China, and Yi Wu (famous as international small
commodities market) in central China. These five urban Muslim
communities reflect different lifestyles of urban Muslims in China.
Lan Zhou and Xi An belong to the category of steadily vanishing
traditional cities where old communities still exist but face dislocat-
ing and agonizing perplexity.
Guang Zhou can be regarded as a representative city where
the features of traditional Muslim community have disappeared in
the process of modernization and urbanization in the coastal cities
in China. Shen Zhen and Yi Wu are the new commercial cities at-
tract more and more Muslims both from China and outside world
to do business, and consequently, new communities have already
emerged in both cities. Most of the data and conclusions are the
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result of my participatory observation during my field research.
The ethnographic data I collected was mostly gathered through the
interviewing of Imams, students of the masjids, preachers, work-
ers, members of management committees of masjids, residents of
the community, Arabic interpreters, managers of companies, tran-
sient workers, different employers, government officers, and im-
migrants came from different countries, etc. I have also used offi-
cial government statistical data, communiqués, and other official
documents as well as ethnographic and sociological research works
conducted by other scholars.
Empirical Findings
1. Disintegration of traditional Muslim communities in urban China
This is a prominent phenomenon that emerged in the pro-
cess of urbanization, and constitutes a principal factor behind di-
lemmas of religion in the city. But what are the factors that
caused the community disintegration? The following two factors
may account for this situation.
A. Decrease in the population size of the community due to
political campaigns, urban renewal, migration, welfare-oriented
public housing distribution system, the construction of the multi-
storey buildings, the decline of economic attraction, traffic prob-
lems, housing conditions, etc.
B. Decline of the community functions. This is related to the de-
crease in the size of population, which undermines the sense of identity
among the community members because of inconvenience and heter-
ogeneity caused by urban development, thus affecting the traditional
functions that used to be fulfilled by the community. Likewise, religious
education has declined or even faded away, and Muslim individuals can
no longer get religious education and exhortation that imbibes them
with the sense of belonging and identity with the community. Thus
they have to find new ways to communicate with other Muslims by
migrating to other areas in the city.
2. Classification of the Muslim urban communities in China today
A- From the perspective of resident patterns, we can classify
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as multi-site compact community, scattered region and congrega-
tional compact community.
B- From a historical and development perspective, we can
classify communities as traditional and emerging communities.
C- From an ethnic point of view, they can be classified as
multi and mono ethnic communities.
Table 1: Classifications of Muslim communities in China




- Bei Jing, Lan Zhou and Tian Jin, etc.
- Scattered community - Guang Zhou, Shen Zhen, Shanghai
Ha，Hong Kong and Yin Chuan, etc.
--Congregational
compact community
- Xi An Hui Quarter, Dong Guan
District of Xi Ning, Guan Cheng Hui
District of Zheng Zhou, and Hui
District of Hohhot, etc.
Classification 2
- Traditional community - Xi An Hui Quarter, Niu Jie of Bei Jing,
Nan Guan and Xi Guan of Lan Zhou,
and Shun Cheng Street of Kun Ming, etc.




- Hong Kong, Guang Zhou, Shen




- Xi An Hui Quarter, Guan Cheng
Hui District of Zheng Zhou, and Hui
District of Hohhot, etc.
3. Emergence of moving communities
A moving community is one of the most remarkable out-
comes of the rapid urbanization process underlying the instability
of Muslims in cities and the tactics they have adopted to face the-
se challenges. It is also a temporary community formed by immi-
grants in their new living areas inside or outside most of the cities
to which they migrate, such as Shen Zhen and Yi Wu. It is differ-
ent from the traditional community in many facets.
A. In terms of population, most of these emergent commu-
nities consist of both national and international immigrants.
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B. They are diversified ethnic groups, involving almost all
Muslim ethnic groups in the world. The feature is distinctive of
Muslim immigrant cities.
C. They include diversified doctrinal inclinations, such as SunnÊs
and ShÊÑÊÎ, as well as Sufi suborders (Men Huan in Chinese).
D. Different geographical characteristics accompanied with ethno-
cultural elements that display the heterogeneity in Islamic culture.
E. Mobility and instability owing to urbanization and devel-
opment.
Islamic Movements and the Concept of Religious Denomi-
nation
1. The Salafiyyah movement, which mainly originated from
Saudi Arabia and spread throughout and outside the Arab world
since the late nineteenth century, is still a new phenomenon in
most of the traditional Muslim communities in China. Therefore,
instances of disharmony among old denominations and the inno-
vative groups are consequently being reported. As a movement,
the Salafiyyah is primarily confined to one specific school of Is-
lamic jurisprudence, the ×anbalÊ madhab. Some of the ArabÊ
Muslims and Chinese students coming back from Arab countries,
mainly Saudi Arabia, strive to spread the notion of purgation and
purification meant to eradicate what they perceive as non-Islamic
elements in Chinese Islam. Because of different jurisprudential in-
terpretation methods between the ×anafÊ School, which prevails
among Chinese Muslims, and the ×anbalÊ School, the appeal for
detachment by the SalafÊs seems to be inevitable, and it would natu-
rally result in a kind of segregation of Muslims from one another
and the undermining of their unity as one integrated whole ummah.
2. The second movement is Jamaat al-TablÊgh which originated
from India in 1920s. It seeks to intensify and purify the practice
of Islamic teachings, and has mainly spread throughout Chinese
urban areas. It aims at transforming individuals’ lives from secu-
lar materialist lifestyles to more spiritual and ascetic life by re-
forming people’s character through personal contact and the role
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models of its missionaries. It emphasizes Islamic identity and su-
periority. Ultimately, Jamaat al-TablÊgh is committed to the goal of
revitalizing the faith of a born Muslim; of promoting the good
and eradicating the unjust. This teaching is mostly diffused by its
active adherents from China, and is occasionally supported by
small international groups. The city offers a relatively liberal space
for such missionary activities.
3. The third movement is new Sufism (mysticism). Unlike tradi-
tional Sufi brotherhoods which specially emphasize the practice of
meditation and personal self-discipline, the new Sufi movement pur-
sues social agendas besides personal obligatory duties to God. Alt-
hough most of these movements carry out their activities in the
name of traditional denominations which are familiar to Chinese
Muslims, they have anti-traditional characters both theoretically and
practically, to some extent. These small groups recruit their follow-
ers in the city and practise their rituals secretly, and aspire to gain
more understanding and support by other Muslims.
Chinese Muslims began to realize the diversity of Islamic cul-
ture and differences among Muslims around the world. Many of
them started understanding Islam as a whole, and gave up nar-
row-minded views on religious rituals and practices that had dis-
turbed Chinese Muslims for many years. Thanks to intercommu-
nication between Chinese Muslims and foreign immigrants, and
seen the fact that increasing numbers of Chinese Muslims travel
to Makkah for pilgrimage (×ajj) every year as well as the growing
number of graduates coming back home after completing their
studies in Islamic countries, Muslims’ perceptions of Islamic
teachings and their practice thereof are undergoing great changes.
Urban Islamic issues and their potential resolutions
1. Development and innovation among the community
It mainly refers to the traditional Muslim community. The in-
novative works on traditional communities should be based on con-
sidering their belief and economic life, and try to keep the entity of
Jamaat sufficiently, in order to avoid such phenomenon that the ge-
ographical community being demolished in some cities without re-
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spect the Muslim living traditions, which bring about more complex
problems and difficulties in their life. Some Muslim places have al-
ready become world cultural heritage which should be protected
when planning for city development. More investigation should be
conducted by local Islamic associations and related government of-
fices in the community. Furthermore, the innovative works should
be discussed with the representatives selected by the community and
be carried out gradually.
2. Immigrants and their life
It includes domestic moving population and international
immigrants. Some of the immigrants have bought apartments and
become the permanent inhabitants of the city. But most of immi-
grants are still transient populations whereas urban religious
problems emerged accordingly, such as Exotic Street in Yi Wu
city, where Muslim businessmen concentrate from all over the
world, namely Arab, Indian, Pakistani, Malay, African Muslim,
Afghan and other central Asian nationalities, etc. Being a famous
trade fair, Guang Zhou Fare attracts nearly all of the Muslim eth-
nic groups to find economic and trade opportunities in Guang
Zhou; hence Yearning Prophet Masjid (Huai Sheng Si) and the
sanctified shrine of SaÑd ibn AbÊ WaqqÉs have become the main
Friday prayer places and tourism sites that receive tens of thou-
sands of guests from around the world.
The moving of domestic immigrants has such characteristics
as: A- From west to east, to coastal cites particularly; B- From
rural or underdeveloped areas to developed cities; C- From tradi-
tional Muslim communities to non-Muslim areas; D- From small
and medium-sized cities to metropolitans.
The majority of immigrants are Hui Chinese Muslims besides
a small quantity of Uyghur migrated from Xin Jiang Uyghur Au-
tonomous Region. They are managing ×alÉl food and restaurant,
leather and fur, native products and trade companies, and so
forth. The most salient occupation is Arabic interpreter who
graduated from Islamic universities abroad, or from Islamic insti-
tutes and Arabic schools, plays a connecting role between Arab
businessman and local factories. Actually, the new religious
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community is always constructed by these immigrants who have
acquired Islamic knowledge in different ways.
The dilemma is how to manage these moving communities
in order to provide a convenient religious life for Muslims in the
city. Some of the small prayer sites and masjids have been ap-
proved by the government, and certain amount of financial sup-
port and assistance has been obtained too, but this procedure is
always delayed because in most of the cities such issue is com-
pletely a new one in the process of urbanization.
The other problem concerns children’s education of immi-
grants. In China, the system of nine-year compulsory education is
implemented even in remote rural areas. But the problem is the na-
tive places of immigrants are not in the city where they are living,
and confronted foreigners in particular; so they are confronted with
such difficulty that they cannot get equal opportunities for their
children’s education like city residents. Even when they get the op-
portunity for education by paying extra fees eventually, they still
have difficulties in offering ×alÉl food to their children. Obviously,
the educational cost of Mulism immigrants is higher than city resi-
dents. It should brought to the close attention from the government
to eliminate the dilemma in order that the immigrants can take root
in the city and cooperate with other people conveniently.
3. Religious activity and its management
This can be elaborated from two perspectives. One is of the lo-
cal government, the other is for the management committee of the
masjid, which actually is the real leadership of Muslim community.
The religious issues need the relevant government office to
contact with the local residents, immigrants, and Islamic associa-
tions, and to discuss the probable resolutions when difficulties
emerge. The quality and attitude of the service and management
provided by the government determines the activity of Muslims.
Local Islamic associations need to improve the quality of
their services relying on the assistance by the Muslims they repre-
sent. The masjid should pay more attention to select the members
of the management committee in order to provide good services
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to the Muslims involved. Selecting members of the management
committee should be in accord with the spirit of QurÒan and
Hadith. They must be pious Muslims with honesty, equality, abil-
ity, and well-behaved. Once the committee is set up, its members
should take counsel together according to the teachings of the
Prophet, and select the excellent Imam and Ustaz to develop edu-
cation and the practice of religious rituals.
4. Islamic thought and movement
International Islamic movements such as Jamaat Tabligh,
Salafiyyah and new Sufism, will certainly exert great influence on
Chinese Muslims in such a globalized world. For Chinese Mus-
lims, no one can keep away from these movements if only one is
living in this globalized world because of convenient media and
network. But the question is how could we reply to these move-
ments and thoughts? Generally, each movement will be Sinicized
or localized when it enters into local society in China. We should
wait for this process of localization finished and then give a pre-
cise judgement in the future; it is too early to criticize or
acknowledge these movements hastily when it is still in the course
of Sinization.
In terms of the complex of ethnicity and diversity of Islamic
theology and Jurisprudences, the urban Muslim community in
China is undoubtedly representative of these pluralities. All the
Muslims ought to have known that the universalism of Islam
intends to transcend ethnic, local, or national boundaries and
teach the believers to express their membership and brotherhood
adherent to Muslim Ummah. If only one confesses to abide by the
teachings of the Qur’an, he (or she) should be regarded as the
member of Ummah, and should be cared for by other members
respectively, because Prophet Mohammed emphasized such kind
of solidarity and brotherhood.
5. ×alÉl food
This is a serious problem in most of cities in China with the de-
velopment of population, geographical periphery and markets. Not
only because of shortage of ×alÉl food factories and supplies, but
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the supervisory works by the government also need to be improved.
Actually, most of ethno-religious conflicts between Muslims and
non-Muslims in China originated from disrespect to Muslims’ diet
habits because of ignorance and misunderstanding by non-Muslims,
regardless of history and reality.
6. Religious education
In most of Chinese cities, the traditional education attached
to the masjid has already stopped or degenerated during these
years. This situation can be ascribed to such factors as the devel-
opment of civil education, secularization, and vanishing of tradi-
tional Islamic education in the masjids. But the problem in some
cities is that, the young Muslim generations know little about Is-
lam, and their activities and beliefs are different from their par-
ents, which caused problem of intergenerational identity. Some of
the children are segregated from the Imam’s religious exhortation
for a long time, they begin to pursuit the anti-Islamic fashions
and undertake activities forbidden in Islam. Studying QurÒan or
attending school became a contradiction for urban Muslims.
7. Female mosques (madrasas) and other woman issues
Female masjid is a particular phenomenon in China, which
originated in central China as early as the late Ming (1368-1644)
and the beginning of Qing dynasty (1644-1911). This emergency of
female masjid has became prevalent since 1990s due also the pro-
cess of urbanization. It is a special issue which I discussed in an-
other work. The question here is: can we male Muslim, especially
the Imams, management members of the masjid, and worldly elites
of the community understand and be tolerant to special female
masjids (or madrasahs, and give them more opportunities to express
their religious appeal, though in some areas, this kind of renewal is
still a controversial topic?
Being a place of social activity for diffusing basic knowledge
about Islam and make it convenient for female Muslims to fulfill
their prayer and communicate with each other in the rapid devel-
opment of urbanization, female masjid (or madrasah) gives women
a separate space to learn from each other, exchange information,
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and communicate among themselves what they may not be to do
otherwise. It can be looked as a tactic for those pious female Mus-
lims to fight against dissimilation, discrimination and alienation
incurned against them by modernization, whereas it is an aspect of
strength for urban Muslims to preserve their traditions vis-a-vis
female attitudes, and change the situation whereby thes males mo-
nopolize the religious resources for a long time.
8. Maintenance of faith and acculturation in the society
How to maintenan their Muslim identity and adapt to city life
simultaneously is a severe question for urban Muslims in China.
Urban community and urban life are different from rural areas in
that the members are strange to each other where Muslims are a
different from Han Chinese and vice versa. Because of their spe-
cial food needs and religious activity, some of the opportunities
cannot be obtained in their daily life. For example, the majority of
Muslims are doing small businesses, small trades and peddlers, or
specialized in ×alÉl food supplies and Arabic interpreters, they
can seldom get chance to study handicraft or technology in facto-
ries managed by non-Muslims. Even for businessman, how to
deal with the profit of banks, and how to use loans from banking
institutions to enhance their careers is still a critical issue.
Thus urban vagrants are confronted with many difficulties in
practicing Islam, such as how to recite Islam in their daily prayers
when it is difficult to find a mosque or take ablution on prayer
time, let to get the opportunity to learn more about Islam. Such
pressing needs require to be attended to by people who have relia-
ble knowledge of Islamic Jurisprudence. As a consequence, the
author believes that there is urgent need to identify all the related
questions of Muslim minorities and organize a special committee
by Muslim scholars in the world to give interpretations and pro-
vide fatwÉs to be communicated through the internet or any other
efficient means. This will help Muslim minorities who are living in
different countries to take a reference instead of being confused by
the random explanations from local interpreters blindly.
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Conclusion
Over the last 30 years since the Chinese government started
implementing its policies of reform and opening to the outside
world, Chinese Muslims have succeeded in seizing this
opportunity to make important acievements in many areas and
their life has undergone significant changes. Uurban migration
can be seen as the most significant aspect of that process of
change in their conditions. After 1990, many international
Muslim immigrants came to China from different places in the
world; they were attracted by the fast-growing markets and
affluent economic life. Though they live in cities that are totally
strange to them in many respects, they have managed to cope
with the new environment.
Notwithstanding the opportunities available to them, both
Chinese and foreign Muslims in China are confronted with
serious difficulties and challenges. Their success or otherwise in
dealing with the challenges and difficulties of Chinese complex
urbanization process depends on whether or not they will
acculturate with city culture harmoniously.
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CHAPTER 7
The Muslim Community in Korea:
Organization and Activities
(Abdul Rajiq) Sohn Ju-young
Introduction
This chapter is aimed to help correct the misunderstanding of the
culture and image of the Muslim community in Korea. This will
be accomplished through surveying the structure and role of Ko-
rea Muslim Federation (KMF), the research and educational ac-
tivities related to Islam in Korean universities and institutes, and
the Korean government policies and regulations pertaining to
matters of religion.
Although Muslims in Korea are a minority, they possess many
characteristics that make them quite unique compared to followers
of other religions with whom they coexist peacefully. Korea Muslim
community is still in its sprouting season. It has enjoyed the support
of a number of Islamic countries and nizations such as Saudi Arabia,
the Muslim World League and OIC. In addition to these factors be-
hind this growth, the cooperation and the special solicitudes of the
Korean government are meaningful. The Korean government do-
nated land to the KMF for the establishment of an Islamic universi-
ty, as well as the Seoul Grand Mosque, even during the Oil Crisis of
1973/1393.
The major barriers facing the propagation and spread of Is-
lam in the Korean society is the Korean people’s ignorance, mis-
understanding, and negative preconceptions about Islam. This is
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mainly due to the heavy influence of Western Christian culture
and media. Modern education in Korea was greatly inspired and
moulded by by western culture and educational philosophy. In
most cases, it was the westerners or Western Christians who
taught Islam to Koreans until quite recently.
The biggest issue facing Muslim activities to promote the cause
of Islam and reach out to the different components of the Kaorean
society is shortage of financial means and knowledgeable and skilled
Muslim missionaries. Certainly, Islamic daÑwah activities benefited
from the support of some rich Muslim countries, especially during
the 1980s. But such external assistance cannot be always guaranteed
nor should it be relied upon unendlessly, and the Muslim communi-
ty in Korea needs to develop its own self-generated and continuous
resources. Until we reach a status of financial self-reliance to carry
out our activities and execute our daÑwah and outreach programmes
to enlighten people on the truth of Islamic teachings, the support of
Muslim majority countries and Islamic organizations will continue to
be crucial for the sustainability of the Islamic mission in Korea. It is
necessary to set up a long term strategy for the call to Islam. This
involves a well organized system and team work. Although Islamic
daÑwah has a limited experience, it is crucial that we have enough,
capable, well trained, and good daÑwah workers. We need devout
missionary workers who can dedicate their lives to Islamic propaga-
tion in Korea just as Christian missionaries have done and still con-
tinue to do. In connection with this, it is hoped that Islamic coun-
tries would invite young Muslim students to study Islamic
knowledge and daÑwah methodology for the purpose to cultivate
qualified missionary workers for the future.
Rise and Formation of the Muslim Community in Korea
Islam is a new religion in Korea. In Jun 1950/1369, when the
Korean civil war broke out, the UN, consisting of the USA and
16 other countries, dispatched a multi-national army to the Kore-
an peninsula. This multinational force included Turkey, a Muslim
country, which helped form today's modern Muslim community
in Korea. The first Muslim who devoted himself to the propaga-
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tion of Islam was Adul Gafur Karaismailoglu, an imam of the
Turkish brigade that took part in that multi-national army. Under
his guide, the first generation of Korean converts came to the
Islam faith. Umar Jingyu Kim, Muhammad Duyoung Yoon and
Abdulla Yoodo Kim established the Korea Islamic Society in Oc-
tober 1955/1375 and began to propagate Islam after erecting a
masjid and setting up a temporary office with 3 tents donated by
the Turkish army at Imundong Dongdaemun, Seoul.
In early propagation activities, Korean Muslims became active
when the young Imam Zubeyr Koch came to the Turkish brigade
as a new Imam in Jun 1956/1375. He built a temporary mosque with
a big military tent and a minaret that became the first masjid in
Korea. There were 208 Korean Muslims worshiping there when he
left Korea a year after.1
Muslim majority society in Malaysia showed interest in Korea
from the beginning. In September 1961/1381, a group of religious
representatives from Malaysia visited Korea for 15 days to assess
the situation of Islam in Korea. They promised to support the ed-
ucation of 11 Muslim students from Korea, to study for 6 months
at the Islamic College of Klang, Malaysia. In November
1962/1382, Tun Abdul Razzaq, the deputy prime minister, and
Dato Haji Noah, the speaker of Malaysian parliament visited Ko-
rea. The outcome was a donation worth of one hundred thousand
Malaysian dollars was made to support the activity of Islamic
daÑwah in Korea. This Financial assistance confirmed to the Mus-
lims in Korea the sincerity and brotherhood of Islam among Mus-
lims. This encouraged them to work harder for the propagation of
Islam. Hence, Malaysia lined up other Muslim countries to support
the Muslim minority in Korea.
In 1966/1385, Sabri Junggil Seo, Sulayman Hwasik Lee, and
Muhammad Duyoung Yoon led a group of Muslims in Korea to
establish the Korea Muslim Federation, KMF. The Federation
still bears this name and is the sole Muslim organization that ex-
1 Korea Muslim Federation, Islam in Korea (1955-1995/1374-1415), Special Issue in
Conjuction with the 40th Anniversary of Islam in Korea (Seoul: KMF, 1996/1416), p. 15.
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ists in Korea and is legally aknowledged by the government.
The Federation established a temporary masjid with office
rooms at Wonhyoro Yongsangu, Seoul and resumed daÑwah activ-
ities. At this critical period, Mr. Maulana Sayyid Jamil, president
of the Association for Qur’an in Pakistan came to Korea. He was
the chief supporter of the Korea Muslims including Imam Mu-
hammad Duyoung Yoon, while living at the humble house of
KMF. He arrived in October 1966/1386 and stayed for two
months. He visited Korea in five consecutive years and exerted
his most effort in propagation of Islam and education of Muslims
in Korea. He made a great contribution towards the development
of Islam in Korea; for this he has been regarded as ‘the father of
the Korean Muslims.’
The year 1967/1386 was a historic moment for the Korea Is-
lam Foundation (KIF). Islam was offically recognized as a legal reli-
gion in Korea and KIF was registered as a legal organization under
Korean national law. In March of that year, KIF received donations
(5,000 pounds) from the Ministry of Religious Affairs in Kuwait.
Though this was not a big donation, it was meaningful in laying
down a foundation for Islam in Korea. Brother Sulayman Hwasik
Lee was elected as the first president of the KIF. Since that time the
religious society for Islam in Korea became an official legitimate re-
ligious body, like Buddhism and Christianity, and began to propa-
gandize. Islam is not well known in Korea even though it is known
as one of the major religions in this world, but the KIF now raises
its torch to shed the light of truth in Korea.
Since June 1967/1387, the KMF has been publishing the Korea
Islam Herald, a bi-monthly and bi-lingual (Korean-English) news-
paper, by which daÑwah activities are described and conveyed home
and abroad. After the transfer of the temporary masjid to
Namyongdong, Yongsangu, Seoul, the federation accelerated its
daÑwah movement through lectures and the distribution of booklets.
While the federation sent Korean Muslim students to Islamic coun-
tries in order to foster Muslim leaders for the future, it made efforts
to construct a masjid and an Islamic center that would be the basis
for Islamic outreach or daÑwah IslÉmiyah.
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The dream of the Korean Muslims of building a grand
mosque in Korea came true under the auspices of the Korean
government in September 1970/1390. Thanks to Jeong Hee Park,
the president of the Republic of Korea, the Korean government
donated 5,000 square metres of land located at Hannamdong
Yongsangu, Seoul, Korea, to KMF for the construction of a
grand mosque in Korea. From the 1970s, the Korean govern-
ment has paid full attention to the importance of the Islamic
countries, particularly after the first oil crisis. With donations of
land by the Korean government and 400,000 US dollars, contrib-
uted by Islamic countries including Saudi Arabia, Libya, Kuwait,
Qatar, Morocco, UAE, and Malaysia, the Seoul Central Grand
Masjid and Islamic center had a historical grand opening ceremo-
ny on 21st of May 1976/1396. This was a turning point in the
development of the Muslim minority society in Korea.
In fact, from the mid 1970s till the mid 1980s/1400s, Islam in
Korea became more prosperous. With the urban boom in the Mid-
dle East, especially in the Gulf countries, many Korean construction
workers, including technicians, went to the Islamic countries. They
witnessed the religious life of Arab Muslims directly. They became
interested in Islam, and many of them finally embraced it. For in-
stance, the KMF had built the branch of the Islamic center at Jed-
dah, with a help of a Saudi Arabian business man named Shaikh
Omar Abdullah Kamal, in March 1978/1398. Through this centre
8,000 Korean workers embraced Islam. And in July 1979/1399 in
another branch of KMF, at Zaharah camp of Samho Construction
Co., in Kuwait, about 3,000 Korean workers embraced Islam. A
branch of KMF was also opened in Indonesia in 1982/1402.1
During this period, domestic activities for the propagation of
Islam became very active. DaÑwah workers from the World Mus-
lim League (Rabitah) and the Ministry of ×ajj and DÉr al-IftÉ’ in
Saudi Arabia, the Islamic Call Society came to Korea. They pro-
duced 17 booklets on the teachings of Islam, for example, ‘Way
to be Muslim’ was published in Korean language. The glorious
1 Ibid., p. 27.
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Qur’an was translated into Korean by Professor Othman
Yongsun Kim to help the Muslim minority to read the Words of
God in the Korean language. In addition to these activities, prop-
agation activities in other parts of Korea resulted in building
many branches of the KMF with their own Mosques in Busan,
Gwangju, Jeonju and Anyang.
However, since the middle of the 1980s, the propagation activi-
ties of the Muslim minority in Korea have become slow. Interest in
the Middle East and the Islamic world and on trade dwindled away.
It is true that this setback is due to outside influences such as the
Iran-Iraq war and the Gulf war, but there are also domestic causes
like the lack of leadership from KMF, especially after the first Kore-
an Muslim generation Doyoung Yoon, Jeonggil Seo, and Hwashik
Lee passed away. Today there are 340,000 Muslims in Korea. KMF
manages a central Grand Mosque in Seoul with 8 branches: 5
Mosques and 3 temporary praying places for propagation of Islamic
faith and values.
Although Muslims in Korea are a minority, they possess
many important featurers that make them quite unique compared
to the followers of other religions. Korea is a very religious
society and tolerant and open towards other religions. And none
of the world religions have seized a superior position in Korean
culture and society. However, all of world leading religions like
Confucianism, Buddhism and Christianity co-existed in Korean
society peacefully. This is the focal point of this chapter: the role
and task of the Muslims in Korea – how to expand, and how to
develop its forces in Korean society.
Structure and Role of KMF
A. Structure
A specific feature of the Muslim minority in Korea is that it has
a uniform structure for the propagation of Islam. Consisting of 7
executives and 2 auditors, the Executive Board of the Korea Islam
Federation, is approved by the Ministry of Culture and, likewise, it is
the highest legislative organ. The Board approves financial matters
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and plans future projects of the Fedearation. The president of the
Board represents the Islamic brotherhood in Korea.
KMF has three major departments: 1. department for admin-
istration and secrertariat, 2. department for the propagation of Is-
lam, and 3. department for maintenance. The first department part
looks after the general management and running of the affairs of the
Islamic brotherhood in Korea: accounts, correspondence and coop-
eration with government and other agencies and institutions, and the
management of the Foundation’s funds. The second department
takes care of the call to Islam and propagation of its teachings:
planning and carrying out various lectures on Islamic articles of
faith, education programmes, public relations, publications, super-
vision, supporting and managing the branches’ activities, propaga-
tion, organizing and assisting foreign Muslims, religious affairs
(marriage, divorce, register, ×alÉl and ×arÉm, etc.) and providing
information for visitors. The third department is responsible for
the maintainance of the buildings and properties of KMF main
office and the chapters.
B. KMF Chapters and their Activities
1. Grand Mosque of Seoul
As described above, the construction work of the Grand Mosque
in Seoul, started work in October 1974/1394, and inaugurated in
May 1976/1396 as it was the first Grand Mosque in Korea.
The Grand Mosque complex includes: the head quarter’s office
of KMF, a grand conference hall, a reception room, Imam’s office at
the first level, a main prayer service hall for 427 men on the second
level, and a women’s prayer room on the third level. It can accom-
modate about 600 people. The Islamic Centre and attached build-
ings of the Grand Mosque, is a two-story building erected on 1, 362
square metres. In July 1990/1410 the Jeddah based Islamic Devel-
opment Bank gave 350 million won (US$ 291,000) for the construc-
tion of a three-story building that was completed in November
1991/1412. It houses the Institute for Islamic Culture, Madrasa Amir
Sultan bi Abdul Aziz, the Advisory Committee, a training center for
the Arabic language, the Student’s Association, the womenfolk cir-
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cle, and a Muslim charity unit. The major entities and activities of
the Grand Mosque consist of the following matters.
1. Muslim Charity Circle: It is established by senior Muslims
to promote mutual friendship among the circle’s members and to
provide assistance in case of any mishappenings and disasters
occouring at home and abroad. For instance, they raised relief
funds worth of US$ 5,000 when the Turkey earthquake occurred
in 2000/1420 and another US$ 5,000 for Iraqis displaced by the
Iraq war this year. This circle is consisted of 25 members who
help themselves in marriage and funeral ceremonies and also help
poor people next door to the mosque.
2. Students’ Association: This is a student body of Korea
Muslim university students. The purpose of this association is as
follows: a) to promote mutual friendship, to foster brother and
sisterhood with Muslim students, to help youths at home and
abroad, and to enhance Islamic knowledge and beliefs. Under the
association, there are several activities such as: propagation, study,
publication, cooperation, social sports, and language. They hold
regular meetings on Saturdays; athletic sessions and an outing in
the spring; a summer camp in the summer; and an exhibition for
Islamic culture in the winter season. All members work on Arabic
language courses for non-Muslims; lecture on the Islamic creed;
and work at the World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY)
Summer Youth Camp organized by the KMF. Since 1983, under
the auspices of WAMY, a youth camp is held every summer in
Korea. Through these activities the youth increase their Islamic
knowledge and way of life.
3. Womenfolk Circle: The members visit Muslim families to
provide assistance in family and other matters, such as marriage and
funerals. After Friday prayer, they serve coffee other refreshemnts to
foreign Muslim brothers, and provide lunch meals to Korean
Muslims to promote mutual friendship.
2. KMF Chapter at Busan (Al-Fatah Mosque)
This is the second Mosque, after the Seoul Grand Mosque,
located at Geumjeonggu Busan city, the largest port city in south-
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ern Korea. The main building and attached structures were con-
structed under the auspices of Dr. Ali Fellagh, then Minister of
Finance of Libya. More than 50 delegates from Islamic countries
attended the inaugural ceremony of this mosque. The plottage of
al-Fatah Mosque is 2,087 square metres (about 600 pyung) and
Mosque building is 210 square metres, Islam center is 1334 square
metres and can accommodate about 250 people.
Presently, Yasir JongYeuk Lee is the chairman and imam. In
past, there were 3 Thai DaÑwah workers for the propagation of
islam, but presently there is no one. The major activities include:
exhibition on Islamic culture, courses on Arabic language, lectures
on Islamic faith, values and code of conduct, Qur’an recitation,
various activities for Islamic propagation via mass media in Busan
area, and an athletic sessions, etc. The Muslim students’
association also carries out many activities led by students from the
Arabic department of the Pusan University of Foreign Studies.
They launch propagation of Islam projects at the 5 local
universities during festive seasons. They also opened a public
lounge room of Islamic culture for the local people. They conduct
Arabic and English language classes and lecture on the Islamic
creed continuously. On the occasion of 2002/1423 World Cup and
Asian Games, a butchery centre was launched to produce halal
meat to meet the needs of the Muslims in Busan area.
3. KMF Chapter in the Gwangju Province (Gwangju Mosque)
This is the third mosque in Korea. In May 1979/1399, Sheikh
Muhammad Nasir al-Hamhan al-Utaibi, Deputy Minister of Awqaf
and Islamic Affairs of Kuwait, visited Sang-Yong ri ‘The Muslim
village’ and encouraged the newly converted Muslims. After his re-
turn to Kuwait, Sheikh Muhammad Ibrahim al-Sagabi, a judge from
Kuwait, also visited the village and arranged to provide funds for the
construction of the Mosque and Islamic Centre. Muslims from Ku-
wait, led by Br. Abdul Aziz al-Reeys, the editor of Al-Banna newspa-
per, donated 126,675 American dollars. The land was donated by Br.
Wi Sik Ha, a devoted Korean Muslim in the village. The inaugural
ceremony of this mosque was held in July 1981 (1401 H) and wit-
nessed by more than 40 delegates from various Islamic countries. All
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the population of this small village, totalling 700 people, embraced
Islam in 1979/1399.
The Gwangju Mosque is situated in an 856-square-metres area
with its premises occupying 99 square meters. As of February
2003/1423, it was frequented by around 735 people (male 450, fe-
male 285). In March 2001/1421, the KFMA was formed; it provides
assistance and guidance to 1,500 foreign Muslims who are mainly
workers from Pakistan, Bangladesh, Indonesia, India, Uzbekistan,
Ghana, Burkina Faso and Iran. KFMA helps in making pleas to the
Ministry of Labor in cases of delayed pay; industrial disasters; and
solving compensation problems with Korean employers. They made
a contract with the Association of Medical Doctors in Gwangju city
for 50% off on medical charges to Muslim workers. They also work
with the police station there for their safety.
4. KMF Chapter at Jeonju (AbË Bakr al-ØiddÊq Mosque)
This chapter at Jeonju was opened in November 1986, with a
support of US$ 265,000 by Br. Abdul Latif al-Shari who visited Ko-
rea in April 1985. AbË Bakr al-ØiddÊq Mosque is located on a site of
1,066 square metres. It consists of lecture rooms, an office and
wudË’ room on the first level of the building and a prayer hall (83
square metres) for men on the second level, and prayer hall for
women on the third level with a capacity for about 250 people.
AbË Bakr ØiddÊq Mosque is indeed a piece of art. Because
Jeonju city is considered a traditional folk site, this mosque was
constructed with the Korean traditional tiled roof and Islamic
dome style for a beautifully harmonized building. A Syrian Muslim,
Dr. Abdul Wahab Zahid Haq, who joined this chapter in 1986, is
the Imam of the mosque since its opening. The special pro-
gramme, comprised of the introduction to Islamic culture and
creed during the summer and winter vacations, has received a great
response from schools and institutions and the public in this area.
5. KMF Chapter in Anyang (RÉbiÏah Mosque)
This mosque is a remodeled Christian church building pur-
chased with private funds of 50 million Won by the late Br. Hussein
Changsik Yoo, it opened in April 1986/1406. Originally, it was a
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double story building with children’s housing and a lodging house
on the first floor, and a prayer hall at the second floor. In 1990s,
when many foreign Muslim workers came to this area, the prayer
hall at the second floor became too small to accommodate all of the
foreign Muslim workers. They had to build a 3rd floor with their
charity fund of 100 million Korean Won which made it possible to
rebuild the current prayer hall with a 100 people capacity.
The Anyang Mosque had its name changed to the Rabitah
Mosque in December 1985/1406 as the funds for remodeling
and management of the Mosque was donated by the World
Muslim League (Rabitah) in Saudi Arabia. However, the Mosque
has experienced many difficulties with its management. The fi-
nancial problems were solved by funds raised from the council
for the mosque management – comprised mainly of labour
workers from Bangladesh.
Br. Najmul Hak had been taken charge of the services as an
imam of this Mosque after the late Imam Changsik Yoo passed
away in December 1999/1420. The wife and family of the late
Imam Yoo proceeded to sell the mosque premises. Meanwhile the
council for the Mosque management made decision to stop the
sale of the Mosque and has collected 150 million won through
fund raising. They continue to keep good relations with KMF by
talking with the late Imam Yoo’s family to resolve this crisis.
6. KMF Chapter in Jeju (Islamic Centre of Jeju Island)
The Islamic Centre in Jeju Island opened on June 1,
2002/1423 with the purpose of providing a prayer place for Mus-
lims who visit this island located in the Southern part of the Kore-
an peninsula and also to propagate Islam to the people there. Cur-
rently, the Friday prayer is led by Br. Bashir Dayyong Kim who
just returned from Qatar where he lived for 12 years. Professor
Bashir Kim, is engaging in lecture on the science of tourism at the
Jeju Halla University. He is putting his utmost efforts and energies
for Islamic propagation while managing directly the ‘Open Forum’
to give a better understanding of Islam to university students and
youths in Jeju area.
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7. KMF Chapter at Ansan (Islamic Centre of Ansan city)
A prayer venue was established at Ansan area, Wongokdong
Ansan city, Gyunggi province, for Muslim labour workers there.
KMF purchased a three-story building for 350 million Korean Won.
Being managed by Br. Hussein Dinar from Bangladesh, this chapter
is the cuddle of the religious life of approximately one and half
million Muslims living around Ansan Banweol industrial complex.
8. KMF Chapter at Pocheon (Islamic Center for Songwoori)
In May 2000/1421, the KMF opened a MuÎallÉ (prayer ven-
ue) at the heart of Soheuleub Pocheongun costing 10 million
Won. In Songwoori about 1,500 foreign Muslims convened
around this small MuÎallÉ and launched a compaign to raise 200
million Won for developing it into a full-fledged mosque. In Jan-
uary 2003/1423, a piece of land expanding over 589 square me-
tres was purchased for the construction of the mosque. Then the
KMF designed the plan of the building. A cornerstone-laying cer-
emony took place in June 2003/1424. The plan also includes the
construction of an Islamic centre on a 225-square-metre area with
150 million Won (US$ 125,000). The fund raising compaign for
building this mosque is on going at KMF in Seoul.
KMF Affiliated Major Bodies and Institutions
1. Korea Institute of Islamic Culture (KIIC)
The KIIC was established in August 1997/1418 with the
following aims: 1. to carry out comprehensive and systematic
research on Islamic culture; 2. to provide relevant and correct
information related to Islam to academic, religious, industrial
circles and to the media and government agencies, and 3. to
counter prejudices and misunderstandings on Islam and promote
mutual understanding and respect between Muslims and non-
Muslims. It also emphasizes the promotion of cultural exchanges
between Korea and Islamic countries; public relations efforts to
correct the Korean perception of the Islamic world; and enhance
people-to-people or popular diplomacy.
Scholars who studied in Islamic countries such as Saudi
Arabia, Iran, Turkey, Pakistan, Indonesia, etc. undertake research
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works under the slogan ‘Making a good institute.’ Since
1997/1417 they have published five volumes of the Korean Journal
of Islamic Culture in English, Arabic and Korean. Among their
major activities is the reorganizing and expansion of language
classes at KMF. They teach languages of Islamic countries
(Arabic, Persian, Turkish, Malay-Indonesian and Urdu) and also
deliver special lectures on Islam for the public.
They conduct domestic seminars and participate in
international symposia where they present their papers to be
published in various learned journals. They give special lectures on
Islam upon invitation from major public institutions and groups. An
introducetory book on Islamic beliefs and the Muslim world1
became a bestseller in Korea for several months after the September
11 events in the USA. The institute considers contents, related to
Islam described in the textbooks of the middle and high schools in
Korea and learned journals from all angles. They also correct
misinformation on Islam spread in newspapers, magazines,
broadcasting, etc. Currently Dr. Wonsam Lee, a SunMoon
University professor, is in charge of this institute.
2. Madrasah Amir Sultan bin Abdul Aziz al-Islamiya
In October 2000/1421, Sultan Bin Abdul Aziz, Saudi minister
of defense visited the KMF and met delegations who conveyed to
him of the need to establish an Islamic educational institute in
Korea. He laid down the cornerstone for Islamic education for
Muslim children in Korea by donating 300,000 dollars for building
a Madrasah. In November 2001/1422, the KMF opened the
Madrasah with this fund. The multi-media room was built from the
conference room of the Seoul Grand Mosque, the Madrasah classes
were classroom remodeled from the classrooms of the Islamic cen-
tre. This is a supplementary education for children from 7 pm to 9
pm, 4 days a week, after regular school. They are teaching
Arabic, English, Qur’an, Islamic creed, and the practice of the
creed as a major subject. 25 Muslim children from 5 countries,
1 Bearing the title Islam, the book was written by Cheong A. and published in
2001/1421.
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including Libya, are attending. The teachers of this school are Br.
Juwha Lee, a director of the propagation section, and 4 foreign
Muslims.
3. Institute of Arabic Language
After the oil crisis of the early 1970s, when the Middle East
construction boom was at height, many of Korean workers had an
ardent desire to learn Arabic language. To meet this demand, the
KMF founded the Institute of Arabic Language in 1976/1396 in
order to propagate Islam. Afterwards, this institute carried out not
only Arabic education, but also taught Islamic culture and basic
Islamic teachings as a bridgehead of Islamic propagation. Thanks
to this institute, many people were converted to Islam, and got
jobs at industrial sites in the Middle East. Many of the Muslim
converts of that time are very devoted people who are now active
at various mosques.
When the KIIC was established in 1997/1417 under the aus-
pices of KMF, the task of teaching the Arabic language was
passed over to it.
4. Advisory Committee
The Advisory Committee propagates Islam in Korea. It was
established in April 1998/1418 by leading figures from Islamic
countries who took the lead in propagating Islam in Korea.
They meet every 3 months at the Advisory Committee room
of the KMF where they discuss various issues important to the
Muslim minority in Korea. They give advice on the propagation
plan and strategy of the KMF and contribute to the development
of Islam in Korea.
5. Social Welfare Committee
There are about 100,000 foreign Muslim workers living in
Korea. The KMF manages the Social Welfare committee to help
them in their difficulties; to aid them with adapting to Korean
society; and promoting and securing their welfare.
This committee has two major tasks: The first is a special pro-
gramme to secure getting free medical examinations and treatment
services for poor foreign Muslims. Medical examinations and treat-
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ment services take place, on the last Sunday of every month, at the
big conference room attached to the KMF. Currently, Dr. Seokwon
Kim from Sacred Heart Hospital of Gangdong, Seoul and 2 physi-
cians from the Korean/Chinese medical school provide free medical
treatments for 100 foreign Muslim workers. In the near future, the
KMF’s plan is to set up a standing clinic at the Seoul Grand Mosque
for foreign Muslims with the goal to give free medical services.
The second task is to set up a Muslim lounge at the KMF.
This lounge will be created to help foreign Muslims facing diffi-
culties caused by Korean employers, i.e., unpaid or delayed wages,
victims of accidents or unsafe situations. The KMF, through this
lounge programme, will provide relevant legal consultations to
foreign Muslims and will speak on their behave in making a plea
or asking for cooperation from arbitrator of Ministry of Labor
and the Bureau of Police and the Immigration Bureau of Korea
respectively.
Meanwhile this social welfare committee has many plans to es-
tablish an orphanage, a shelter for single mothers, an old people’s
home, and a poor relief place managed in the Islamic way.
6. Committee for the Establishment of the Islamic College
In May 1977/1397, Br. Abdullah Ali al-Mutawa, the chairper-
son of The Committee of Muslims’ Foreign Aid in Kuwait, visited
Seoul Central Masjid and proposed to establish an Islamic college.
Encouraged by him, the Muslim leaders of KMF approved the Is-
lamic College plan and formed the “Committee for the Establish-
ment of the Islamic College”. The plan took concrete shape when
HRH Prince Naif bin Abdulaziz, the Interior Minister of Saudi Ara-
bia, visited Korea in July 1979/1399 and promised to support a fi-
nancial fund and gave his approval to the plan.
In May 1980/1400, H.E. Choi Kyu Ha, then president of Ko-
rea, paid an official visit to Saudi Arabia and a joint communiqué
was issued in which the two countries agreed to cooperate in estab-
lishing an Islamic college in Korea. After this visit, and as a first step
in that direction, a site of 430,000 square metres, located in Yong In,
50 km away from Seoul, was donated by the Korean government.
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According to the communiqué, the two countries would organize a
“Joint-Committee for the Establishment of an Islamic College,”
and in December 1982/1403, the joint committee discussed the
projects. It was decided that the cost of construction and manage-
ment for this projects should be contributed by the Saudi Arabian
government.
Even though we had the ground breaking ceremony for the
Islamic College, with the participation of more than 80 Muslim
leaders from various Islamic countries, the Islamic College plan is
still behind the original schedule.
Major Centres and Activities for the Propagation of Islam
by Foreign Muslims in Korea
1. International Muslim Students Association of Korea
This is a gathering of foreign Muslim students studying at Seoul
National University and the KAIST (Korea Advanced Institute of
Science and Technology). There are about 300 members currently.
It started with various activities since 1999/1419 aiming at propagat-
ing Islam in Korea and strengthening friendship among members.
They publish booklets and pamphlets on basic Islamic creed and
distribute them to the general public. In the early 2003/1424, they
made Islamic calendars for free distribution, and because of the pos-
itive response, they launched in Korean language the publication of
a monthly magazine the named Beautiful Islam, which has contributed
a great deal to introducing Islam to the Korean society.
2. Turkish Muslim Students Association in Korea
Though not a formal establishment as a propagation organi-
zation, it is a gathering of Turkish Muslims in Korea who follow
the teachings of Bediuzzaman Saeed Nursi. It was started by 3
students from Turkey, in the early year of 1990s, but has 20 stu-
dent members who managing it actively. This association has a
good relationship with the KMF since Br. Faruk Zunbul, a mis-
sionary at the Seoul Grand Mosque, leads the gathering. They are
mainly devoted to DaÑwah activities to propagate the teachings of
Islam - trough their friendship network. They are very popular
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among Koreans because of their good Korean speaking abilities.
3. Ikatan Keluarga Muslim Indonesia, IKMI
This is a meeting of Muslim workers from Indonesia that has
been in place since 1996. They meet once a month to promote
friendship among members and propagate Islam in Korea. There
are about 250 members who live near Seoul. They have minor
organizations at Busan and other local cities.
4. JamÉÑat al-TablÊgh
This organization consists of workers from Pakistan and
Bangladesh. Its headquarters is located in India. The real aim of
this organization is to show the Islamic way of life directly
through practicing the propagation method of early Islam. There
are in this organization Muslims who agree to follow this aim and
activities of the Tabligh Jamaat. They meet every Thursday at the
Grand Mosque where they make plans for the week and month
and review past activities.
They usually visit MuÎallÉ (temporary prayer place) with other
members. They stay several days or months for propagating activ-
ities including direct practice, of the model life, of Muslim Tabligh
Jamaat in Korea. They also work together with Tabligh Jamaat
from other countries, who visit Korea 2-3 times a year, to help
their propagation activities.
5. Da’watu al-Islamiya
Da’watu al-Islamiya is an Islamic organization for the propaga-
tion of the message of Islam in Korea, with its headquarters in
Bangladesh. It consists of foreign Muslim workers living in the
Anyang area. Established in 1994, this organization, which com-
prises 500 members who are mainly from Bangladesh, is centered
on the Anyang Mosque. They organize annual events such as a
prayer on the occasion of the Prophet Muhammad birthday, spe-
cial lectures by Muslim leaders, and a revival service for propaga-
tion of Islam. They have a special fund of 150 million Korean
Won allocated to the activities and maintenance of the mosque.
They hold regular monthly meetings to discuss matters relating to
life and wellbeing of the group.
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Islamic Education and Research Institutes in Korea
A. The Study of Islam in Universities
In 1965/1384, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies (HUFS)
opened the department of Arabic to teach the Arabic language
and literature and Middle East and Islamic studies. The aim of
HUFS is to produce Korean experts and specialists in Arab and
Middle East affairs. Since its inception it has produced about
2,500 graduates and its annual intake is roughly 90 students (50
Seoul campus and 40 at the Yong In campus). It offers courses
on the history of Islam, introduction to Islamic teachings and cul-
ture, Qur’an and Hadith, etc. Other departments were also estab-
lished to focus on Turkish (1973), Iranian (1976), and Malay-
Indonesian (1964) studies.
HUFS also launched a Masters’ degree programme in Arab and
Middle East Area Studies and a doctoral programme in international
relations in 1966/1385, a Masters’ programme in Arabic language
and literature in 1976/1396, and a doctoral programme in Arabic
language and literature in 1982/1402. These programmes offer
courses such as the following: history of Islamic thought and cul-
ture, Qur’anic studies, Islamic law, Islamic theology, and history of
Islamic revivalist movements. The Graduate School for Internation-
al Area Studies at HUFS teaches languages of the Muslim world and
and other Islam-related courses.
The Myongji University opened its department of Arabic
language and literature in 1976/1396. In 2000/1420 its name was
changed to the Department of Arab Area Studies. It offers cours-
es such as understanding of Qur’an & Hadith, and Islamic living
custom. Its graduate school established a Masters’ programme in
Arabic literature.
Pusan University of Foreign Studies (PUFS) and Chosun Uni-
versity in Kwangju also established departments for Arabic language
in 1983 and 1985 respectivley. The latter university offers courses on
Islam that are very similar to those taught at HUFS. In March
1997/1417, the Chosun University also set up a Masters’ pro-
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gramme in its department of Arabic and Islamic studies. It offers
courses on topics such as Arabic & Islamic history, studies in Ara-
bic-Islamic classical texts, and conducts a seminar on modern Islam-
ic studies.
Seoul National University and Seogang University have de-
partments of Religious Studies and teach several courses related
to Islam. The former offers a course on introduction to the reli-
gion Islam, while the latter has history of the religion Islam as a
main course.1
The real centre for research and education on Arab, Middle
East and Islam is the Graduate School at HUFS. It has produced
most of the Korean scholars on the Middle East and Islamic stud-
ies. From 1975/1395 to February 2003/1423, they have published
48 MastersÒ theses and 6 doctoral dissertations of which 19 theses
and 2 dissertations deal with topics related to Islamic studies.
Since 1975 the total number of Korean Masters and doctoral
graduates specialized in Mulsim area and Islamic studies has
reached 211, including HUFS (with 200 MAs and 11 PhDs).2
B. Islamic Research Institutes and Major Activities
1. Korea Association for Islamic Studies (KAIS)
KAIS was founded after a series of lectures on “Understanding
of Islamic World” had been launched on June 18, 1987/1407. It
lasted almost 2 years at the seminar hall of the Daewoo Foundation
which had been very supportive of these unfamiliar but important
fields of study and knowledge in Korea. It was, indeed, a place to
exchange earnest opinions for the improvement of Islamic studies.
Covering different Islamic topics, such as “Muhammad, Who is
He?”, “Jesus in the Qur’an”, “fundamentals of Islamic doctrine”,
“Sufism: understanding Islamic Mysticism”, these lectures take place
every month. All lectures have been very successful and have at-
tracted many people.
1 For further details see, Sohn Joo Young, “Introduction to Present Situation of Islamic
Studies in Korea,” Korea Journal of Islamic Culture, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1997).
2 Republic of Korea: National Assembly Library, 2003, Books: Ph D dissertations, MA
Theses of Republic of Korea.
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The most significant result of this series of lectures is that it
gave a great momentum to interest in Islam that culminated in
the founding of KAIS in February 1989/1409 at the end of the
final session of those lectures. Professors Kim Yong Sun, Kim
Jong Wee, Han Duk Kyu and Jung Su Il then came to the conclu-
sion that it was necessary to study Islam with a renewed
perpective and to systematically spread knowledge about it. Thus
KAIS leads Islamic studies in Korea; it holds two symposia and
one international conference. It has published 86 papers in all
fields of Islamic studies by 150 regular members from 25 univer-
sities in an annual journal. Out of 171 articles that have been pub-
lished in different journals produced by these universities, 103 are
related to Islamic studies.1
The most remarkable activity of KAIS is the programme of
Islamic Texts Reading (ITR). In addition to meetings, members are
strengthened in unity and friendship and share academic
achievements. The meetings are mainly streamed towards the
methodology of colloquium and ITR. For instance, from 1993/1413
to 1995/1415, it tried to translate and annotate the Qur’an into the
most appropriate Korean format.2 In 1996/1416, the third project
of ITR, a joint research project, published the book ‘The Formation
Process of the Islamic Sects and Their Present Situation’.3 ‘Research
of Islamic World’ the proceedings of a colloquium held over in
1997-1998/1417-1418, and ‘The Religion of Islam’, by M.
Muhammad Ali, the ITR text in 1990-1992, are now under
preparation for publication. ‘The Wars Unended’ dealing with the
factional conflict in the Islamic world was published at end of the
last year under the name of KAIS.4
1 Korean Association of the Islamic Studies (KAIS), 1990-2003, Annals of KAIS, No.1,
pp. 1-13.
2 KAIS, Annals for Korean Association of the Islamic Studies, No. 3, pp.285-296 and No. 4
pp. 324-330 (Korean translation of the meanings of the Qur’an, Chapters 81-114).
3 Sohn Joo Young, Kim Jung Wi, Lee Hee Soo, Hwang Byung Ha, & Kim Young
Kyung, The Formation Process of the Islamic Sects and their Present Situation, Acanet, 2000.
4 KAIS, The Wars Un-ended: The Factional Conflict in the Islamic World, Cheong A, 2002
(H.1423).
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2. Korea Association for Middle East Studies (KAMES)
The oil shock of 1973/1393 was the historical turning point in
diplomatic and economic relations between Korea and the Middle
East countries. It made the need of studying this region urgent. The
oil crisis directly motivated the establishment of the KAMES (Korea
Association for Middle East Studies). The KAMES was founded in
March 1976/1396 with 54 members. Now there are 250 KAMES
members including scholars, diplomats, and experts on area studies.
They hold regular conferences and seminars, international symposia,
and publish The Korean Journal of the Middle East Studies (KAJMES)
annually. The latest issue of the journal is No. 23-2. The total
number of the articles published in this journal is 335, of which 56
(16%) are related to Islam.1
3. Institute of Middle East Studies, HUFS and Other Institutes
Another major institute of Islamic studies is the IMES (Institute
of the Middle East), an ancillary institution of HUFS which founded
in January 15, 1976/1396. This institute was established with big
expectations and support from the Korean government. The pur-
pose of this institute was to build a better relationship with the Mid-
dle East countries by doing research on politics, diplomacy, eco-
nomics, society, religion, and culture of this region. It has invited
many distinguished scholars and experts from inside and outside for
special lectures and seminars. The IMES has published a collection
of materials, a research series, and a number of books. The total
number of articles published in its journal is 228, of which 66 (29%)
deal with in Islamic studies subjects.2
Besides the institute described above, there are a couple of
other major institutes, such as the Korea Institute of Islamic
Culture (KIIC) under the KMF and the Institute of Islamic
Studies (IIS) attached to Ewha Woman’s University. The latter
institute was established in September 1992/1413 with the aim of
developing propagation methods of Christianity in the Islamic
world. The scholars belonging to this institute are mainly
1 Korea Association of the Middle East Studies (KAMES), 1980-2003, Journal of
KAMES, No. 1.
2 Institute of the Middle East Studies (IMES) of HUFS, 1980-2002, Journal of IMES, No. 1.
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Christians who are engaged in research on Islam. They have
published four series of books titled Journal of Islamic Studies
including an article entitled “How do Muslims Identify Jesus?”1
The Religious Situation in Korea and Government Official
Policy on Religion
The Religious Scene in Korea
A. Religious Features of Korean Society
Historically, various religions have coexisted in Korean socie-
ty: Koreans are a religious people. Not only Christianity, Bud-
dhism, and Islam exist in Korea, but also hundreds of new reli-
gions and common beliefs which form spiritual communities are
visibly present in the Korean scene. Also groups of sorcerers have
organized themselves into certain structures, though they have
been censured for their superstitious and irrational inclinations.2
All of these belief systems are part of the religious map in the Ko-
rean society. Their cultural elements have influenced, more or less,
the Korean public. Therefore, the religious scene in Korea is vivid-
ly pluralistic.3 According to the statistics released by the Korean
Statistic Bureau in 1994/1414, the number of religiously affiliated
people in Korea is 33,772,552, 77.7% of the total population
(44,453,000). However, this percentage could be much higher
when we add to it the followers of new unregistered religions that
were not included in this statistics.4
This data clearly reflects the Korean society’s general attitude
towards religion. In other words, it means that individual members
have more than one religion: in fact the religious population would
be more than the absolute number of the Korean population.5
Certainly, the religious population of Korea would be greater than
1 Institute of Islamic Studies (Chun Chae Ok): The 1995 Yeyong Communication.
2 Ministry of Culture &Tourism, Religious Affairs, A Handbook for Religion of Korea (Seoul:
Kyemoonsa, 2001), p. 79.
3 Yoon E Heum, Religions of Korea at the transition era (Seoul: National University and
Research Center for Religion and Culture, Jeepmundang, Department of Religion,
1986), p.16.
4 Kim Sangho, A Study on Religious policy in Korea, 1996, p. 16.
5 Ministry of Culture & Tourism and Religious Affairs, A Handbook for Religion of Korea, p. 397.
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the absolute population number if we include the numerous sham-
ans among the people at the lower levels of society.
In this way Korea is remarkable in that it never broke apart in
the name of any religion even though ruling kingdoms, in its history,
changed religious affiliation. The Korean society has continuously
existed as a multi-religious society for more than 1600 years, since
Buddhism was introduced to it. Entering the 20th century, many
nations fell under colonial rule; they were forced to divide into many
states. In Korea, however, during the independence movement
launched in March 1, 1919/1337, various religious groups joined
hands to save the state and the nation.1 This shows that religions in
Korea are rather tolerant and cooperative in their relations with one
another. It is easy to see Korea’s religious pluralism and respect, if
not appreciation, of different beliefs and value systems clearly re-
flected in its national public holidays.
Secondly, religious communities in Korea are quite liberal and
tolerant. As seen in the religious population, Korea is a multi-
religious society; the people get along with various religions and, in
fact, some belong to more than one religion. Also, it is a common
feature of Oriental culture to have a generous attitude towards
other religions.2 From a historical viewpoint, it can be said that the
tolerant Korean attitude towards religion is due to the fact that the
people’s social and personal life in Korea has been influenced and
moulded by the creeds and values of different religions at same
time. In this context, the Korean is Confucian in human affairs,
Buddhist in his view of life, Christian in caring for neighbors, and
Shaman in his view of destiny.3
In other words, the Korean society has a natural disposition
and original receptivity to religious beliefs and values. This fact is
very much in favour of Islam which the Qur’an has proclaimed as
the religion of human nature (dÊn al-fiÏrah), thereby attaching high
1 The March 1 movement is a national representative movement that fought against
the Japanese invasion. It was led by prominent religious figures from Cheondoism,
Buddhism, and Christianity.
2 Yoon Eheum, Development of Society and Role of Religion, State and Society, (Institute of
Religions Domestic and Abroad, 1984), p. 26
3 Yoon Eheum, ibid, p. 26
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consideration to a number of major human values, such as love of
mankind, brotherhood, family belonging, and human destiny. The
religious system of Islam and the exemplary model of Prophet
Muhammad may thus be said to be very much in consonance with
the Korean people’s view of life and cultural values which have
been deeply rooted in Shamanism since very old times.1
B. Religions in Korea
The religious situation in Korea can be described as basically
an amalgam of historical world religions, native religions, arsing
new religions, and Shaman local beliefs. A brief description of the
religious map is provided in the following paragraphs.
1. Historical Religions
Buddhism: It flourished during the Koryo dynasty when it
came to Koguryo in 372 via China. Although it began to decay
after the Chosun dynasty, it was, at that time, at its zenith. Bud-
dhism is the oldest foreign religion that settled in the Korean pen-
insula.2 This religion has greatly influenced the Korean spirit and
culture of living. There are two major sects, Jogaejong and
Taegojong, with 40 sects and 12,004 registered temples, 3,500 un-
registered temples, 25,598 monks and about 22,700,000 followers,
thus accounting to approximately 40% of total population.3
Confucianism:4 It came during the same period as Buddhism. Its
ideology has influenced politics and education. It reached its hey-
day under the Chosõn dynasty (1392-1910) which “implemented
harsh measures in order to diminish the institutional power of
Buddhism” and promote Confucianism “as the philosophy of state
1 Kim Seongkwang, A Study of Religious Education of the Korea Christian Mission Schools
under Influences the Religious Pluralism, 1993, pp. 11-12.
2 Yoo Dongsik, Korean Religions and Christianity (Seoul: Korea Christian Book Press,
1982), pp. 59-63.
3 According to Korean Statistics in Nov. 1, 1995, the total population of Korea is 44,554,000. –
Author. According to 2012 records, the total population in South Korea has reached 50 million
people. – Editor.
4 It is debatable whether Confucianism can be classified as a religion, but it is
customarily regarded so.
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governance.”1 Since then Confucianism has become the source of
values and morality for the Korean society. In the modern era its
power has declined rapidly, and barely maintains its slender exist-
ence under the basis of civic code of conduct.2 There is only one
sect with 234 local schools annexed to the Confucian shrine,
18,240 teachers and 10,000,000 followers. However, the number of
followers is very doubtful.
Catholicism: The Catholic Church became a centre of Western
learning among the intelligentsia when Lee Seunghoon was the first
to be baptized into the Christian faith. It suffered persecution se-
verely for a century and was viewed as a harmful creed to Confucian
society during the Chosun dynasty which emphasized the absolute
power of kingship and ancestor worship. After the Korea-France
treaty in 1886/1303, Catholicism was allowed to be propagated in
Korea for the first time. Currently there are 2,369 clergymen, 5,000
sisters, and 1,657 churches and 3,578,113 believers.
Protestantism: Protestantism arrived to Korea one century after
Catholicism. It has celebrated its centennial anniversary. It has been
very successful in expanding with securing enormous power and
number of believers. There are 132 sects, 48,256 churches, 52,312
ministers, and 15,055,609 followers.3
Islam: Islam, as we have already seen, is a late comer to Korea,
barely more than half a century since it was first introduced to Ko-
reans in 1950/1369. The number of its followers is about 33,640.
2. Rising New Religions
Contrary to historical religions whose truths and systems have
been established, a rising new religion can be defined as one that is
still experimenting and searching for its truths and substance. While
historical religions in Korea came mainly from the outside, arising
new religions are homegrown creations. Presently, there are 240
1 Choi Mihwa, “State Suppression of Buddhism and Royal Patronage of the Ritual of
Water and Land in the Early Chosõn Dynasty”, Seoul Journal of Korean Studies, Vol. 22,
No. 2 (Seoul: Kyujanggak Institute for Korean Studies, December 2009), pp. 181-182.
2 Yoo DongSik, Folk Religion and Korean Culture (Seoul: Modern Thought Co., 1978),
pp. 262-263.
3 Ministry of Culture & Tourism, Religious Affairs, pp. 30-39.
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newly risen religions in Korea, although only 26 of them are active
and registered as corporate bodies with the Ministry of Culture and
Sports. They have 26 places for gathering, 36,450 ministers, and
5,654,970 followers. The major representative religions of this cate-
gory are Cheodogyo, Won Buddhism and Daejonggyo.
Cheondogyo: It was created by the Donghak movement in
1860.1 In a short time, it developed into a national religion with a
big sacrifice of one million people in the name of fighting to save
the nation and to inspire a national movement for modernity.
There are 1,200,000 followers, 150 parishes, and 4,907 ministers.
Won Buddhism: This Buddhist sect emerged around
1900/1317, under rapidly changing circumstances.2 It has some
1,230,000 followers and 500 temples in Korea, the United States
of America, Canada, Germany, and Japan, with 9,800 ministers.
Its followers run three universities, including Wonkwang Univer-
sity, 7 middle and high schools, 96 preschools and kindergartens,
and 34 charity and medical centres.
Dae Religion: The founder of this religion is Tangun, the
founding father of the Korean nation. It is a five-thousand-year-
old native religious tradition. There are 89 shrines in the country,
271 ministers and 470,100 believers belonging to this tradition.3
3. Local Religions of Korea
By the term ‘local religions’ refers to primitive religious
traditions with no specific originator or well-defined creed and belief
system, but they have religious characteristics, with incantation, and
adopt the local folk beliefs. Shamanism, which mainly teaches the
1 Literally, Cheondogyo, also known as Cheondoism, means “Religion of the Heavenly
Way”. It is a 20th-century Korean religious movement based on the 19th century
Donghak Confucian movement movement founded by Choe Je-u (1824-1864) and codi-
fied under the Korean nationalist and independence activist Son Byeong-hui (1861-
1922). Cheondoism has its origins in the peasant rebellions which arose in 1812 during
the Chosõn dynasty. Cheondoism is essentially Confucian in origin, but incorporates
elements of Korean nationalism, Taoism and Buddhism. It places emphasis on personal
cultivation, this-worldly social welfare, and rejects any notion of an afterlife. – Editor.
2 Ministry of Culture & Tourism and Religious Affairs, A Handbook for Religion of Korea,
p. 102
3 Ibid., p. 397.
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pursuit of good fortune, is representative of this type of religion.1
Since such local religions do not form into groups, it is not easy to
find their religious demographics, but it is safe to add that there are
uncountable numbers of followers that belong to these local
religions in Korean society.
C. Korean Official Policy and Regulations on Religion
1. General Principles of Korean Policy on Religion
Article 20 of the Korean Constitution stipulates that “All peo-
ple have the freedom of religion.” It does not recognize a state reli-
gion; but there is a separation between religion and politics. This
means that Korea’s policy on religion is based on two main pillars:
principles of the freedom of religion and separation of church and
state.
Here freedom of religion is defined as the freedom of a per-
son to believe in the way he or she wishes. That includes not only
active freedom of belief: religious ceremony, religious gathering,
association and missionary activities, but also passive freedoms, i.
e. not having any religion at all, not taking part in religious cere-
monies, and propagation activities. This is supported by article 11
of the constitution which states that “All people are equal in view
of the law, not allowed to be discriminated against by gender, reli-
gion or social statues relate to all spheres of political, social and
cultural life.”
Freedom of religion, defined as a human right rather than the
right of a nation, is not only for the natives but also for foreigners
and stateless persons. The supremacy of this right has allowed
religious groups to flourish and build churches and temples.2
The principle of the separation of church and state is based
on the idea that the state is only concerned with the mundane life
of people and does not interfere with their religious and spiritual
life. The principle’s basic elements: denial of state religion and
neutrality of state concerning religious matters.
1 Sik, Folk Religion and Korean Culture, p. 268.
2 Kim Sangho, ibid, p.16.
THE QUESTION OF MINORITIES IN ISLAM178
- No Recognized State Religion: In pre-modern Korean society
religion was not separated from the state; Buddhism developed
under the auspices of the royal family in Koryo dynasty (918-
1392). Politics was part of the life of most revered monks. Con-
fucianism in the Chosõn dynasty greatly influenced not only poli-
tics but also people’s social life thanks to the policy implemented
by the state to promote Confucianism. Even after the end of this
dynasty, a systematic policy separating religion and the state was
not undertaken, though there were some leaders who upheld the
idea of the separation of religion and state under the influences of
western thought.
Later, such a stand was clearly upheld by the Constitution
promulgated in July 17, 1948 when the Republic of Korea was
established. Thus, Articles 19 and 20 underscore “freedom of
conscience” and “freedom of religion” to all citizens, while Arti-
cle 20(2) indicates that “No state religion shall be recognized, and
church and state shall be separated”.1
- Neutrality of the State towards Religion: The state is not allowed
to give preferential treatment to any particular religion, nor shall it
perform or support financially special religious ceremonies. One of
the manifestations this neutrality towards religion is Article 5 of the
Education Law which states that “The state and the public school
cannot do any religious education for a particular religion.”
Yet, the controversy over religious interference in politics is
far from being settled. The Grand Court of Korea, under the
Yooshin constitution of the 3rd Republic Government,2 ruled that
a critical sermon on politics is regarded as a political speech and is
guilty of violating martial law.3 However, there is no regulation of
positive law restricting the political activities of religious persons or
religious bodies. If is such law is enacted in the future, such a move
1 Constitution of the Republic of Korea, pp. 6-7. See also Park Jongsu, Analysis on the Change
of Relationship of State and Religion Emphasizing on the religious policy in 1st - 6th Republic of
Korea, p. 200.
2 Daepan, 1973, 5, 23, pp. 73-525.
3 Yanggun, Legal Study on the relationship of State and Church: Issues in the Modern Legal
Science (Seoul: Park Young Sa, 1983), pp. 592-593.
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will, in fact, be a violation against the freedom of religion.1
There are two positions regarding the issue: It is possible to
organize and work for a religious party in Korea in the same man-
ner as Christian democratic parties in some Western countries, like
Germany, do. Hence, the organization of religiously-based parties
should not be banned from politics; their political activities should
rather be protected by the law. The second position is that it is un-
desirable, by virtute of the principle of the separation of church
and state enshrined in the Korean Constitution, to allow the for-
mation of political parties based on any partcular religious creed in
a multi-religious society like Korea.2 Most Korean intelligentsia
today subscribe to the second view. There is yet great concern that
this situation might develop into a serious crisis affecting order and
stability the Korean society.
Nevertheless, the constitution of Korea guarantees the free-
dom of religion. Hence, it regulates the registration of religious
groups under civil law. Article 32 of the Civil Code guarantees
“The establishment and permission of non-profit organizations”
permits associations or foundations with aims of academic, reli-
gious, charitable, social and other non-profitable nature and activ-
ities to form corporate bodies with permission of the regulating
authority. In addition, various laws related to taxation also deter-
mine the tax status of religious organizations, charity require-
ments for such bodies, and the regulation of benefit of religious
organizations to their receptors.
2. Religion-related Laws
The laws and regulations related to religion could be divided
into three categories. The first category pertains to the protection
of Buddhism, and is known as the “Law for Traditional Temples
Reserves”. The second one concerns Confucianism, and consists
of the “The law of religious property”. By law Buddhist temples
and Confucian shrines, which are annexed to local schools, must
have their historical value and cultural significance protected as
1 Ibid.
2 Han Sangbum, Basic Human Rights (Seoul: JeongEumSa, 1985), pp. 172-173.
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part of the heritage of national culture. The third category in-
cludes general laws regulating religious matters.
As we have described above, all religious organizations in
Korea are established and managed as non-profit organizations
according to Article 32 of the Korean Civil Code (the establish-
ment and permission of non-profit organization). There are 398
religious organizations registered with the Ministry of Culture and
Sports as of December 2001: Buddhism (90), Protestantism (188),
Catholicism (73), Confucianism (21), Islam (1), and others (25).1
As already mentioned, Islam in Korea was legally registered as a
foundation in 1976/1396.
Religious education is only possible at private schools under Ar-
ticle 5 of the Education Law. The most important factor for the fast
growth of Christianity is the indirect method of propagation of its
teachings through education: Christian middle and high schools and
universities. For example, the Catholic Church manages various pro-
jects on education: kindergartens (215), primary schools (6), profes-
sional colleges (3), middle schools (26), high schools (35), universi-
ties (9), and theological seminaries (5). They also provide social ser-
vice to the people through different means, such as hospitals (30),
old people’s homes (25), and leper colonies (25). Islamic organiza-
tions, however, have none of such institutions related to educational,
cultural and welfare programmes.
Currently private schools and social welfare organizations are
established under special laws. Education foundations are estab-
lished by the Private School Law (Law No. 1362, June 26,
1963/1383). Social welfare foundations are established by the Social
Welfare Projects Law (Law No. 2191, January 1, 1971/1390). In ad-
dition, there was a strong request by religious organizations to estab-
lish a religious law to promote good relationships among religions.
Korean law protects religious ceremonies and places of wor-
ship. Article 158 of the Criminal Code stipulates that “one who
1 Ministry of Culture &Tourism, Religious Affairs, A Handbook for Religion of Korea, pp.
353-374.
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intends to obstruct funerals, feasts, prayers or sermons will be
fined not exceeding fifteen thousand won.” Article 149 of the
Criminal Procedure Code states that “a person who holds a reli-
gious position or has it in past can deny the testimony in regards
to his religious position.” Article 286 of the Civil Procedure
Code also stipulates the right of a religious man to deny the tes-
timony: “one who holds a religious position or held it in past,
has the right to deny the testimony if he does not want that po-
sition known.” The Labor Union Act No. 11 stipulates, “A
member cannot be discriminated against with regard to race,
religion, sex, (political) party, or rank.” The Labor Standards Act
No. 5 also gives equal treatment, stipulating that “the labor con-
dition cannot be discriminated against nationality, belief or so-
cial rank.” The Law of Conscription Affairs No. 50 and the Law
for Military Personnel Affairs, section No.5, No. 8 and No.12
provides rules relating to religious military personnel and reli-
gious officers and specifies standard rules concerning such acts
as sarcasm, mockery, hatred of religious beliefs, religion or dis-
respect for religious ceremony.
Conclusion: Future Prospects of Islam in Korea
Religious policy of Korea is based on the freedom of religion and
the principle of separation of church and state. However, regard-
ing the religious policy of Korea, two major issues must be point-
ed out here.
Firstly, Korea needs to work out a general policy on religious
matters. As has been indicated by one researcher, there is no
comprehensive policy on religion adopted by the government;
handling of religious affairs is subject to ad hoc initiatives and
suffers from much inefficiency and lack of unified and consistent
regulations.1 Therefore, there is urgent need for new regulations
on religious matters and organizations to be set up in a systemat-
ic, well-thought and balanced manner.
Secondly, in addition to the shortage of official experts on reli-
1 Tak Myung Hwan, A Study on the Religious Policy of Korea (Seoul: Gukjong publication,
September 9, 1980).
THE QUESTION OF MINORITIES IN ISLAM182
gious matters, the authority looking after such matters is under the
auspices of the Ministry of Culture and Sports, which does not seem
to be the right state organ that should handle such sensitive issues as
those pertaining to religion. Without underestimating the efforts
done under the current administrative regime to solve arising con-
flicts and foster mutual understanding, harmony and cooperation
among the different religious communities and organizations, and
seen the complexity and sensitivity of the religious issues and mat-
ters involved, it is high time that a special department be established
under the Korean government to look after matters of religion.
Today, no religion holds a dominant position in Korea, but
Buddhism and Confucianism comparatively enjoyed a strong posi-
tion before the 1950s, when Islam came. Christianity has registered
considerable growth after 1960s when Korea put much effort into
the industrial development with reconstruction projects supported
by the United States of America after the Korean War in 1950. The
followers of both Catholicism and Protestantism constitute about
40% of the total population. This is mainly due to the great and
multifarious efforts made for the propagation of Christianity in Ko-
rea by the 132 Christian organizations which are the most well-
organized religious bodies in the country. These organizations spon-
sor and support numerous educational institutions (including prima-
ry, middle, and high schools), social welfare centres, hospitals, or-
phanages, old people homes, etc.
Meanwhile, Korea’s Muslim community is still in its sprouting
season. Despite its short history, it has shown startling growth with
solid foundation in the major cities of Seoul, Busan and Jeonju. This
work has been supported by Islamic countries like Saudi Arabia and
Islamic organizations such as the Muslim World League and OIC.
The cooperation and special solicitudes of the Korean government
have also been meaningful to foster that growth.
The major obstacles facing the spread of Islam among the
Korean people have to do mainly with negative preconceptions
and misunderstandings due especially to Western and Christian
influences. The modern educational system of Korea was estab-
lished on Western cultural and its intellectual lines. Most Koreans
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have learnt about Islam and the Muslim world and culture through
Western academic and mediatic channels. Until quite recently, it
was Westerners and Christians who taught Koreans about Islam.
Moreover, Christianity in Korea has deviated from its original
phase and has become increasingly exclusive towards other reli-
gions, especially Islam about which it spreads negative images
among the people.
In order to face this situation, the first thing we have to do, for
the proper propagation of Islam in Korea, is to remove the misun-
derstandings and correct the perception of Islam in Korean minds.
In this connection, it is noticeable that after the 9.11 crisis there has
been a great increase in the volume of serious and academic publica-
tions on Islam in both Korean and English, including translations of
original Islamic sources. This is a very important and encouraging
phenomenon. In the near future, the KMF will embark on a spe-
cial project of systematic spread and publishing of information on
Islam and Islamic thought and culture for the general public. In-
ternational Islamic organizations can surely help in this and other
similar projects.
Our age is one of professional journalism and advanced me-
dia technololgies that have become essential means for any effi-
cient communication and reachout. This is more so for any or-
ganization embracing a message and mission to be conveyed to
the people and to whole world. That is why we find that many
Korean religious groups and bodies have launched their TV cable
networks. Buddhism, Catholicism, and Protestantism now run
their own TV broadcasting stations.
One of the biggest problems facing the propagation of Islam by
specialized Islamic organizations in the world is the shortage of
funds. The Korean case is no exception. Call-to-Islam activities in
Korea started in the 1980 thanks to financial support of some Arab-
Islamic countries. The Muslim community in Korea has not been
able to attain financial independence as it has not been able to de-
velop sustainable economic resources enabling it to embark on more
systematic and long-term programmes for the propagation of Islam.
It is hoped that Muslim majority countries and international Islamic
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organizations would consider the situation of Islam and Muslims in
Korea as part of their concerns and future plans regarding the cause
of Islam in the world.
What is of utmost necessity for the advancement of Islam in
Korea is a well-thought out strategy and systematic approach for
DaÑwah activities with clear priorities and sound understanding of
the needs and problems of the Korean society. This requires, in ad-
dition to financial means, capable, well-trained, and dedicated daÑwah
workers. We need professional DaÑwah workers who have sound
knoweldge of Islam and good understanding of the Korean society
and culture and a sense of the needs and priorities of the Muslim
community in Korea. Muslims in Korea can actually find a good
example in the systematic way Christian missionaries and organiza-
tions are carrying out the call to Christianity. One essential need that
has to be satisfied on the way toward this goal is to provide oppor-
tunities for Korean Muslim students in Islamic universities in Mus-
lim countries so that they get equipped with profound and sound
knowledge of Islam both in its fundamental sources and teachings
and its development as culture and civilization.
I am quite sure that the future of Islam in Korea will be
brighter compared to other Muslim minority groups in the region
and perhaps the world over. The following factors will, I believe,
make this possible.
Firstly, there is considerable similarity of orientation between
many Islamic teachings and rituals and elements of Korean tradi-
tional culture.
Secondly, there is basic commonality between Islam and Ko-
rean education consisting in the central place given to ethics and
morality.
Thirdly, the Korean government keeps good relationships
with many Islamic countries. It is necessary for Islamic organiza-
tions to enhance such relationships for more mutual understand-
ing and cooperation.
Fourthly, many religious and non-religious people in Korea
are very disappointed at the existing religious institutions that are
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complacent with regard to exploitative capitalism, unfettered he-
donism, increasing immoral trends and negative cultural influences
of Western civilization. An increasing number of the Korean intel-
ligentsia have become critical of Christian organizations due to
their fanatic and exclusivist attitudes towards other religions.
As pointed out above, Koreans are very open and receptive
to religions and religious values; they are quite generous, tolerant
and friendly towards the different religions. It will not take too
long to witness Islamic Korea sending its bright light all over the
Korean peninsula, the Land of the Morning Calm.
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CHAPTER 8
The SharÊÑah Objectives and their
Implications for non-Muslim Minorities:
The Case of Malaysia
Muhammad Amanullah
Introduction: An Overview of MaqÉÎid al-SharÊÑah
Islam provides a comprehensive code of life. Its teachings and
commands cover all aspects of human conduct and activities at the
individual as well as the collective levels. Its code of life, expressed
by the all-inclusive term SharÊÑah which denotes among other
things watering source (i.e. source of life), right way or straight
path, revolves around the realization and promotion of fundamen-
tal values which embody human good and well-being both in this
world and in the hereafter. Described as MaqÉÎid al-SharÊÑah, these
goals and objectives are a reflection of the Islamic worldview and
values according to which human needs are indentified and judged
in a descending hierarchical order from the most important and
indispensable to the least important and most ancillary.
In other words, the injunctions of the SharÊÑah, which consist
of rules governing human acts and conduct in terms of prescrip-
tions and proscriptions and what lies in between, are not instituted
for their own sake; they are rather intended for the realization of
benefit (maÎlaÍah) and prevention of harm (mafsadah) for human
beings. Likewise, the doctrine of MaqÉÎid al-SharÊÑah aims at attain-
ing goals that consist of three main categories as have been classi-
fied by Muslim legal theorists.
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1. The ÌarËriyyÉt: this term refers to indispensable things that
constitute essential needs for human beings both individually and
collectively. Human social life and collective existence will suffer
greatly if such things are affected and the severity of human suf-
fering will increase depending on the degree of harm and viola-
tion they undergo. Hence their realization, protection and promo-
tion is of utmost concern in the SharÊÑah. According to the major-
ity of Muslim legal theorists and jurists, these indispensable things
consist of religion (dÊn), life (nafs), intellect (Ñaql), offspring (nasl)
and property (mÉl). They constitute the core values for human
individual and collective existence and any harm or violation af-
fecting them wholly or partly means the violation or destruction
of society’s fundamentals. In fact, as Muslim scholars assert, the
protection and promotion of these five fundamentals is conse-
quential nor only for human worldly life, but more importantly
for the life to come.
2. The ÍÉjiyÉt: this category includes all things that are needed
for the proper and smooth functioning of society and attainment
of the ÌarËriyyÉt. Although they are not indispensable, their ab-
sence will cause harsdship and sverity in human life. Alternatively,
their realization brings comfort and alleviates distress and diffi-
culty in people’s life.
3. The taÍsÊniyyÉt: it includes all that leads to splendor, perfec-
tion and peace in human life. It thus bestows graciousness and
beauty on people’s conduct, relationships and transactions, and
improves their life conditions in all aspects of their existence.1
Covering all levels and aspects of human life and exemplifying
all kinds of human interests from the most fundamental to the least
important, these three categories of the SharÊÑah objectives actually
reflect the hierarchical scheme of values Islam has set up for human
1 For more details, see AbË IsÍÉq al-ShÉÏibi, Al-MuwÉfaqÉt fÊ UÎËl al-SharÊÑah, edited by
Abdullah Draz (Beirut: DÉr al-Kutub al`Ilmiyyah, n. d.), vol. 2, pp. 7-10; Muhammad
al-Tahir Ibn Ashur, Treatise on Maqasid al-ShariÑah, trans. Mohamed El-Tahir El-Mesawi
(Herndon, VA: The International Institute of Islamic Thought, 1427/2006), pp. 117-
125; Wahbah al-Zuhayli, UÎËl al-Fiqh al-IslÉmÊ (Damascus: DÉr al-Fikr, 1996), vol. 2,
pp. 1020-1024; Ibrahim Muhammad Salqini, Al-Muyassar fÊ UÎËl al-Fiqh al-IslÉmÊ
(Damascus: DÉr al-Fikr, 2nd ed., 1996), pp. 412-419.
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social life and existence. Likewsie, they concern all people, Muslims
and non-Muslims alike, and constitute the basis for human rights in
the Islamic framework. Accordingly, non-Muslim minorities living
within majority Muslim societies and under Islamic rule should be
enjoying the same interests embodied by those objectives. The fol-
lowing section of this chapter discusses implications of the doctrine
of MaqÉÎid al-SharÊÑah for non-Muslim minorities living in a Muslim
majority country, by taking Malaysia as an example.
The SharÊÑah Objectives and their Implications for non-
Muslim Minorities
1. Protection of Religion and Its Implication for Non-Muslim Minorities
One of the basic and higher objectives of the SharÊÑah is to
protect religion, for which a number of obligatory rulings have
been provided by the SharÊÑah. For a Muslim, an important obli-
gation is to continue with his correct faith, which comprises its
six pillars. Likewise, he must perform five pillars of Islam. He is
not allowed to abandon his faith. If he does so, he will be pun-
ished by death for his apostasy, unless he repents and comes back
to the fold of believers again.
However, a non-Muslim is not obliged to accept Islam or
convert to it. Islam provides him full freedom to continue with his
own faith. In this regard, Islam is so flexible that it allows a male
Muslim to marry a woman of the People of the Book and also al-
lows her to remain non-Muslim within a family of Muslims. Her
Muslim husband is not allowed to compel her to accept Islam.
Likewise, a non-Muslim is not obliged to perform the Islamic ritu-
als of devotional worship nor any other matters that are specific to
the Islamic faith. Rather, a non-Muslim is free to follow and prac-
tice the teachings of his religion as pertaining to faith, ritual wor-
ship and most of other aspects of personal and devotional life.1 In
1 Salih bin Husayn al-Ayid, ×uqËq Ghayr al-MuslimÊn fÊ BilÉd al-IslÉm (Riyadh: DÉr
IshbÊlyÉ li’l-Nashr wa al-TawzÊÑ, 2001), p. 25. According al-Qaradawi, since the time of
righteous caliphs Jews and Christians performed their worships and held their services
and celebrations with freedom and security, just as was prescribed in the covenants of
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this respect, the Qur’an (2:256) clearly states that,
There shall be no coercion in matters of faith.
Moreover, God addresses the Prophet in the strongest terms
to the effect that it is not part of his mission to force people to
convert to his message:
And [thus it is:] had thy Sustainer so willed, all those who live on
earth would surely have attained to faith, all of them: dost thou, then,
think that thou couldst compel people to believe? (Qur’an, 10:99)
These Qur’anic verses teach that compelling non-Muslims to
accept Islam against their will is not allowed. Likewise, any type of
oppression to convert non-Muslim minorities living among Muslim
majority society into Islam is not allowed. In fact, belief is an aspect
that is so strongly connected with the heart and mind of everybody
that force cannot change it unless he or she willingly changes it and
accepts another belief system, which in this case is Islamic system.
Moreover, this type of forced conversion is against the sincerity of a
person and thus it is not accepted by God. Any conversion to Islam,
therefore, must be the result of understanding, rational conviction,
and personal decision. While it protects the dignity and religion of
non-Muslim minorities, this principle also serves to protect Islam
from superficial converts who might turn into hypocrites.
2. Protection of Life and Its Implications for Non-Muslim Minorities
Another important higher objective of the SharÊÑah is to protect
human beings’ life, for which many commands are found in the
Qur’an. Thus, God says:
… and do not take any human being’s life – [the life] whivh God has
declared to be sacred – otherwise than in [the pursuit of] justice: this has
He enjoined upon you so that you might use your reason. (Qur’an,
6:151; see also 17:33).
Likewise, He says:
A believer should not kill another believer except by mistake. (Qur’an,
4:92).
AbË Bakr and ÑUmar, such as the treaty between ÑUmar and the people of ÔliyÉ’
(Jerusalem). See Yusuf al-Qaradawi, Al-AqalliyyÉt al-DÊniyyah wa al-×all al-IslÉmÊ (Beirut:
Al-Maktab al-IslÉmÊ, 3rd ed., 1998), p. 13.
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All these verses of the Qur’an prove that intentional and illegal
killing in Islam is forbidden. Forbidding killing, the Prophet said in
his speech at ÑArafah during his last pilgrimage: “Indeed your blood
and souls are sacred like the sacredness of this day of this month at
this place.”1 It means that nobody is allowed to kill others. As a mat-
ter of justice, if anyone commits this crime, he should be killed in
retaliation unless the guardian of the victim forgives the criminal. In
this regard, God says:
Just retribution is ordained for in cases of killing. (Qur’an, 2:178)
Again we read:
And We ordained for them in that [Torah]: A life for a life. (Qur’an,
5:45)
In addition to the ÍadÊth cited above, the inviolability of hu-
man life has been reiterated by many other Prophetic traditions; a
few more will be enough to highlight this principal value. Thus, we
read, “The most hated people to God are three: (1) A person who
deviates from the right conduct, i.e., an evil doer, in the ×aram
(sanctuaries of Makkah and MadÊnah); (2) a person who seeks to
revive the traditions of the jÉhiliyyah in Islam, (3) and a person
who seeks to shed somebody’s blood without any right.”2 De-
scribing the gravest sins a person must avoid committing, the
Prophet is reported to have said: “The biggest of the great sins
(kabÉ’ir) are; associating partners with God, murder a human be-
ing, to be undutiful to one’s parents, and to make a false state-
ment,” or said, “to give a false witness.”3 Again, he said, “A faith-
ful believer remains at liberty regarding his religion unless he kills
somebody unlawfully.”4
If a non-Muslim intentionally kills a Muslim, all Muslim ju-
rists agree that the culprit must receive just retaliation. Since all
religions forbid intentional and illegal killing including Judaism
1 Muslim b. al-×ajjÉj al-NaysÉbËrÊ, ØaÍÊÍ Muslim, ed. Muhammad Fuad Abd al-Baqi
(Beirut: DÉr IÍyÉ’ al-TurÉth al-ÑArabÊ, n. d.), ÍadÊth No. 1679, Vol. 3, p. 1305.
2 AbË ÑAbd AllÉh MuÍammad b. IsmÉÑÊl al-BukhÉrÊ, ØaÍÊÍ al-BukhÉrÊ (Riyadh: DÉr al-SalÉm
/ Damascus: DÉr al-FayÍÉ’, 1419/1999), “KitÉb al-DiyyÉt”, ÍadÊth No. 6882, p. 1186.
3 Ibid., ÍadÊth No. 6871, p. 1184.
4 Ibid., ÍadÊth No. 6862, p. 1183.
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and Christianity clearly, this punishment for a non-Muslim killer
is not considered to be unfair. However, Muslim jurists differ
over the issue of whether a Muslim who kills a non-Muslim
should receive just retaliation by capital punishment or not. Ac-
cording to the majority of jurists, a Muslim, who kills intentional-
ly a non-Muslim, should not receive just retaliation by death pun-
ishment, while the ×anafÊs maintain that this Muslim killer should
be retaliated by death punishment. Considering public interest
and the objective of protecting the life of non-Muslim minorities,
and for the sake of justice, the ×anafÊ view should be preferred in
this regard. Supporting the ×anafÊ view, the contemporary jurist
and lawyer Muhammad S. El-Awa says:
One cannot deny that the law of qiÎÉÎ is based on equality, but
equality in what? This is the question. The Hanafi School
rightly holds that equality here means that both the killer and
the victim must be human beings; therefore, any human be-
ing who kills another human being is liable to qiÎÉÎ disregard-
ing the religion of the victim.1
An alternative punishment for intentional and illegal killing is
the payment of indemnity.2 According to Muslim jurists, if a Mus-
lim kills another Muslim, the defender of the deceased person’s
right (walÊ) is allowed to forgive the offender and settle the issue by
receiving the indemnity; he is allowed to receive its full amount,
i.e., one hundred camels or the equivalent value, or whatever
amount is agreed upon by the both parties.3 However, they differ
over the issue of the amount of indemnity for a non-Muslim victim.
1 Mohamed S. El-Awa, Punishment in Islamic Law (Indianapolis: American Trust
Publications, 1993), p. 79.
2 According to some scholars, payment of indemnity is not considered to be a ruling that
protect objectives of ÌarËriyyÉt; rather, it protects objectives of ÍÉjiyÉt. Since this rule is
relevant to the protection of the life of non-Muslim minorities I have decided to discuss
it here regardless of its relevance to either category of objectives.
3However, there is difference of opinions among the Muslim jurists whether the
payment of blood money in the case of forgiveness from intentional killing is obligatory
or not. According to AbË ×anÊfah and MÉlik, it is not obligatory. However, if the
offender pays it satisfactorily, the guardian of the victim is allowed to receive it. On the
other hand, according to al-ShÉfiÑÊ and AÍmad ibn ×anbal, if the guardian of the victim
forgives the offender, the latter must pay the blood money to the former.
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According to MÉlik Ibn Anas, indemnity for the People of the Book
is one half of that of Muslims, and for Magians (majËs) it is eight
hundred dirham; whereas according to al-ShÉfiÑÊ, indemnity for the
People of the Book is one-third of that of the Muslims, and for
Magians it is eight hundred dirham. On the other hand, the ×anafÊ
School of Law maintains that the indemnity for all non-Muslim vic-
tims regardless of their religions should be equal to the that of Mus-
lim victims. Again, the researcher would like to maintain that con-
sidering the interest and objective of protecting the life of non-
Muslim minorities, and for the sake of justice, the ×anafÊ view
should be preferred in this regard.
3. Protection of Progeny and Its Implication for Non-Muslim Minorities
A third higher objective of the SharÊÑah is to protect the
progeny. In order to protect the progeny, Islam encourages mar-
riage. Thus, God says:
And if you have reason to fear that you might not act equitably to-
wards orphans, then marry from among [other] women such as are
lawful to you – [even] two, or three, or four: but if you have reason to
fear that you might not be able to treat them with equal fairness, then
[only] one. (Qur’an, 4:3)
On the other hand, Islam discourages its followers from di-
vorce. The Prophet thus says: “Divorce is the permissible thing
that God hates most.”1 Islam provides elaborated rules for both
marriage and divorce to regulate the matrimonial life of Muslims
which lead to maintain an important objective of the SharÊÑah, i.e.
comfortable and stable family life, which has very close relation-
ship with the higher objective of protecting progeny and offspring.
Many aspects of family life which are forbidden in Islam may
not be forbidden in other religions; rather, they are lawful for
them. Islam, however, does not interfere into these customary
family laws of the people of other religions. On the contrary, it al-
1 AbË DÉwËd SulaymÉn b. al-AshÑath al-SijistÉnÊ, Sunan AbÊ DÉwËd, edited by
Muhammad Abdulaziz al-Khalidi (Beirut: DÉr al-Kutub al-ÑIlmiyyah, 2010), “KitÉb al-
ÙalÉq”, ÍadÊth No. 2178, p. 347. See also WalÊ al-DÊn MuÍammad bin ÑAbd AllÉh al-
KhaÏÊb al-TabrÊzÊ, MishkÉt al-MaÎÉbÊÍ (Lahore: Maktaba’i Mustafa’i, n.d.), p. 283.
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lows them to follow their own customs. Being uncertain about
why the People of the Book were allowed to be different from
Muslims in terms of their social affairs, ÑUmar Ibn ÑAbd al-ÑAzÊz
asked al-×asan al-BaÎrÊ in a letter: “Why the righteous caliphs left
the people of the Book to continue to marry maÍÉrim (forbidden
women), drink alcohol and eat pork?”Al-×asan al-BaÎrÊ replied
that “they pay jizyah so that they would be left with whatever they
practise and believe. You should follow this precedent of the right-
eous caliphs, and avoid making innovations.”1
Furthermore, in order to preserve legitimate, pure and dignified
progeny, Islam forbids adultery and fornication. Thus, we read:
As for the adulteress and the adulterer flog each of them with hundred
stripes. (Qur’an, 24:2)
According to Muslim jurists, the punishment mentioned in
this verse is for fornication committed by unmarried people. The
punishment for adultery committed by married individuals is
stoning to death, which was instituted by the Prophet. A number
of authentic aÍÉdÊth have been transmitted to this effect. One of
them is:
The blood of a Muslim who confesses that there is no dei-
ty but God and that I am His Apostle, cannot be shed ex-
cept in three cases: life for life [in case of murder], a mar-
ried person who commits illegal sexual intercourse, and the
one who reverts from Islam (apostate) and leaves the
community of Muslims.2
Therefore, if a Muslim male commits fornication with a Mus-
lim female, and all the conditions are fulfilled, he and she should
be punished by one hundred lashes. On the other hand, if any
Muslim male commits adultery with a Muslim female he and she
are stoned to death. Likewise, Islam allows the people of the
book to implement their own rule regarding adultery, i.e. death by
stoning.
1 Abu al-AÑla Al-Mawdudi, ×uqËq Ahl al-Dhimmah fÊ al-Dawlah al-IslÉmiyyah (Jeddah: al-
DÉr al-SaÑËdiyyah li’l-Nashr wa’l-TawzÊÑ, n.d.), pp. 20-21; al-Ayid, ×uqËq Ghayr al-
MuslimÊn fÊ BilÉd al-IslÉm, p. 34.
2 ØaÍÊÍ al-BukhÉrÊ, “KitÉb al-DiyyÉt”, ÍadÊth No. 6878, p. 1185.
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Thus Islam encourages People of the Book to protect their
progeny by not committing this sin and by implementing the
punishment in the case of violation. Leading Muslim jurists of the
different schools have upheld two different views on the condi-
tion of being a Muslim, in order to inflict the punishment of
stoning to death for adultery. AbË ×anifah and MÉlik Ibn Anas
maintain that adulterer must be a Muslim in order to be punished
with stoning to death. On the other hand, AbË YËsuf of the
×anafÊ guild, al-ShÉfiÑÊ and AÍmad ibn ×anbal maintain that Islam
is not a condition for this punishment.1 The researcher maintains
that the second view for the people of the book should be given
preference because their religion has the same ruling of stoning to
death although they are not Muslims. However, for the people of
other religions, the punishment for adultery should be inflicted ac-
cording to the laws of their religious tradition and teachings.
4. Protection of Intellect and Its Implication for Non-Muslim Minorities
A fourth higher objective of the SharÊÑah is to protect intel-
lect. In order to protect this intellect, Islam encourages Muslims
to acquire knowledge. To some extent, it makes religious
knowledge obligatory for every Muslim. The Prophet says: “Seek-
ing knowledge is obligatory for every Muslim.”2 Likewise, Islam
has made deep understanding and expert knowledge of Islamic
teachings obligatory on some people, so that they teach and edu-
cate other fellow Muslims. God says:
With all this, it is not desirable that all of the believers take
the field [in time of war]. From within every group in their
midst, some shall refrain from going forth to war, and shall
devote themselves [instead] to acquiring a deeper
knowledge of the Faith, and [thus be able to] teach their
home-coming brethren, so that  these [too] might guard
1 Abd al-Qadir Auda, Al-TashrÊÑ al-JinÉ’Ê al-IslÉmÊ MuqÉranan bi al-QÉnËn al-WaÌÑÊ
(Beirut: Mu’assasat al-RisÉlah, 7th ed., 1986), Vol. 2, p. 393.
2 AbË al-×asan al-×anafÊ al-SindÊ, Sunan Ibn MÉjah bi-SharÍ al-SindÊ, ed. Khalil
Ma’moun Shiha (Beirut: DÉr al-MaÑrifah, 1416/1996), ‘KitÉb al-Sunnah’, hadÊth No.
224, Vol. 1, p. 146. The hadÊth has been transmitted by Ibn MÉjah on the authority of
the companion AbË Hurayrah.
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themselves against evil. (Qur’an, 9:122)
Moreover, knowledge of other disciplines is obligatory in Is-
lam for some Muslims.
In Islam, the door to knowledge is open for Muslims and
non-Muslims alike. Islamic history bears witness to the fact that
many non-Muslims were educated under the supervision and
guidance of Muslim scholars at higher institutions of learning in
Spain and Baghdad as it testifies to the opposite. Non-Muslim
students also were boarded and lodged in hostels at the cost of
the state.1
In order to protect and promote intellectual capacity, Islam
prohibits the consumption of intoxicating liquors. If any Muslim
commits this sin, and all relevant conditions are fulfilled, he or she is
punished by eighty lashes. However, this rule is not applicable to
non-Muslims. They can consume such substances and likewise they
are allowed to do business on them among themselves because their
religions do not forbid them to do so. However, in order to respect
the feelings of the Muslim majority and in order to protect them
from indulging into this sin, non-Muslims have to observe certain
rules, i.e., they are not allowed to drink liquor publicly and they are
also not permitted to trade in it with Muslims.
5. Protection of Wealth and Its Implication for Non-Muslim Minorities
A fifth higher objective of the SharÊÑah is to protect wealth.
Islam encourages Muslims to earn and collect wealth through
lawful means, such as business, employment, investment, etc.
Non-Muslim minorities living among Muslim majority are al-
lowed to do business unless they are not forbidden by Islam.
They are also allowed to be employees in Islamic government in-
stitutions. History bears witness that many non-Muslims under
Islamic caliphates were employed by successive governments in
different offices.2
In order to protect wealth from being stolen, Islam prescribes
1 Muhammad Marmaduke Pickthall, Cultural Side of Islam (Islamic Culture) (Lahore: Sh.
Muhammad Ashraf, 1979), pp. 91-92.
2 See Fahmi Huwaydi, MuwÉÏinËn lÉ DhimmiyyËn (Cairo: DÉr al-ShurËq, 1985), pp. 69-73.
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the punishment of the cutting of the hands of a thief. God says:
As for thief, male or female, cut off his or her hands: a punishment by
way of example, from Allah, for their crime. (Qur’an, 5:38)
This punishment is applicable for both Muslims and non-
Muslims because the verse does not qualify the thief with the condi-
tion of being a Muslim.1 On the other hand, if Islam is considered to
be a condition for inflicting this punishment injustice will be com-
mitted when a non-Muslim thief is exempted from it, but a Muslim
thief will not be exempted; rather, will be punished. Morever, theft is
forbidden by many religions and Judaism prescribes the same pun-
ishment of cutting off the hand for this crime. Therefore, this pun-
ishment should not be opposed by non-Muslim minorities. Thus
Islam protects wealth of Muslims and non-Muslims alike through
legislating this penalty and prescribing other rulings to this regard.
Concluding our reflections on the implications of the higher
SharÊÑah objectives for non-Muslim minorities, we may ascertain
that the Islamic system is the most suitable of all socio-political
systems to such minorities. This assertion is based on the fact that
what Islam recognizes and legislates for us rights of human beings
is not the result of mere political arrangement nor simply a matter
of practical expediency. Rather, what Islam considers as human
rights applying to Muslims and non-Muslims alike stems from its
worldview and is an embodiment of its fundamental values which
are grounded in its view of the original human nature and dignity
as fashioned by God Himself. Thus while many areas pertaining to
personal and life are left to be regulated according to non-
Muslims’ beliefs and traditions, those areas which come under the
preview of the SharÊÑah are dealt with according to the rules of
justice applying equally to Muslims and non-Muslims alike. This is
God’s decree to all who have subscribed to His message:
O you who have attained to faith! Be ever steadfast in your devotion to
God, bearing witness to the truth in all equity; and never let hatred of
anyone lead you into the sin of deviating from justice. Be just: this is
1 Muhammad Abu Hassan, AÍkÉm al-JarÊmah wa’l-ÑUqËba fÊ al-SharÊÑah al-IslÉmiyyah:
DirÉsah MuqÉranah (Al-Zarqa/Jordon: Maktabat al-ManÉr, 1987), p. 277.
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closest to being God-conscious. And remain conscious of God, God is
aware of al that you do. (Qur’an, 5:8)
Likewise, an Islamic state is not allowed to assimilate or eradi-
cate its non-Muslim minority citizens. Rather, it should allow them
to exist as independent communities with their own religion, cul-
ture, and customs. Thus, any non-Muslim living among Muslim
majority is considered to be a subject or citizen of the Islamic state
and he or she is also an active member of his or her own religious
community. This is way an Islamic state is considered to be a plu-
ralistic state.
A MaqÉÎid-based Overview of the Malaysian Law on Non-
Muslim Minorities
1. Protection of Religion and Freedom of Faith
According to the Malaysian Constitution, although Islam is
considered the country’s state religion, Malaysian Law does not
compel non-Muslim minorities to accept Islam. Rather, they are
free to continue with their own belief systems. Likewise, they are
free to worship according to their rituals in their churches and
other places of worship. In terms of establishing their new
churches or worshiping places, they are allowed to do so. Kuala
Lumpur city is a good example where many Hindu and Chinese
temples are highly visible in almost every corner.
2. Protection of Life
According to Malaysian Penal Code, intentional and illegal
homicide is forbidden. No doubt this law helps the protection of
life of both Muslims and non-Muslim minorities in this country.
This code also forbids hurting others. It states:
S. 323. Whoever, except in the case provided for by section
334, voluntarily causes hurt by means of any instrument
for shooting, stabbing or cutting, or any instrument which,
used as a weapon of offence, is likely to cause death,…
shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may
extend to three years, or with fine, or with whipping, or
Amanullah: THE SHARÔÑAH OBJECTIVES AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS… 199
with any two of such punishments.1
Every human being living in this country, whether he or she
is a Muslim or not, wants to be free from being hurt or being
threatened by anyone. The above clause helps to fulfill this objec-
tive. However, in its present formulation this clause does not
make clear distinction between those bodily hurts which are seri-
ous and those which are slight.2
In another clause, adding the phrase “grievous hurt,” this
penal code tries to make distinction between serious and slight
hurts. It indocates:
S. 326. Whoever, except in the case provided for by section
335, voluntarily causes grievous hurt by means of any in-
strument for shooting, stabbing or cutting, or any instru-
ment which, used as a weapon of offence, is likely to cause
death, …shall be punished with imprisonment for life, or
with imprisonment for a term which may extend to ten
years, and shall also be liable to fine or to caning.3
Beside the phrase “grievous hurt,” the mention of maximum
time of imprisonment, i.e. ten years or life time indicate that this
clause has been prepared for serious hurts. However, the ambigu-
ity still remains in terms of the criterion of serious or grievous
hurt because this last clause does not mention any amount of
hurt and also mentions instruments of same type that are found
in the previous clause. However, there is no doubt that this pun-
ishment will help to protect the safety of the life of both Muslims
and non-Muslims in this country.
3. Protection of Progeny
Marriage and divorce have an important role to preserve the
appropriate progeny, and to protect it from being damaged or
defective. In the past, i.e. the period that extends until February
1982, non-Muslim Chinese and Indians of Malaysia used to de-
pend mostly on their own customary family laws for the purpose
1 Koh Kheng Lian and Molly Cheang, The Penal Code of Singapore and Malaysia
(Singapore: QUINS PTE.  Ltd., 1976), p. 259.
2 Ibid, p. 260.
3 Ibid, p. 264.
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of their marriage and divorce. During this period, non-Muslims
especially women were unable to receive fair judgment for their
marriage and divorce related problems. Likewise, they had to face
the problem of polygamy, which was still recognized. However,
according to Dr. Zaleha Kamaruddin, on 1 March, 1982 when
the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act (LRA), 1976 came
into force, it introduced a social revolution for the non-Muslims.
According to her,
This act provides for monogamous marriage and consoli-
dates the law relating to divorce… Its provisions are appli-
cable generally to all non-Muslim persons domiciled in Ma-
laysia with the exception of any native of the States of East
Malaysia and aborigine of West Malaysia whose marriage
and divorce is governed by native customary law or aborigi-
nal custom.1
Following the commencement of LRA, a number of important
additions occurred. Firstly, registration of marriage became compul-
sory. Before this, it was not compulsory; rather, it was up to the
couple to register their marriage.2 Secondly, polygamy was abolished.
Thirdly, a minimum age of marriage was fixed at 18 years. Fourthly,
customary divorces were no more recognized and decree of divorce
can only be granted by a court of competent jurisdiction.3
Although LRA is considered to be in favour of non-Muslim
minorities of Malaysia, its implementation for Muslims should be
modified because to some extent this act goes against God’s clear
command allowing capable Muslims to marry up to four women,
as mentioned earlier. Likewise, Islam does not interfere with the
customary family laws of non-Muslims. Therefore, imposing
some rulings on non-Muslims which are against their customary
family laws is not permitted in Islam. Hence, there should be
provision of following the customary laws, if any non-Muslim
wants willingly to do so even if it goes against LRA.
1 Zaleha Kamaruddin, Divorce Laws in Malaysia: Civil and Shariah (Kelana Jaya: Malaysian
Law Journal Sdn Bhd, 2005), p. 62 & 64.
2 Ibid., p. 63.
3 Ibid., pp. 66-67.
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4. Protection of Intellect
In order to increase their knowledge, the Malaysian gov-
ernment allows non-Muslim minorities to establish their own
schools. Likewise, they are allowed to enter all higher learning
institutions of this country including International Islamic
University Malaysia to receive their higher education. Addi-
tionally, they are allowed to contribute in the field of
knowledge by being members of teaching staff and researchers
in the universities.
In order to protect their intellect, Muslims are not allowed
to drink intoxicating liquors. However, this rule is not applicable
for non-Muslim minorities of this country. They can drink these
liquors but they should not do it publicly.
5. Protection of Wealth and Property
In order to increase their wealth, non-Muslims in Malaysia,
like Muslims, are allowed to earn money through lawful businesses,
employment, investments, etc. They are even allowed to invest
their money through Islamic investment institutions. Additionally,
they are also allowed to be government employees and members
of the parliament. In terms of protecting public and private wealth,
although Malaysian government does not implement the SharÊÑah
punishment for theft, it has some man-made laws that are benefi-
cial for both Muslims and non-Muslims alike. Thus, the first clause
of S. 403 of the Malaysian Penal Code stipulates that, “Whoever
dishonestly misappropriates or converts to his own use movable
property, shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which
may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.”1
Another clause: S.408 concerning breach of trust, stipulates that,
Whoever, being a clerk or servant, or employed as a clerk or servant,
and being in any manner entrusted in such capacity with property, or
with any dominion over property, commits criminal breach of trust in
respect of that property, shall be punished with imprisonment for a term
which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.2
1 Lian and Cheang, The Penal Codes of Singapore and Malaysia, p. 354.
2 Ibid., p. 362.
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This rule is applicable to both Muslims and non-Muslims. Both
groups can get benefit out of it when they appoint anyone in their
offices and find him or her guilty of breach of trust. Likewise, indi-
viduals from both groups are liable to the same punishments men-
tioned above, when committing such a crime.
Concluding this section, the researcher would like to point out
that, with only a few exceptions, the Malaysian law is in favour of
non-Muslim minorities in most of the aspects discussed above.
However, the Internal Security Act (ISA), itself a legacy of the Brit-
ish colonial rule based on the British Internal Security Act, has been
subject on increasing criticism by different quarters in Malaysia. Pro-
cedures before and following the arrest of anyone under this act
have been criticized by many observers locally and internationally.1
To some extent, these procedures stand against the personal
safety and security and comfort of individuals arrested under it and
their family members, which is considered to be one of the basic
objectives of Islamic SharÊÑah. On the other hand, we should appre-
ciate the Malaysian government that at least this act was not utilized
against individuals because of their affiliation with religions other
than Islam. Accordingly, it is not appropriate to say that this act was
utilized against non-Muslim minorities of this country because prac-
tically it had been utilized against both Muslims and non-Muslims
alike when the government needed to do so. However, responding
to public criticism, Malaysian government has abolished ISA and
replaced it by another modified version of act which is considered to
be better than ISA.
Conclusion
At the end of this chapter, we would like to reiterate the follow-
ing points.
1. Muslim jurists have different views on whether a Muslim
is justly killed if he intentionally and illegally kills a non-Muslim.
1 See Kehma-s, The Rule of Law and Human Rights in Malaysia and Singapore, A Report of
the Conference held at the European Parliament, 9 & 10 March 1989, organized by:
Kehma-s (The European Committee for Human Rights in Malaysia and Singapore) and
The Rainbow Group, European Parliament.
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The majority of jurists maintain that this Muslim offender should
not be killed. On the other hand, ×anafÊ jurists maintain that this
Muslim must be killed. Considering the public interest, justice,
and equal system of maintaining the higher objective of protect-
ing life for Muslims and non-Muslim minorities alike, the re-
searcher prefers the view of ×anafÊ School.
2. Likewise, Muslim jurists differ on whether a non-Muslim
victim is allowed to receive full blood money like Muslims or not.
By and large, majority of jurists maintain that a non-Muslim vic-
tim is not allowed to receive full blood money, while ×anafÊ ju-
rists maintain that he should receive full blood money. Again the
researcher prefers the ×anafÊ view, in order to preserve the public
interest, justice and the higher objective of protecting life equally
for both Muslims and non-Muslim minorities.
3. Moreover, Muslim jurists have different views on whether
Islam is a condition for inflicting the punishment of stoning to
death for adultery. AbË ×anÊfah and MÉlik ibn Anas maintain
that it is a condition, while AbË YËsuf of the ×anafÊ guild, al-
ShÉfiÑÊ and AÍmad ibn ×anbal maintain that it is not a condition.
The researcher prefers the second view for the People of Book
because their law also prescribes the same punishment for main-
taining the higher objective of protecting the proper progeny for
them. However, for maintaining the higher objective of protect-
ing proper progeny for non-Muslims other than the People of the
Book, their own customary laws should be applied for this sin.
4. Under the Islamic system non-Muslim minorities can receive
dealings and treatments from an Islamic government, which are
considered to be far better than that of modern secular system,
which is headed by the USA. Under an Islamic state, non-Muslims
can be members of two different entities, i.e. members of their own
religious communities and subjects or citizens of the state so that
they will be able to maintain a dignified and just life in a majority
Muslim country by establishing all the higher objectives for them.
5. By and large, non-Muslim minorities in Malaysia are able to
receive their proper rights to protect all the higher objectives that are
necessary for their dignified and just survival in this country.
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The researcher would like to make the following suggestions:
1. Malaysia government is requested to review its LRA 1982
for the purpose of implementing it for Muslims because to some
extent it goes against the Qur’an. Likewise, to some extent, it
goes against the Islamic policy of not interfering into the custom-
ary family laws of the people of other religions.
2. An amendment should be made to remove ambiguity
from the clause no. S. 324 on “hurt” and clause no. S. 326 on
“grievous hurt” of the Penal Code of Malaysia because these
clauses do not specify the amount of hurt for anyone of them.
CHAPTER 9
“Living in Hell”: A Comparative Analysis of
Domestic Violence against Women in Muslim
Minority Communities in the US and UK
Zaleha Kamaruddin
Introduction
Domestic violence is one of the numerous forms of violence against
women that have been identified worldwide.1 The United Nations
defined the term “violence against women” in a 1993 declaration as
“any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result
in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women,
including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of
liberty, whether occurring in public or private life.”2 The declaration
further notes that violence against women can occur within the fam-
ily or within the general community. And that it may be condoned
or perpetrated by government officials.3 Having included domestic
violence as a form of violence against women, the United Nations
further explained that,
The term ‘domestic violence’ is used to describe actions and
 The author would like to acknowledge the contribution of Bro. R. K. Salman to Part
One of the research project on which this chapter has been based.
1 Johanna Bond & Robin Phillips, “Violence against Women as a Human Rights
Violation: International Institutional Responses”, in Claire M. Renzetti et al. (eds.),
Sourcebook on Violence Against Women (London: Sage Publications, 2001), pp. 481- 482.
2 Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women, G.A. Res. 48/104, U.N. GAOR,
48th Sess., art. 1, Supp. No. 49, at 217, UN Doc. A/48/49 (1993).
3 Ibid, Article 2.
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omissions that occur in varying relationships. The term is
used narrowly to cover incidents of physical attack, when it
may take the form of physical and sexual violations... The
result of such physical violence can range from bruising to
killing; what may often start out as apparently minor attacks
can escalate both in intensity and frequency (...) ‘Domestic
violence’ ... [also] includes psychological or mental violence,
which can consist of repeated verbal abuse, harassment,
confinement and deprivation of physical, financial and per-
sonal resources.1
Domestic violence has also been defined as “violence that
occurs within the private sphere, generally between individuals
who are related through intimacy, blood or law ... It is nearly al-
ways a gender-specific crime, perpetrated by men against wom-
en.”2 It is distinguished from other forms of gender violence by the
context in which it occurs (the domestic or private sphere) and the
relationship between perpetrators and victims (familial). When vio-
lence occurs within the context of the family, it raises questions
about the laws and legal administration of family relations.3 Ela
Gridinic has highlighted that “gender-based violence”, such as do-
mestic violence which involves some form of physical assault or in-
trusion. As a result, these forms of violence inherently violate the
rights, physical integrity and security of the person4 and are preva-
lent in almost all parts of the globe.5
The pervasiveness of impunity is evident in the fact that do-
mestic violence is reported as “common” in almost all countries,
1 United Nations Office at Vienna, Centre for Social Development and Humanitarian
Affairs, Strategies for Confronting Domestic Violence: A Resource Manual 6 (1993).
2 Coomaraswamy, Radhika. “Further Promotion and Encouragement of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms for Women,” Report to the UN Commission on
Human Rights. E/CN.4/1996, p. 35
3 Lisa Hajjar, “Religion, State Power, and Domestic Violence in Muslim Societies: A
Framework for Comparative Analysis” Law and Social Inquiry, Vol. 29, No. 1 (2004), p. 2.
4 Ela Gridinic “Application of the Elements of Torture and Other Forms of Ill-
Treatment, as Defined by the European Court and Commission of Human Rights, to
the Incidents of Domestic Violence” 23 Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 217, 232 (2000).
5 Andreea Vesa, “International and Regional Standards for Protection of Domestic
Violence,” American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy and Law, Vol. 12, No. 2
(2004), p. 5.
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although estimated rates vary.1 Impunity suggests a reluctance or
resistance to recognizing and dealing with intra-family violence as
violence. This assertion is buttressed by the UNFPA reports, that
worldwide, one in three women has been beaten, coerced into
unwanted sexual relations, or abused - often by a family member
or acquaintance. The report further states that at the start of the
21st century, violence kills and harms as many women and girls
between the ages of 15 and 44 as cancer. The costs to countries -
in increased health care expenditures, demands on courts, police
and schools and losses in educational achievement and productiv-
ity - are enormous. In the United States alone, the figure adds up
to some $ 12.6 billion each year.2
It is interesting to note that a common type of violence is
family violence. The reason for this violence is remotely connect-
ed with the culture, poverty, religion and lack of adequate laws to
protect women.3 The questions which readily come to mind are:
Is intra-family violence legally permitted or prohibited? In prac-
tice, is it tolerated or penalized by the authorities? Are civil reme-
dies available to victims? In contexts where intra-family violence
is not prohibited by law (i.e. criminalized), perpetrators enjoy le-
gal impunity. In contexts where it is prohibited but the laws are
not enforced, perpetrators enjoy social impunity. 4
The Vienna World Conference on Human Rights in 1993
marked the culmination of a long struggle to secure international
recognition of women’s rights as human rights. It was a turning
point for both the international women’s rights movement and
the human rights movement. The final document that emerged
from Vienna acknowledged that, partly as a result of the artificial
line drawn between the public and private sphere, certain gender-
1 Joni Seager, The State of Women in the World Atlas (London: Penguin Books, 1999), p. 29.
The few countries where domestic violence is not reported as “common” include Cote
D’Ivoire, Djibouti, Laos, Madagascar, and the Maldives.
2 UNFPA, State of World Population 2005, The Promise of Equality: Gender Equity, Reproduc-
tive Health, and the Millennium Development Goals 5 (2005).
3 Vesa, “International and Regional Standards for Protection of Domestic Violence.”
4 Celina Romany, Women as Aliens: A Feminist Critique of the Public/Private Distinction in Interna-
tional Human Rights Law, 1993, 6 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 87
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specific issues had been left out of the human rights arena.1 Gov-
ernments around the world acknowledged that women, too, were
entitled to enjoy fundamental rights. These include full and equal
participation in political, civil, economic, social, and cultural life at
the national, regional, and international level.2 In addition, the
document brought about a significant change in human rights
law: the recognition of women’s human rights in the private
sphere.3 A broad spectrum of harms occurring in the sphere of
the family was rendered open to human rights scrutiny.4 The
document challenged the public/private distinction along which
human rights had traditionally operated and increased awareness
of the fact that power operates in multiple arenas.
The women’s rights movement at the international and regional
levels and the official recognition of women’s rights appear to have
focused primarily on the issue of violence against women and their
victimization in this context. Immediately after the Vienna confer-
ence, the UN General Assembly passed a Declaration on Violence
Against Women.5 The declaration stated that it would strengthen and
complement the process of effective implementation of the Conven-
tion on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
(CEDAW). It recognized that violence against women “is a manifes-
tation of historically unequal power relations between men and
women, which have led to domination over and discrimination
against women.” It reiterated the consensus reached at Vienna: that
violence against women covers “gender-based violence... whether is
1 Ibid.
2 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, United Nations World Conference on Human Rights,
U.N. GAOR, at 25, U.N. Doc. A/CONF/157/23, (1993)
3 Part 1 Article 18 Vienna Declaration states: “The human rights of women and of the
girl-child are an inalienable, integral and indivisible part of universal human rights. The
full and equal participation of women in political, civil, economic, social and cultural life,
at the national, regional and international levels, and the eradication of all forms of dis-
crimination on grounds of sex are priority objectives of the international community.”
4 Part 2, Article 38, the Vienna Declaration.
5 The Declaration also set the basis for the appointment of a U.N. Special Rapporteur on
Violence against Women to cover aspects of violence against women, including its causes
and consequences. Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women, G.A. Res. 104,
U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., 85th Plenary Meeting, Supp. No. 49, at 217-19, U.N. Doc.
A/48/49 (1993).
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occurring in public or in private life.”1 Subsequent to this, Dr.
Radhika Coomaraswamy was appointed in 1994 as the UN Special
Rapporteur on Violence Against Women2 and since then, she has
submitted a series of annual reports to the UN General Assembly
addressing the issue of violence against women.3
Consequently, the focus on violence against women has had
some extremely important and beneficial consequences for wom-
en. The women’s human rights movement drew attention to the
lack of domestic governmental response to women’s demands
for more effective rape laws, laws against child sexual abuse, and
domestic violence laws. The violence against women campaign
has been overwhelmingly successful in translating very specific
violations experienced by individual women into a more general
human rights discourse.4
In 1995, the United Nations Fourth World Conference on
Women held in Beijing proposed a platform for action,5 which
1 Ibid, p. 217 Under Article 2: violence against women includes violence in the family,
marital rape, female genital mutilation, and other “traditional” practices that are harmful
to women. It also covers similar violence in the community, including harassment at
work and violence perpetrated or condoned by the state, wherever it occurs.
2 The United Nations Economic and Social Council endorsed the resolution of UN
Commission on Human Rights to appoint a special Rapporteur  on violence against
women for a three-year term. U.N. ESCOR, 42d plen. mtg., U.N. Doc.
E/DEC/1994/254 (1994)
3 These reports include Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, Its Causes and
Consequences, U.N. ESCOR Hum. Rts. Comm., 53d Sess., Provisional Agenda Item 9(a),
E/CN.4/1997/47 (1997) (concerning violence in the community); Report of the Special Rap-
porteur on Violence Against Women, Its Causes and Consequences, U.N. ESCOR Hum. Rts.
Comm., 54th Sess., Provisional Agenda, Item 9(a), E/CN.4/1998/54 (1998) (concerning
violence against women as perpetrated and/or condoned by the state); Report of the Special
Rapporteur on Violence against Women, Its Causes and Consequences, U.N. ESCOR Human Rights
Commission, 55th Sess., Provisional Agenda, Item 12(a), E/CN.4/1999/68/Add.3 (1999)
(concerning violence against women in the family); Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence
Against Women, Its Causes and Consequences, U.N. ESCOR Hum. Rts. Comm., 56th Sess.,
Provisional Agenda Item 12(a), E/CN.4/2000/68 (2000) (concerning trafficking in wom-
en, women’s migration, and violence against women).
4 The campaign on reproductive rights has also acquired a certain degree of visibility.
However, it has not translated into effective policies or actions by state parties. See U.N.
Report of the International Conference on Population and Development, UN, GAOR, 49th Sess., UN
Doc. A/CONF/171/13 (1994).
5 Report of the fourth World Conference on Women, Beijing, 4-15 September 1995 Annex
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was adopted by its member countries to have its own monitoring
and implementation review process through the Commission on
the Status of Women. It was designated by the Economic and
Social Council following the Beijing Conference to have “a cen-
tral role in the monitoring of the implementation of the Platform
for Action.”1 This central role includes the authority to “assist the
Economic and Social Council in monitoring, reviewing and ap-
praising progress achieved and problems encountered in the im-
plementation of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action
at all levels,” and to advise the Council thereon.2
Specifically, the Beijing Platform for Action called on member
states of the United Nations to draw up national action plans to im-
prove the promotion and protection of women’s rights and to cre-
ate an institutional framework for implementation of the commit-
ments made in the Platform for Action.3 These “national machiner-
ies” were to be established “at the highest political level” with ap-
propriate staffing and a broad mandate.4 The Platform for Action
has given new impetus to the reform of violence against women
laws and the implementation of CEDAW.5
The international dimension it takes to address domestic vio-
lence against women and other forms of discrimination is a
pointer to the fact that domestic violence is a global problem.
The World Health Organization (WHO) in 2006 concluded that
domestic violence against women is universal and pervasive.6 In
nex III, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.177/20/Rev.1, U.N. Sales No. 96.IV.13 (1996)
1 G.A. Res. 203, U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., Supp. No. 49, P 25, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/50/203 (1995)
2 Report of the Economic and Social Council for the Year 1996, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp.
No. 3, at 98, U.N. Doc. A/51/3/Rev.1 (1997).
3 Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, in 1 Report of the Fourth World Conference
on Women, Beijing, 4-15 September, 1995, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.177/20/REV.1,
U.N. Sales No. 96.IV.13 (1996) [hereinafter Platform for Action] p. 230
4 Jessica Neuwirth, “Inequality Before the Law: Holding States Accountable for Sex
Discriminatory Laws Under the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Dis-
crimination Against Women and Through the Beijing Platform for Action” Spring
2005, 18, The Harvard Human Rights Journal, p. 8
5 Ibid.
6 World Health Organisation (WHO), The WHO Multi-country Study on Women’s
Health and Domestic Violence Against Women vii (2005), available at
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fifteen nations studied by WHO, fifteen percent to seventy-one
percent of women in intimate relationships reported having been
physically assaulted by an intimate male partner.1
All the above information serves generally as a background
to defining and understanding the problem and the long struggle
to secure international recognition of women’s rights as human
rights and commitment made by international bodies to reduce if
not eliminate problems relating to violence against women re-
gardless of their religion. Domestic violence is acknowledged at
national, regional and international level as a deeply rooted prob-
lem that exists in every country in the world and its consequences
are devastating to women and society.
In the context of this research project, since Islam abhors vi-
olence and women are to be regarded as amanah, special focus
especially those living in non Muslim communities need to be
made. One of the reasons for it is, although Muslim leaders have
acknowledged that domestic violence exists, the breath and depth
of this problem in the context of Muslim minorities in non-
Muslim societies has never been analyzed in detail. Inadequate
data on violence occuring in these communities further impede
informed policymaking and analysis.
Islam should not only be seen as upholding justice but ensur-
ing that justice is done. Although there exists gap between Islamic
theories and general Muslim practices, the same Muslim commu-
nity which should serve as a safety haven for women, should not
be seen as a breeding ground for such violence. The most effec-
tive approach to solve the problem is, its existence needs to be
acknowledged away from the private domain. It should be treated
in the public sphere so that it will not remain to be accepted as
part of a cultural norm of that community.
Using this approach, the following two sections will survey
data relating to domestic violence and its prevalence in the United
http://www.who.int/gender/violence/who multicountry study/summary report/en/ Last visited on
28 April, 2009.
1 Valorie K. Vojdik, “Conceptualizing Intimate Violence and Gender Equality: a
Comparative Approach,” January, 2008, Fordham Int’l L. J.487, p. 10.
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States and the UK. Specific focus on Muslim women could not
be made due to the disaggregated data in both countries. Howev-
er, some common trends could be identified and specific patterns
of violence have emerged from those informations which will be
discussed subsequently in the analysis of causes of domestic vio-
lence in those communities.
Domestic Violence in the USA
1. Nature and Extent
Domestic violence is a serious problem that cuts across all
background. Researches show that in the United States, as many as
four million women are assaulted severely by male partners in aver-
age 12-month period, and nearly one-eighth of the husbands carry
out one or more acts of physical aggression against their wives.1
Moreover, more than half of women on welfare in the United States
are current or past victims of domestic violence.2 In the United
States, one in every four women experiences domestic violence in
her life.3 An estimated 1.3 million women are victims of physical
assault by an intimate partner each year. The majority of these family
victims are female and the abuse inflicted by their spouse.4 By state
statistic, in 2006 there were 49,980 reported cases of domestic vio-
lence in Washington. While 2,672 cases of forcible rape were report-
ed in Washington in 2005.5 It is reported that 16 children were killed
in Washington between June 2006 and January 2007 as a result of
domestic violence. And in 2006, 47% of domestic violence homi-
cides occurred after the victim had left, divorced, separated or was
1 Murray A. Strause & Richard J. Gelles, Physical Violence in American Families: Risk
Factors and Adaptations to Violence in 8,145 Families (New Brunswick: Transaction
Publishers, 1990), p. 12.
2 K. Rogers, “Violence Puts Women on the Welfare Track,” The New York Time, June
4, 1996, p. 10.
3 Patricia Tajden & Nancy Thoennes, Extent, Nature and Consequences of Intimate Partner
Violence, Research Report (Washington DC: U.S. Department of Justice, 2000), p. iii.
4 U. S. Department of Justice, “Family Violence Statistic,” Bureau of Justice Statistic,
June 2005.
5 Washington Association of Sheriffs and Police Chiefs, “Crime in Washington Annual
Report,” 2006.
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planning on breaking up with the abuser.1
In Washington, the cost of intimate partner violence exceeds
“$5.8 billion each year, $4.1 billion of which is for direct medical
and mental health services.”2 As is the case in most states, Wash-
ington State would require increased funding and shelter pro-
gramme in order to adequately meet the emergency shelter need-
ed for all domestic victims. Washington’s domestic violence pro-
grammes currently do not provide chemical dependency treat-
ment to domestic violence survivors and Washington Coalition
against Domestic Violence is advocating for the creation of these
programmes to better serve victims.3
The situation is not different in New Mexico. There are 26,940
domestic violence incidents reported to law enforcement authorities
in New Mexico in 2004, a rate of 15.3 per 1,000 persons.4 75% of
the 17,793 victims of domestic violence identified in 2004 were
women and their abusers were their spouses.5 New Mexico recorded
ed 36 homicides as a result of domestic violence in 2004. As of
2003, New Mexico was ranked 3rd in the country for incidents of
domestic violence. Interestingly, the rank dropped to 9th in the na-
tion for highest prevalence of domestic violence.6 Although intimate
mate partner violence affects members of all races, rates of fatal in-
timate partner violence are high among African American
Asian/Pacific American than among Anglo or Hispanic women.7
Domestic violence in Alabama is also high. In 2005, there
1 Washington Coalition Against Domestic Violence (WCADV), “Washington State
Domestic Violence Fatality Review,” December 2006.
2 Department of Health and Human Services et al, Costs of Intimate Partner Violence Against
Women in the United States (Atlanta, GA, March 2003), p. 2.
3 Washington Coalition Against Domestic Violence (WCADV), “Washington State
Domestic Violence Fatality Review,” December 2006.
4 Caponera Betty, “Incidence and Nature of Domestic Violence in New Mexico: An
Analysis of 2004 Data from the New Mexico Interpersonal Data Central Repository,”
New Mexico Coalition Domestic Violence,” http://www.health.state.nm.us/finalreport
(visited on May 6, 2009).
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
7 New Mexico Injury Data Book 2004, http://www.uwcnm.org/information/domesticviolence.htp,
visited on May 6, 2009.
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were 26,051 domestic assault and 1,564 forcible rapes committed.
There were 27 homicides due to domestic violence in 2005.1 It is
reported that there were 57,176 shelters night provided for adults
and children in Alabama Shelters in fiscal year 2006. Again, on
one day in November 2006, Alabama Shelter Programme report-
ed that 5,157 requests for victims’ services from adult and chil-
dren went unmet due to a lack of resources.2
The situation is the same in the state of Delaware. This is be-
cause, in 2003, there were 27,776 criminal and non-criminal do-
mestic violence incidents. There were 16,921 criminal domestic
violence incidents.3 In 2003, Delaware Family Courts processed
2,967 Protection from Abuse Petitions and issued 2,851 orders.
In the same token, 147 cases were returned to Family Courts on a
charge of Civil Contempt of a Protection from Abuse Petition.
Civil contempt orders were entered in 62 of those cases.4 In 2002,
2002, 19 women died as a result of domestic violence. In 3 of
those cases, children witnessed the murder of their mother.5 The
story is the same in almost all other states of the United States. It
is, however, sad to note that on the aggregate, more than seventy-
five per cent of the minority Muslim women experience domestic
violence from their minority Muslim husbands.6 The question
then is, who are these minority Muslim women?
2. Muslim Minority Women in US
Muslims (men and women) are all over United States: majori-
ty of these Muslims are the African Americans and South/
Southeast Asia immigrants. At this juncture it is important to un-
derstand their background (to know the origin of and why this
1Alabama Coalition Against Domestic Violence, ACADV Annual Report 2007, at
http://www.acadv.org/acadvreport, visited on 6 May, 2009.
2 Ibid.
3 Domestic Violence Coordinating Council 2004 Annual Report, www.dvcc.state.de.us, (visited on
may 6, 2009).
4 Ibid.
5Domestic Violence Coordinating Council, 2004 Fatal Incident Review Report, available at
www.dvcc_state.de.us/documents/2004_FIRT, visited on May 6, 2009.
6 See Strause & Gelles, Physical Violence in American Families.
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group is predominantly Muslims) so that we could appreciate the
problems that they are facing.
African Americans
Africans or Black Americans make up approximately 12% of
the total US population and constitute its largest racial minority.
Although largely descendants of tribes along the West coast of
Africa, many also have American Indian and European ancestry.1
Unlike other immigrants, African Americans entered the United
States via the slave trade. Their 200 year history of enslavement
was characterized by forced separation of families, beatings, loss
of language, and alienation of culture.2 Following slavery, discrim-
ination took the form of de facto segregation.3 Substantial socie-
tal gains have been made; nevertheless, Blacks have not achieved
economic, employment, and educational parity with Anglo Amer-
icans. For example, one in three African Americans currently
lives in poverty.4 Despite social and economic injustices, African
American families have developed cultural strengths and coping
strategies including, adaptability of family roles; strong kinship
bonds; emphasis on work, education, and achievement; religious
values; and a humanistic belief system that stresses concern for
others and spontaneous interactions.5
On the whole, approximately 30 percent to 40 percent of
Muslims in the United States are African Americans, making Af-
rican Americans the largest single cultural group in the Islamic
1Carolyn M. West, Partner Violence in Ethnic Minority Families, (New Hampshire: Family
Research Laboratory, University of New Hampshire, 2000), p. 1.
2 Ibid, p. 2.
3 W. R. Hammond, & B. R. Yung, “African Americans,” in L. D. Eron & J. H. Gentry
(eds) Reason to hope: A psychological Perspective on Violence and Youth (Washington DC: American
Psychological Association, 1987), p. 138.
4 US Bureau of the Census, “Statistical Abstract of the United States,” Washington
DC, 1992.
5 B. Greene, “African-American Women,” in L. Comas-Diaz & B. Greene (eds.),
Women of colour: Integrating Ethnic and Gender Identities in Psychotherapy (New York: Guil-
ford Press, 1994), p. 12.
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community.1 Although the ‘Nation of Islam’, headed by Louis
Farrakhan, is often portrayed in the media as representative of
black Muslims, it speaks for only a small portion of African
American Muslims. The ‘Nation of Islam’ is widely considered
by other Muslims to be outside the bounds of mainstream Islam
and has an estimated membership of 10,000 to 50,000.2 Almost
all African American Muslims are mainstream Sunnis.3
Asian Americans
Asian/Pacific Island Americans represent 2.9% (7.27 million)
of the total U.S. population. There are three predominant Asian
groups residing in the United States. The first group can trace its
origins to mainland Asiatic culture (Chinese, Vietnamese, Japanese,
and Koreans) and the second to Southeast Asia (Filipinos, Indone-
sians, Malaysians, Cambodians, and Laotians). While the third
group, Pacific Islanders (Hawaiians, Samoans, and Guamanians),
are considered “natives” rather than immigrants.4 The experience
of Asian Americans differs greatly by immigration and generational
status. Immigrant-descendent families, such as Chinese, Japanese,
and Korean Americans, can trace up to four or more generations
in US. In general these groups are highly acculturated, that is, they
have adopted the norms and behaviours of U.S. society. Immigrant
American families, in which the parents are foreign born and the
children are American born, sometimes experience cultural and
generational conflicts as the family tries to manage both traditional
and new norms and values. Nevertheless, these families are often
able to pool their resources and achieve relatively high levels of
educational and economic success.5 Due to the prosperity of these
1 P. Scott Richards, & Allen E. Bergin, A Spiritual Strategy for Counseling and Psychotherapy
(Washington DC: American Psychological Association, 1997), p. 22.  See also Jane .I. Smith,
Islam in America (New York: Colombia University Press, 1999).
2 Jonah Blank, “The Muslim Mainstream,” U.S. News, 20/7/98, www.jannah.org/articles/usnews.html.
3 J. Gordon Melton et al., The Melron’s Encyclopedia of American Religions (Farmington Hills,
MI: Gale, Cengage Learning, 8th ed., 2009), pp. 950-952.
4 A. Okamura et al., “Asian, Pacific Island, and Filipino Americans and Sexual Child
Abuse” in Lisa Aronson Fontes (ed.) Sexual Abuse in Nine North American Cultures:
Treatment and Prevention (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publicationas, 1995), p. 70.
5 Ibid.
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two family constellations, Asians have been dubbed “model minor-
ities.” This stereotype minimizes the poverty that exists among
other Asian American groups, which is almost twice the rate for
Anglos, with recently arrived immigrant/refugee families being
most impoverished. Despite their diverse backgrounds, as a group
Asians emphasize family loyalty, responsibility, respect, and coop-
eration.1
Of all Asian groups in America, the South Asian is unique. This
is because; this group has the highest number of Muslims.2 Since
1965, with changes in the US immigration laws, the number of Mus-
lim immigrants from South Asia has been steadily increasing. Mus-
lim immigrants from South Asia bring with them very strong cultur-
al and religious beliefs. Islam plays a very important and positive role
in the lives of South Asian Muslim immigrants. South Asia includes
the countries of Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, and
Bhutan. Seventy-five percent of all South Asian people live in India,
10% in Pakistan, 11% in Bangladesh, and the remaining 3% in the
countries of Bhutan, Nepal, and Sri Lanka.3 Numerous Islamic Cen-
tres have been established in America by this group. These centres
act as religious and community centres to meet the growing com-
munity’s needs.4
People from the South Asian countries have been immigrat-
ing to the United States since 1875. In the earlier years their
numbers were small, they came in search of better economic
conditions. Most were labourers, uneducated and unskilled work-
ers. In 1965, the US immigration laws were changed to accom-
modate the needs of the market and the immigrants’ ability to
suit the job market. This change in the immigration laws led to an
increase in the number of South Asian immigrants to the United
States. The new immigrants were mostly educated and fluent in
English. They came not just to make money and return to their
1 Carolyn, Partner Violence, p. 2.
2 Ruksana Ayyub, “Domestic Violence in the South Asian Muslim Immigration in the
United States,” Journal of Social Distress and the Homeless, Vol. 9, No. 3 (2000), p. 237.
3 W. D. Jacob, World Book Encyclopaedia (London:  World Book Inc., 1999), p. 279.
4 Haddad, The Muslim World Today, p. 12.
THE QUESTION OF MINORITIES IN ISLAM218
countries, but also to establish themselves in America and to par-
ticipate in the American dream.1 The majority of South Asians
from Pakistan and Bangladesh are Muslims. Immigrants from In-
dia, Sri Lanka, Bhutan, and Nepal, on the other hand are Hindus,
Buddhists, Christians, or Muslims.
Although most major cities have Muslim populations, the
largest concentrations are in New York City, Los Angeles, Chica-
go, Houston, Boston, and the Detroit-Toledo corridor.2 Whereas
almost every state has a Muslim population of some size, there is
particularly heavy concentration in California and New York,
with roughly a quarter of Muslims living in the former state and a
fifth living in the latter.3 Excluding African Americans, it is esti-
mated that some 75 percent of adult Muslims in the United States
are foreign born.4 Changes in immigration policies in the 1960s
placed an emphasis on the needs of the labour market, resulting
in a substantial increase in immigration. Although recent immi-
grants originate from diverse regions around the globe, most have
come from Middle East/North Africa and South/Southeast Asia,
where Muslims predominate. The combination of these groupe
formed a Muslim community in United States with basic values
and common features.
Community is a fundamental Islamic value.5 Rooted in the
belief that all people are equal before God, Muslims tend to em-
phasize benevolence, care for others, cooperation among individ-
uals, empathy, equality and justice between people, the im-
1 See Judy Galens & Rudolph J. Vecoli et al., Gale Encyclopaedia of Multicultural America
(New York: Gale Group, 1995).
2 M. F. Denny, “Islam in the Americas,” in Jhon L. Esposito (ed.), The Oxford Encyclopae-
dia of the Modern Islamic world (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), Vol. 2, p. 298.
3 Barry A. Kosmin & Seymour P. Lachman, One Nation under God (New York. Harmo-
ny Books, 1993), p. 70.
4 Yvone Yazbeck Haddad, “Make Room for the Muslims,” in Walter H. Conser Jr &
Summer B. Twiss (eds.), Religious diversity and American Religious History (Athens: Univer-
sity of Georgia Press, 1997), p. 231.
5 Alphonso W. Haynes, Mohamed M.I. Eweiss, Lobna M. Abdel Mageed & Douglas
K. Chung, “Islamic Social Transformation: Considerations for the Social Worker”,
International Social Work, Vol. 40, No. 3, 1997, p. 265.
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portance of social support, and positive human relatedness.1 Rela-
tionships are usually based on the principle of consultation, and
the welfare of the community, the ummah, is to be safeguarded
by all. A relationship is generally understood to exist between in-
dividual freedom and the community’s responsibility to the indi-
vidual. In other words, individual freedom is circumscribed so as
not to harm other members of the community, for it is this
community that protects and empower the individual.2 Thus,
Western individualistic values, such as personal success, self actu-
alization, self-reliance, and personal autonomy, hold somewhat
less attraction for Muslims, who tend to find meaning in group
success, community development, interdependence, and consen-
sus. Byng’s qualitative research with African American women
revealed the significance of the ummah for Muslims. These wom-
en, largely converts to Islam, reported finding a “safe social
space” from the racial, gender, and religious inequalities they ex-
perienced in the larger culture. The community mediated the dis-
crimination they experienced by providing a resource for con-
structing a salutary internal self-definition, essentially empowering
them to “transform their life, identity, and consciousness.”3
The basic social unit for Muslims is the family.4 However,
“family” is often conceptualized broadly to include relatives or
even the whole Islamic community. It is the family, most specifi-
cally the husband and wife that is understood to be responsible
for reproducing spiritual and social values. Thus, family, both nu-
clear and extended, is essential to the spiritual and social health of
the broader ummah.5 Marriage, rather than a joining of two indi-
1 Eugene W. Kelly, Aany Aridi, & Laleh Bakhtiar, “Muslims in the United States: An
exploratory study of universal and Mental Health Values,” Counselling and Value, Vol.
40, No. 3, 1996, p. 210.
2 Mumtaz F. Jafari, “Counselling, Values and Objectives: A Comparison of Western
and Islamic Perspectives”, American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences, Vol. 10, No. 3
(1993), p. 326.
3 Byng, M. D. “Mediating discrimination: Resisting oppression among African Ameri-
can Muslim Women,” Social Problems, 45, 1998, p. 486.
4 Elizabeth Warnock Fernea, “Family,” in J. L. Esposito (ed.), The Oxford Encyclopaedia
of the Modern Islamic World, vol. 1, p. 458.
5 Haynes (ed.) Religion and Politics, p. 267.
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viduals, tends to be seen as a union of two extended families,
with partners frequently selected by the respective families. Hus-
bands and wives are held to be of equal worth but to have
differrent complementary roles.1 Generally, women have the pri-
mary responsibility for maintaining the home and raising the chil-
dren, and men are responsible for the material provision and the
leadership of the family. This structured arrangement has been
seen as promoting peace, less conflict and more harmonious rela-
tionships with associated benefits to the broader community,
such as fostering a stable nurturing environment for raising chil-
dren and caring for the elderly population.2
It is important to note that women are not necessarily pre-
cluded from working outside the home. However, employment is
held in tension with providing proper care for the family. Chil-
dren are considered a blessing, and large families are usually en-
couraged. A secure mother-child attachment is considered critical
to the child’s future well-being and consequently the well-being
of the larger community.3 The determining factor is the provision
of a stable family unit, which enhances the unity of the communi-
ty. The sexual commodification of people is believed to facilitate
the breakdown of the family and community.4 Accordingly, mod-
esty is an important spiritual and cultural value for many Mus-
lims, especially in a liberal US society in which sexuality plays an
increasing role in the public arena. Outside the immediate family
system, many Muslims choose not to mix socially with members
of the opposite gender. Women may adopt Islamic dress, includ-
ing the practice of veiling, or ×ijÉb, as a proactive way of express-
ing modesty, as well as for other reasons.5
1 J. M. Corbett, Religion in America (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2nd ed., 1994), p. 7.
2 M. Daneshpour, “Muslim families and family therapy,” Journal of Marital and Family
Therapy, 24, 1998, p. 355.
3 David R. Hodge, “Social Work and the House of Islam: Orienting Practitioners to
the Beliefs and Values of Muslims in the United States” April 2005, Social Work, vol.
50, no. 1, p. 116.
4 BY Altareb, “Islamic spirituality in America: A Middle Path to Unity,” Counselling and
Values, vol. 41, No. 1, 1996, p. 30.
5 Hodge, “Social Work and the House of Islam …,” p. 120.
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To nurture vital communities, Muslims have created a signifi-
cant number of institutions and organizations to support the
ummah in the United States. There are more than 2,300 Muslim in-
stitutions throughout the nation. Included in this total are more than
100 private Islamic schools, a home-school association, the Bachelor
of Arts – granting American Islamic College located in Chicago, and
the School of Islamic and Social Sciences in Leesburg, Virginia, a
graduate program specializing in Islamic studies.1 Most institutions,
however, are mosques or Islamic centres. There are more than 1,300
mosques and Islamic centres in the United States, with almost 80
percent of these built since 1980.2
Traditionally, the mosque has not performed the same func-
tion in Islam as the church does in Christianity. The use of
mosques for religious services is optional in America. It is not a
requirement for the expression of faith, as seen in the delineation
of the five pillars.3 It is estimated that only 10 percent of Muslims
in the United States are regular attendees at mosque religious ser-
vices, although a much larger percentage typically attend special
holidays such as the feast at the end of fasting during the month of
Ramadan.4 In North America, numerous mosques have added to
the services they offer, changing their characters substantially, to
provide a greater degree of social support to the Islamic communi-
ty. In traditional Muslim countries, mosques tend to be a place
where Muslims have the option of gathering for prayer, especially
Friday prayers. In the United States, these institutions have fre-
quently evolved into diverse centres that provide Muslim commu-
nities with an extensive array of services, both religious and cultur-
al.5 In addition to traditional prayer services, mosques may offer
education for children and adults, day care, libraries, and social and
1 Yvone Yazbeck Haddad &, Jane I. Smith, “United States of America,” in Jhon L.
Esposito (ed.), The Oxford Encyclopaedia of the Modern Islamic World, Vol. 4, p. 278.
2 J. I. Smith, Islam in America (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), p. 70.
3 Dale F. Eickelman, The Middle East and Central Asia (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice
Hall, 3rd edn. 1998), p. 12.
4 Yvone Yazbeck Haddad, The Muslim World Today (Washington DC: American Institute of
Islamic Affairs, 1986), p. 280.
5 Corbett, Religion in America, p. 9.
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sporting activities.1 Consequently, mosques can be important cen-
tres of social support.2
Muslims have also formed a number of organizations.3 The
largest organization is the Islamic Society of North America
(ISNA).4 ISNA attempts to foster a degree of commitment and
community among Muslims in the United States, both through its
own actions and by facilitating a large number of locally based
organizations throughout the country. ISNA activities are diverse
and address most dimensions of Muslim life in the United States.
Services include provision of instructional material, journals,
regular workshops, library facilities, housing assistance, a Zakat
fund, women’s services, and a marriage bureau that operates a
computerized database for matching partners. Although ISNA
attempts to serve all segments of the Muslim population, it tends
to be perceived as an organization tailored primarily to meet the
needs of immigrants.
ISNA grew out of the Muslim Student Association (MSA),
the largest Muslim student organization in the United States. Ac-
cording to the former president of MSA, more than 500 chapters
exist in the United States.5 These chapters offer religious and
cultural services, including, perhaps most important, social sup-
port to the hundreds of thousands of Muslims enrolled on cam-
puses in the United States. A number of publications have been
inaugurated to keep Muslims informed of issues from an Islamic
perspective, in addition to the products of ISNA and the MSA;
more than 100 mosques publish their own journals.6 Largely lo-
cally based, these publications cover social, cultural, economic,
1 Ibid.
2 Z. Hedayat-Diba, “Psychotherapy with Muslims” in P. Scott Richards and Allen E. Bergin
(eds.) Handbook of Psychotherapy and Religious Diversity (Washington, DC: American Psycholog-
ical Association, 2000), p. 290.
3 Sulayman S. Nyang, Islam in the United States of America (Chicago, ABC International
Group, 1999), p. 62.
4 Denny, “Islam in the Americas,” p. 299.
5 Syed Arshad Husain, “Religion and mental health from the Muslim perspective,” in
Harold G. Koenig (ed.), Handbook of Religion and Mental Health (New York: Academic
Press, 1998), p. 280.
6 See Nyang, Islam in the United States of America, op. cit.
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and political issues of interest to Muslims and can be an im-
portant means of maintaining contact with the larger Islamic
community. Notwithstanding these impressive activities, domes-
tic violence committed by male partners is rampant among the
women of these minority communities. This is not surprising,
domestic violence is endemic within the globe. The causes of this
phenomenon shall be discussed later.
Domestic Violence in the United Kingdom
1. Nature and Extent of Domestic Violence in UK
The scale and impact of domestic violence in modern-day Britain
can be judged, to some degree, by the size of the government’s
proposed investment: it was announced that at least £6 million is
to be made available from Crime Reduction Programme to front-
line agencies tackling domestic violence in 1999.1 The figure rose
tremendously in 2004 to £23 billion.2 The figure can be broken
down thus- The cost of domestic violence to the criminal justice
system (CJS) is around £1 billion a year. This is nearly one-quarter
of the CJS budget for violent crime. The largest single component
is that of the police. Other components include: prosecution,
courts, probation, prison, and legal aid. The cost to the NHS for
physical injuries is around £1.2 billion a year. This includes GPs
and hospitals. Physical injuries account for most of the NHS costs,
but there is an important element of mental health care, estimated
at an additional £176 million.
Expenditure on emergency housing includes costs to Local
Housing Authorities and Housing Associations for housing those
homeless because of domestic violence; housing benefit for such
emergency housing; and, importantly, refuges. This amounts to
£.16 billion a year. Civil legal services cost over £.3 billion, about
half of which is borne by legal aid and half by the individual. This
1 Chris Bazell and Bryan Gibson, Domestic Violence and Occupation of the Family Home
(Winchester: Waterside Press, 1999), p. 11.
2 See Sylvia Walby, The Cost of Domestic Violence, (UK: National Statistics & Women and
Equality Unit, September 2004).
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includes both specialist legal actions such as injunctions to restrain
or expel a violent partner, as well as actions consequent on the dis-
entangling of marriages and relationships such as divorce and child
custody.1 Lost economic output accounts for around £2.7 billion a
year. This is the cost of time off work due to injuries. It is esti-
mated that around half of the costs of such sickness absences is
borne by the employer and half by the individual in lost wages. An
additional element is the human and emotional cost. Domestic vio-
lence leads to pain and suffering that is not counted in the cost of
services. This amounts to over £17 billion a year. Including all
costs, the total cost of domestic violence for the state, employers
and victims is estimated at around £23 billion.2
The first reliable and representative ‘dark figure’ studies re-
garding the extent of domestic violence originated in the United
States.3 The extent and nature of domestic violence in the UK be-
came a substantial part of the British Crime Survey (BCS) from
1999 onwards. Domestic violence accounts for around 16 per cent
of all violent crimes in Britain at a cost in excess of £23billion a
year.4 British studies have revealed that domestic violence incidents
claim the lives of two women each week and that it is the largest
cause of morbidity worldwide in women aged 19-44; greater than
war, cancer or motor vehicle accidents. It is also noted that domes-
tic violence affects one in four women in their lifetime.5 Public in-
terest in domestic violence in the UK increased with the publica-
1 Ibid.
2 Ibid.
3 See, Murray A. Straus, Richard J. Gelles & Suzanne K. Steinmetz, Behind Closed Doors:
Violence in the American Family (New York: Anchor Press, 1980); M. A. Straus, “Physical
assaults by women partners: A major social problem,”, in Mary Roth Walsh (ed.),
Women, Men and Gender: Ongoing Debates (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), pp.
210-221. See also M.A. Straus, ‘Physical aggression in the family’, in Manuela Martinez
(ed.), Prevention and Control of Aggression and the Impact of its Victims (New York: Kluwer
Academic/Plenum Publishers, 2001), pp. 1-20.
4 Home Office, Crime in England and Wales 2004/2005 (London 2005); see also: Home
Office, Domestic Violence: National Report (2005) www.crimereduction.gov.uk/domesticviolence
(last visited May 7, 2009).
5 E.A. Stanko, D. Crisp, C. Hale and H. Lucraft “Counting the Costs: Estimating the
Impact of Domestic Violence in the London Borough of Hackney,” Crime Concern
(Swindon 1998).
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tion of a groundbreaking research into the effects of domestic vio-
lence by Betsy (Elizabeth) Stanko.1 Stanko and her research team
found that one in four women had experienced domestic violence
at least once in their lifetime. Her research firstly concentrated on
the United States, later in Britain, and linked domestic violence
with direct and indirect costs to society.2 Stanko further estimated
that the London Metropolitan Police (‘the Met’) would receive a
distress call from a victim every minute of the day. More recently,
research has addressed ‘risk factors’ resulting from domestic vio-
lence incidences.
Nearly one million children in the UK could be living with
domestic violence, according to a 2006 report by the United Na-
tions Children’s Fund, UNICEF. The Report estimates that be-
tween 240,000 and 963,000 children in the UK annually witness
violence against a parent or caregiver. And the effects on children
could range from poor exam results to them becoming violent
themselves. The Home Office3 and Children’s Society research
studies4 focused on children as victims of domestic violence. The
‘Safe on the Streets Research Team’ of the Children’s Society
found that 100,000 British children run away from home every
year in the UK, and that four out of five children who run away
from home said that they did so to escape family conflict, vio-
lence or domestic abuse. The 2004 survey highlighted drink and
drug abuse as linked to domestic violence and some 12 per cent
of youngsters described themselves as ‘maltreated’ at home. Re-
1 Ibid
2 See E. A. Stanko, ‘Hidden Violence Against Women’, in M. Mauire and J. Pointing, (eds)
Victims of Crime: a new deal (Milton Keynes 1988); see also E. A. Stanko, Everyday violence: how
women and men experience sexual and physical danger (London 1990) and  D. Crisp, C. Hale and
E. Stanko, A measure of pain: the social and economic cost of domestic violence. The Children’s Report.
The Children’s Society (London 1998).
3 Home Office, Domestic Violence: findings from a new British Crime Survey self completion
questionnaire (London 1999), C. Mirrlees-Black, HORS Study 191. See also: Metropoli-
tan Police Service (MPS), Understanding and Responding to Hate Crime. MPS Domestic
Violence Strategy (2001)
4 The Children’s Society, Safe and sound. Making England safe for young runaway First and se-
cond national survey of young runaways ‘Still running’. Parts I and II (London 1999 and
2005), accessible at www.the-childrens-society.org.uk/media/pdf/Campaigns/StillRunning2Final
(visited on May 7, 2009).
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search linked children on the UK Child Protection Register to di-
rect and indirect domestic violence. It was discovered that among
victims of child abuse, 40 per cent of the children interviewed re-
ported domestic violence in the home. It was further established
that of one -third of children on the ‘Child Protection Register’ in
the London Borough of Hackney, their mothers were also known
to be being abused.1 Their sample of 1,888 child protection refer-
rals across several local authorities in England found that in 27 per
cent of cases, domestic violence was an issue in the family.2
A 1998 survey by the British ‘Zero Tolerance Charitable
Trust’ found that of 2,039 young people (13-19 years old), one in
five young men and one in ten young women thought violence
against women was acceptable. One in four young men thought it
acceptable to hit a woman if she had ‘slept with someone else’;
one in five young men considered it acceptable to force a woman
to have sex if she was his wife. A 2000 survey by the same trust
of 1,300 schoolchildren found that one in three boys thought vio-
lence against women was acceptable.3 The BCS 2002 found that
domestic violence incidents made up nearly a quarter of all vio-
lent crime (499,000 cases of domestic violence incidences in
2002). The BCS 2004 further estimated that one in five women
experienced at least one incident of non-sexual domestic violence
or force since the age of 16. 24 per cent of women had experi-
ence some form of sexual victimisation since the age of 16.4 Of
this entire figure, it is estimated that about sixty per cent minority
Muslim women experienced domestic violence.5 Who are the mi-
nority Muslim women in UK?
1 C. Humphreys and A. Mullender, Children and domestic violence: a research overview of the
impacts on children. Research in Practice Press Darlington, 2005, p. 12.
2 Ibid.
3 See “Hitting Home Factfile 2000” http://www.bbc.co.uk/pressoffice/pressreleases/
stories/2003/01_january/17/hitting_home_facts (visited on May 7, 2009.
4 Home Office, Domestic violence, sexual assault and stalking: findings from the British Crime
Survey, S. Walby, and T. Allen, HORS Study 276, London, 2000.
5Helmut Kury and Ursula Smartt, “Domestic Violence: Resent Development in
Germany and English Legislation and Law Enforcement” European Journal of Crime,
Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, Vol. 14/4, 2006, p. 382-407.
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Minority Muslim Women in United Kingdom
The Muslims’ presence in Britain can be traced back over 300
years to the sailors from the Indian subcontinent that were em-
ployed by the British East India Company. More arrived follow-
ing the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 and the subsequent
recruitment of sailors from Yemen into the merchant navy.1 Sig-
nificant Muslim communities developed in port cities such as
London, Cardiff, Liverpool, Hull and South Shields, the oldest of
which is the Yemeni community.2 The British Nationality Act 1948
gave members of the Commonwealth the right to freely enter,
work and settle with their families in the UK. Migration of Mus-
lims to the UK increased significantly from 1960 onwards as a re-
sult of labour shortages in the post-World War II period. Britain
invited citizens of the Commonwealth to fill vacancies, resulting in
many of today’s British Muslims having South Asian descent.
A clear demonstration of the growth of British Muslims
since the 1960s is the rise in the number of mosques. In 1963
there were only 13 mosques registered in Britain. The number
grew to 49 in 1970 and doubled in the space of five years to 99 in
1975, and again to 203 in 1980 and almost doubling yet again to
338 in 1985.3 An author describes the large scale Muslim settle-
ment to Britain as occurring in two broad phases: firstly 1945 to
the early 1970s; and then the second phase from 1973 to the pre-
sent.4 Lewis, however, describes four phases, ‘first the pioneers,
then what is known as “chain migration” of generally unskilled
male workers, followed by migration of wives and children and
finally the emergence of a British born generation.’5 Hussain
1 J. Sherif, “Historical Roots of Islam in Britain,” in The Quest for Sanity: Reflections on
September 11 and the Aftermath (London, Muslim Council of Britain, 2002), p. 165.
2 Fred Halliday, Arabs in Exile: Yemeni Migrants in Urban Britain (London: Tauris, 1992), p.35.
3 S. Vertovec, “Religion in Migration, Diasporas and Transnationalism.” Research on
Immigration and Integration in the Metropolis, University of British Columbia, 2002, Work-
ing Paper February 2007. Available at http://www.riim.metropolis.net, visited last on May
6, 2009.
4 H. Ansari, The Infidel Within: Muslims in Britain since 1800 (London: Hurst and Co.,
2004), p. 7.
5 P. Lewis, Islamic Britain: Religion, Politics and Identity Among British Muslims (London: I.
B. Tauris, 2002), p. 22.
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suggests that a three-fold division is more useful. First, the period
from 1945 to approximately 1970, this is characterised by the ar-
rival of young male migrant workers. Secondly, the period from
around 1970 to approximately 1990 with family formation and
the establishment of a generation born in Britain. A third section
covers those who arrived from the 1990s as asylum seekers and
refugees rather than economic migrants.1
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, East African Asians began
arriving under pressure from the ‘Africanisation’ policies in
Kenya and Tanzania, and in the case of Uganda, as a result of
forced expulsion.2 The East African Asians were highly skilled
urban middle-class professionals and entrepreneurs; they tended
to settle in London and the Midlands. Their experience of living
in urban centres combined with their business and professional
background ensured faster integration into economic and social
structures. It is estimated that 20,000 of the group of 150,000
East African Asians were Muslims, mainly with family roots in
Pakistan or the Indian state of Gujarat.3
While Muslims from South Asia constitute 68 per cent of the
Muslim population in the UK, there are other significant Muslim
populations in Britain. However, there is limited research and lit-
erature focusing on these groups. There are for example, estimated
to be around 120,000 Turkish Cypriots and 80,000 mainland Turk-
ish and Kurdish people in the UK. These three groups, while con-
nected, have very different migration histories. The earliest to settle
in the UK were the Turkish Cypriots. Tensions between Turkish
and Greek communities in Cyprus created pressure for migration
in the early 1960s. Turkish migration from Turkey of largely male
migrant workers started from the late 1960s and early 1970s and
family reunions began in the late 1970s. Finally, Kurds arrived
1 S. Hussain, A Statistical Mapping of Muslims in Britain, unpublished doctoral thesis
(University of Bristol, 2005), p. 79.
2 R. Hansen, Citizenship and Immigration in Post-War Britain (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2000), p. 45.
3 The Runnymede Trust, Islamophobia a Challenge For Us All (London: The Runnymede
Trust, 1997), p. 23.
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mainly as political refugees in the late 1980s and early 1990s.1
Muslims from the Middle East in Britain appear to have a
much more diverse profile, coming from various national and
class backgrounds. There were Arabs who had taken advantage of
their financial gain from the oil crisis of 1973–4 and invested in
property and businesses in Britain seeing it as a safer option than
their home countries, which were undergoing uncertain political
developments and regime changes. In addition to this, Muslim
professionals in states experiencing political unrest took advan-
tage of employment opportunities in their fields in Britain to
work and settle there.2 As described above, Muslim settlement in
Britain occurred periodically, in that different communities ar-
rived in higher concentrations according to the pull-push factors
facing them at any given time. This has resulted in communities
being formed along ethnic lines that have come to be concen-
trated in different parts of Britain. Clearly, chain migration played
a key role in the development of ‘pockets’ of communities and
the reproduction of village and kin networks. These have further
been strengthened by trans-national marriages where spouses are
often from the area of original migration.3
The absence of an agreed figure for the number of Muslims in
the UK was a key reason for Muslims campaigning for the inclu-
sion of a question on religious affiliation in the 2001 Census.4 The
Census statistics provide an important baseline of data on Muslims
in the UK. It provides the most comprehensive data on the size,
settlement pattern, demographics and some aspects of employ-
ment for Muslims in the UK. But important areas were outside the
scope of the Census, for example, experiences of education, polic-
ing, domestic violence and criminal justice. While the Census pro-
1 P. Enneli, T. Modood, and H. Bradley, Young Turks and Kurds: A Set of ‘Invisible’ Dis-
advantaged Groups (York: Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 2005), p. 34.
2 C. El-Solh, “Arab Communities in Britain: Cleavages and Commonalities,” Islam and
Christian-Muslim Relations, Vol. 3 (2), 1992, p. 14.
3 Roger Ballard, “Riste and Ristedar: The Significance of Marriage in the Dynamics of
Transnational Kinship Networks,” University of Manchester, CASAS, 2004. Available at
http://www.arts.manchester.ac.uk/casas/papers/pdfpapers/ristedari (visited on May 6, 2009).
4 See Hussain, A Statistical Mapping of Muslims in Britain.
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vides a baseline of information from which data collection in these
areas could be developed, for the moment, most data in these areas
are disaggregated by ethnicity alone and do not cover religion.
There have been numerous attempts, using various methods
of calculation and sources to estimate the figure of Muslims not
only in Britain, but also in Europe.1 Muslims are often stated to
be the largest ‘minority religious group’ in Britain and various
sources have estimated the Muslim population to fall between
550,000 and 3 million. In the early 1990s, figures over 1.5 million
were normally mentioned by Muslim organisations. However, the
most common estimate of the Muslim population was 1 million.
The heterogeneous nature of British Muslims makes it particu-
larly difficult to calculate their numbers. British Muslims, other
than being Muslim had no other common denominator with re-
gards to identifiers such as ethnicity or language. Despite this, the
most common methods used to estimate the number of Muslims
in Britain has been from minority groups’ countries of birth and
from data on ethnicity.
Prior to 1991, when the Census introduced, for the first time, a
question on ethnic identity, data from large surveys such as those
conducted by the Policy Studies Institute and the Labour Force Sur-
vey, relied on country of origin data to provide data on British Paki-
stani and Bangali Muslims.2 Hai conducted research on the size of
the South Asian Muslim population in Britain, and inferred a figure
by taking into account the percentage of Muslims in the country of
origin, for each ethnic group. He acknowledged that 98 per cent of
the population of Pakistan are Muslim, compared with 85 per cent
of the population of Bangladesh and 11 per cent of that of India.
However, he argued against using percentages of Muslims in the
country of origin as the basis for estimations of Muslims within a
1 See M. Anwar, Muslims in Britain: 1991 Census and Other Statistical Source (Birmingham:
The Centre for the Study of Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations, Selly Oaks Col-
leges, 1993).
2 M. Brown, “Religion and Economic Activity in the South Asian Population,” Ethnic
and Racial Studies, vol. 23 (6), 2000, p. 17.
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particular ethnic group in the UK.1
The 2001 Census provides the most comprehensive and accu-
rate data source on Muslims to date. All the tables on religion to be
released by the Office for National Statistics are now available.
Hussain’s introduction to Muslims in the Census provides an over-
view of the demographic profile of Muslims in England and Wales.
2 According to the data, there are just over 1.5 million Muslims in
England and Wales. In addition to this, the 2001 Census for Scot-
land found that there are 42,600 Muslims in Scotland. Muslims
constitute 3 per cent of the total population of Great Britain (57.1
million). Muslims are the largest minority religious groups, they
represent over half the non-Christian religious population. The
Census also reveals that, in terms of age structure, Muslims have
the youngest demographic profile as a religious group in England
and Wales. Over 60 per cent of all Muslims are under the age of
30. At the opposite end of the scale, Muslims have the lowest pro-
portion of elderly people when compared with all other groups.3
Clearly, migration processes contribute to the age structures of
groups, since the majority of migrants arrived as young adults and
have only recently approached retirement ages. Although this mi-
gration pattern is true as argued, for Muslims there has been a se-
cond and more recent phase of migration which has not been mir-
rored by these other communities. Approximately half of the Mus-
lims living in England and Wales were born in the UK.4 Despite
their concentration in the younger age cohorts there are propor-
tionately less Muslims born in the UK than Sikhs. This may be the
consequence of later family reunion in the Bangladeshi communi-
ty, combined with more recent arrival of Muslims as refugees from
1 N. Hai, “Britain’s South Asian Muslims: A Statistical Profile,” Department of Soci-
ology, Manchester Metropolitan University, 1999, p. 12.
2 S. Hussain, “An Introduction to Muslims in the 2001 National Census,” Paper presented
on 7 September 2004 at The Muslims in Britain Network Meeting, Selly Oaks, University of
Birmingham, 2003. http://www.bristol.ac.uk/sociology/ethnicitycitizenship/intromuslims_census.pdf
(visited on May 6, 2009).
3 Ibid.
4 See Office of Chief Statistician, Analysis of Religion in the 2001 Census: Summary Report
Edinburgh: Scottish Executive, 2005.
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Eastern Europe and East Africa.1 The Census data demonstrated
that there are Muslims in every local authority in the UK except
the Isle of Scilly; however, some local authorities have counts as
low as 10 such as Berwick-upon-Tweed. The results showed some
expected clusters in and around London, the West Midlands, Lan-
cashire and West Yorkshire. They also reveal some unexpected
clusters in the North East (for example, Middlesbrough and New-
castle) and at the opposite end of the country in the South West
(Gloucester and Bristol).2 The Muslim population in the UK may
now number as many as 2 million. The updated Whitehall estimate
confirms the position of Islam as the second largest religious
community after Christianity, and means that Muslims now make
up 3.3% of the UK population.3
Despite the notable improvement in the living and educa-
tional standards of the first generation Muslims, on the whole,
British Muslims continue to suffer from unemployment, poor
working conditions, poverty, poor and overcrowded housing,
poor health, and low educational qualifications.4 More than two-
thirds of the entire Muslim women population remain economi-
cally inactive, the highest number in any religious group. Facing
what can be described as the ‘double-minority’ syndrome; many
Muslim women face pressures of compliance with the communi-
ty norms of traditions upbringing and social behaviour. Muslim
women face substantial health crisis; while middle age women
suffer from long-term debilitating problems and women of all
ages face persistent neglect and lack of adequate medical treat-
ment.5 Forced marriage, ‘honour killing’ and domestic violence
phenomenon has a presence within the Asian and in particular
1 Serana Hussain and Tufyal Choudhury, “Muslims in the EU: Cities Report, United
Kingdom, Preliminary Research Report and Literature Survey”, 2007, p. 14.
2 Ibid., p. 15.
3 Jacqui Smith (British Home Secretary), “Officials Think UK’s Muslim Population
has Risen to 2m,” The Guardian, Tuesday 8 April 2008.
4 Javaid Rehman, “Religion, Minority Rights and Muslims of the United Kingdom” in
Javaid Rehman and Susan S. Breau eds., Religion, Human Rights and International Law: A
Critical Examination of Islamic State Practices (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2007),
p. 528.
5 Ibid.
Kamaruddin: "LIVING IN HELL": A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS… 233
Pakistani and Bangali communities.1
The Causes of Domestic Violence among Muslim Minorities
As previously stated, the paucity of research on Muslim families as
monirities in non Muslim countries makes it difficult to provide spe-
cific statistical evidence. Since it appears that Muslims in the USA
and the UK seem to have similar backgrounds, it is expedience to
take causes of domestic violence among these communities togeth-
er. There are many factors responsible for domestic violence among
Muslim minorities; although they are not diametrically different
from that of larger society. Some factors that are unique are analysed
below. However, it should be stressed that these factors are findings
of many research works on domestic violence rather than empirical
study of this work.
Wahida Christi Valiante’s2 personal practice as a family counse-
lor over the last 18 years and data collected from different sources,
indicate that Muslim families also experience social and personal
problems like the rest of the American society. There is marked in-
crease in divorce rates, separation, domestic violence, child abuse,
elder abuse, intergenerational conflict, and teenage pregnancies. Bar-
ring violence or psychological abuse in the family, seeking solutions
through negotiations is the Islamic norm. Marriage requires collabo-
ration, commitment, and above all a sense of responsibility towards
oneself, one’s partner, family, and the society.
In addition, a significant number of young Muslims are mar-
rying outside the community. One of the major hurdles facing
young Muslims to find someone to marry from within the diverse
Muslim community is the question of ethnicity and culture. Cul-
tural and racial diversity instead of being a positive factor, as the
Qur’an tells us (49:13), is becoming a dividing factor, since every
Muslim group wants to preserve its own ethnic and culture puri-
1 Ansari, The Infidel Within, p. 4.
2 Wahida Christi Valiante is a psychotherapist, specializing in Family Counseling. She has
made numerous presentations on treatment of families from an Islamic perspective to
academic institutions and professionals both in Canada and the US. See
www.crescentlife.com/familymatters/challenges-facing-muslim-families (accessed on April 23, 2009).
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ty. This limits the pool of young (male and female) to choose
from. Also, increasing numbers of young Muslim parents, both
father and the mother, are choosing to work outside the house,
primarily for economic reasons, and are relegating the care and
nurturing of their children to daycare centers and elderly parents.
Both arrangements are inherently insufficient because daycare by
its very nature lacks individualed emotional, spiritual, and intellec-
tual care the child needs. Also, the social environment of daycare
is predisposed to producing conformity through the process of
socialization and leaves very little room for developing an inde-
pendent religious or social identity. Although more equipped to
provide emotional, spiritual and nurturing environment, grand-
parents, too, lack the physical vigour to cope with the demands of
growing children. In numerous instances, language is also a barri-
er putting both under undue stress.
The above social trends in Muslim families point to various
degrees of assimilation, or adaptation to existing societal values.
This has serious implications for the future of the Muslim fami-
lies. In Islam, family is central to creating a stable society and ul-
timately civilization itself. Therefore, if family as a social system
fails to provide sound religious and social values for the total
physical and psychological growth of a human being, then society
will suffer greatly as is evident from the malaise affecting western
society. According to social scientists, the American society is be-
coming increasingly violent, aggressive, self destructive, narcissis-
tic and uncaring towards those who are less fortunate, including
members of the immediate family.
The Qur’an, which was revealed to the Prophet in order that
that he “might lead mankind out of the depth of darkness into light”
(15:1), provides numerous examples of what happens to nations,
peoples and individuals who exceed the limits prescribed by God:
Have they not traveled in the earth and seen how evil was the end of
those who were before them? And they were stronger than they in
power.(Qur’an, 35:34)
If Muslim families are to survive the current social and struc-
tural changes in the USA and the UK, they must actively initiate
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social changes in the society in which they live. Humanity is told
that it is to act as a vicegerent of God (Qur’an, 2:30). It is under
moral obligation to reform its own thinking and behaviour in or-
der to create a just and morally balanced self and society.
(Qur’an, 3:110)
Other factors cited which relate to domestic violence among
the minority Muslim women is the misconception of Islamic reli-
gion. More than fourteen hundred years ago, Islam was revealed to
Prophet Muhammad (SAW) in Makkah. The first person with
whom he shared God’s revelations to him was his wife KhadÊjah,
thereby acknowledging the status and value of women.1 The Islam-
ic religion offered women rights they had never had before, like
the right to choose their marriage partner, the right to divorce, and
the right to inheritance.2 The Prophet, many times, admonished
the believers to treat their wives kindly. This is depicted in his last
sermon (khuÏbat al wadÉÑ) in which he said,
Be good to women; for they are powerless captives in your households. You
took them in God’s trust, and legitimated your sexual relations with the
words of God, so come to your senses people, and hear my words.
He further admonished them:
Let not one of you whip his wife like a slave, then move near her bed
at the end of the day.3
This admonition is in line with the Qur’anic injunction
which says;
And among His signs is this; that He created for you mates from
among yourselves, so that you may dwell in tranquillity with them,
and He has put love and mercy between your (hearts): Verily in that
are signs for those who ponder. (Qur’an, 30: 21)
Over the years, however, through cultural distortions, the re-
ligion itself has been used to suppress and oppress women. To-
day, in Muslim religious centres across America and England, like
1 K. Siddique, The Struggle of Muslim Women (MD: American Society for Education and
Religion, 1983), p. 12.
2 Fatimah Mernissi, Beyond the Veil: Male-female Dynamism in Modern Muslim Society
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987), p. 30.
3 Ibn MÉjah, Sunan Ibn Majah (Beirut: DÉr al-Kutub al-ÑIlmiyyah, 2009), Vol. 1, p. 638.
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many other Muslim countries, debates continue around the justi-
fication for a husband to hit his wife. This is based on the ‘chas-
tisement principle’ that evolves from misinterpretation of a verse
of the Qur’an. This verse seems to permit husbands to chastise
their wives as a last resort when they failed to obey God’s
cammnds; thus we read,
As to those women on those you fear admonish them first, then aban-
don them in bed, and last hit them lightly; and if they obey you, seek
not against them means of annoyance or harm, for God is most high,
and Great. (Qur’an, 4: 34)
Some scholars interpret the verse as allowing a symbolic beat-
ing of a wife if she disobeys. Others cling to a more literal mean-
ing. This selective preference of one verse from the Qur’an over
many other verses that stresses on kindness and justice toward
women has created an atmosphere that tolerates and allows vio-
lence toward women. As a result of misinterpretation of this verse,
women who experience violence in their lives are told to be patient
and to give in. No clear stand is taken against a man who is violent.
Violence in marriage is generally condemned but when it does
happen the religious community gives no clear consequences for
the violent behaviour. Furthermore, the religious community con-
demns any woman who seeks legal protection from an abusive
spouse. Rather, her actions are considered as disloyal and bringing
shame to the husband and the family. The message given to wom-
en is to be patient and accept. A religion meant to bring about
peace in the lives of all mankind is then involved in a limited way
in preventing violence toward women.1
Another major factor responsible for domestic violence
among minority Muslim women is the culture. The minority Mus-
lim women, as mentioned earlier, comprise many of different cul-
tural and ethnic groups, each with its own unique background,
history, language, customs, and traditions. Variations exist within
the same group across different social class lines. But the cultures
are basically the same. Most cultures are traditional and patriar-
1 Siddique, The Struggle of Muslim Women, p. 18.
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chal. At the head of the system is invariably the father figure fol-
lowed by his brothers, other male relatives, sons, and older wom-
en. At the bottom of the hierarchy are women of the household.
In such a system, the power positions of members are very clearly
and rigidly maintained. An individual’s desires and needs are put
aside in the interest of the group. What is in the interest of the
group is based upon the judgment of the head of the family.
Members of the extended family are expected to have faith and
believe that any decision the head of the family makes is in their
best interest and to accept it. The roles that traditional, patriarchal
values have played in engendering violence toward women in this
regard are enormous.1
Again, these cultures resist the development of a strong sense
of individual identity. Individuals are socialized to define themselves
as part of a larger familial group. A person’s identity is described in
terms of the family he/she belongs to and the relationships the per-
son has in the family. Thus, the South Asian Indian woman’s identi-
ty, for example, is more specifically based upon her role as mother,
daughter, niece, sister, and so on. Identities outside of these relation-
ships may seem inconceivable to her.2 The culture respects and sup-
ports women who can fit into these prescribed roles. However, re-
spect and support is not often given to those women who do not fit
traditional roles (e.g., single women, battered women, and divorced
women). The family tries to meet the needs of all members of the
family within its rigid and strict rules. Few allowances are made for
individual needs or differences.
Maintenance of the order of hierarchy is important; women
at the bottom of this hierarchy face the most rigid controls. In
addition, the burden of maintaining the system also falls on them.
The system is sustained through the magnification of concepts of
honour and shame. Women bring honour to the family if they
comply and maintain their prescribed role; any deviation by them
1 Ruksana, “Domestic Violence in the South Asian Muslim Immigration in the United
States,” p. 243.
2 Jayakar, K., “Women of the Indian Subcontinent,” in L. Comaz-Diaz & B. Greene
(eds.) Women of colour: Integrating Ethnic and Gender Identities in Psychotherapy (New York:
Guilford Press, 1995), p. 22.
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not only brings dishonour to them but also shame to the entire
family system. Women are encouraged to maintain the traditional
role of wife and mother. They are supposed to be protected only
by their husbands, brothers or their fathers. A single woman is
seen as someone at risk of being abused. Such beliefs fail to take
into account the statistics that indicate most women face violence
not from strangers but at the hands of men they love and who
are supposed to be their protector.1
This focus on marriage and belittling of most other roles for
women has a tremendous impact on the socialization process of
women. Many young women are pressured by their parents to
marry. Parents themselves feel the stress of messages ingrained in
them that requires them to marry off their daughters as soon as
possible. Many women delay higher education in pursuit of mar-
riage. Many drop out in the middle of their studies because of
pressure from parents. Those who stay on and complete their
studies face an escalation in pressure to marry. There is very little
tolerance of a grown woman who is working, independent, and
single. The Muslim family system perceives a single woman as
leading to fitnah or social disorder.2 Women are encouraged to be
in passive dependent roles. Once married, the message ingrained
in them by parents, friends, and clergy is that the marriage be
maintained. No price a woman might pay would be greater than
the shame she would bring on the family if she chose to end the
marriage. Therefore, many women, even in the face of extreme
domestic violence, continue to stay in the marriage because leav-
ing would bring shame to their family. Such beliefs are so strong-
ly embedded in the cultures and the minds of the people, that its
abusiveness almost becomes invisible.
A parent pressuring a woman to stay in a violent marriage is
not seen as abusive to her, but as trying to help her and prevent
her from taking an impulsive decision based on her interest alone.
A traditional view of a decent and virtuous girl was one who
walks slowly, never runs, never laughs out loud, and never ever
1 Leonore E. A. Walker, The Battered Women Syndrome (New York: Springer Publishing
Company, 1984), p. 34.
2 Mernissi, Beyond the Veil, p. 33.
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takes care of her needs before that of the family. The interest of
the group has to be remembered above all. If anyone has to be
sacrificed for the maintenance of the family system, it is the
woman. She is expected to sacrifice herself willingly and without
complaints. She is reminded of the rewards that will follow her
after death for being a patient and tolerant wife.1
The 1960s brought a wave of educated single males Muslims
from their countries. Most of them went back to their home coun-
tries in search of a bride. Because they were educated, they choose
women who were educated as their wives. As they settled in to
married lives with wives and children, there was a very clear effort
to recreate the old family system in America. Life in America,
which looked very attractive from their home countries, created
stresses. The freedom in the American culture that had first at-
tracted them now scared them. Men accustomed to a patriarchal
family system now found it difficult to share power with their
wives. As their children grew, concern about the impact of the
American culture on them grew. Accustomed to total submission
and compliance vis-á-vis their own parents when growing up, the-
se immigrants were totally unprepared for their children question-
ing them. Freedom of expression, open sexuality, and 50% divorce
rate in American society became their biggest fears. The men de-
mand total power and control for themselves over their family.
Men expect their wives not only to submit to their control but also
to the control of their mothers and other family members. Even in
situations where the wife works, the husband has deciding power
over how and where she spends her money.2 Efforts are made by
the man to recreate the patriarchal system and to resist sharing de-
cision-making with his wife. Any attempt to correct this anomaly
by women leads to domestic violence.3
Apart from this, family of origin is another factor which en-
courages domestic violence. This is, however, peculiar to Asian
countries in general and South Asian countries in particular. This
1 Ruskana, “Domestic Violence in the South Asian Muslim Immigration in the United
States,” p. 244.
2 Jayakar, “Women of the Indian Subcontinent,” p. 23.
3 Ibid.
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may look similar to cultural factor discussed above, interestingly,
they are not the same. In Asian countries, women tend to idealize
their family of origin in general and their fathers in particular.
Whether it is the exaggerated way in which the father is described as
a generous and loving parent, or the mother is described as indulged
and respected by the father, the overlying theme is always how
wonderful things were in the parental home before the marriage.
Most of these women describe an awareness of the harshness and
cruelty toward women in their culture. They were aware that in
Asian society the place of the women was a few steps behind the
man. They had grown up hearing stories of other women being
abused by husbands, by in-laws, or others, and who had no options
to escape. They describe themselves as lucky that they did not have
to face the suppression of women, and invariably they owed it to
their family’s generosity. Thus, they felt protected from the unfair-
ness of society, not by their own strength, but by the strength of the
parent and the family. Therefore, the self that emerged was a self,
dependent upon an authority figure for rights and grants.1
The women were allowed to pursue education and career be-
cause it made the parents look good. It also had the added benefit
of enabling the parents to find a better match for them. An educa-
tional degree could offset mediocre looks and a not-so-hefty dow-
ry. The goal of the education was to attract a marriage partner.2
However, the degree to which a girl is allowed an education or job
opportunities is influenced more by the family rules than by her
individual interests and desires. Women’s education is to enhance
the reputation, first, of her original family and, then, the position,
honour and material well being of her in-laws. For those facing
conflict or violence in the marriage, parents expect the young
women to tolerate and totally submit to the authority of the spouse
and his family. They are encouraged to accept it as their fate. After
having invested money and family resources in raising and then
1 See Ruskana, “Domestic Violence in the South Asian Muslim Immigration in the
United States.”
2 Ayesha Jalal, “The Convenience of Subservience: Women and the State of Pakistan,”
in Deniz Kandioyoti (ed.), Women, Islam and the State (Philadelphia: Temple University
Press, 1991), p. 40.
Kamaruddin: "LIVING IN HELL": A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS… 241
marrying their daughters, the parents are often the most resistant
in letting even a bad marriage come to an end. The young women
themselves report strong feelings of obligations toward the family
and suffer from guilt on letting down their parents who had been
good providers. Invariably, many women live with the abuse. To
the outside world they appear educated and like professional wom-
en; independent minded and strong. Inside themselves they carry
remnants of their family origin concept that demands women to
maintain a marriage at all costs.1 Apart from these factors which
are peculiar to minority Muslim women, other factors enhance or
contribute to domestic violence.
The challenge in the next millennium for Muslim women is
not from the external environment; it is from within. Islam has a
lot to offer to the ongoing debate on the future and status of the-
se victims. The practical implications of the answers found in the
Qur’an for those who advocate stability of the family and society
are immense.
Solutions and Remedies
Both the United States and United Kingdom have tried to reduce
domestic violence to the barest minimum. Apart from whopping
sum of money invested, various legal frame-works were put in place.
These include (1) legalistic remedy, i.e. various laws and procedure
to curb and enforce orders against domestic violence; (2) social rem-
edy, e.g. instituting refugee camps and shelters for victims of domes-
tic violence; and (3) Government policy, e.g. offer of domestic vio-
lence courses for men convicted of criminal violence, public aware-
ness campaign and mediation and conflict resolution scheme and
funding of statutory bodies and private organizations. As plausible
as these initiatives are, domestic violence has not reduced to the ex-
pected level. This is shown by the recent statistics of domestic vio-
lence between 2002 and 20072 as well as the huge sum the scourge
1 Ibid.
2 Sundari Anitha, “Neither Safety Nor Justice: The UK Government Response to
Domestic Violence Against Immigrant Women,” Journal of Social Welfare and Family
Law, vol. 27, No. 2, 2008; Amnesty International and Southall Black Sisters, No Re-
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engulfed. All over the world, individual countries are trying within
their limit to curb domestic violence, yet extra efforts need to be ex-
alted. It is against this backdrop that the following recommendations
and suggestions are made.
First, the problem of domestic violence must be transferred
from private to public domain. It is only when it is approached from
this perspective that more efforts will be directed towards solving
the problem. Akin to this, it is suggested that each nation should
internationalise domestic violence problem by strictly complying
with conventions, regional and international instruments relating to
domestic violence signed and domesticated. This is because domes-
tic violence standards have become part of customary international
law, which is binding in nature. Such conventions and instruments
include, among others, the International Bill of Human Rights (e.g.
ICCPR, ICESCR, UDHR); the United Nations Campaign for
Women’s Rights; the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW); the Inter-American
Convention on Violence against Women; the Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment (CAT); the African Charter on Human and People’s
Rights; and the European Convention for the protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedom. All these, in one way or the oth-
er protect women against domestic violence; and as such must be
actualised.
Another suggestion is that early identification of abusive men
must be incorporated in any intervention mechanism. Further, in
order to change their conception of gender role of masculinity, in-
tervention measures must not challenge their manhood or be an in-
trusion into their rightful role as family heads. Otherwise, they will
continue to ignore and will remain dangerous to their families.
Along this line, intervention measures should be culturally sensitive
course - no Safety: The UK Government Failure to Protect Women from Violence
(London: Amnesty International, 2008); and Home Office, “Control of Immigration
Statistics, United Kingdom 2005,” presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State
for the Home Department, August 2006. <http://www.official-
documents.gov.uk/document/cm69/6904/6904 > (visited on May 7, 2009).
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and consistent with the norms of the victim’s culture. In addition,
use of support groups of non-violent men will have a positive mod-
elling effect on abusive men. While making policies and measures,
preventive measures should address cognitive, emotional, and be-
havioural effects on children and adolescents who witness adult vio-
lence. Witnessing violence in their homes, boys later as adults may
themselves practise physical aggression against female partners and
girls, and may become insensitive to male violence.
In the same token, social institutions and professional organ-
isations, insensitive to male violence against women, should be
made aware of their obligation to stop this social injustice by de-
veloping prevention and intervention strategies against male vio-
lence. Efforts of national publicity of the plight of battered wom-
en, their increased empowerment and legislation prohibiting as-
sault against women have already been initiated in many coun-
tries. However, community watch and sanctions, practised effec-
tively in some countries, could be more realistic, practical, and
effective deterrents to domestic violence than change in the reli-
gious precepts or legal system.
Medically, documentation and validation of assault histories
and observed consequences are essential components of both
short and long term mental health interventions. Such efforts must
be confidential for the personal safety of victims and their family
members. Neuropsychological assessment is essential whenever a
woman complains of being hit on the head, being shaken, or being
choked into unconsciousness repeatedly. Also, responses to post-
trauma are important for diagnosis and treatment planning but
such efforts must not over examine the victim for demonstrating
the effects of trauma. Male therapists working with women survi-
vors of violence should develop an attitude of trust, support, and
alliance in order not to trigger inadvertently fears of male violence
and dominance.
Lastly, Sarla has rightly proposed1 using multiple approaches
1 Sarla Sharma, “Domestic Violence Against Minority Women: Interventions, Preventions
and Health Implications,” Equal Opportunities International, vol. 16, No. 2, 1997.
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to reinforce the message that violence against women is inhumane,
abominable, illegal, and intolerable. Despite the gains from existing
societal and legislative reforms, the rates of violence and lethal
crimes against women remain high. Hence, public policy initiatives
should encompass accelerated research, prevention, and interven-
tion efforts as well as legislative reforms. In addition, there should
be an aggressive and resolute enforcement of the laws to encourage
personal freedom, economic opportunity, and formation of support
groups to combat victimisation of women. Further, development of
additional policies; continued monitoring of crime victimization sur-
vey database; national media campaign to condemn domestic vio-
lence; research for innovative techniques to increase arrests, prose-
cution, and conviction; and legal protection for women victims of
domestic violence should be the top priority in all societies.
Conclusion
Awareness of the presence of domestic violence in the Muslim
minority community is slowly increasing. Different cultural
groups that may never have dealt with the case of domestic vio-
lence in their home countries are springing up and trying to help
their own populations. Women are utilizing these resources. They
are finding strength to break the cycle of violence and oppres-
sion. They are questioning the wisdom of saving a marriage at all
costs. The 50% divorce rate in Europe does not appeal to them
neither does the continuation of 25% of marriages with ongoing
violence in Asia and Africa.
Domestic violence hurts the whole family. It hurts the victim
at the physical, emotional, and psychological levels. It causes pain
and suffering to the victim. It also hurts the perpetrator of the
violence by creating distance between him and his family and by
destroying any possibility of close comforting relations. Most of
all, domestic violence hurts the children by taking away a sense of
safety and security they need while growing up. Being a witness to
violence in the home also teaches our children to resort to vio-
lence themselves. Studies show that boys growing up in violent
homes are more likely to resort to violence as they grow up. For
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life to be fulfilling and satisfying to all family members, this cycle
of violence has to stop. Women have always depended on their
families and religion for support. Even now, when facing domes-
tic violence women turn to their religion and families for answers.
For a woman trying to overcome domestic violence, it is very
comforting to know that her religion supports her.
But when religious leaders, family, and friends discourage
such a woman, it adds to the oppression in her life. The questions
then arise, what can be done to help such a woman? How can
these same institutions be utilized to help the women? The first
step toward resolution of any problem is acceptance of the prob-
lem. Some Muslim women have tended to deny the existence of
the problem of domestic violence. Involving resources at various
levels can increase awareness of domestic violence. Community
leaders, religious leaders, and professionals mental health field all
need to get together to tackle this problem by demonstrating the
willingness to help and support.
Mental health professionals need to educate the community
about the damage caused by domestic violence, not just to the
woman but the whole family. Information on resources and sup-
portive services need to be made easily accessible to women,
while religious rules and regulation surrounding marriage, di-
vorce, separation, and custody need to be further clarified. Wom-
en who utilize these resources need to be supported and encour-
aged. Religious and community leaders need to express a clear
stand on violence against women. One recent trend that offers a
very hopeful sign is the work by scholars who are trying to remove
the cultural distortions from the religion and trying to help women
re-establish equality, dignity, and respect in their lives.
There is need to change our parenting styles in order to ena-
ble our next generation to face the next millennium with a strong
sense of self and to have an awareness of who they are, what they
desire, and their goals. Our children need to learn to survive on
their own and to become aware of their own strength for surviv-
al. Children have to be allowed to make choices, to learn from
their mistakes, and grow from their life experiences. Such child-
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rearing behaviour is difficult for most parents, who feel they have
to be overprotective. In addition, girls and boys are raised differ-
ently as there continues to be extra pressure on daughters to be-
have in socially prescribed ways. Such beliefs will have to change
if we want our children to develop into strong independent hu-
man beings and experience life free of violence.
CHAPTER 10
 :
ب حب السعيد كمال 
 

مصطلح جديد يف الفقه اإلسالمي واحلضارة اإلسالمية، فلم يعرف " األقليات"
مبعناه الشائع يف العلوم " األقلية"الفكر اإلسالمي مبجاالته املختلفة مصطلح 
إىل مكانة أدىن يف االجتماعية ذات النشأة احلديثة يف الغرب والذي يشري
الرتاتب االجتماعي مستندة إىل أسباب متصلة مبخالفة األقلية لألغلبية يف أحد 
ويؤدي هذا االختالف إىل تعرض األقلية عادة . املقومات الطبيعية أو الثقافية
لتضامن فيما إىل اللتمييز ضدها من قبل األغلبية، األمر الذي يدفع أفرادها 
، وهو ما يؤدي يف كثري من وما ينجّر عنه من نتائجمييزبينهم ملواجهة ذلك الت
تمع 1.األحيان إىل حدوث توتر العالقة بني األقلية واألغلبية يف ا
سعد : راجع. حول تعريف األقلية واملصطلحات املختلفة اليت تستخدمها العلوم االجتماعية كاجلماعة اإلثنية1
وتستخدم مسرية. 64ص،)1992دار سعاد الصباح،: القاهرة (تأمالت في مسألة األقليات: الدين إبراهيم
مكتبة األجنلو املصرية،: القاهرة(المدخل لدراسة  األقليات: مسرية  حبر". األقليات اإلثنية"حبر عبارة 
: نيفني عبد املنعم مسعد". اجلماعة اإلثنية"كما تستخدم مصطلح األقلية، وتنتقد مصطلح . 64ص،)1982
THE QUESTION OF MINORITIES IN ISLAM248
الفكر يف السياق اإلسالمي، إال أّن " األقليات"ومع حداثة مصطلح
معناه بدالالت خمتلفة للتعبري عن أخرى اإلسالمي قد استخدم مصطلحات 
ويعد .وغري املسلمني،وأهل امللل،وأهل الذمة،أهل الكتاب، مثل متقاربة
من املصطلحات الشائعة يف العلوم االجتماعية اليوم،" األقليات"مصطلح 
أفراًدا –كما أصبح شائًعا يف اخلطاب السياسي واالجتماعي جلهات متعددة 
تعبريًا عن أحد املوضوعات احلساسة يف العالقات االجتماعية –ومؤسسات 
فال مناَص إذْن للفقه . اسية على املستويات احمللية واإلقليمية والعامليةيوالس
اإلسالمي عامة والفقه السياسي منه خاصة من التعامل مع هذا املصطلح، 
ولذلك حياول هذا البحث النظر . والتبصر مبا يرتبط به من قضايا وإشكاالت
ختلفة مبا يتسق مع منطق يف هذا املصطلح وحتديد مفهومه ودالالته وأبعاده امل
احلضارة اإلسالمية ويف ضوء مقاصد الشريعة الكلية وقيمها العليا وقواعدها 
العامة اليت حيتل فيها تكرمي اإلنسان ونبذ اإلكراه يف التعامل مع مسائل العقائد 
وسيقتصر البحث على األقليات غري املسلمة يف .واألديان مكانة أساسية
تمع اإلسالمي . ا
متهيًدا لذلك نقرر أن اإلسالم ال يعرف التمييز بني الناس على أساس و 
،اللون أو اجلنس أو العرقمن ، الطبيعيةواخلصائص االختالف يف املقومات 
EO  N  M   L  K  J  I  H     G  F: لقوله تعاىل
ولذا عرفت التجربة التارخيية اإلسالمية مصطلحات خمتلفة .)13: احلجرات(
أهل "و" أهل الذمة"، و"أهل الكتاب"عن الطبيعة احلضارية هلا مثل تعرب 
حوث والدراسات السياسية جبامعة مركز الب: القاهرة(األقليات واالستقرار السياسي في الوطن العربي
. 12ص،)1،1988القاهرة، ط
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وهو متييز يقوم على أساس الكتاب والذمة وامللة، أي أن التمييز هنا 1،"امللة
ومن هنا فإن اإلسالم . اإلسالمي أو التمايز عنهيقوم على أساس خمالفة الدين 
ون على دينهم، سواء أكان هو الذي مييز بني الذين يلتحقون به وأولئك الذين يبق
أديان مبذاهبهما ومللهما املختلفة، أو هذا الدين مساويا كاليهودية والنصرانية
فمصطلح غري املسلمني . الوثنيني الذين يتبعون أديانًا ال أثارة هلا من وحٍي إهلي
الذي يعد مصطلًحا حديثًا يف التعبري عن ظاهرة األقليات يف الفكر اإلسالمي
يتبعون أقواًمالة حضارية تعين غري املسلمني باملعىن الواسع الذي يضم حيمل دال
فمعيار التمييز ليس عرقًا أو لونًا أو إثنية، وإمنا هو 2.ديًنا مساويا كما يشمل غريهم
. غري املسلمني/معيار ديين عقدي جيعل التمييز قائًما على أساس املسلمني
ة يف نظام االجتماع السياسي اإلسالمي ومن هنا فإن أبناء القوميات املختلف
ممن خيتلفون يف أرومتهم العرقية أو أصوهلم مثل الكرد والرتك واألمازيغ الرببر وغريهم
ا ،اللغوية ال يعتربون أقليات إذا كانوا مسلمني، كما أن العشائر وأفخاذها وبطو
ا ذات الطابع االنشقاقي ال تعترب أقليات طاملا   كانت تدين واألسر وتعبريا
فاحلضارة اإلسالمية قامت على أساس التنوع والتعدد ولكن يف إطار . باإلسالم
على فيها نكر حقبة أُ احلضارة اإلسالمية عرفتوحدة االنتماء لألمة اإلسالمية، فلم 
م أو قبائلهم، كما مل مواطنيها املسلمني حقُّ  هم يف االنتماء لعشائرهم أو قوميا
كمال السعيد حبيب، : حول املصطلحات املختلفة لغري املسلمني يف الفقه السياسي اإلسالمي راجع 1
األقليات والسياسة في الخبرة اإلسالمية من بداية الدولة النبوية وحتى سقوط الدولة العثمانية
.42- 36ص،)2002مدبويل،: القاهرة(
،)4،1985مؤسسة الرسالة، ط: بريوت(غير المسلمين في المجتمع المسلم: القرضاوييوسف2
مواطنون ال ذميون، موقع غير المسلمين في مجتمع المسلمين: فهمي هويدي:كذلكوانظر. 7ص
ة اإلسالميةفي النظام السياسي للدول: حممد سليم العوا؛)1،1405/1985دار الشروق، ط: القاهرة(
). 7،1989/1410دار الشروق، ط: القاهرة (
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على مواطنيها غري املسلمني حقهم يف العيش آمنني داخل تنكر أي دولة إسالمية
ومل يعرف التاريخ اإلسالمي تقاليد . يهمحدودها هلم ما للمسلمني وعليهم ما عل
أو ممارسات االستئصال العرقي أو الديين اليت ،(melting-pot)بوتقة الصهر 
ا التقاليد الغربية والقومية 1.العلمانيةحفلت 
صيغاً  توحيدية، اإلسالميةتعدد والتنوع يفرض على الدولةلاوكان قبول 
ا، فالدولة ذات الطبيعة التعددية تفرض دينامية خاصة جتعل من التعدد مصدرً  ا لقو
ينتمي اجلميع إليها مبا يف ذلك غري فحبيث توسع من القاعدة االجتماعية للدولة 
لنظام السياسي أو حتديه وهنا يعد معيار عدم االمتناع على ا. املسلمني أنفسهم
مث معيار الوالء للدولة ومشاقته على مستوى اهلوية أو االستقرار السياسي،
2.اإلسالمية، من املعايري املهمة اليت يبىن عليها مفهوم املواطنة مبعناها املعاصر
أي أن تكون هناك عالقة تعاقدية بينك فماذا يعين أن تكون مواطًنا يف دولة؟
يف إطار هذه العالقة يتم تبادل احلقوق والواجبات بينك وبينها حبيث وبينها؟ إنه 
تؤدي إليها واجب الوالء واالنتماء وواجب الطاعة، أي القبول بالنظام السياسي 
تمع، وتؤدي هي إليك   وقواعده القانونية والسياسية اليت تنظم الفضاء العام يف ا
احلد األدىن للحقوق االقتصادية من، فاألكل احلقوق الواجبة عليها بداية من توفري 
ا، مثل توفري املسكن املالئم والعمل واالجتماعية اليت ال ميكن للحياة أن تقوم إال 
هلا، وتيسري أسباب احلياة مثل النظافة هااملناسب للقدرات والكفاءات اليت مت تأهيل
مثل يف احلق يف واملواصالت والبيئة النظيفة وغريها، مث احلقوق السياسية اليت تت
واحلق يف تكوين اجلمعيات واألحزاب وحق النقد والتعبري، املشاركة السياسية
واحلقوق القانونية اليت تكفل املساواة وعدم التمييز على أسس طائفية أو عرقية مبا يف 
.، املقدمةاألقليات والسياسةحبيب، 1
).يف مواضع متفرقة(املرجع نفسه 2
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ذلك احلق يف حرية اعتناق دين خمتلف عن دين الدولة أو األغلبية املسلمة وفاقًا ملا 
، أي ال يكره غري )256: البقرة(ÑÔ  Ó  Ò: ن يف قوله تعاىلقرره القرآ
. املسلم أن يدخل يف دين اإلسالم وهو كاره أو غري راغب
 
الباحث يف مسألة األقليات من منظور من اإلشكاالت اليت تواجههناك عدد 
أبعادها احلقيقية إلحسان التعامل ال بد من الوقوف عندها وتبني واليت إسالمي 
وفيما يلي حماولة لرصد تلك اإلشكاليات دون توسع كبري يف . مع هذه املسألة
- وليس أمهها -وأوىل تلك اإلشكاالت . حتليلها مما يتجاوز حدود هذا البحث
ا  ما أثرناه من أن احلضارة اإلسالمية مل تعرف املصطلح وكان لديها مصطلحا
فاحلضارة اإلسالمية حضارة قائمة يف جوهرها . بعد الديين احلضارياخلاصة على ال
على الدين، فكل العلوم والتقاليد واخلربات استندت إىل القانون اإلسالمي 
والفقه اإلسالمي، أي ) الشريعة اإلسالمية يف القرآن والسنة النبوية(األساسي 
وميكننا .نة الصحيحةاالجتهاد أو الفهم الذي قدمه الفقهاء لنصوص القرآن والس
القول إن هناك عالقة قوية بني طبيعة االجتماع اإلسالمي والفقه، ففقه األقليات 
نشأ يف ظل أوضاع سياسية املتعلق بتنظيم أوضاع غري املسلمني يف الدولة املسلمة
واجتماعية كان املسلمون فيها هم احلضارة الغالبة، وكان الفقه يؤسس ألوضاع 
فمعظم البلدان اليت دخلت يف . علوهم على املستوى السياسيغلبة املسلمني و 
كانت هلم السلطة نظام اإلسالم مت فتحها من قبل الدولة اإلسالمية، ومن مث
، أي تلك اليت "دار اإلسالم"العليا واحلاكمية النهائية، وكان ذلك منشأ مصطلح 
ن املرجعية وتكو حتكمها سلطة سياسية إسالمية ال ينازعها يف السلطة سواها
بشكل ومن مث اجتهد الفقهاء لدار اإلسالم. القانونية فيها للشريعة اإلسالمية
، فتحدثوا عن البلدان اليت لتكييف األوضاع والعالقات النامجة عن ذلكرئيس
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رها فتحها املسلمون عنوة وتلك اليت فتحت صلًحا، وحتدثوا عن البلدان اليت مصَّ 
والفسطاط يف مصر والقريوان يف تونس عراقيف الاملسلمون كالكوفة وواسط
فتبلورت يف . وغريها، وحتدثوا عن البلدان القدمية وأحكام الكنائس فيها وغريها
ضوء ذلك وبالتفاعل معه جمموعة األحكام الفقهية كانت وظيفتها وغايتها التنظري 
1.لنظام اجتماعي وسياسي خمتلف عن ذلك الذي نعيشه اليوم
اليوم يواجهون نظاًما نياملسلميتمثل يف أن اين فأما اإلشكال الث
وسياسيا جديداً وخمتلًفا، ليسوا هم قادته وصانعيه وإمنا صانعوه هم اجتماعيا
والصني واهلند ،)أمريكا وأوروبا واليابان والكيان الصهيوين(عامل الغرب 
، ومعظم دول اإلسالم تعرضت )حوايل ربع العامل من حيث عدد السكان(
ار النظام السياسي املعرب عن املؤسسة السياسية لعامل . الستعمارل فقد ا
، وسادت الدولة القطرية ملا بعد االستعمار"اخلالفة اإلسالمية"وهو اإلسالم
(post-colonial state)ا، وإن علمانية يف أغلب، وهي دولة يف أشريتوجها
. وثائقها الدستورية إىل اإلسالم والشريعة
ا املسلمون أو تغلب وليست هذه الدولة احلديثة نتاًجا حلركة فتح قام 
وإمنا هي نتاج لوضع قانوين وسياسي جديد هو جزء حققوه وسيادة بلغوها،
أمرًا " األقليات"من نظام دويل وقانوين عاملي مهيمن جيعل التعامل مع مصطلح 
غري مقبولة أو جيعل املصطلحات اإلسالمية القدمية وهذا الوضع. ال مفر منه
ا يف وعي األقليات غري املسلمة اليت تعيش  على األقل غري مفهومة اليوم؛ أل
تشري إىل نوع من التمييز الذي جيعلها يف وضع أدىن داخل البلدان اإلسالمية
م أقليات، وأن  من حيث املكانة االجتماعية، ومن مث فهم يصفون أنفسهم بأ
. 81املرجع نفسه، ص1
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وهنا تربز 1.د االستعمار هي عالقة املواطنةالعالقة اليت تربطهم بدول ما بع
صعوبة التأسيس واالجتهاد لوضع جديد رمبا يكون غري مسبوق يف عامل 
، وحيتاج لتخريج فقهي وسياسي خمتلف عن ويف تراثه الفكري والفقهياإلسالم
ذلك الذي عرفته اخلربة اإلسالمية السابقة، وهو ما جيعلنا نقبل أيًضا بعالقة 
2.ني هذه األقليات وبني الدول اليت حتكم عامل اإلسالماملواطنة ب
أن العامل مل يعد منفصًال عن بعضه كما كان من قبل، واإلشكاالت هوثالث
ال ومن مث فإن احلديث عن دار اإلسالم ودار الكفر ودار احلرب ودار العهد والصلح
خترجيات يكفي ملواجهة هذه األوضاع اجلديدة، فكل تلك التصنيفات إمنا هي
للفقهاء القدامى كانت تعرب عن طبيعة النظام السياسي الدويل يف ذلك الوقت وال 
يف عامل واحد يتداخل فيه املسلمون وغريهم،  اليومتفي بذلك اآلن، فنحن نعيش
كما أن طبيعة التداخل املعقدة بني املصاحل والدول أصبحت قوية بدرجة قد يصعب 
الشركات العابرة والتمييز فيها، وخاصًة بالنسبة لنشاطالفصل- إن مل يتعذر متاماً - 
من ذلك ما حدث مثالً يف مصر إذ اضطرت الدولة حتت ضغوط أقباط املهجر والداخل أن تضمن املادة 1
شري إىل املواطنة بوصفها رابطة سياسية جتمع بني الدولة والنظام السياسي، ذلك أن األوىل من الدستور ما ي
.املواطنة تعين يف ذهن أولئك نزع السمة اإلسالمية عن الدولة
البن القيم بتحقيق صبحي الصاحل إىل أن " أحكام أهل الذمة"حممد محيد اهللا يف مقدمته لكتاب أشار العالمة 2
مل تشأ أن تفرض اجلزية على غري املسلمني بإمجاع 1949/1368جلنة لوضع دستورها عامالباكستان حني ألفت 
ا فكرت طويًال "آراء أعضاء اللجنة، حيث  يف أمر املسلمني املعاصرين الساكنني –لدى حبث اجلزية –لوحظ أ
إن حنن فرضنا اجلزية على - يف دول نصرانية ويهودية وبوذية وبرمهانية واشرتاكية وغريها من دول العامل، وخشيت 
أن تعمد هذه إىل اجراءات انتقامية تعسفية تفرضها يف مقابل اجلزية على –أهل ذمتنا من ملل تلك الدول 
سكان بالدها من أبنائنا املسلمني، وال نظن أن تلك اللجنة أخطأت روح اإلسالم السمح يف ختليها عن اجلزية، 
مرانة اإلسالم من عالج واقعي منطقي لبعض احلاالت يف بعض البيئات ما تؤثره –يف اعتقادنا –بل أدركت 
دار العلم : بريوت(، حتقيق صبحي الصاحل وتقدمي حممد محيد اهللا أحكام أهل الذمةابن قيم اجلوزية، . والظروف
. 92ص،1ج،)3،1983للماليني، ط
THE QUESTION OF MINORITIES IN ISLAM254
للقارات واألسواق وحركة املنتجات والبشر واألفكار، والتفكري حول وحدة املصري 
ويف هذا السياق فإن هناك أقليات . اإلنساين فيما يتصل باحلفاظ على كوكب األرض
ر اإلسالم هناك، ومن مسلمة تعيش يف الغرب وهذه األقليات متثل حدوًدا جديدة لدا
ا ووجودها، ويثور احلديث اليوم  فقه "عنمث فهي حتتاج للحماية واحلفاظ على كيا
أمريكا وأوروبا ويف غريها من بلدان أي األقليات اليت تعيش يف–" األقليات املسلمة
وال تكاد توجد دولة يف العامل . فريقياإا والصني واهلند والعديد من دول العامل كروسي
إال ولإلسالم واملسلمني فيها وجود يتفاوت حجمه وتأثريه، ولكنه وجود ال ختطئه 
.عني املرء سواء كان موالياً أو معادياً 
ربز إشكال التعامل مع تلك األقليات مبنطق خمتلف عن ذلك الذي يوهنا 
صاغه الفقه اإلسالمي يف عصور كان العامل اإلسالمي فيها يكاد يعيش منفصالً 
اإلقامة والسفر واصطحاب دول العامل، وكان الفقه التقليدي حياذر منعن بقية 
ومل تكن . ، ومن باب أوىل التوطن واإلقامة فيها"دار الكفر"القرآن الكرمي إىل 
نحو جعل العامل اليوم كله يف تقديرنا الوسائل االتصال والتنقل قد تطورت على 
العهد /الكفر أو احلرب/سالمومل يعد تقسيم الدار على أساس اإلدارًا واحدة،
ومل تعد الدار هي اليت حتمي . الدعوة/والصلح، وإمنا على أساس أمة اإلجابة
وحتفظ اإلسالم، وإمنا حيافظ عليها املسلمون الذين حيملون أمانة التمسك مبا 
اإلسالم أو " مازْ كارِ "يدينون ويعتقدون، وحيافظ عليها ما ميكن أن نطلق عليه 
1.عتباره الدين اجلاذب والبديل حلرية اإلنسان املعاصرباقوته الذاتية
رير اإلنسان مما يطلق عليه ماكس هناك دراسات كثرية عن احلركات االجتماعية يف الغرب تتحدث عن حت1
اَل للتعبري عن نفسها" القفص احلديدي"فيرب  وقد عرب عن ذلك املفكر وعامل . من أجل أن جتد ذاتُه ا
عن الفرنسية ه، ترمجنقد الحداثةأالن تورين، : انظر". الذات الفاعلة"االجتماع الفرنسي تورين مبصطلح 
لس األعلى : القاهرة(أنور مغيث  ومن املنظور اإلسالمي فإن الذات الفاعلة املسلمة هي . 1998للثقافة،ا
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أن العامل اإلسالمي أصبح جزًءا من نظام دويل وأما اإلشكال الرابع فه
ا املختلفة، وينظم العالقة بني الدول معاهدات  متثله األمم املتحدة ومؤسسا
ن أن نطلق وهناك ما ميك. وفق ما يستند إليه من منظومة قانونية دوليةواتفاقيات
عليه شرائع حقوقية ذات طابع دويل جتعل من حقوق األقليات موضوًعا رئيًسا 
هلا، كما جتعل من قضية األقليات سبًبا للتدخل من أجل محايتها والتأثري يف
وتوجد مجاعات ضغط  . القرار السياسي للدول اليت تعيش فيها تلك األقليات
الغربية القرار السياسي لدولتدعم تلك األقليات وتوجه يف الغربكبرية
كما هو احلال مثًال بالنسبة ألقباط املهجر يف مصر، وكما هو ، وتؤثر فيهوغريها
ضغط اليهودية واملسيحية اليت ما فتئت تصب الزيت الاحلال بالنسبة جلماعات 
. يف مشكلة دارفور بالسودان، وكما هو احلال بالنسبة ملسألة األرمن يف تركية
ان اإلسالمية أصبحت مهددة حتت الضغط الغريب بسبب مشكلة فحدود األوط
األقليات، وهناك سيناريوهات حول تقسيم تلك األوطان والدول حلساب تلك 
وال نستثين من ذلك . األقليات أو بامسها، كما هو احلال يف العراق اليوم مثالً 
هو غربية الستحداث أقليات، كما ل اخلليج ومصر، كما أن هناك مساعيَ دو 
.احلال بالنسبة لألمازيغية يف اجلزائر مثال
ومن هنا فإن الناظر يف االجتماع اإلسالمي جيد نفسه أمام مشكالت  
كبرية، وهي أننا نواجه بأقليات ذات طابع اسرتاتيجي ال يقتصر تأثريها على 
الداخل، وإمنا هو تأثري متجاوز للحدود ومتدثر مبنطق احلضارة الغربية املهيمنة 
تغلب الرؤية العلمانية اليت تركز على قيمة احلرية بدون قيود وجتعل من اليت 
اإلنسان مرجعية ذاته، فال توجد مرجعيات دينية عليا كما هو احلال يف احلضارة 
اليت حتمل أمانة اإلسالم حىت لو غابت املؤسسة اليت متثله، كما هو احلال يف البلدان اليت يعيش فيها 
. املسلمون كأقليات يف أوروبا  وأمريكا وغريها
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تتحدث عن -وخاصة األمريكية -فمعظم التقارير احلقوقية الغربية . اإلسالمية
ملنظورات الفكرية العلمانية اضطهاد غري املسلمني يف البلدان املسلمة وفق ا
الغربية، فهي تدعو مثالً لبناء كنائس يف السعودية رغم أن ذلك حمرم يف الشريعة، 
دف إىل إزاحة  وتدعو حلرية الشواذ مثًال والدفاع عن الفئات املهرطقة اليت 
مرجعية الشريعة، واستحداث أقليات وطوائف غري موجودة يف الواقع كما هو 
. للبهائيني يف مصر مثالً احلال بالنسبة 
أن احلضارة الغربية يف تعاملها مع مسألة وا هنواجهيي ذالاخلامسواإلشكال
ج فرعون ~     ¡  ¢  £  : األقليات تنزع إىل التجزئة والتفتيت، على 
¦  ¥  ¤)حىت أصبح احلديث يدور حول النساء )4:القصص ،
ة بالعدد وإمنا مبا يطلق عليه النسويون بوصفهن أقلية، وهي هنا ليست مسألة مرتبط
فالفكر الغريب مبقوالته ومناهجه يف التعامل مع القضايا . اهليمنة والتسلط الذكوري
اإلنسانية واالجتماعية ينزع إىل زرع بذور الصراع والتفتيت، واعتبار الفرد ال اجلماعة 
رد غاية يف ذاته، هو الوحدة االجتماعية األساسية، ومن مث ما يريده اإلنسان الف
واحلرية هي القيمة العليا يف احلضارة الغربية بينما يعترب اإلسالم وحدة التحليل هي 
. اجلماعة اليت ينتمي إليها الفرد والقيمة العليا فيه هي العدل
ا  وتشري دراستنا للخربة العثمانية يف التعامل مع غري املسلمني إىل أ
د واح"قامت مبا أطلقنا عليه  ، بينما يقوم (unite and rule)" كموحِّ
divide and)" فرق تسد"يف منطق احلضارة الغربية على املبدأ املعروف 
rule) . فاحلضارة الغربية من منظور علماين تقدس الفرد وجتعله غاية يف
ذاته، بينما اإلسالم يعرتف بالوالءات األولية لكل األقوام والشعوب 
فلهم حق امللكية والعمل والرب ،ني بالطبعوامللل مبا يف ذلك غري املسلم
والعدل واملساواة، وهلم قوانينهم وأحواهلم الشخصية ومعابدهم، فقط هو 
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ومن .يرفض االمتناع على الدولة سواء على مستوى االستقرار أو اهلوية
الطابع الفردي احلداثي يكتسح العامل ااملؤكد أن النموذج الغريب ذ
وهو ما يهدد ،التمرد وااللتحاق بالنموذج الغريبويثري نزوات ،اإلسالمي
. وحدة البلدان اإلسالمية
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األقلية : "ويف ضوء ما سبق ميكن أن نضع تعريًفا إجرائيا ملصطلح األقليات فنقول
وهلا حكم ) الدوام(هي اجلماعة اليت تعيش داخل الدولة املسلمة على سبيل االستقرار 
أو اليت فارقت اجلماعة املسلمة بتأويل ،املسلمةشرعي خمتلف عن أحكام اجلماعة
ذا االعتبار فاألقليات". ديين ال يسوغ ا هي من املسائل املتغرية، و وما يتصل 
وهذه املسائل املتغرية حتتاج دائًما الجتهاد يعتمد على القواعد الكلية اليت أقرها 
يف الوقت نفسه يراعي طبيعة العصر والعامل وأوضاع االجتماع اإلسالم و 
السياسي اجلديدة، وهذا االجتهاد اجلديد ينبغي أن يتوافق مع أصول الشريعة 
. العامة وأن يكون حمققاً ملقاصدها
ينِ : تعاىلوعلى سبيل املثال فإن قول اهللا  : البقرة(َال ِإْكرَاَه ِيف الدِّ
إىل مستوى القاعدة الكلية وتتسق مع مقصد الشريعة آية حمكمة ترقى ، )256
يف حفظ الدين اإلسالمي أن يدخله مكره عليه يعبث به أو يتالعب مبقدراته،  
كما حدث لكثري من املنافقني الذين دخلوا اإلسالم ووصلوا إىل مراتب عليا يف 
تمع املسلم جرى توظيفها ضد مقاصد الشرع ومصاحل األمة يقول . مؤسسات ا
هذه "إن لإلمام الشاطيب"املوافقات"دراز يف مقدمته لكتاب عبد اهللالشيخ
رد إدخال الناس  الشريعة املعصومة ليست تكاليفها موضوعًة حيثما اتفق، 
حتت سلطة الدين، بل وضعت لتحقيق مقاصد الشارع يف قيام مصاحلهم يف 
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1."والدنيا معاالدين 
دته أن يكون البشر خمتلفني يف مللهم وحيث اقتضت حكمة اهللا تعاىل وإرا
!   "  #  $  %  &  '  (  *  : وعقائدهم كما جاء يف قوله تعاىل
   +,3  2  0  /  .  -)فإن يف ذلك )119- 118: هود ،
ابتالء للمسلم بوجود خمالف له يف امللة واالعتقاد الختبار قدرته على العدل معه  
صوص حتتمل يف داللتها طابع اإلكراه يف عالقة كما أمر اهللا تعال، ومن مث فأي ن
ينِ املسلمني بغريهم ال بد من فهمها يف ضوء قاعدة  اليت ،َال ِإْكَراَه ِيف الدِّ
  T       S    R  Q  P  O  N   M  L  K      J  I: يعضدها قول اهللا تعاىل
 ̂  ]  \  [  Y  X  W  V  U)حيث أرست )8: املمتحنة ،
ة قاعدة كلية أخرى يف شأن معاملة املسلمني لغري املسلمني، فإذا وجدنا هذه اآلي
يف بعض النصوص أو التأويالت أو املمارسات ما يعارض مثل هاتني القاعدتني 
مما قد يوحي جبواز استعمال اإلذالل واإلهانة والتعذيب يف التعامل مع غري 
. اعد الكلية ال العكسهذه القو املسلم، فإن ذلك ينبغي أن ُحتكَّم فيه مثلُ 
ملواجهة إشكاليات األحكاماتويف حالة عدم وجود نص أو تبدل مناط
جديدة بالنسبة ملوضوع األقليات، مثل القبول مببدإ املواطنة حيث يقف كل 
منتسيب الدار والبالد على قدم املساواة أمام القانون، أو إسقاط اجلزية أو تويل غري 
ل القضاء والوزارات أو غريها، فإننا هنا نستدعي املسلمني لبعض الواليات مث
منهجية االجتهاد اليت تتوسع يف تقدير الواقع وتأخذ بأدوات القياس واملصلحة 
ومراعاة العرف والعادة واالستحسان وقواعد مراعاة املآالت وسد الذرائع وفتحها، 
ف وتلك هي األصول واألدوات اليت تسع. واألخذ بقواعد السياسة الشرعية
دار : بريوت(، حتقيق عبد اهللا دراز  الشريعةالموافقات في أصول أبو إسحق إبراهيم موسى الشاطيب، 1
.3ص،1/1ج،)1422/2001الكتب العلمية،
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تهد يف القضايا ذات الطابع املتغري، وقد قرر ذلك ابن القيم حيث قال أما : "ا
، وبالتايل "األحكام املتغرية، فهي اليت روعي فيها عوائد الناس وأحواهلم وأعرافهم
فإن علة املصلحة فيها متغرية فتدور مع املعلول وجوًدا وعدًما، وهذه أطلق عليها 
ف األزمنة فظنها من ظنها شرائع عامة الزمة لألمة ختتلف باختال" سياسة جزئية"
ا الناس هي من تأويل القرآن : "إىل قيام الساعة وقال هذه السياسة اليت ساسوا 
من والسنة، ولكن هل هي من الشرائع الكلية اليت ال تتغري بتغري األزمنة أم
ا زمانًا ومكانًا 1."السياسات اجلزئية التابعة للمصاحل فتتغري 
اخلربة اإلسالمية للتعبري عن مفهوم يف إن املصطلحات اليت شاع استعماهلا 
فأهل الكتاب ".أهل الذمة"، و"أهل الكتاب"وأمهها مصطلحا األقليات عديدة
لتحديد النطاق البشري واإلنساين الذي يدخل حتت هذا املعىن أو مصطلح وضع 
كان يوسع الفئات اليت ونالحظ أن الفقه اإلسالمي  . يأخذ حكمه قياًسا عليه
تدخل يف معىن أهل الكتاب قياًسا عليهم كلما اتسعت دار اإلسالم والفتوحات 
م فقطهماإلسالمية، فالبعض حتدث عن أن أهل الكتاب الذين ميكن معاهد
على اجلزية واعتبارهم جزًءا من مواطين دار اإلسالم خيرج منهم العرب مث أدخلوهم 
وس،فيهم باعتبار أن هلم شبهة كتاب، مث أدخلوا الوثنيني يف معىن مث أدخلوا ا
فيما يتصل بأحكام الزواج فوارقأهل الكتاب وقاسوهم عليهم وإن كانت هناك 
. ا من الوثنينيكفرً والطعام معلومة معروفة باعتبار أن أهل الكتاب أخفُّ 
اللتني تتسم دراز عن هذه احلركية والقدرة االستيعابية عبد اهللاوقد عرب الشيخ
حيث قرر ،من خالل االجتهاد القائم على اعتبار املقاصديةما الشريعة اإلسالم
كيف كانت الشريعة "أن املسائل اليت بسطها الشاطيب يف شأن علم املقاصد جتلي 
: استخدام أدوات األصول االجتهادية، كما قررها ابن القيم وغريه من العلماء يفعنتفصيالً انظر 1
. 35- 21، صاألقليات والسياسةحبيب، 
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ا نظام عام جلميع البشر دائم أبدي، لو فرض بقاء  مبنيًة على مراعاة املصاحل، وأ
اية ا مراعى فيها جمرى العوائد املستمرةالدنيا إىل غري  وأن اختالف األحكام . ؛ أل
عند اختالف العوائد ليس اختالفًا يف اخلطاب الشرعي نفسه، بل عند اختالف 
يف إطار من الرفق " العوائد ترجع كل عادة إىل أصل شرعي حيكم به عليها
توسيع قاعدة ومن مث فما طوره االجتهاد الفقهي اإلسالمي من صيغ ل1.والسماحة
الداخلني يف معىن مواطين دار اإلسالم إمنا هو يف احلقيقة تعبري عن موقف عقدي 
وشرعي ذي طابع إنساين كوين متصل باالستخالف وإقامة العمران اإلنساين 
. واالجتماع البشري على أساس العدل واألخوة اإلنسانية
الذي لرسولومن مث ال يعقل يف ميزان اإلسالم وشريعة القرآن وسنة ا
أرسله اهللا تعاىل رمحة للعاملني أن يكون املوقف من هؤالء املاليني من البشر 
الذي يبقون على سابق عقائدهم ويقبلون أن يعيشوا حتت سلطة الدولة 
م، فمثل هذا املوقف مناف قطًعا  اإلسالمية هو إعمال السيف فيهم وإباد
ا صاحلة حلل مشك الت اإلنسان يف كل زمان لسماحة شريعة اإلسالم وكو
ومن مث كانت هناك صيغة توفيقية تقوم على فتح الذريعة هلؤالء لكي . ومكان
وسد الذريعة على املسلمني بأخذ اجلزية منهم واحلفاظ على يبقوا على دينهم،
م، فخيار اجلزية هو موقف متصل ببقاء العمران واستمرار  آدميتهم وحيا
مادته اإلنسانية حبفظ حياة البشر واملعنوية بالتبشري استقرار العامل واحلفاظ على 
.بعامل جديد يسود فيه دين الرمحة وهو اإلسالم
أما مصطلح أهل الذمة فهو تعبري قانوين يقوم على عالقة تعاقدية بني 
الدولة اإلسالمية وأهل البلدان املفتوحة يتضمن إقرار غري املسلمني على دينهم 
أحكام امللة، وهو عقد مؤبد يكفل هلم األمان واحلماية بشرط بذل اجلزية والتزام
. 6- 5ص،1/1جالموافقات،الشاطيب، 1
  261
وأهل الذمة هم املعاهدون من . واحلرمة، وبه يصريون من أهل دار اإلسالم
وبينما . اليهود والنصاري وغريهم ممن يقيمون يف دار اإلسالم على سبيل التأبيد
يشري "نظام امللل"فإن مصطلح ،يشري مصطلح أهل الذمة إىل التطبيق العريب
واآلن ال ميكننا استخدام هذه املصطلحات؛ ألن عوائد . إىل اخلربة العثمانية
م قد تغريت، ومن مث فنحن نستخدم بدًال منها مصطلحات  الناس وعالقا
. أخرى، مثل املواطنة، واألقليات، واجلاليات، والسكان األصليني، إخل
ب تغري أحوال مل تعد مصطلًحا سائًغا اليوم بسبىواجلزية هي األخر 
ا يف أذهان غري  الناس وعوائدهم ونظام العمران والعامل، وبسبب صور
ا عنوانًا على الوضاعة االجتماعية والصغار، ومن مث فإننا ال  املسلمني بكو
ذلك أن للجزية يف الفقه . نستخدمها يف العالقة مع غري املسلمني اليوم
يها إسقاطها كما هو احلال اإلسالمي تطبيقات متعددة، فهناك حاالت مت ف
، ويف العديد من املعاهدات بني الدولة اإلسالمية "بين تغلب"مع نصاري 
. ون يف القتالدُ والبلدان املفتوحة كانت اجلزية تسقط إذا شارك املعاهَ 
ويذهب أغلب الفقهاء املسلمني إىل أن اجلزية كانت تؤخذ من غري املسلمني 
بالد يف حالة احلرب، لذا فإن غري القادرين مقابل إسقاط واجب الدفاع عن ال
كذلك فإن اجلزية كانت تؤخذ من أهل الذمة و . ى القتال ال تؤخذ منهم اجلزيةعل
يف مقابل أن تتكفل احلكومُة اإلسالمية حبمايتهم وأمنهم يف أنفسهم وأمواهلم 
ركة ومن مث فمشا1.وسائر أحواهلم االجتماعية، فإن مل تستطع فإنه ال جزية عليهم
هلم "غري املسلمني للمسلمني يف اجليش والضرائب ميكن االستناد فيها إىل قاعدة 
وقد ذكر يف املوضع نفسه أن سويد بن مقرن كتب ألهل دهستان .8، صكام أهل الذمةأحابن القيم، 1
، كمما كتب خالد بن الوليد لصلوبا بن "إن لكم الذمة، وعلينا املنعة: "وسائر أهل جرجان يف زمن عمر
". إن منعناكم فلنا اجلزية، وإال فال حىت مننعكم: "نسطونا وقومه
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1".ما لنا وعليهم ما علينا
وقد أوضحُت يف دراسة سابقة كيف أن متسك فقهاء الدولة العثمانية بفرض 
اجلزية على غري املسلمني بينما يقوم املسلمون باحلرب واجلهاد والدفاع، أدى إىل 
األقليات يف الدولة العثمانية، بينما كانت أعداد املسلمني تتناقص ازدهار عامل
ألقليات حتوُل اولألسف فقد صاحب ازدهاَر . بسبب القتل يف ساحات احلروب
يف عامل األورويبالكثريين من أبنائها إىل وكالء وقناصل لطالئع موجات االستعمار
وحني ألغيت اجلزية سنة . ةلدولة العثمانيلومن مث كان عامل إضعاف 2اإلسالم،
وفرض التجنيد اإلجباري أو اخلدمة العسكرية، ترك القانون الباب مفتوًحا 1857
كانت الكنائس تتهرب منها، ال يريد املشاركة يف القتال، واليت  للبدلية املالية ملن
3.كان ذلك معادلة مناسبة ملن يريدون افتداء أنفسهم باملالف
ا بالنسبة ملسألة حدود و  مشاركة غري املسلمني يف السلطة السياسية، فإ
أيًضا من القضايا املتغرية، ذلك أن تطور مفهوم مشاركة غري املسلمني يف السلطة 
السياسية للدولة اإلسالمية مل يتخذ مساًرا واحًدا، وإمنا اختذ أشكاًال خمتلفة وفق 
ا وتطور مفهوم الوالية ال ذي حكم ممارسة تطور طبيعة الدولة اإلسالمية ذا
فمفهوم الوالية يعين .أمرها حىت لو كان مسلًماالسلطة وشروط من يقوم على 
صالحية االستقالل بالتصرف والتدبري يشرتط أن يكون القائم بتلك الوالية مسلًما 
بدائع الصنائع في ترتيب الشرائعالدين أبو بكر بن مسعود الكاساين، عالء: يفانظر هذه القاعدة1
.100ص،7ج،)1،1329مطبعة شركة املطبوعات العلمية مبصر، ط: القاهرة(
منوذج تطبيق االقرتاب األصويل الشرعي يف التعامل مع غري املسلمني يف الدولة "كمال السعيد حبيب، 2
.78ص،12لعددا،1414نرمضا/1994، مارسمنبر الشرق، "اإلسالمية املعاصرة
وراجع .455- 435حبيب، األقليات والسياسة يف اخلربة اإلسالمية، ص: انظر مزيًدا من التفاصيل يف3
يد حسيب القيسي المجتمع اإلسالمي والغربالسري هاملتون جب وهارولد بوين، : أيًضا ، ترمجة عبد ا
).1،1997دار املدى للثقافة والنشر، ط: دمشق(
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ا باعتبار  باإلضافة طبًعا للعدالة واخلربة، ويشرتط مفهوم الوالية اإلسالم فيمن يقوم 
اإلسالمية كانت الواليات يف تلك املرحلة من مراحل تطور الدولةأن طبيعة بنية 
امسهما " األحكام السلطانية"عنولذا فإن كتايب أيب يعلي واملاوردي. واليات دينية
، فالواليات يف الكتاب هي واليات "األحكام السلطانية والواليات الدينية"الكامل 
والقضاء ا، فاخلالفة واحلرب واجلهاددينية، ومن مث فإن شرط متوليها أن يكون مسلمً 
. واليات دينية يف التنظري الفقهي اإلسالمي
التحوالت اليت حصلت يف طبيعة "املقدمة"ويشرح ابن خلدون يف 
الواليات يف الدولة اإلسالمية وبنيتها فيقرر أن هناك خططًا دينية ختتص 
اليت يقتضيها ، أي"امللوكية السلطانية"باخلالفة وأخرى يسميها باخلطط 
ن اخلطط الدينية الشرعية من أاعلم : "السلطان وامللك أيا كان، مث يقول
الصالة والفتيا والقضاء واجلهاد واحلسبة كلها مندرجة حتت اإلمامة الكربى اليت 
ا اإلمام الكبري واألصل اجلامع وهذه كلها متفرعة عنها . هي اخلالفة، فكأ
وتصرفها يف سائر أحوال امللة الدينية والدنيوية، داخلة فيها لعموم نظر اخلالفة
كالمه يف هذا ابن خلدون  وخيتم1".وتنفيذ أحكام الشرع فيها على العموم
هذا آخر الكالم يف الوظائف اخلالفية، وبقيت منها وظائُف : "الشأن بقوله
ذهبت بذهاب ما ينظر فيه وأخرى صارت سلطانية؛ فوظيفة اإلمارة والوزارة 
2".واخلراج صارت سلطانيةواحلرب
ومها ينتميان- ) ه458-380(وأبو يعلى) ه450-370(وإذا كان املاوردي 
لواليات كلها على إىل اقد نظرا -منتصفه للقرن الرابع واخلامس اهلجري حىت
املكتبة : بريوت/صيدا(، حتقيق درويش اجلويدي مقدمة ابن خلدونعبد الرمحن بن حممد ابن خلدون، 1
.237- 217وانظر القول فيما مساه اخلطط امللوكية السلطانية يف ص. 202ص،)2،1416/1996العصرية، ط
.209املرجع نفسه، ص2
THE QUESTION OF MINORITIES IN ISLAM264
ا واليات دينية، فإن ابن خلدون الذي ينتمي  لقرن الثامن وأوائل لأ
هذا يعين أن و ة الواليات تغريت، يرى أن طبيع- ) ه808- 722(التاسع 
فضًال عن ،الواليات يف الدولة اإلسالمية مل تأخذ مساًرا واحًدا يف تطورها
أن تثبت على منط واحد، وإمنا اختلفت طبيعتها باختالف مراحل التطور 
التارخيي للدولة وطبًقا ملدى متثلها لقيم الدين وسعيها لتحقيق مقاصد 
هو مما يتغري بتغري الزمان ومداهايعة الواليةوهكذا فتحديد طب. الشريعة
. واألحوال والعوائد
وميكن القول إن املنصب األعلى املتمثل يف الرئاسة العليا للدولة اليت 
أغلب أبنائها مسلمون هو إشارة إىل والية ال ميكن لغري املسلم أن يتوالها 
ا وتعبريًا عن هوي . ة األغلبية فيهاباعتبارها عنوان الدولة ورمًزا لسياد
وبالطبع هناك مؤسسات مثل اإلفتاء والقضاء الشرعي ومؤسسات القرار 
االسرتاتيجي املتصلة باحلرب والسلم هي مما يعرب عن التوجهات العامة 
للدولة، أما املناصب ذات الطابع التنفيذي وتلك اليت ليس هلا طابع ديين 
قى شرط الوالء للدولة خاص فإن شرط اإلسالم فيها ال يكون واجًبا، ويب
ويف هذا . قائًما بالنسبة لغري املسلم كما تشرتط العدالة بالنسبة للمسلم
الصدد يشري ابن خلدون إىل أنه كان من عوائد دولة الرتك يف مصر أن 
يكون وزير اجلباية والتصريف والتولية والعزل يف سائر العمال املباشرين هلذه 
القبط القائمني "اتبهم وتباين أصنافهم من اجلباية والتنفيذ على اختالف مر 
على ديوان احلسبان واجلباية الختصاصهم بذلك يف مصر منذ عصور 
وقد نص املاوردي من قبله على جواز أن يكون وزير التنفيذ من1".قدمية
.222املرجع نفسه، ص1
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1.وإن مل جيز أن يكون وزير التفويض منهم،أهل الذمة
املسلمني يف السلطة وهناك اجتهادات متعددة حول حدود مشاركة غري
داموا مؤهلني ذوي كفاية، وكلها تقول حبقهم يف املشاركة يف السلطة السياسية ما
ذات الطابع غري الديين، أي يف غري ما يعطي للدولة هويتها وحيدد توجهها 
م يسريون على هذا املبدإواألمريكيون2؛االسرتاتيجي العام يتحدثون إذ يبدو أ
majority)"حق األقليةحكم األغلبية و "عن  Rule and minority Rights).
فاالستثناءات اليت ترد على مبدأ املساواة واليت تنظمها الدولة اإلسالمية بالنسبة 
ملشاركة غري املسلمني يف تويل املناصب العامة يف الدولة تفرتض أن طبيعة الدولة مبا 
القائمون على التوجيه هي دولة قائمة على عقيدة اإلسالم اليت توجب أن يكون
وهذا ال يعد متييزًا ولكنه تصنيف يتم ،ينتمون لعقيدة الدولةاوالتخطيط فيها أفرادً 
3.على أساس اختالف مواطين الدولة يف بعض األوصاف
هي مشاركة األفراد الذين " معجم العلوم االجتماعية"إن املواطنة كما يشري 
اجبات، واحلقوق هي اليت ترى الدولة أنه ينتمون إىل دولة معينة يف احلقوق والو 
املناسب منَحها لبعض األفراد الذين هم من أهاليها مبقتضى قوانينها األساسية، 
ويرى الفقه السياسي اإلسالمي أن غري . وهي تشري يف القانون الدويل إىل اجلنسية
م يشرتكون مع املسلمني يف احلقوق  املسلمني جزء من أهل دار اإلسالم، وأ
احلرية : ولذا عدد الفقهاء ماهلم من حقوق وأفاضوا يف ذكرها، وأمهها. والواجبات
، حتقيق أمحد األحكام السلطانية والواليات الدينيةبن حبيب املاوردي، أبو احلسن علي بن حممد1
وانظر مزيًدا من . 37- 36ص،)1409/1989، 1مكتبة دار ابن قتيبة، ط: الكويت(مبارك البغدادي 
. 76- 72، صاألقليات والسياسةحبيب،: التفصيالت واإلحاالت يف
،)1988/1408دار الشروق،: القاهرة(عة الوطنيةالمسلمون واألقباط في إطار الجماطارق البشري،2
.آراء عديدة أخرى مثل ما قرره عبد الكرمي زيدان ورضوان السيد وغريمهاكهناو . 688- 686ص
.155، صمواطنون ال ذميونهويدي،3
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الشخصية اليت تتضمن حرية غري املسلم يف احلركة والتنقل وعدم جواز القبض عليه 
أو حبسه أو معاقبته إال مبقتضى القانون، وحريته يف التنقل داخل الدولة وخروجه 
ن، وحرمة العقيدة حيث تضمنت عقود املواطنة منها وعودته إليها، مث حرمة املسك
. ألهل الذمة مع الدولة املسلمة تركهم وما يدينون به
التعبري عن وكذلك فإن لغري املسلم حق التمتع مبرافق الدولة وحرية العمل و 
ويذهب الشيخ عبد الكرمي زيدان إىل أنه ليس يف نصوص . والتعليمالرأي واالجتماع
قواعدها ما مينع الذميني من حرية إبداء الرأي واالجتماع؛ فلهم الشريعة اإلسالمية و 
م والشؤ إبداء الرأي فيما خيص ش ، وهلم امة للدولة يف حدود النظام العامون العؤ و
حق احلماية من االعتداء اخلارجي والظلم الداخلي، وهلم حق محاية الدماء واألبدان 
1.والشيخوخة والفقرواألموال واألعراض، وهلم التأمني عند العجز 
أي حق غري املسلمني ،ويف هذا السياق تربز قضايا مثل حرية التدين والعقيدة
يف ممارسة شعائرهم، ويتصل بذلك قضية الكنائس واملعابد والبيع وحدود القواعد 
دم من بن وهذه ائها أو استحداث جديد مل يكناليت تنظم عملية جتديد ما 
وحجم ية اجتهادية تقوم على املصلحة والعرف والعادةالقضية يف اعتقادنا هي قض
أعداد غري املسلمني وتوزعهم وحاجتهم إىل إقامة دور للعبادة وتقدير ما يرتتب على 
موضوع يري اليت وضعها الفقه اإلسالمي ملعاجلةوإن املعا. ذلك من مصاحل ومفاسد
هاة واحلفاظ على طابعبناء الكنائس راعى فيها قضية األمن القومي للدولة اإلسالمي
وبالنسبة . الذي حيرتم األغلبية املسلمة وحيرتم النظام العام للدولةالعامالعمراين 
لتكافؤ دم املسلم وغري املسلم من مواطين الدولة اإلسالمية فالفقه احلنفي والدولة 
العثمانية أخذا بتكافؤمها، فكانت تقتص للمعاهد الذمي من املسلم، ويف كل 
. 80-78، صاألقليات والسياسةالسعيد، 1
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1.فإن نفس غري املسلم مصونة وقتله حمرم لورود األحاديث اليت حترم ذلكاألحوال 
وهكذا تبدو العالقة قوية بني فقه املقاصد الذي يقوم على إعمال املبادي 
الكلية ومراعاة قواعد االجتماع اإلنساين وسنن االستخالف وعمارة األرض،  
فيما يتطلب فيه من كما يقوم على فقه الواقع وإدراك وجوه املصاحل واملفاسد
أوضاع فيستند يف ذلك على مجلة من القواعد واألصول كمراعاة املصلحة املرسلة 
ونظم التعاهد والعقود، واعتبار املآالت وقواعد العرف والعادة واالستحسان 
وسد الذرائع وغريها من الوسائل واملناهج الشرعية اليت تقود يف النهاية إىل 
واليت تتمثل يف الضروريات اخلمسة، وهي حفظ الدين لشريعة لاملقاصد الكلية 
ولنقرر أن من عظمة شريعة اإلسالم أن اعتربت . والنفس والعقل والنسل واملال
أيًضا غري تشملضرورياتا تلك الضروريات قائمة يف كل ملة وأمة، وأ
املسلمني يف الدولة اإلسالمية، فحفظ دينهم بعدم إكراههم على تغيريه بل 
يئ ، كل ذلك مما وكذا نفوسهم ونسلهم2ة الظروف للتمسك به والقيام عليهو
. قيم الشريعة اإلسالمية العامة ومقاصدها الكليةتقتضيه 
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>  =  <  ;  :  9?@A: يف بعض التفاسري لقوله تعاىل2
CB)م، أي لو ال دفاع املسلمني عن غري املسلمني لتهدمت أماكن عب)40: احلج . اد
. 21ص،1، جأحكام أهل الذمة: وراجع ابن القيم
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اليت اشتقت " قلل"وتشري معاجم اللغة إىل مادة . ية أو مباينة الغالب والكثرةواجلزئ
، وقليلون يكون ذلك "القلة خالف الكثرة: "منها كلمة األقلية، فلسان العرب يقول
}  |  : اجلثة وقوم قليل أيًضا، كما يف قوله تعاىليف قلة العدد ورقة
  ~  })ل القصري من والقليل من الرجا.)86: األعراف
الرجال الدقيق اجلثة، والقل من الرجال اخلسيس الدين، ويقال هو قل بن قل أي ال 
من الناس إذا كانوا من قبائل ) بضم القاف(يعرف هو وال أبوه، ويقال قدم علينا قُلل 
شىت متفرقني، وقلة كل شيء رأسه، والقلة أعلى اجلبل، وقلة كل شيء أعاله، وخص 
ويشري معجم القرآن الكرمي إىل أن الكلمة يف 1أس والسنام واجلبل،بعضهم به أعلى الر 
  Z  Y  X   W  V  U  T: إيل النقص كقوله تعاىلالقرآن تشري
\  [) وقوله تعاىل عن فرعون)249: ةالبقر ، :È  Ç   Æ  Å
تثري بعض الدالالت اللغوية" أقلية"، فاملادة اليت اشتقت منها كلمة  )54: الشعراء(
}  |  : كمية يف مقابل األكثر كما يف قوله تعاىلةفهي تعرب عن دالل
  ~  })ا تستخدم للتعبري عن داللة  )86: األعراف ، وأ
الربا وإن  «: بن مسعود عبد اهللا كيفية ال جتعل العدد معيارًا هلا كما يف حديث
ية خالصة، كما يف تعبريًا عن حالة كيفوقد تكون2،»كثر فإن عاقبته تصري إىل قل
Ã   Â  Á   À  ¿: الشيء كما يف قوله تعاىلتفسري القلة بأعلى
وتشري الكلمة إىل جتمع األشتات املتفرقني من . ، أي محلت وارتفعت)57: األعراف(
اليت يشري إليها املصطلح يف العلوم نفسهاأصول عرقية متعددة، وهي الداللة
من الناس، إذا كانوا من قبائل قدم علينا قلل : "قولهوهذا واضح جدا يف ،االجتماعية
دار املعارف، : القاهرة(، حتقيق عبد اهللا علي الكبري وزمالئه لسان العربابن منظور، حممد بن مكرم، 1
.3729- 3726ص، 5، ج)بدون تاريخ
.47ص،2ج،2317، احلديث"كتاب البيوع"، المستدركاحلاكم النيسابوري، 2
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1".متفرقنيشىت
بيد أن التأمل يف السياق القرآين يفتح لنا آفاقًا أوسع لفهم هذا املصطلح، 
: كما يف قوله تعاىل،ففي القرآن الكرمي جند أن املادة استخدمت أكثر من مرة
  ³  ²  ±´ ̧  ¶  µ)ةكميداللة  ذات ، فهي )14-13: الواقعة
والسبق، يف سياق كيفي، فالقلة هنا ال تعين النقص وإمنا تعين التميز واالرتقاء
ا حبالة اجتماعية وسياسية تعرب عن االستضعاف يف قوله  ا ما يزيد بيا وأحلق 
، وتقدم )26: األنفال('  &  %  $  #  "  !: تعاىل
اق اجتماعي وسياسي يعكس يف سي" شرذمة"عليها ما يزيدها بيانًا وهي كلمة 
كما تذهب إليه الدراسات االجتماعية ،أكثر احلاالت تعبريًا عن مفهوم األقلية
يف قوله تعاىل حكاية عن فرعون يف وصفه لقوم موسي بعد أن ، وذلكاحلديثة
-54: الشعراء(  È  Ç   Æ  ÅÉÌ  Ë  Ê: خرجوا من مصر
يف هذا السياق " شرذمة قليلون"عبارةافرتاض أن إىل ومييل الباحث .)55
" األقلية السياسية"تعكس الداللة السياسية واالجتماعية ملا يشري إليه مصطلح 
وهو - " االستضعاف"وأن مصطلح ،)السلطة احلاكمة(من وجهة نظر األغلبية 
ولكن من حيث رؤية ،"األقلية"ا عن مصطلح هو األكثر تعبريً - مصطلح قرآين 
جتاه اجلماعة الغالبة اليت توصف عادة يف القرآن باالستكبار هذه األقلية لنفسها
2.حني يكون الصراع بني األقلية واألغلبية حول املبدأ
ولئن كان القرآن الكرمي يستخدم لفظ القلة للتعبري عن النقص العددي، إال أنه 
م يف ال جيعل منه مثارًا لالحتقار أو التقليل من الشأن، بل الغالب أن القلة تستخد
السياق القرآين للتعبري عن املدح والتقدير، وهذا ما يؤكد أن التصور القرآين ال جيعل 
. 53- 52، صليات والسياسةاألق، حبيب1
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العددي مقياًسا لرتتيب أوضاع اجتماعية وسياسية واقتصادية متميزة البعدمن جمرد 
. باعتبار أن هذا التمييز هو تعبري عن احلق الذي متثله قيم اإلسالم
اجلماعة اليت تعيش داخل "األقلية تعين ومن وجهة النظر اإلسالمية فإن 
تمع اإلسالمي على سبيل االستقرار  ، وهلا حكم شرعي خمتلف عن )الدوام(ا
أحكام اجلماعة املسلمة أو اليت فارقت اجلماعة املسلمة بتأويل ديين اليسوغ، 
املستأمنون الذين ر السياسي اإلسالميأقلية من وجهة نظر الفكدُّ عَ فإنه ال يُـ 
ون دار اإلسالم لضرورات تفرضها طبيعة العالقة بني البلدان املسلمة وبقية يدخل
الحكم الشرعيبلدان العامل، وينظم العالقة بني اجلماعة املسلمة واألقلية 
الكثرة أو القلة العددية، ويقصد باحلكم الشرعي اجتهاد مفهومال المعياري
وضاع املنظمة لتواجد غري يف حتديد طبيعة األاملؤسسات الدينية والقانونية
تمع املسلم مبا ال يتعارض مع املقاصد العامة للشريعة أو  املسلمني يف ا
1.نصوصها القطعية وقواعدها ثابتة
ويعد أقلية َمْن فارق اجلماعة بتأويل ديين ال يسوغ، أي ال جتيزه قواعد اللغة أو 
يدخل ضمن هؤالء و . وهذه تسمى اجلماعات املخالفة إلمجاع األمة،الشريعة
، فهؤالء ينتسبون لإلسالم وإن كان والقاديانيونالدروز واإلمساعيليون والبهائيون
م أحق  أي الذي ال (والتأويل الديين الذي ال يسوغ .بوصف الردةهناك من يرى أ
هو ذلك التأويل الذي ) حتتمله قواعد اللغة العربية وقواعد األصول يف فهم الشريعة
اك معىن النص واخلروج عن مقصوده، كما يف تأويل املرتدين لقوله يؤدي إىل انته
ا خاصة بالنيب ) 103: التوبة(m  l  k  j: تعاىل وحده فال أ
ا للخلفاء من بعده، وتأويل اخلوارج  ~    ¡  : يف قوله تعاىل" احلكم"يدفعو
. 56، صاملرجع نفسه1
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¢)ن هناك أدلة على ذلك  نفَي احلكم للبشر متاًما، وإن كابأنه يعين ) 57: األنعام
،)35: النساء(X  W  V  U  T  S  R: كما قوله تعاىل
1).95: املائدة( Ã  Â  Á  À  ¿: وكما يف قوله تعاىل
ا خارجة عن إمجاع  ولكن ما املعايري اليت جتعلنا نقول عن فرقة معينة إ
األمة، وبالتايل تعد من األقلية من وجهة النظر اإلسالمية؟ 
عبد القاهر البغدادي أنه ال ينتسب ألمة اإلسالم كلُّ من قال ال إله إال ذكر 
اهللا، فالذين يعتقدون إهلية األئمة أو بعضهم، والذين يعتقدون مذاهب احللول 
أو الذين يقولون بنسخ ،والذين يبيحون نكاح البنات أو البنني،وتناسخ األرواح
نص القرآن على حترميه، أو حرم ما من أباح ما ، و اإلسالم يف آخر الزمانشريعة
وفرق ! اإلسالم وال كرامة لهأباحه القرآن نصا ال حيتمل التأويل، فليس هو من أمة
الفرق اليت ظهرت قبل اإلسالم وبعده فقرر أن الفرق اليت ظهرت بعد البغدادي بني
عن الدولة اإلسالمية فال جيوز أخذ اجلزية من أهلها؛ ألن حكمهم حكم املرتدين 
: ويضع البغدادي هنا شرطني.الدين، ال حتل ذبائحهم وال حيل نكاح املرأة منهم
فهم النصوص القرآنية فهًما يتفق وقواعد اللغة واألصول، فال :أولهما
باملعلوم من عرفيذهب إىل حد إباحة احلرام أو حترمي املباح أو خمالفة ملا ي
. الدين بالضرورة يف العقائد واألحكام
ا تصري هو زمن ظهور الفرقة، فإن ظهرت بعد دولة:هماوثاني اإلسالم فإ
ورمبا يذهب لذلك باعتبار أن دولة اإلسالم قد أقامت احلجة على الناس ،مرتدة
خاصة فيما يتصل بشعائر الدين اإلسالمي ومبادئه، وبالتايل فال عذر هلذه الفرق 
.57املرجع نفسه، ص1
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1.الت األهواءفيما ذهبت إليه إال جمرد اتباع خطوات الشيطان وضال
وإذا كان عبد القاهر البغدادي ذكر هذه املعايري جمردة، ومل يتعرض للواقع 
تنزيل هذه األحكام على (الذي تطبق فيه األحكام أو ما يسمى بفقه التنزيل 
فتحدث عن تعامل االجتاهيف هذاخطوة مهمة ، فإن ابن تيمية خطا )الواقع
، وهو جيعل "الطائفة املمتنعة"ل ما أمساه الدولة اإلسالمية مع هذه الفرق من خال
سبًبا -مبعىن عدم التزام أحكام الدولة اإلسالمية واخلضوع هلا -االمتناع العضوي 
م يقاتَلون كما يُقاَتل الكفارُ  ومفهوم االمتناع يعين . يف عدم إقرارهم يف الدولة، وأ
فوجهة نظر ابن تيمية . االجتماع، والتحيز، ورفع راية العصيان: ثالثة أشياء هي
ركزت على االستقرار السياسي للدولة، بينما ركزت وجهة نظر البغدادي على 
أنه ميكن قبول هذه -ومن منظور مقاصدي -ويرى الباحث . هوية الدولة
تمع املسلم إذا مل حيدث منها  امتناع "اجلماعات اخلارجة على إمجاع األمة يف ا
احلاكم عيارقى املصلحة الشرعية العليا هي امل، وتب"امتناع ثقايف"أو " عضوي
2.الجتهاد الدولة يف كيفية التعامل معهم
قاعدة - جريًا على قواعد الفقه املالكي - ن ما أطلق عليه الشاطيب بل إ
ميكن تطبيقها هنا حيث يراعى اخلالف، ويؤخذ يف االعتبار "مراعاة اخلالف 
ا فإنه بعد تكون هذه اجلماعات بعد وقوع األمر عنه قبل وقوع اخلالف، لذ
داخل الدولة اإلسالمية بعهود طويلة فإن استئصاهلم وفًقا ألحكام الردة ال يتفق 
وقواعد السياسة الشرعية الصحيحة مع القطع بأن فعالية الوظيفة العقيدية للدولة 
ولنا أن نؤكد أن غياب مفهوم . ميكن أن حتوهلم ناحية الفهم الشرعي الصحيح
، حتقيق حممد الَفْرق بين الِفَرق وبيان الفرقة الناجية منهمأبو منصور عبد القاهر بن طاهر بن حممد البغدادي، 1
.  64، صاألقليات والسياسةلك حبيب، وانظر كذ؛31- 30، ص)ت. دار ابن سينا، د: القاهرة(عثمان اخلشت 
.  65ص،األقليات والسياسةحبيب، 2
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من القومي للمجتمع يقوم على تبين املفهوم اإلسالمي للسلطة الذي واضح لأل
يرتكز على مفهوم العدالة كان أحد األسباب اجلوهرية اليت أدت إىل اخرتاق 
ديدها فكريا وعضويا فخطر هذه الفرق ميكن . هذه الفرق للدولة اإلسالمية و
أن أن نعلمقيقة وصفه بأنه خطر سياسي وثقايف ممتد، ويكفي لتأكيد هذه احل
بدايات التجزئة يف اجلسد اإلسالمي حدثت بسبب استقالل أقلية جبزء من 
ويف حاالت تعرض الدولة . أطراف الدولة فيما نطلق عليه الدولة األقلية
اإلسالمية للخطر اخلارجي، فإن هذه الفرق قد تتعاون مع أعداء الدولة 
إلسالمي من قبل أحد الوزراء اخلارجيني إىل حد أن استدعاء التتار للعامل ا
املنتمني للروافض الباطنية، وهو ابن العلقمي الذي اعتقد أن هوالكو سيعود من 
. حيث أتى بعد قتل املعتصم، وعندئذ تنتقل اخلالفة إىل العلويني
 
ميثل الفقه املقاصدي مقاربة مهمة يف التعامل مع قضية األقليات وما يتفرع عنها 
االت  االجتماعية والسياسية والفكرية، سواء على مستوى قبول املصطلح يف ا
باعتباره مصطلًحا حادثًا يف الفقه السياسي اإلسالمي، ولكنه يبقى مصطلًحا 
مفيًدا إذا ما نظر إليه يف إطار علم اجتماع إسالمي، أو على مستوى توخي 
وبالنسبة للمسائل . احلكم الشرعي املناسب الذي مييز بني اجلماعة املسلمة وغريها
الكثرية املتصلة باألقليات، كمسألة املواطنة واملشاركة وحرية العقيدة والدين وغريها 
أو أشار إليه، فإن الفقه املقاصدي ميكننا من خالل فصل هذا الناقشهمما 
استخدام أدواته العلمية واملنهجية واعتبار إنسانية اإلنسان وتكرمي اهللا له وبقاء 
اجتهادات ورأن نط، منمرار احلياة واالستخالف والتعامل باملثلالعمران واست
جديدة ال تتعارض مع املقاصد الكلية للشريعة وقواعدها العامة أو نصوصها 
دد وحدة األوطان، وال القطعية، حبيث حنسن التعامل مع قضية األقليات، فال 
THE QUESTION OF MINORITIES IN ISLAM274
ليات وتلبية تفتح الباب للتدخل اخلارجي، كما ميكننا حل مشكالت تلك األق
ا ومطالبها يف إطار من التوافق االجتماعي والتعاون اإلنساين الداخلي مبا  حاجا
. االجتماعيو االستقرار السياسي بال خيل بأسس الدولة على مستوى اهلوية وال 
ومن املناسب أن خنتم هذا البحث بذكر ما قرره الدكتور علي مجعة عند النظر يف 
اإلطار الذي ميكن أن تُدار من خالله عالقات املسلمني مقاصد الشريعة بوصفها
: ترتيب الكليات اخلمس على حنو ما قررناه: "بغريهم يف الداخل واخلارج حيث قال
النفس، العقل، الدين، النسل، املال، هو ترتيب منطقي وله اعتبار، حيث إنه جيب 
ا األفعال، مث على ا لعقل الذي به التكليف، مث احملافظة أوًال على النفس اليت تقوم 
ا العبادة وقوام العامل ويرتتب على ذلك أن عالقة 1."حنافظ على الدين الذي 
، وبذلك "مبنية يف الداخل على الرعاية، ويف اخلارج على الدعوة"املسلمني مع اآلخرين 
به حضارة، وعلى ما ميكن أن قائًما على ما ميكن أن تُقاميكون خطاب املسلمني 
به األرض، وكذلك على ما ميكن أن يعبد به اهللا سبحانه وتعاىل، ويطيع أوامره عمر ت
دولة "تفصيًال ال إمجاالً، ومن مث تكون الدولة اإلسالمية اليت ترعى مقاصد الشريعة 
ويتحقق فيها املناخ املناسب للتعدد الديين واالجتماعي والتعايش " حتافظ على الناس
2.ب األديان األخرى على أساس املواطنةبني املسلمني وغريهم من أصحا
.317ص،)1،1424/2004دار السالم، ط: القاهرة(المدخل إلى دراسة المذاهب الفقهيةعلي مجعة حممد، 1





إذا كان الوجود اإلسالمي بالغرب عموًما يتطّور على نسق سريع يف كّمه وكيفه، 
عليه واآلمال املستقبلية اليت يستشرفها سوف يطاهلا هي فإّن األهداف املطروحة 
أيضا التغّري والتطّور، فتلك األهداف واآلمال ملّا كان هذا الوجود يتمّثل يف عدد 
مل يكن لألسر وللجيل الناشئ حضور كثيف ليست هي ذات و املسلمني قليل من
بينهم العدد األهداف واآلمال حني أصبح هذا العدد يُعّد بعشرات املاليني من
وكذلك فإنّه ملا كان هذا الوجود اإلسالمي يعترب . الكبري من األسر واألجيال الناشئة
ا ملا د املنشأ،نفسه وجوًدا عارًضا غايته العودة إىل بال مل تبق تلك الغاية هي ذا
أصبح هذا الوجود يعترب نفسه وجوًدا مواطًنا ثابًتا يشّكل مكّونًا أساسيا من 
تمع األورويبمكّونات  .ا
إّن هذا التطّور يف أهداف الوجود اإلسالمي بالغرب وآماله يستلزم 
بالضرورة تطورًا يف الفقه اإلفتائي له ليكون وجوًدا حمّقًقا لتلك األهداف واآلمال 
أفراًدا افطبيعة اإلفتاء لألقليات املسلمة باعتباره. وفق أحكام الدين ومقاصده
خالل وجودهم افظة على دينهم يف ذوات أنفسهميقف طموُحهم عند حّد احمل
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يف جمتمع غريب عنهم ريثما يعودون إىل بالدهم اإلسالمية ومل ينقص من دينهم 
تمع  شيء ليست هي طبيعة الفقه اإلفتائي ألقليات مسلمة مواطنة يف ا
تمع،  األورويب بصفة مجاعية، ترنو إىل أن يكون هلا شأن حضاري يف ذلك ا
ذو طبيعة جزئية تعتمد إىل حد كبري على منزع الرتخيص ملا يعاجل تاءٌ فذلك إف
من وضع صفته االستثنائية، وهذا إفتاء ينبغي أن يكون ذا طبيعة كلية تأسيسية 
.ملا يعاجل من وضع ينزع إىل االستقرار والدميومة
وإذا كان االختالف يف طبيعة اإلفتاء بني هذا وذاك اختالفًا قائًما على 
ف األحوال واألوضاع، فإنّه باعتبار تداخل تلك األوضاع واألحوال يف املرحلة اختال
ا األقلي املسلمة بأوروبا على وجه اخلصوص قد يقع هو أيًضا اتاالنتقالية اليت متّر 
يف بعض التداخل، فُيفىت إذن للمرحلة اجلديدة مبا حّقه أن يُفىت به للمرحلة القدمية 
شأنه أن حيدث ارتباًكا يف التوجيه الشرعي لألقلّية والعكس صحيح، وهو ما من
ومن شأنه أن ينعكس سلبًا على املسلمة حبسب مقتضيات احلالني املتداخلتني،
.األهداف واآلمال يف املرحلة اجلديدة
الذكر إىل التوفر على رؤية واضحة ملا يتصدون له من أهلَ وهذا األمر يدعو
يساعدها على حتقيق أهدافها، إفتاؤهم حبيث فيأيتإفتاء لألقّليات املسلمة، 
واكب تطّورات تلك األهداف حىت ال تبقى الفتاوى يف واد املاضي واألهداف يو 
مسرية بذلك، فتتعّطل متشعب يف احلاضرواآلمال املستشرفة للمستقبل يف واد آخر
تاوى تلك األقليات يف تطّورها من حال إىل ما هو أفضل منها إذا ما وقفت عند الف
املوضوعة للحال األوىل، أو تتطّور إىل ما تستشرفه من مستقبل ولكن على غري 
.هدي ديين تكّفل اإلفتاء بأن يكون هو هدفه املبتغى
اتوبالنظر إىل هذا الوضع الذي جيد أهل الذكر أنفسهم مفتني فيه ألقلي
مسلمة يف الغرب هي يف حال تطّور من مرحلة إىل أخرى، فإنّه أصبح من 
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) اسرتاتيجية(لضروري أن تكون القرارات والفتاوى الفقهية مستهدية خبطّة كربى ا
تأخذ بعني االعتبار هذه املرحلة االنتقالية فيما هي مشدودة فيه إىل وضع 
سابق، وما هي مستشرفة إياه من وضع مستقبلي، ليكون اهلدي الديين الذي 
ى هذا االنتقال مبا حيّقق يتصّدى له املفتون يف شأن األقّلية مساعًدا هلا عل
.أهدافها املتطّورة دومنا اضطراب أو احنراف
ويف ضوء ما تقّدم فلعّل السؤال املهّم الذي يُثار يف بناء اسرتاتيجية الفقه 
كيف ميكن إقامة معادلة صحيحة لبناء فقه : اإلفتائي لألقليات املسلمة هو
ة العرضية من فتوى متيل إىل لألقّليات املسلمة يف أوروبا بني ما تقتضيه املرحل
الرتخيص حبكم الطبيعة االستثنائية لتلك املرحلة، وما تقتضيه مرحلة املواطنة من 
فتوى متيل إىل التأسيس حبكم طبيعتها املستقرّة؟ إّن اجلواب على هذا السؤال 
يقتضي شرًحا أوىف لطبيعة املرحلتني يف أبعادمها املختلفة، وبيانًا لطبيعة ما 
كّل منهما من الفقه اإلفتائي، حىت يتّم بعد ذلك بناء املعادلة بني فقه تقتضيه  
الرتخيص وفقه التأسيس خطًّا أساسيا من خطوط االسرتاتيجية اهلادية لفقه 
.اإلفتاء يف شأن األقليات املسلمة
 
: وبا هو وضع انتقايل بني مرحلتنيإّن الوضع الذي ميّر به الوجود اإلسالمي بأور 
وال ختطئ عني الدارس هلذا الوضع . مرحلة عرضية سابقة، ومرحلة مستقرّة الحقة
االنتقايل مظاهَر ومتّثالٍت هلاتني املرحلتني، تؤول املتعّلقة منهما باملرحلة األوىل إىل 
ا هي السّنة يف هذا وكم. التناقص شيًئا فشيًئا، لتحّل حمّلها املظاهر املتعّلقة بالثانية
الشأن، فإّن بني املنصرف واملقبل نزاًعا يضيف للمشهد عنصرًا جديًدا ينبغي دوًما 
.، ليؤخذ بعني االعتبار يف العالجتشخيصأخذه بعني االعتبار يف ال
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مرحلة العرضية-أ
ملّا بدأ املسلمون يتوافدون إىل أوروبا يف اهلجرة اليت هم فيها اآلن مل يكن خيطر 
باهلم إّال أن يأتوا إليها من أجل قضاء مأرب وقيت، هو حتصيل مكسب اقتصادي ب
يف األكثر أو علمي يف األقّل، مث العودة إىل بالدهم اإلسالمية اليت وفدوا منها 
م وحياة أبنائهم يف ظروف أفضل وحىت أولئك . بغنائمهم املكتسبة ليؤّسسوا حيا
م املقام يف الديار األور  وبية كانت العودة إىل بالدهم هي احللم األكرب الذين طال 
الذي حالت دونه يف الغالب ظروف قسرية، فكانت أجسامهم يف أوروبا وآماهلم 
.وأشواقهم معّلقة ببالدهم األصلية
وعلى أساس ذلك فإّن حياة هؤالء املهاجرين انبنت على أساس الظرفية يف  
ا م مل تكن تشمل. كّل جماال األسر إالّ على سبيل الندرة، ومن ذلك أّن هجر
إذ األسرة هي عنوان االستقرار، واالستقرار املأمول إمنا يكون يف البالد األصلية، 
فكان معظم املهاجرين يعيشون يف أوروبا عزّابًا من العمال والطلبة واملضطهدين 
ا أعماالً كانت و . السياسيني ذات طابع ظريف يف األعمال اليت كانوا يتعاطو
ها، وهي ال تعدو أن تكون إجارة لليد العاملة يف األكثر، أو أنشطة مهنية أغلب
ومل يكن متّلك البيوت أو املتاجر داخًال يف حسبان املهاجرين إّال . يف األقلّ 
.نادرًا؛ إذ هو من مقتضيات االستقرار الذي مل يكن مطروًحا عليهم
يكون البعد اجلماعي وقد أّدى هذا النمط الظريف من حياة املهاجرين إىل أن 
م ببعضهم بوصفهم مسلمني بعًدا ضعيًفا إىل درجة كبرية، إذ الشعور  يف عالقا
م مسلمون أفرادً  ّ ا وليسوا مجاعة، فكانت العالقات السائد بينهم هو الشعور بأ
اجلارية بينهم تقوم يف أغلبها على ذلك األساس؛ وهلذا السبب فإّن املؤّسسات 
إىل البعد اجلماعي مل يكن هلا وجود يتجاوز العدد القليل من واهليئات اليت تشري 
.املَصلَّيات اليت يقتصر دورها متاًما على أداء صلوات يتفّرق املسلمون بعدها أفرادا
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تمع األورويب الذي يعيشون فيه حمدودة وكذلك فقد كانت عالقتهم با
جارة اليت كانت عمل أغلب جدا، ال تكاد تتجاوز املعامالت املتعلقة بإجراءات اإل
أّما الوشائج االجتماعية والثقافية واالقتصادية فضًال عن السياسية، فقد  . املهاجرين
كان غري وارد على املهاجرين أن ينخرطوا فيها، حبكم ما حيملونه من شعور بظرفية 
.وجودهم يف املهجر، فلم يكن هلا إذن وجود يف الواقع إال على سبيل الندرة
نت إذن أوضاع األقّليات املسلمة بأوروبا منذ بدأت اهلجرة إليها قبل هكذا كا
هجرةً : ما يقارب القرن، وقد ظّلت على ذلك النحو ما يقارب ثالثة أرباع القرن
ا ظرفية حمكومة بالتوق إىل العودة، متخّففةً فردية، مرتّبةً  ّ من كّل على أساس أ
بالطابع الوضع األسري، ومنطبعةً مقتضيات االستقرار يف ممارسة األعمال ويف 
الفردي الذي خيلو أو يكاد من الشعور بالوجود اجلماعي للجالية املسلمة، وحمدودةً 
تمع الذي تعيش فيه .على خمتلف أوجه احلياةإىل درجات كبرية يف تفاعلها مع ا
مرحلة االستقرار-ب
زيد على العقدين من الزمن إّن مرحلة الظرفية اآلنفة البيان بدأت تغزوها منذ ما ي
مرحلة أخرى مقابلة هلا، وهي مرحلة الوجود املستقّر الثابت للمسلمني املهاجرين؛ إذ 
قد بدأ كثري منهم يرّتب أمره على أساس أن يكون هذا املهجر هو مستقّر احلياة، 
الّ ودار القرار، وعلى أّن البلد األصلي الذي هاجروا منه أو هاجر منه آباؤهم مل يبق إ
ها على سبيل السياحة أو التواصل مع ما تـذكريات بعيدة ال يتجاوز التوق إليها زيار 
ا وما فتئت أعداُد هذا الصنف من املسلمني تزداد يومً . بقي فيها من ذوي األرحام
.بعد يوم حىت أصبحت تزاحم أعداد أولئك املنتسبني للمرحلة الظرفية
من املسلمني يوّجه حياته حتقيًقا ويف هذه املرحلة أصبح العدد املتزايد 
لالستقرار حنو بناء أسري بدل العزوبة، حىت امتّدت األسر إىل جيل ثان وطالئع 
لثالث، ويوّجهها حنو أعمال دائمة بتعاطي ضروب من التجارة وتأسيس 
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املقاوالت والشركات بدل أعمال اإلجارة الظرفية، بل بدأ يوّجهها حنو متّلك 
بيوتًا وأبنيًة وأراضني وحقوقًا جتاريًة، وذلك مؤّشر على االّجتاه العقارات واملنشآت 
.القوي حنو االستقرار بدل العبور والعرضية
عىن اجلماعي للمسلمني، وهو وقد صحب ذلك منوٌّ سريع للشعور بامل
يدفع إىل حتّققات عملية متثّلت يف تكاثر املؤّسسات اليت يلتقي فيها شعور بدأ
م والبحث هلا العدد الكبري منهم م اجلماعية، وتدارس مشكال ملمارسة حيا
عن حلول فيها، وهو ما جتاوز تأسيس األعداد الكبرية من املساجد إىل تأسيس 
ا، وكّلها  املراكز والنوادي واجلمعيات واملدارس واملعاهد اجلامعية وما هو شبيه 
ى مستوى شعوري حماضن حلياة مجاعية بدأت تّتجه إليها األقّلية املسلمة عل
.ثقايف، وعلى مستوى ممارسة فعلية
تمع تنحو يف طالع هذه املرحلة منحى التواشج يف مستويات  وبدأت العالقة با
متعّددة، فقد اخنرط كثري من املسلمني يف الدورة االقتصادية جتارة وأعماالً، واخنرط 
من املسلمني آخرون يف مؤّسسات ومنظمات اجتماعية خمتلفة، وأصبح جيل بأكمله
تمع األورويب، وهناك  يؤّمون املدارس واجلامعات العاّمة، ويتخرّجون منها بثقافة ا
وهكذا . طالئع من املسلمني بدأت تنخرط يف العمل السياسي يف مستويات متعّددة
تمع بدل ما كان سائًدا من مسلك التمايز  بدأ املسلمون يف دورة من االندماج يف ا
.عنه إالّ مبقدار ما حتّتمه الضرورة من قضاء حاجات آنيةمنه واالبتعاد
وإذا كانت هذه املرحلة قد بدأت يف مظهر عملي هو أقرب إىل أن يكون 
ا منذ بعض الزمن بدأت تبحث هلا عن سند نظري تأصيلي، وتّتخذ  ّ عفويا، إّال أ
ومن . يهاشعارات معّربة عنها، بل ترسم أهدافًا وغايات تسعى إىل أن تنتهي إل
املقصود به تفاعل املسلمني مع "االندماج"ذلك ما أصبح يروج من مصطلح 
جمتمعهم األورويب تفاعًال يكونون به جزًءا منه ومكّونًا من مكّوناته، وليسوا 
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وما أصبح يروج أيًضا من مصطلح . مفصولني عنه واقعني على هوامشه وأطرافه
تمع األورويب مواطنني فيه، هلم ما املقصود به أن يصبح املسلمون "املواطنة" يف ا
لسائر املواطنني من احلقوق وعليهم ما عليهم من الواجبات، وأن يكونوا خملصني 
. لوطنهم األورويب، غيورين عليه، عاملني على حتقيق مصاحله، ودفع الضرر عنه
ولعّل من أهّم األهداف اليت أصبحت مطروحة اليوم على الوجود اإلسالمي 
حلته اجلديدة هو هدف الشراكة احلضارية، وهو هدف يعين أّن املسلمني يف يف مر 
أوروبا ينبغي أن يكون وجودهم فيها غري مقتصر على االستهالك يف ميدان 
اإلشباعات املاّدية، واإلشباعات العلمية واملعرفية، وإمنا جيب أن يكونوا مسهمني 
تمع وترشيده ومعاجلة مشكالته، ويف  دفع مسريته احلضارية حنو يف تطوير ا
م مسلمني يتوفّرون على مدد ثري فيما  االزدهار والتقّدم، وذلك من جهة كو
وإذا كان هذا اهلدف مل حيتّل بعد . يتعّلق بالقيم الروحية واألخالقية واالجتماعية
يف وعي األقّلية املسلمة موقًعا واسًعا عميًقا، إّال أنه يبدو أنه يّتجه حنو أن يكون 
.املوّجه األساسي هلذه املرحلة من الوجود اإلسالمي بأوروبا بأكملهاهو
المرحلة االنتقالية- ـج
تمعات ال حيدث بصفة حّدية تتمايز فيها املراحل باملفاصلة،  إّن التغّري يف ا
وإمنا يتّم فيها االنتقال من مرحلة إىل أخرى بالتداخل، حبيث حتدث بينهما مرحلة 
. من هذه ومن تلك حىت يتّم االنتقال بصفة قاطعة أو شبه قاطعةانتقالية تأخذ 
ذه املرحلة االنتقالية منذ ما يقارب  ووضع الوجود اإلسالمي بأوروبا هو اليوم ميّر 
العقدين من الزمن، إذ هو جيمع الواقع فيه بني مشاهد من مرحلة الوجود الظريف، 
.إىل الثبات واالستقرارومشاهد من الوجود املواطن املستقّر أو النازع 
قسم من الناس ما زالوا ففي هذا الوجود اإلسالمي يف وضعه الراهن
م على أساس العودة إىل  يعتربون أنفسهم مهاجرين لظرف مؤّقت، ويرتّبون حيا
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مواطنهم األصلية؛ ولذلك فإّن صلتهم بالبالد اليت يقيمون فيها صلة حمدودة، 
تمع مبا فيه امل ومنه . كّون اإلسالمي من مكّوناته تفاعل ضعيفوتفاعلهم مع ا
م على أّن أوروبا هي موطنهم، وكثري  قسم آخر أكثرهم من الشباب رتّبوا حيا
م قطعوا أشواطً اا غريهمنهم ال يعرفون هلم موطنً  ا مهّمة يف االندماج ؛ ولذلك فإ
ثابتة، االً أعم: ، واّختذوا من أسباب االستقرار مجلة مقّدرةوالثقايفاالجتماعي
وملكيات متنّوعة، ومؤّسسات اجتماعية وثقافية وسياسية، ومن جمموع ذلك 
م مواطنون مثل سائر املواطنني األصليني ّ . أصبحوا يتصرّفون على أ
وهذا التداخل يف الفرتة االنتقالية بني مظاهر من مرحلة سابقة ومظاهر من 
ئص، غري منضبطة يف أخرى الحقة من شأنه أن جيعلها متفاوتة يف اخلصا
فاملراحل االنتقالية يف احلياة االجتماعية تتمّخض دوًما عن تعقيدات، .التوصيف
وتنطوي على مالبسات قد تبلغ درجة األزمات، وذلك على غري الوضع الذي 
تكون عليه املراحل العادية، وهو ما من شأنه أن يوّلد صعوبة إضافية فيما يبتغيه 
يات املسلمة كي تتوّفق أوضاعهم ملقتصيات الدين؛ فما الفقهاء من إفتاء لألقل
تكون به الفتوى لوضع ينتمي إىل املرحلة الظرفية قد ال يكون مناسًبا ملا تكون به 
.الفتوى للمرحلة اليت تستشرف املواطنة واالستقرار، بل قد يكون مناقًضا له أحيانا
جه املتصّدين لإلفتاء حد أكرب التحّديات اليت تواأولعّل هذه الصعوبة متّثل 
خالل املرحلة املقبلة، فكيف ميكن لإلفتاء أن يواجه هذا التحّدي؟ وكيف ميكنه 
التوفيق يف الفتوى بني ما تتطّلبه هذه الفرتة االنتقالية مبرحلتيها املتداخلتني 
لتمضي حياة األقّلية املسلمة يف أوروبا مستهدية باهلدي الديين فيما هي منتقلة 
ظرفيا إىل ما هي صائرة إليه استقرارا مواطنا؟ منه وضًعا 
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لس األورويب لإلفتاء مل يكن لألقلّيات املسلمة بأوروبا والبحوثعندما تأّسس ا
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مرجعية أوروبية ذات صفة جممعية أكادميية لإلفتاء، وإمنا كانت الفتوى متارس من ِقبل 
م يف أغلبهم من أئّمة املساجد، مع ورود فتاوى أحيانًا من البالد أفراد من الفقهاء ه
ومل يكن ذلك كّله يتّم إّال يف نطاق ضّيق من جماالت حياة املسلمني،  .اإلسالمية
فكانت الفتاوى يف معظمها .كما أنّه كان يكاد يقتصر على الفتوى لألحوال الفردية
وخاّصة منها ،ربى يف حياة املسلمنيمطبوعة بطابع اجلزئية دون تعّرض للظواهر الك
. تلك اليت متثّل مشكالت عويصة، أو تلك اليت تتطّلب نظرًا اجتهاديا عميقا
لس األورويب لإلفتاء وباشر عمله بالفتوى لألقّليات 1والبحوثفلّما قام ا
املسلمة أصبح ميّثل مرجعية للمسلمني يف أوروبا ذات صفة جممعية فقهية، فتصّدى 
توى مبنهج غري املنهج الذي كان سائًدا؛ إذ نظر يف حياة املسلمني بأوروبا نظرة للف
ا االقتصادية واالجتماعية والسياسية واألسرية، وتناول  شاملة، تناولت مجيع جماال
املشكالت املتعّلقة بتلك اجلوانب كّلها ليفيت فيها مبا هو أعمق نظرًا وأدّق حتقيًقا مما  
وذلك ما تشهد به البحوث املستفيضة اليت تعّد مسبًقا لتُبىن . لكان يُفىت به من قب
عليها الفتاوى، حىت إّن الفتوى اليت قد ال تتجاوز الصفحة أو الصفحتني قد تتوّقف 
على إجراء حبوث تستغرق مئات الصفحات، ومثال ذلك الفتوى املتعلقة باملرأة اليت 
لة العلمية تسلم ويبقى زوجها على دينه، فقد ُخّصص هلا عددٌ  كامل من ا
2.للمجلس مبئات الصفحات
ا  لس واقع لألقّليات املسلمة تشغله النوازل اجلزئية اليت جتري  لقد كان أمام ا
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الشؤون اليومية، ما تعّلق منها باحلياة األسرية، أو بالكسب واملعاش، أو بالعبادات 
وإذ كانت . باألخالق واآلدابباملعىن اخلاّص، أو باألشربة واألطعمة واأللبسة، أو
لس شطرًا   تلك كّلها متّثل مها آنًيا للقطاع األكرب من املسلمني، فقد خّصص ا
لإلفتاء فيها، جوابًا على استفتاءات خاّصة ترد عليه، - إن مل يكن األكرب- كبريًا
.األبنيأو إفتاء يف ظواهر عاّمة يراها متفّشية بني املسلمني على غري احلكم الشرعي 
لس كان بني احلني  ومع اإلفتاء يف هذه القضايا اجلزئية اخلاّصة والعاّمة، فإّن ا
واآلخر يتجاوز ما هو جزئي من مناطات الفتوى يف شأن األقليات إىل بعض من 
ا، أو ذات  قضاياها ذات البعد الشمويل اجلامع، أو ذات األثر الواسع يف حيا
الفقهية، ومن ذلك ما ُخّصص من حبث واسع اإلشكاالت العويصة من الناحية
تمع األورويب، وموضوع القروض  وقرارات فقهية شاملة ملوضوع األسرة املسلمة يف ا
.   املصرفية لشراء البيوت، وموضوع الزوجة اليت تسلم ويبقى زوجها على دينه
أّن ما إالّ أّن الناظر يف املسرية اإلفتائية للمجلس خالل مرحلته السالفة جيد 
أصدر فيها من قرارات وفتاوى كان مستجيًبا يف معظمه للحاجات العاجلة اليت 
تمع األورويب، ومبا أّن تلك احلياة تتوّسع كما بتزايد تتطّلبها حياة  املسلمني يف ا
عدد املسلمني بصفة متسارعة، وكيًفا بتوّسعها وتعّقدها نتيجة الرتاكم واملضي يف 
لس باالستفتاء، وتكاد تستبّد االندماج، فقد كانت  احلاجات اليومية تالحق ا
به، دون أن ترتك له الفرصة ليمتّد بنظره الفقهي إىل ما هو من قضايا املسلمني 
مستقبل وجودهم بأوروبا، وعلى يفاألوروبيني أكرب منها حجًما، وأخطر أثرًا 
.حتقيق أهدافهم املتجّددة فيها
اة األقّليات املسلمة بأوروبا سوف يبقى على وإذا كان الشأن اليومي يف حي
الدوام شأنًا قائًما، وذلك بالنظر إىل التطّور السريع لتلك احلياة، والتشابك 
املتواسع الذي متتّد به مما يتطّلب من الفتاوى ما هو ذو طابع جزئي آين، فإّن 
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لس األو -املتصّدين لإلفتاء يف شأن املسلمني بأوروبا  رويب لإلفتاءوعلى رأسهم ا
آن األوان يف نظرهم اإلفتائي كي يّتجهوا فيه أيًضا إىل اإلفتاء يف - والبحوث
القضايا الكربى املتعّلقة بالوجود اإلسالمي بأوروبا، وهي تلك القضايا ذات التأثري 
االسرتاتيجي يف مستقبل هذا الوجود، ويف الرسالة اليت هو مدعّو ألدائها يف 
تمع الذي قام في .ها
وإذا كان اإلفتاء يف عمومه إمنا يقوم على ذات القواعد واألسس الشرعية سواء 
ما تعّلق منه بالقضايا اجلزئية أو بالقضايا الكلّية، إّال أّن املنهج اإلفتائي قد خيتلف 
نوَع اختالف بني هذه وتلك، وذلك على األقّل من حيث ما يتطلّبه كّل منهما من 
ملاّدته، ومن استكشاف للمقاصد واستشراف توّسع يف البحث واستجماع
ومن البّني أّن هذا االختالف يف املنهج يستتبع اختالفًا يف االستعدادات . للمآالت
اليت تتطلّبها الفتوى، ويف طرق العمل اليت تقتضيها، وإن يكن ذلك مّتجًها يف أغلبه 
.إىل الدرجات وليس إىل األنواع
تداخل يكما شرحناه سابًقا مبا -مي بأوروبا والوضع االنتقايل للوجود اإلسال
يكاد يواطئ هذه الداعية اليت -مرحلة الظرفية مبرحلة املواطنة واالستقرار من فيه 
تدعو املفيت إىل التطّور يف نظره اإلفتائي من اإلفتاء اجلزئي إىل اإلفتاء الكّلي، ومن 
الظرفية العرضية حتمل يف اإلفتاء لآلين إىل اإلفتاء للمستقبل؛ ذلك ألّن املرحلة 
طبيعتها معىن اآلنية واجلزئية، يف حني أّن مرحلة االستقرار واالستمرار حتمل معىن 
منهما حتمل  الكّلية واملستقبلية، وإن يكن ذلك على وجه العموم وإّال فإّن كال
.بعًضا من خصائص األخرى
أن تكون خطّته وبناء على ذلك فإّن اإلفتاء يف مرحلته املقبلة مدعّو إىل 
اإلفتائية خطّة مزاوجة تستمّد من طبيعة املرحلة االنتقالية يف مجعها بني مرحلة 
ظرفية تتطّلب من الفتوى ما طابعه العاّم طابع جزئي، ومرحلة استقرار ومواطنة 
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ورّمبا اقتضى ذلك بادئ ذي بدء . تتطّلب من الفتوى ما طابعه الكّلية واملستقبلية
الالت الفتوى ميّكن من استيعاب هذه املزاوجة، ليستبني بعد ذلك حتريرًا جديًدا لد
ا كّل منهما، والقواعد  طرفا اإلفتاء يف قضايا املرحلتني، واخلصائص اليت خيتّص 
.        واألصول اليت ينبنيان عليها

الوضع اإلسالمي الذي نشأ فيه لعّل مفهوم اإلفتاء قد كان متأثّراً من حيث حتديده ب
وتطّور واستمّر، وهو الوضع الذي كان يسود فيه اإلسالم نظاًما للمجتمع، ويوّجه 
خمتلف مناحي احلياة فيه، فاإلفتاء إّمنا كان إفتاء للمسلمني يف جمتمعهم اإلسالمي 
الذي حيتكم إىل الشريعة اإلسالمية، وذلك بأن يوّفق مظاهر احلياة الفردية 
تماعية، ونوازهلا الطارئة بتغّري الظروف إىل األحكام الدينية، كي تبقى مستهدية واالج
ًجا هلا وموّجًها ملسارها .دي الدين الذي التزمته من حيث األساس 
ذا املعىن فقد نشأ اإلفتاء وتطّور فيما يشبه أن يكون حارًسا للمجتمع  و
اشطه املختلفة، ويف اإلسالمي كي ال حييد عن أحكام الشرع يف خضّم من
تمع هو جمتمع ارتضى أن  مستجّدات حياته وطوارئها، انطالقًا من كون هذا ا
ولذلك فقد انطبعت . يكون إسالميا يف أساسه، حمتكًما إىل توجيهات الشرع
الفتوى على وجه العموم بطابع اجلزئية والتفصيل، استجابة لنوازل احلياة اليت ال 
تشهد به دواوين النوازل والفتاوى اليت هي يف أغلبها تقع إال عينية، وهو ما
إجابات شرعية على تساؤالت يف أحداث وقعت أو يُراد أن تقع مبا يوّجهها 
.الوجهة الشرعية الصحيحة
وإذ كان اإلفتاء كما هو معهود يف الفقه اإلسالمي موّجًها يف مسته العاّم إىل 
م إيقاعها فيما تتطلّبه من معاجلة شرعية، اإلجابة الشرعية على نوازل واقعة أو يُعتز 
ا من  وإذ كانت تلك النوازل يف معظمها ذات طابع جزئي إّما من حيث متعلَّقا
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ا من األفعال، فإّن البعد الكّلي يف الفتوى الذي به  األشخاص أو من حيث مناطا
بة، يقع تناول القضايا الكربى للمجتمع مل يكن مسًتا ظاهرًا فيه على وجه الغل
تمع من مسارات ينبغي  وكذلك فإّن االستشراف املستقبلي ملا ينبغي أن يّتجه إليه ا
بل إّن .أن حيافظ فيها على الصفة اإلسالمية مل يكن ملحوظًا فيه على حنو بارز
تلك النزعة االفرتاضية يف الفتوى اليت تؤّسس للمستقبل بفتاوى مسبقة مل تكن 
بالنزعة - على سبيل االستنقاص - قهية، وكانت توسم حتظى بالقبول يف الثقافة الف
ويبدو أّن ...". أرأيت لو : "اشتقاقًا من استعماهلا لصيغة متكّررة هي،"األرأيتية"
اإلفتاء يف مسته هذا كان يوكل املصري املستقبلي للمجتمع يف خطوطه األساسية 
.هويته ويوّجه مسارهالكّلية إىل قّوة التديّن الذي هو متأّسس عليه، والذي يشّكل
: والسؤال الذي يطرح نفسه على اإلفتاء لألقليات املسلمة يف أوروبا هو
ا يقتصر مفهومه على  هل اإلفتاء هلذه األقليات الذي ندب نفسه للنهوض 
ذات املفهوم املأثور يف الرتاث الفقهي، وخيتّص بذات خصائصه ويّتصف بذات 
إفتاء ألقّليات مسلمة تعيش ضمن جمتمع غري واحلال أّن هذا اإلفتاء هو ؟صفاته
مسلم، وختضع لسلطان قوانني غري إسالمية، ويهدف وجودها إىل أهداف قد ال 
تمع املسلم إىل حتقيقها !تكون مقتصرة على ذات األهداف اليت يسعى ا
إذا كان من شروط اإلفتاء يف إصدار األحكام اليت تعاجل النوازل أن تكون 
نية على الواقع املفىت فيه، فإّن مفهوم اإلفتاء ذاته ينبغي أن تلك األحكام مب
ا، ليس على أساس التغاير يف املفهوم، ولكن على يكون مبنيا على ذلك أيضً 
أساس التوّسع يف مشموالته، أو التنوّع يف منهجه، أو التوجيه يف مناطاته، وذلك 
َىت فيها على أساس من أجل أن يستصحب اإلفتاء وظيفته يف حفظ احلياة املُف
، وضعشرعي، وتوجيهها حنو ما حيّقق أهدافها اليت قد تتفاوت من وضع إىل 
.ومن زمن إىل زمن
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إّن وضع الوجود اإلسالمي يف أوروبا الذي هو موضوع اإلفتاء للمجلس 
تمع اإلسالمي، وهو الوضع  األورويب وضٌع خمالف للوضع الذي كان عليه ا
تمع اإلسالمي خاضع لسلطان . اء وتوّسع وتطّورالذي نشأ من أجله اإلفت فا
الشريعة يف األساس، وهو جمتمع فيه من القّوة الذاتية للدفع الديين ما يضمن 
استصحابه للسمت الديين العاّم وعدم احلياد عنه إّال أن تكون أحداث حمدودة 
لدعوية على ميكن أن ُجترب بالفتوى، وهو أيًضا جمتمع لئن كان معنيا بالشهادة ا
ا شهادة تندرج ضمن الشهادة العاّمة لألّمة عليهم، وذلك يف غري  ّ الناس إّال أ
.احنصار يف فئة حمّددة أو يف وضع معّني 
ولكّن الوجود اإلسالمي بأوروبا الذي هو موضوع اإلفتاء للمجلس األورويب 
على هشاشة إنّه وجود يقوم يف أغلبه. هو وجود إسالمي يف جمتمع غري إسالميإمنا 
يف تكوينه اجتماعيا؛ إذ هو متأّسس على املعىن الفردي أكثر ممّا هو متأّسس على 
تمع الذي هو فيه جمتمع غّالب من الناحية احلضارية، فهو إذن املعىن اجلماعي، وا
ال ميلك من قّوة الدفع الديين ما يضمن أن ينحفظ به كيانه اإلسالمي، وإّمنا هو 
ّمث إّن هذا الوجود اإلسالمي وجودٌ . ليت قد تنتهي به إىل االندثارللغواية اعرضةٌ 
تمع الذي يعيش فيه بصفة عينية مباشرة،  ملقاة عليه مهّمة الشهادة الدعوية على ا
تمع يرقب عن كثب ذلك الوجود بصفته اإلسالمية فيما سيكون عليه  إذ هذا ا
ري البالغ يف مستقبل اإلسالم مآله من جناح أو خسر، وسيكون لذلك املآل التأث
.نفسه يف الديار األوروبية من رفض أو قبول
ا من ظروف املرحلة وإذا ما أضفنا إىل هذه االعتبارات ما بيّناه سابقً 
ا هذا الوجود اإلسالمي بأوروبا، واليت تتداخل فيها مرحلتان  االنتقالية اليت ميّر 
ية، فإّن صورة االختالف بني ومرحلة مستقرّة متناممرحلة ظرفية متناقصة،
الوضعني تظهر جلّية بّينة، فيتبعها إذن توّسع يف مفهوم اإلفتاء لألقّليات املسلمة 
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تمع اإلسالمي، وتوّسع أيًضا يف مناطات  بأوروبا بالنسبة لإلفتاء املأثور يف ا
.الفتوى ويف أهدافها ويف منهجها
ود اإلسالمي بأوروبا املتمثّلة يف وباعتبار االزدواجية يف الوضع الذي عليه الوج
لس األورويب  ينبغي أن يكون هو - كما نقّدر - مرحلتني متداخلتني، فإّن إفتاء ا
أيًضا إفتاء مزدوًجا يف مناطاته وأهدافه، فيّتجه قسم منه إىل معاجلة ما يتعّلق باملرحلة 
ابع جزئي العرضية من حياة املسلمني بأوروبا من مشكالت هي يف معظمها ذات ط
ظريف، فتقتضي من الفتوى ما هو من ذات ذلك الطابع، ويّتجه قسم آخر إىل 
معاجلة ما يتعّلق مبرحلة االستقرار واملواطنة من أوضاع ومن أهداف هي يف معظمها 
.ذات طابع كّلي مستقبلي، فتقتضي من الفتوى ما هو من ذات ذلك الطابع أيضا
ها اليت وصفناها خصائصي بأوروبا يف إّن املرحلة العرضية للوجود اإلسالم
تمع اإلسالمي يف  تمع الغريب انتقاًال مهاجرًا من ا سابًقا مبا هي طارئة به على ا
ا  ّ أبعاد فردية، ومبا هي مبنية عليه من ظرفية، ومتحّفزة إليه من استقرار، فإ
ا رّمبا مطبوعة على وجه العموم بطابع الفردية واالستثناء واالنتقالية؛ وهلذا ّ فإ
يناسبها من الفتوى ما هو أميل إىل اجلزئية والتفصيل، وما طابعه العاّم طابع 
.التيسري، وما منهجه منهج الرتخيص
وأّما املرحلة املستقرّة املواطنة اليت أخذت تزاحم بشّدة املرحلة العرضية وحتّل 
ا  ّ إليه من الثبات اليت عرضناها، مبا هي نازعةهاخبصائصبالتدرّج حمّلها، فإ
واالستمرارية، ومّتجهة فيه إىل الرتابط واجلماعية، ومدعّوة إليه من الشهادة 
قّلية املسلمة الدعوية، تكون الفتوى املناسبة هلا إّمنا هي تلك الفتوى اليت توّجه األ
ا يف سبيل تأسيس وجود إسالمي مواطن مستقّر، مسهم يف إىل السري حبيا
مع األورويب، ومنتج ألمنوذج حضاري إسالمي شاهد على مسرية التنمية للمجت
ذا املسار، واملؤّدية  الناس، وذلك مبا تتناوله من القضايا الكّلية الكربى املتعّلقة 
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وميكن أن نطلق على هذه الفتوى اسم فتوى التأسيس يف . فيه إىل حتقيق أهدافه
.مقابلة ما ذكرناه آنًفا من فتوى الرتخيص

مبدأ الرخصة يف الشريعة مبدأ معترب، فكثري من األحكام جاءت على وجه 
االستثناء من األحكام األصلية العاّمة، وهي أحكام العزائم، وذلك لسبب من 
وتُبىن أحكام الرتخيص على أساس أّن احلكم . األسباب اقتضى ذلك االستثناء
لظروف غري مؤّد إىل حتقيق العاّم قد يكون تنزيله على مناطه يف ظرف من ا
مقصده، بل قد يكون مؤّديًا إىل عكس ذلك املقصد من الضرر أو احلرج 
الشديد، فيكون حكم الرتخيص إذن مؤّديًا إىل حتقيق تلك املقاصد باستثناء 
ا من أن ينطبق حكم العزائم عليها .مناطا
عند وقد يكون الرتخيص حكًما منصوًصا عليه مثل الرتخيص يف التيمم 
تعّذر الوضوء، أو الرتخيص يف قصر الصالة عند السفر، وقد يكون غري 
منصوص عليه ولكن ُيستحدث باالجتهاد وفق قواعد فقهية مقّررة، مثل الرخص 
؛ ولذلك فإّن جمال الرتخيص يف "الضرورات تبيح احملظورات"اليت تقتضيها قاعدة 
النظر جهوًدا مضاعفة، الشريعة جمال واسع، وفقه الرخص فقه دقيق يستلزم من
إمنا : "ولذلك شاعت بني الفقهاء تلك املقولة املأثورة عن اإلمام سفيان الثوري
1."الفقه الرخصة من ثقة، أما التشّدد فيحسنه كّل أحد
مسوغات فقه الترخيص-أ




أعيان األشخاص أو األحوال استثناًء هلا ختصيص أحكام شرعية مبفردات من
من األحكام الشرعية العاّمة املتعّلقة بأجناس تلك املفردات، وذلك بسبب 
ا جتعل املقصد من احلكم الشرعي العاّم ال يتحّقق فيها،  مالبسات تعّلقت 
فُيرتّخص فيها إذن حبكم آخر يتحّقق به مقصد الشريعة، وذلك هو مراد اإلمام 
إذا اعتربنا العزائم مع الرخص وجدنا العزائم مطّردة مع : "يف قولهالشاطيب 
1."العادات اجلارية، والرخص جارية عند اخنراق تلك العوائد
وبناًء على ذلك فإّن فقه الرتخيص إمنا تشتّد احلاجة إليه يف الظروف اليت 
اعات والقحط وما ش ها، تكون استثناء من جمرى احلياة العادية، كاحلروب وا ا
فتلك الظروف خيتّل فيها كثري من األنساق العادية ألحوال الناس فرادى 
وللعالقات بينهم مجاعات، فيكون للرخص جمال واسع ملعاجلة تلك األحوال 
رى العادي للحياة توّخًيا ملا تقصده الشريعة من رفع  والعالقات الطارئة على ا
يهم أن ميضوا يف التدّين مبا تُيّسره احلرج واملشّقة على املكّلفني، وتسهيًال عل
الرخص حذَر أن ينكصوا عنه مبا تسّببه العزائم من الشّدة يف تلك الظروف 
.املستثناة من النسق العادي للحياة
أوروبا فإننا جنده وضًعا حيمل من بولو تأّملنا يف وضع األقّليات املسلمة 
عظمها باخلطاب إىل املسلمني يف االستثنائية قدرًا كبريًا؛ فأحكام الشريعة يّتجه م
تمع الذي خيضع لسلطان القانون الشرعي، وتسود فيه  تمع اإلسالمي، وهو ا ا
الثقافة اإلسالمية، وتنبين فيه العالقات على أسس دينية، أما األقّليات املسلمة فهي 
خاضعة لسلطان قانوين غري إسالمي، وتعيش يف مناخ ثقايف واجتماعي خمالف يف 
ر أحواله للمقتضيات الدينية، وتتعّرض كّل يوم لتحّديات شديدة يف تديّنها أكث
آلحسنبنمشهورعبيدةأيبحتقيق،الموافقاتالشاطيب،حممدبنموسىبنإبراهيمإسحاقأبو1
.541ص،1ج،)1،1417/1997طعفان،ابنارد: السعودية/اخلرب(سلمان
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ا بسطوة إعالمية قاسية، وبإلزامات قانونية نافذة، وقد تتعّرض معتقدات وسلوكً 
.أحيانًا ألنواع من اهلجوم ذات طابع عنصري ومتييز ديين
وروبا ناشًئا وإذا كان هذا الوجه من االستثنائية لوجود األقليات املسلمة بأ
ا تعيش مرحلة هي فيها منتقلة يف أغلبها من البالد اإلسالمية إىل  عن كو
مهاجرها اجلديدة، وهو ما كانت به قلقة يف وضعها أقّلياٍت يف جمتمع غري 
ا تعيش يف تلك  إسالمي، فإّن وجًها آخر من هذه االستثنائية ناشئ من كو
ي متحّفزة إليه من الدخول يف مرحلة املرحلة حالة من الظرفية والعرضية ملا ه
جديدة هي مرحلة املواطنة واالستقرار، فجمعت بذلك بني استثنائية من حيث 
مبدأ وجودها، واستثنائية من حيث صريورته، وهو ما ينبغي أخذه بعني االعتبار 
ذه األقلية .يف النظر الفقهي املتعلق 
هو وضع مجاعي أو نازع وفضًال عن ذلك فإّن وضع األقّليات املسلمة مبا
ا، ومبا أّن املطالب اليت يطلبها هي مطالب مجاعية يف الكثري إىل أن يكون مجاعي
ا ضرورات ا حاجات إىل كو ةإذ احلاج؟منها، فإّن حاجاته قد ترتفع من كو
إذا كانت مجاعية تُنّزل منزلة الضرورة يف وضع األفراد، وذلك ما قّرره العّز ابن 
، وأقرّه وشرحه شرًحا "املصلحة العاّمة كالضرورة اخلاّصة: "يف قولهعبد السالم
وهو ما يقوى به معىن 1،"اإلسالميةمقاصد الشريعة"وافًيا ابن عاشور يف كتابه 
.االستثنائية يف وضع األقّليات املسلمة
لس األورويب شديد الوعي هلذا الوضع االستثنائي لألقّليات  وقد كان ا
ا قائمة املسلمة بأور  وبا، فكانت الفتاوى والقرارات الفقهية اليت أصدرها يف شأ
يف شطر كبري منها على فقه الرتخيص، وخاّصة ما كان متعّلًقا باألوضاع اليت 
دار : عّمان(، حتقيق حممد الطاهر امليساوي مقاصد الشريعة اإلسالميةحممد الطاهر ابن عاشور، : راجع1
.299ص،)2،1421/2001النفائس، ط
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ويف هذا السياق يندرج .ألفراد املسلمني أو جلماعتهماشديدً احرجً بُ تسبِّ 
ئد ألجل شراء السكن، اإلفتاء بالرتخيص بقيود وضوابط حمددة يف القروض بفوا
والرتخيص للزوجة اليت تسلم دون زوجها بالبقاء زوجة له، والرتخيص للمسلم يف 
وراثة أبويه غري املسلمني، وغريها من الفتاوى الكثرية املندرجة ضمن فقه 
لس جهوًدا 1.الرتخيص وإذ قد قيل إمنا الفقه الرخصة من الثقة فقد بذل ا
أجل تقرير هذه الفتاوى على أصول شرعية مضنية يف البحث العلمي من 
ا تدخل  معتربة، وقد قوبل بعضها باعرتاضات شديدة من ِقبل من كان يظّن أ
يف باب العزائم اليت ال ترخيص فيها، وهو ظّن يندرج يف إطار الشطر الثاين من 
.تلك املقولة، وهو أّن التشّدد حيسنه كّل أحد
ات املسلمة ستظّل حاًال مستصحبة على ومبا أن احلال االستثنائية لألقّلي
ا سيظّل أيًضا مستصحًبا طيلة ذلك ،مدى أجيال فإّن فقه الرتخيص يف شأ
املدى، ولكّنه فيما نقّدر ينبغي أن يكون ذلك الفقه متناسًبا يف حجمه ويف كيفه 
، فوجود األقّليات املسلمة بأوروبا لئن مع حجم االستثنائية وكيفها يف تلك احلال
يف مبدئه طارئًا باهلجرة ذات الطابع الفردي فإنّه بعد مرحلة كان فيها يّتصف كان
يف مرحلة أخرى أصبح -كما أشرنا سابًقا -بالظرفية والعرضية بدأ يدخل 
يّتصف فيها باملواطنة واالستقرار، وحجم االستثنائية وطبيعتها يف هذه غري 
النظر بني الفينة واألخرى فيما حجمها وطبيعتها يف تلك، وهو ما يدعو إىل إعادة 
تقوم عليه منهجية فقه الرتخيص املعتمدة يف اإلفتاء لتواكب التحّول الواقع يف 
.االستثنائية اليت هو املربّر األكرب للرتخيص
لس يف اعتماده فقه الرتخيص يف فتاواه خالل املرحلة السابقة،  ومع توفيق ا
ة،دار التوزيع والنشر اإلسالمي: القاهرة(قرارات وفتاوى المجلس األوروبي لإلفتاء والبحوث: راجع1
2002.(
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يف هذا الشأن، وذلك باألخّص من حيث ما فإنّه فيما حنسب ينبغي أن يراجع أمره 
ينبغي عليه أن يرسم من منهج بّني هلذا الفقه ال ينبين فقط على األدلّة الشرعية املعتربة 
ّوزة للرتخيص، وإمنا ينبين أيًضا على االعتبارات الواقعية اليت يشهد فيها وضع  ا
الذي يشهده هذا الوضع األقلّيات تغّريات يف استثنائيته، وعلى األخّص منها التغّري 
كما ينبين أيًضا على مراجعة .متمّثًال يف االنتقال من املرحلة الظرفية إىل مرحلة املواطنة
لس من فتاوى ذات صفة ترخيصية خالل املرحلة املاضية،  تقييمية ملا صدر عن ا
فيما عساها أن تكون قد أحدثت من أثر واقعي يف حياة املسلمني يتناسب مع 
.أو خيتلف عنهود الشرعي منهااملقص
منهجية فقه الترخيص-ب
بناء على ما تقّدم ميكن أن تتأّسس قواعد منهجية عاّمة يف فقه الرتخيص 
ولعّل من بني ما يصلح أن يُدرج ضمن . الذي يعتمده اإلفتاء يف املرحلة املقبلة
:تلك القواعد ما يلي
يها اإلفتاء بالرتخيص فيما وهو القاعدة اليت جرى عل: تأصيل الفتوى: أوالً 
لس األورويب من فتاوى ا . أصدره ا ونعين بالتأصيل أن يكون لكّل رخصة يُفىت 
أصٌل تستند إليه من أصول االجتهاد، نصا من الوحي، أو ما هو عائد إليه من 
وإذا كان النّص ظنّـيا فإّن لالجتهاد من أجل الرتخيص فسحة . طرق االستنباط
.ن التأويل معتربًا جتيزه قوانني اللغة، وتدعمه قواعد الشريعة ومقاصدهابشرط أن يكو 
وإذا كان اإلمجاع هو اخلّط األمحر الذي ينبغي لالجتهاد من أجل الرتخيص 
أن ال يتجاوزه، فإّن اجتهادات الفقهاء يف املذاهب املعتربة تصلح أن تكون مجيًعا 
سوى أّن اإلمجاع كثريًا ما كان حمّل نظر من أجل االستفادة منها يف الرتخيص،
يُّدعى يف العديد من القضايا ويتبّني بالبحث أنّه اّدعاء زائف، وهو ما يستدعي 
جهًدا من التقّصي لتمييز ما هو جممع عليه مما هو ليس كذلك يف القضايا العارضة 
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.لشؤون األقّليات املسلمة
اد من أجل وإذا ما اسُتبعد ما هو جممع عليه من أن يطاله االجته
فإّن اجتهادات الفقهاء فيما له عالقة بالقضايا املطروحة ينبغي أن ،الرتخيص
تُعرض مجيًعا للنظر اإلفتائي، دون استبعاد ألّي منها بسبب تعّصب مذهيب، أو 
وحينما يكون السند العلمي ألّي .خالف عقدي، أو عدم تداول وشهرة
يكون بتفضيل املرجوح على كن أناجتهاد فقهي سندا معتربًا، فإّن الرتخيص مي
الراجح، واملغمور على املشهور، وما قال به اآلحاد على ما قال به اجلمهور، 
فإّن يف تراثنا الفقهي كنوزًا خمفية غمرها التعّصب، وغّيبتها املرجوحية، وطمسها 
.التناسي، وناهيك يف ذلك باجتهادات أئّمة عظام من أمثال الطربي وابن حزم
ا من هذه االجتهادات إذا كانت غري مناسبة حلّل مشكالت عصرها إّن كثريً 
ا أصبحت  ّ ا فطاهلا النسيان واإلمهال، فإنه عند املراجعة يتبّني أ ملالبسات ختتّص 
ا  صاحلة ملعاجلة قضايا حدثت يف عصرنا مبالبسات أخرى غري تلك اليت استبعد
خيص يف شأن األقلّيات ما تبّني أّن يف يف املاضي، فينبغي االستفادة منها يف فقه الرت 
ويف اآلراء الفقهية املتعّلقة بإسالم املرأة مع بقاء زوجها على . ذلك مصلحة معتربة
لس يف فتواه يف هذه املسألة .دينه مثال بّني لذلك، وهو ما استفاد منه ا
س فقه حينما يقع اإلفتاء يف شأن األقّلية على أسا:استثنائية الطابع: ثانًيا
ا ملعىن االستثنائية  الرتخيص ينبغي فيما حنسب أن تكون الفتوى حاملة يف ذا
ا من الوضع الواقعي الذي وقع فيه اإلفتاء، حبيث  اليت هي مسوّغ الفتوى 
يستقّر يف ذهن املسلم أّن تلك الفتوى إمنا هي متعّلقة بالوضع الذي هو فيه من 
الوجود يف ذاته بصفة مطلقة، فإذا ما وجوده يف أوروبا، وليست متعّلقة بذلك
تغّري ذلك الوضع فإّن تلك الفتوى ميكن أن تفقد مشروعيتها ليحّل حمّل الفتوى 
بالرتخيص الفتوى بالعزمية حىت وإن استمّر احلال على الوجود كأقّلية ولكن بتغّري 
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.األوضاع يف ذلك الوجود
ثنائية يف صياغة الفتوى وميكن أن يُشرب هذا املعىن املتمّثل يف روح االست
ا، أو يف توجيهات تتخلّلها، أو يف تنبيهات تصحبها أو يف تذييالت تعقبها،  ذا
وذلك كّله من أجل أن ال تنبين حياة املسلمني يف أوروبا نفسيا وواقعيا على أساس 
الرخص، وتستمرئ ذلك وتستمّر عليه، فيصبح الرتخيص القائم على االستثناء هو 
. احلال أّن األصل هو أن جتري احلياة على العزائم ال على الرخصاألصل، و 
إّن وجود األقّليات املسلمة بأوروبا لئن كان يف وضعه احلايل حيتاج إىل أن 
يُعاجل يف كثري من قضاياه بفقه الرتخيص بالنظر إىل استثنائّية أوضاعه، فإنّه ينبغي 
ية شيًئا فشيًئا، وحينئذ فإّن ا حنو التخّفف من تلك االستثنائأن يكون مّتجهً 
االّجتاه يف معاجلته الفقهية ينبغي أن يكون هو أيًضا ناحًيا منحى عزائم 
م على . األحكام وإذا ما سادت يف حياة املسلمني ثقافة الرتخيص، وجرت حيا
فإّن ذلك سوف يدفعهم إىل التقاعس عن العمل من أجل تطوير ،استمرائها
م يف اّجتاه االستق ن االستثنائية، ويف ذلك ضرر بأهدافهم عرار بديًال حيا
.املستقبلية كما شرحناها سابقا
إّن فقه الرتخيص ينبغي أن يؤطّر بإطار الظرفية، وأن حيمل يف ذاته ما ميكنه به 
أن يتجاوز نفسه لينتهي إىل فقه العزمية، فيكون له ذلك منهًجا يقيه من الوضع 
فإذا أُفيت مثالً . فيعيق حياة األقلّيات عن التطّورالذي يصبح فيه هو األصل املستقرّ 
فإّن ذلك جيب ،على سبيل الرتخيص جبواز القرض بالفائض من أجل شراء البيوت
ا بوجوب أن يسعى املسلمون سعًيا حثيثًا إىل استحداث أن يكون استثناء مقرتنً 
التأمني يف وإذا أُفيت ترخيًصا جبواز. املؤسسات اليت تقرض على أساس غري ربوي
فينبغي أن يكون ذلك مشروطًا بالسعي يف ،بعض الصور اليت يكون فيها الغرر
وهكذا ترتّىب األقلّية على أّن فتوى .استحداث املؤسسات اليت تؤّمن بغري غرر
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ا من الظروف اليت أجلأت إليها،  الرتخيص إمنا هي مشروطة بالسعي يف إزالة أسبا
ا يف سبيل حتقيقومن شأن هذه الثقافة أن تكون . أهدافهاعامل تطوير حليا
إّن الفتوى بالرتخيص لألقّليات املسلمة لئن كانت : اعتبار المآل: ثالثًا
مبنية على مقصد تيسري احلياة ورفع احلرج الناشئ من ظروفها االستثنائية، فإنه 
املآل ينبغي أن يُنظر فيها بدّقة إىل املآل الذي تؤول إليه، حبيث ال يكون ذلك 
ا قد ُعلم بأغلب الظّن على األقّل فإذا ما . مناقًضا ملا ابُتغي منها من مقصد أ
تنتهي إىل ذلك التناقض، فرمبا وقع العدول عنها إىل اإلفتاء بالعزمية اعتبارًا للمآل  
.كي ال يعود على املقصد بالبطالن
فق خطّة ويستلزم هذا االعتبار للمآل أن يكون اإلفتاء بالرتخيص جاريًا و 
تقوم على استشراف للمستقبل يف وضع األقّليات من حيث ما هو متطّور إليه 
من مصري، وما هو مرسوم له من أهداف، فيكون إذن مستهديًا خبارطة مستقبلية 
تستبني فيها املسارات الصحيحة اليت تؤّدي إىل اهلدف املقصود، فإذا ما تبّني 
ّن الرتخيص يف قضية ما من القضايا بذلك االستشراف ومن خالل تلك اخلارطة أ
قد ينتهي إىل مصري خيالف ذلك اهلدف ُعدل عن الرخصة إىل العزمية دفًعا ألقوى 
واإلفتاء بالرخصة بصفة تلقائية عفوية ال . املفسدتني أو جلًبا ألقوى املصلحتني
من شأنه أن يوقع ،تنظر إال إىل الوضع الراهن، وال تستهدي باخلارطة املستقبلية
.وجود األقّليات يف إرباك ينعكس سلًبا على مسريته املستقبلية
ا له أن يُصبح وجوًدا وإذا كان وجود األقلّيات املسلمة بأوروبا قد وضع هدفً 
مواطنًا مستقرا يُسهم يف املسرية احلضارية للمجتمع األورويب إسهاًما حقيقيا باعتباره 
إّن اإلفتاء بالرتخيص جيب أن يضع نصب أصبح مكّونًا من مكّونات املواطنة فيه، ف
عينيه هذا اهلدف، ويكون مستهديًا به، وذلك حىت ال يقع هذا اإلفتاء يف ترخيصات 
ا أن تناقضه درهمن شأ ، مبا تفضي إليه من تكريس دائم حلالة الظرفية واالستثنائية و
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.ةمن حيث كان املراد هو حتقيق املواطنة واالستقرار والشراكة احلضاري
وعلى سبيل املثال لقد كان االجتاه يف مسألة اللحوم إىل اإلفتاء بعزمية 
لس األورويب ماض فيه  الذكاة، وهو ما جرى عليه األمر منذ عقود، ويبدو أّن ا
ا الواقعية والفقهية، وقد اأيًضا، وكان ميكن أن يُفىت فيه بالرخصة لتوّفر أسبا
إذ قد نشأت منه يف أوروبا سوق  ؛ن هو األصوبتبّني أّن اإلفتاء فيه بالعزمية كا
كبرية للحالل من اللحوم أسهمت بقدر كبري يف فوائد اقتصادية للمسلمني،  
1.كما أسهمت يف احلفاظ على شخصيتهم وهويتهم الثقافية واالجتماعية
ويف مقابل ذلك فإّن البعض يرون جواز اإلفتاء بالرتخيص يف بيع احملّرمات 
وغريها يف البالد األوروبية بناء على قول بعض الفقهاء جبواز من مخر وخنزير 
التعامل بالعقود الفاسدة يف البالد غري اإلسالمية، فهذا اإلفتاء من شأنه أن جيعل 
تمع ال يف إصالحه، وهو ما يتناقض مع هدفهم  املسلمني يسهمون يف إفساد ا
وهكذا يتبّني أّن اإلفتاء . يف املواطنة الصاحلة واألمنوذجية احلضارية الداعية
بالرتخيص ينبغي أن ينظر إىل املآل املتعّلق باهلدف املستقبلي للوجود اإلسالمي 
.بأوروبا، فيرتّتب اإلفتاء على أساس ما يقتضيه ذلك اهلدف من رخصة أو عزمية
المعادلة بين الفردية والجماعية: رابًعا
ال جمرّد ّثل مجاعة من املسلمنيإّن األقلّيات املسلمة يف أوروبا هي أقلّيات مت
فيما بينهم بروابط اجتماعية ذات خصوصية بالنسبة واصلونأفراد مشّتتني، وهم يت
ا بعد يوم بتوّسع وهذا البعد اجلماعي يتأّكد يومً .للمحيط الذي يعيشون فيه
وكذلك فإّن هذه .األقّليات وتناميها، وبنزوعها إىل وضع االستقرار واملواطنة
ا، وتطمح إىل أن يوميت تعيش ضمن جمتمع أورويب تتفاعل معه تفاعالً األقليا
المجلة العلمية ، "مسألة اللحوم ومصري األقلية املسلمة يف الغرب"راشد الغنوشي، : راجع يف ذلك1
.2،2003، العددللمجلس األوروبي لإلفتاء والبحوث
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ا من مكّوناته الفاعلة، تندمج فيه مستقبًال اندماًجا إجيابيا حبيث تصبح واحدً 
فالوجود اإلسالمي بأوروبا هو إذن وجود مجاعي على مستوى ذاته وعلى مستوى 
ات املسلمة والعديد من األقّليات فارقة بني األقلّيموضوعه، وهذه اخلاّصية عالمةٌ 
تمع األورويب بصفة الفردية اليت ال  األخرى، إذ مثّة عدد من األقّليات اقتحمت ا
يرتبط فيها األفراد برابطة ذات شأن، فظّلت الفردية خاّصيتها، وانتهى أمرها أو 
ا أفرادً  تمع، ويُنسى وجودها يف صفة األقّلية اجلسينتهي إىل ذوبا .ماعيةا يف ا
ا أقّلية متكّونة من أفراد،ولكن مع هذا البعد اجلماعي لألقّلية املسلمة ّ .فإ
فإّن معىن الفردية قائم ،وبالرغم من اخنراط هؤالء األفراد يف اجلماعة املسلمة
فيهم، وهو ذلك املعىن الذي جيعل بعض األفراد ينفرد مبشكالت خاّصة قد ال 
خر ال متّثل مشكالت آلابعضالعل تكون هي مشكالت اجلماعة، أو جي
وهكذا فإننا جند أنفسنا أمام مستويني يف ظاهرة األقّلية . اجلماعة مشكالت له
.مستوى يتعّلق باألفراد، ومستوى يتعّلق باجلماعة:املسلمة
وهذه االزدواجية اليت تنبين عليها األقّلية املسلمة ينبغي أن تؤخذ بعني 
ا بفقه الرتخيص؛ ذلك ألّن شأن اجلماعة خيتلف عن االعتبار يف معاجلة شؤو
من اشرتاكهم يف شأن األفراد إذا مل تكن تربطهم رابطة مجاعية مهما يكن 
فرّب نازلة أُفيت فيها برتخيص ألفراد وال .االنتماء إىل ذات الدين أو الثقافة أو العرق
بالعزمية يُفىت فيها بذلك للجماعة، والعكس صحيح؛ ألّن الفتوى بالرخصة أو
ات أولئك األفراد، بينما الفتوى بذلك و لألفراد باعتبارهم أفراًدا ال تتعّدى آثارها ذ
.للجماعة مجاعة متتّد اآلثار فيها إىل أفرادها وإىل الروابط اليت تربط بينهم
ولذلك فإّن فقه الرتخيص الذي حنن بصدده ينبغي أن يكون شديد املراعاة 
ىت برخصة ذات بعد مجاعي يف نازلة هي من هلذين املستويني، فال يُف
خصوصيات فرد أو مجاعة قليلة من األفراد، كما ال يفىت بالرتخيص لفرد بفتوى 
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وإذا مل تقع مراعاة . يقصرها عليه واحلال أّن النازلة اليت تطلبتها هي نازلة مجاعية
ذلك، فإّن الفتوى بالرخصة قد ال تصيب هدفها، بل قد تصيب هدفًا غري 
ها فتسّبب إرباًكا كبريًا، ولنا أن نتصّور مقدار ذلك اإلرباك على سبيل املثال هدف
لو ُعّمم الرتخيص بالزواج العريف الذي قد يُفىت به يف حاالت نادرة تستوجبه، أو 
الرتخيص بتطليق القاضي غري املسلم ببعض احلاالت الفردية، إذ لو ُخّصص
ال األسرة، وختصيص الثاين يفضي تعميم األول يفضي إىل فوضى عارمة يف أحو 
.إىل احلرج الشديد
ورّمبا يكون من األجدر بوضع األقّليات أن مييل اإلفتاء بالرتخيص فيه نوَع 
األمهية الكربى يف هذا الشأن، وتُرّجح فيه وَىل ميل حنو اجلانب االجتماعي، فيُ 
ا فيما يتعلق باألفراد إذا كان بي نهما تعارض؛ الفتوى بالرخصة على الفتوى 
وذلك يف سبيل تدعيم الكيان اجلماعي للوجود اإلسالمي بأوروبا ليكون قادرًا 
ا األفراد بصفتهم الفردية .على النهوض بأهدافه اليت ال يقدر على النهوض 
يف شراء املدارس واملراكز واملساجد فلو أُفيت بالرتخيص للجمعيات اإلسالمية
إذ هو غّلب ؛ن ذلك إفتاء موفـًّقا فيما نقّدرلكا،بقروض الفوائد دون األفراد
.املصلحة اليت حتصل جلماعة املسلمني على ما قد حيصل لألفراد منها
تمع املوّسع الذي  ويندرج ضمن هذا البعد االجتماعي يف فتوى الرتخيص ا
تمع ينبغي أن ال  يعيش فيه املسلمون والذي يضّم مسلمني وغري مسلمني، فهذا ا
اوى الرتخيص بضرر بدعوى ما حيصل منها من مصلحة للمسلمني، وما تناله فت
أقبح تلك الفتاوى اليت يصدرها بعض األغرار اجلهلة بالرتخيص يف استحالل أموال 
تمع، أو غري ذلك مني، أو بالرتخيص يف خمالفة القواننيلغري املس املنظمة لشؤون ا
تمع املوّسع الذي يع .يش فيه املسلمونمن الرتاخيص املخّلة با
هذه بعض القواعد العاّمة اليت ينبغي فيما نقّدر أن توّجه االجتهاد يف فقه 
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الرتخيص الذي به تصدر الفتاوى والقرارات القائمة على الرتخيص، وذلك من 
أجل أن يكون هذا الفقه مناسًبا للوضع الذي عليه األقّلية املسلمة يف واقعها 
ئية، ومن حيث ما هو متحّول إليه من مصري الراهن من حيث صفته االستثنا
االستقرار والثبات، فتقع فتاوى الرتخيص إذن على حماّهلا من القضايا، وحتّقق 
فيها مقاصدها، ضمن الغايات واملقاصد اليت يتطّور إليها الوجود اإلسالمي 
بأوروبا، دون أن حيدث ارتباك يف املسري إىل تلك األهداف بسبب امليل يف فقه 
.خيص إىل غري مقاصدهالرت 
اإلفتاء بفقه التأسيس: خامًسا
أشرنا سابًقا إىل أّن الوجود اإلسالمي بأوروبا ميّر مبرحلة انتقالية من وجود 
ظريف عرضي إىل وجود مستقّر مواطن، وهذه املرحلة اليت هو نازع إليها ومتقّدم 
تقتضيها وترتّبها فيها تقتضي مقتضيات وترّتب واجبات والتزامات غري تلك اليت 
إذ حينما يصبح ؛املرحلة العرضية املتناقصة لفائدة مصري االستقرار واملواطنة
املسلون مكّونًا أساسيا من املكّونات املواطنة بأوروبا، فإّن ذلك يقتضي أن يكون 
الوجود اإلسالمي مسهًما حقيقيا يف احلركة احلضارية للمجتمع األورويب، يعطي  
يد كما يستفيد، ويرّشد املسار احلضاري العام، ويشرتك يف حّل كما يأخذ، ويف
ا ا وأزما .مشكال
وهذا املصري الذي سينتهي إليه الوجود اإلسالمي، والذي هو اآلن مّتجه 
إليه بسرعة، وما يقتضيه من مقتضيات ويرتّتب عليه من واجبات يستلزم من 
هي الذي يتعامل به معه يف اإلفتاء أن يتعامل معه بنظر فقهي غري النظر الفق
مرحلته الظرفية اليت هي اآلن املظهر األبني يف حياته، واليت يبدو أّن اإلفتاء قضى 
ا بفقه تغلب عليه فتاوى  السنوات املاضية يف معاجلة قضاياها ومشكال
.ا مع صفتها الظرفية من طريف البداية والنهايةالرتخيص تناسبً 
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بأوروبا آيل إىل املواطنة واالستقرار، فإّن النظر ومبا أّن هذا الوجود اإلسالمي
ه تُ الفقهي يف شأنه ينبغي فيما حنسب أن يّتجه يف ذات اّجتاهه، فيكون فقًها مسَْ 
العاّم هو مست التأسيس لوجود إسالمي مواطن مستقّر، بدل ذلك السمت العاّم 
ملرحلة الظرفية، الذي طبع فقه املرحلة السابقة بطابع الرتخيص تالؤًما مع طبيعة ا
علًما بأّن هذه التقسيمات حتمل شيًئا من االعتبارية، إذ املراحل متداخلة، 
واالستثنائية يف حياة األقّلية سوف يبقى قسط منها قائًما حىت يف حال املواطنة 
وذلك ما يرتّتب عليه أن فقه الرتخيص سوف يكون له استمرار يف . واالستقرار
إذن مبقاربتنا هذه هو أن يّتجه اإلفتاء يف املرحلة تلك احلال، فيكون املقصود
املقبلة إىل نظر فقهي مؤّسس للوضع اإلسالمي املواطن، مع استصحاب اإلفتاء 
.بالرخصة فيما سوف يبقى من مظاهر احلياة يّتصف بصفة االستثنائية
مدلول فقه التأسيس-أ
ه من اقرتاح ويف شرحنا ملفهوم فقه التأسيس نستدعي ما كّنا قد قّدمنا
بتوسيع مدلول الفتوى من مدلول يغلب عليه معىن اجلزئية والظرفية إىل مدلول 
يّتسع ليشمل اإلفتاء يف كربيات القضايا اليت تتعّلق مبصري املسلمني يف جمتمعهم 
األورويب، ومنهجهم يف التفاعل معه، واخنراطهم يف حركته احلضارية الشاملة، 
اجتماعيا وأسريا وروحيا وبيئيا، ووصلهم بينه وبني وإسهامهم يف تطويره وترشيده
العامل اإلسالمي من أجل التعارف احلضاري، وحتقيق السالم واألمن بني 
.الشعوب واألمم
هل ميكن أن تكون هذه القضايا وأمثاهلا مما هو متعّلق مبستقبل املسلمني 
ّتجًها إذن إىل فقه يؤّسس يف أوروبا مناطا لإلفتاء الفقهي، فيكون هذا اإلفتاء م
أم أّن هذا الدور يبقى حمصورًا يف إفتاء فقهي يتصّدى ملعاجلة ؟لذلك املستقبل
ا احلياة اليومية للمسلمني؟ إنّه فيما نرى  النوازل اجلزئية وشبه اجلزئية اليت جتري 
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إذا كان اإلفتاء فيما جتري به احلياة اليومية من النوازل أمًرا ال مناص من أن 
يكون مستمرا لتجّدد تلك النوازل باطّراد، فإّن املسلمني فيما هم مّتجهون إليه 
لس - من مصري املواطنة املستقرّة ينتظرون من دوائر اإلفتاء  وعلى رأسها ا
فتيهم أيًضا يف هذه القضايا املصريية الكربى اليت هم مقبلون تأن -األورويب
لس هو مرجعيت هم الكفيلة بأن توّجههم إىل ما ينبغي أن عليها، واحلال أّن ا
يصريوا إليه وفق مقاصد الدين، وليكن معىن اإلفتاء إذن معىن موّسًعا يشمل 
معىن اإلفتاء احلضاري العاّم إىل جانب معىن اإلفتاء يف النوازل اجلزئية وشبه 
لس يف هذه املرحلة هو فقه التأسيس .اجلزئية، وليكن الفقه الذي يّتجه إليه ا
لس كان يستبطن احلاجة إىل هذا الفقه منذ تأسيسه، وهو  وال شّك أّن ا
مثل قضية ،ما يدّل عليه تصّديه لبعض القضايا من ذلك الصنف املشار إليه
وقضية املشاركة السياسية لألقّليات 1،مستقبل األسرة اإلسالمية يف أوروبا
زهلا اآلنية املرتاكمة كانت ولكّن حاجة تلك األقّليات لإلفتاء يف نوا2.املسلمة
ا من جهده للجواب عليها، وقد آن األوان ا كبريً ضاغطة عليه كي يوّجه شطرً 
لس شطرًا مهما من قدٍ بعد مرور ما يزيد على ع من العمل اجلاّد أن يوّجه ا
جهده حنو فقه تأسيسي ملستقبل املسلمني بأوروبا مع استصحاب اإلفتاء يف 
وهكذا تتكامل احللقات الفقهية اليت تفيت لألقّليات . ارئةالنوازل الظرفية الط
املسلمة بني ما يعاجل قضاياها املتعّلقة بوجودها الظريف اليت ينفسج فيها جمال 
لفتاوى الرتخيص، وما يعاجل قضاياها املتعّلقة مبصريها مكّونًا وطنيا أوروبيا فاعًال، 
.وهو ما ينفسح فيه جمال واسع لفقه التأسيس
.7،2005، العددالمجلة العلمية للمجلسراجع البحوث املنشورة يف1
.11،2007- 10، العددانمجلسالمجلة العلمية للانظر البحوث املنشورة يف2
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منهج فقه التأسيس-ب
قد تكون التوّجهات املنهجية لإلفتاء التأسيسي ختتلف بعض االختالف 
عن تلك اليت تتعّلق باإلفتاء الرتخيصي، وذلك الختالف الوضع الذي يقع 
فإّن ،فحينما يكون الوضع املفىت فيه وضًعا ظرفيا، ونوازله نوازل جزئية.اإلفتاء له
فيكون به هو املنهج الذي وصفنا بعض خصائصه آنًفا منهج اإلفتاء الذي يناس
مّتجًها وجهة التيسري بالرخصة، والتفصيل بالتجزئة، واالهتمام بالنوازل الفردية 
وأّما حينما يكون الوضع الذي يُراد اإلفتاء له هو وضع املصري . مع اجلماعية
ي هدف وجودهم العاّم للمسلمني، ووضع املواطنة الفاعلة املنتظرة منهم، واليت ه
املستقبلي، فإّن اإلفتاء هلذا الوضع قد يقتضي منه ذلك أن يكون مّتجًها يف 
منهجية اإلفتاء وجهة أخرى تّتفق مع الوجهة األوىل يف بعض اخلصائص، وتنفرد 
:خبصائص أخرى لعّل من أهّم عناصرها ما يلي
د شديد إّن الوجود اإلسالمي بأوروبا هو وجو : التوّجه المستقبلي: أوالً 
النزوع للمستقبل، فهو كما ذكرنا سابًقا يضع هدفًا له أن يكون مكّونًا أساسيا 
تمع األورويب، ومسهًما من املسهمني يف مصريهمن مكّونات  ولذلك فإنّه لئن  . ا
كان يتحّسس حاضره ليعاجل فيه املشكالت اآلنية النامجة عن وضعه الظريف، 
احلياة اليومية، فإنه يرنو إىل ذلك املستقبل الذي وليواجه االبتالءات اليت تفرزها
سيكون له فيه شأن يف الشراكة احلضارية مع سائر املكّونات األوروبية، وهذا ما 
أصبح اليوم ظاهرًا يف خطاب طالئع الدعاة واملفكرين املسلمني بأوروبا، ويبدو أّن 
األجيال اجلديدة هذا األمر أصبح يتقّدم بسرعة يف وعي األقّليات املسلمة، ويف
.منها على وجه اخلصوص
لس األورويب لئن كان هو أيًضا منشغًال خالل الفرتة السابقة باإلفتاء  وا
الفقهي ملا يشغل حاضر األقّلية من اهلموم، وما يعرض هلا من النوازل، فإنه فيما 
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يت نقّدر ينبغي أن يواكب هذه األقّلية يف آماهلا املستقبلية، ويف أهدافها ال
تقتضيها املواطنة، وذلك بأن ميتّد نظره الفقهي إىل املستقبل أيًضا ليكون له 
. فتاوى يف شؤون تتعّلق به وإن مل تكن مطروحة يف احلاضر
إّن التفكري يف الوضع املستقبلي لألقّليات املسلمة يف أوروبا لئن كان يف 
ون على رأسهم وجوبه يشمل أصنافًا من املهتّمني بالوجود اإلسالمي رمبا يك
لس األورويب ينبغي أن  املفّكرون االسرتاتيجيون وعلماء املستقبل، إّال أّن ا
يكون مواكًبا هلذا التفكري بصفة أساسية؛ وذلك ألّن األوضاع املستقبلية اليت 
ستؤول إليها األقّليات املسلمة ينبغي أن تكون أوضاًعا حمكومة بأحكام الشرع 
ا اليت هي اآلن قيد وحمّققة ملقاصده، وأن تك ون مبنية على ذلك يف مقّدما
ا على مست شرعي، وهذه مهّمة ال ميكن أن  التشّكل، فتّتجه إذن منذ نشأ
لس األورويب لإلفتاء، فينبغي إذن أن ينخرط فيها بفقه يؤّسس  ا إّال ا يقوم 
.فيه للمستقبل الذي ينشده املسلون يف هذه البالد
ا على حنو ذلك اجلدل نظري"أرأيتيا"ه أن يكون وليس من شأن هذا الفق
الذي حدث يف تاريخ الفقه اإلسالمي، وإمنا هو نظر فقهي يف قضايا املستقبل 
ا يف احلاضر، ليكون فيها توجيه شرعي يواكبها يف  اليت هي ناشبة بدايا
ا، ويعصمها من االحنراف الذي تكثر مغرياته وأسبابه .سريور
ركة السياسية للمسلمني يف املستقبل، بل كيف ستكون كيف ستكون املشا
مشاركتهم يف احلكم إذ هو أمر وارد؟ وكيف سيكون وضعهم وأثرهم غًدا يف نطاق 
الوحدة األوروبية الشاملة اليت هي قيد التشّكل اآلن؟ وكيف سيكون املسلمون 
سيكون األوروبيون حلقة وصل متينة فاعلة بني أوروبا والعامل اإلسالمي؟ وكيف 
تمع األورويب اندماًجا يقوم على معادلة دقيقة بني احلفاظ على  اندماجهم يف ا
تمع؟ تلك مناذج من القضايا املستقبلية اليت ميكن أن يكون  هويتهم والتفاعل مع ا
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.لإلفتاء فيه توجيه فقهي مؤّسس ملستقبل املسلمني
هي حمّل اإلفتاء بفقه مبا أّن املرحلة اليت: التأسيس على العزائم: ثانًيا
التأسيس هي مرحلة للوجود اإلسالمي بأوروبا تنزع إىل االستقرار واالستمرار، 
فإّن الفقه املناسب هلا لعّله يكون الفقه الذي يغلب عليه منزع العزائم من 
األحكام بديًال من ذلك املنزع الرتخيصي الذي كان يغلب على اإلفتاء تناسًبا 
عرضي كما شرحناه؛ وذلك ألّن الوجود املستقّر للمسلمني  مع مرحلة الوجود ال
م على حال طبيعية أو أقرب إىل الطبيعية،  كمواطنني جيعلهم يؤّسسون حيا
تمع،  م بالدولة ومبؤّسسات ا سواء يف أعماهلم أو يف أسرهم، أو يف عالقا
التمتع فتكون إذن تلك احلياة راسية يف كّل وجوهها أو يف أغلبها على وضع من 
ا .حبقوق املواطنة والتكليف بواجبا
ا باعتبار إسالميته اخلاضعة وهذا الوضع لئن كان معىن االستثنائية فيه قائمً 
لقانون غري إسالمي، إّال أّن مساحة األحكام بالعزائم فيه من املناسب أن تتسع 
م، ملا هو مّتجه فيه إىل صريورة الدواشيًئا فشيًئا على حساب مساحة الرخصة
فاحلاالت اليت تستمّر على وضع عادي أحرى أن تعاجل بالعزمية، بينما تُعاجل 
احلاالت اليت تنخرق فيها العادات بالرخصة كما أشار إليه الشاطيب يف مقولته 
ا أليق، . اآلنفة الذكر فكّلما آلت األوضاع إىل مستقّر العادة كانت العزائم 
ا أليق، ومبا أّن وضع األقّليات املسلمة وكّلما آلت إىل اخنراقها كانت الرخص 
بأوروبا مّتجهة إىل املواطنة العادية، فإّن االّجتاه بالفقه الذي يعاجله إىل العزمية 
.يكون هو األنسب له
وعلى سبيل املثال فإّن الرتخيص بالقرض الربوي لشراء البيوت إذا كان مناسًبا 
ضية، فإنّه يف مرحلتها املقبلة اليت هي للمرحلة اليت تكون فيها األقّلية يف ظروف عر 
ا  مرحلة االستقرار ينبغي أن يّتجه اإلفتاء الفقهي إىل البحث عن الصور اليت يتّم 
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شراء البيوت بطرق غري ربوية، وتقدمي مقرتحات يف ذلك قائمة على حكم العزمية 
د أشّد التأكيد ويف نفس هذا االجتاه ينبغي أن يّتجه اإلفتاء ملا هو متأكّ . مبنع الربا
مما يتعّلق بالتمويل من أجل التجارة وإقامة املشاريع التجارية، وذلك بأن تُقّدم 
مقرتحات تقوم على فقه يؤّسس لبدائل غري ربوية تلّيب هذه احلاجة املؤّكدة لألقليات 
.املسلمة دون االكتفاء مبوقف اإلفتاء باملنع والوقوف عنده
إذا كان التقاضي يف أحوال األسرة ُرّخص فيه وعلى سبيل املثال أيًضا، فإنه 
خرى يرجع أن يكون تقاضيا إىل قاض غري مسلم، فإنّه ينبغي البحث عن صور أ
كالتحكيم الذي جتيزه بعض البالد األوروبية ويتّم من األمر فيها إىل العزمية،  
وهكذا يكون. خالله التقاضي على الوجه الشرعي عزمية يف غري مناقضة للقانون
ا بتجاوز  النظر الفقهي مدعوا إىل أن يساعد األقّلية املسلمة يف حلول مشكال
موقف إجازة الرخصة، أو موقف االكتفاء مبنعها متّسًكا بالعزمية، إىل موقف آخر 
يتمّسك بالعزمية ولكّنه يبّني سبلها، ويقرتح األشكال اليت تتّم وفقها، فيكون إذن 
.عزائم األحكام بدل الرتاخيصمشّرًعا لفقه تأسيسي يقوم على
إذا كانت الفتوى يف شؤون األفراد من املسلمني : التوّجه المؤّسسي: ثالثًا
م سيكون هلا استمرار باعتبار تعّلقها بتجّدد احلياة  واحلاالت اخلاّصة من حاال
ا فإّن احلياة اليت سينخرط فيها املسلمون يف مستقبل وجودهم  اليومية وابتالءا
تمع سوف تك ون حياة تأخذ فيها املؤّسسة حيزًا كبًريا منها؛ ذلك ألّن ا
األورويب جمتمع يقوم على املؤّسسات اقتصاديا على وجه اخلصوص واجتماعيا 
تمع إمنا متّر باخنراطه الفاعل يف املؤّسسة، إذا كان  وسياسيا، ففعالية الفرد يف ا
ففي الشركات، وإن كان مثقًفا ففي سياسيا ففي األحزاب، وإن كان اقتصاديا
املؤسسات العلمية الثقافية، وهكذا تكون املؤسسة هي احملّرك األكرب حلياة 
تمع، والفرد إمنا يفعل من خالهلا .ا
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تمع إال إذا اخنرطوا يف آليته  وليس بوسع املسلمني أن يكون هلم دور يف ا
مؤّسسة ذات خصوصية الكربي اليت حترّكه وهي آلة املؤسسة، سواء كانت
إسالمية من مراكز ثقافية وشركات جتارية ومنظمات اجتماعية وغريها، أو 
مؤّسسة عاّمة جتمع مجيع املواطنني كاألحزاب السياسية واملنظمات اإلنسانية 
فمن خالل هذه املؤسسة . واحلقوقية، والشركات االقتصادية واخلدمية وغريها
.طلوب منهم يف مآهلم من االستقرار واملواطنةميكن أن يقوم املسلمون بدورهم امل
إّن اخنراط املسلمني يف النظام املؤّسسي للمجتمع األورويب سيجعلهم 
ا عهد من قبل؛ وذلك ألّن  يواجهون أوضاًعا وميارسون معامالت مل يكن هلم 
الثقافة االجتماعية يف البالد اإلسالمية مل تكن قائمة على املؤّسسية، وقد 
ا ذلك يف جمتمعهم األورويب يف مرحلتهم الظرفية، ولكّن اندماجهماستصحبو 
تمعي الذي هم مّتجهون إليه سيجعلهم يف مواجهة مع تلك األوضاع يف  ا
.التعامل املؤّسسي
لس األورويب أن  وهذا الوضع يقتضي من جهات اإلفتاء وعلى رأسها ا
املعامالت املؤّسسية اليت تّتجه يف فقه األقّليات وجهة تتناول بالفتوى فيها 
ستواجه املسلمني بكثافة يف املرحلة املقبلة، واليت ستستغرق شطرًا كبريًا من 
ا ستتوّقف عليها إىل حّد كبري فعاليتهم االجتماعية، مناشطهم، واليت أيضً 
ومشاركتهم يف التنمية، وذلك باإلضافة إىل جناحهم يف أمنوذجيتهم اإلسالمية 
.تمعاملرصودة من ِقبل ا
كيف سيشارك املسلمون يف العمل السياسي ضمن املنظمات السياسية؟ 
وكيف سيتعاطون مع هذه املؤّسسات؟ وكيف سينخرطون يف املؤّسسات االقتصادية 
وميارسون أعماهلم من خالهلا؟ وكيف سيتصرّفون يف املؤّسسات والشركات اخلاّصة 
ومسّريين؟ وهكذا سوف تظهر م سواء باعتبارهم شركاء أو باعتبارهم مديرين 
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ا أن تكون فتاوى  أسئلة كثرية يف هذا الشأن تتطّلب كّلها أجوبة فقهية من شأ
مؤّسسة لوجود إسالمي يّتجه وجهة االستقرار على حياة تشغل املؤّسسات شطرًا  
.كبريا من مناشطها، وتتوّقف النجاعة إىل حّد كبري عليها
الشأن بأن يستحضر الفقيه أّمهات وإمنا يتحقق الفقه التأسيسي يف هذا
القضايا فيه، اسرتواًحا من الواقع، واستشرافًا ملا يكون للمسلمني فيه إسهام 
فاعل، ويقع درسها الدرس املستفيض، مث تقّرر فيها األحكام الفقهية اليت من 
م اإلسالمي،  ا يتقّدمون يف تنمية كيا ا أن جتعل املسلمني عند األخذ  شأ
لس األورويب . تمع بأكمله من خالل ذلكوتنمية ا وما إخال ختصيص ا
لدورتني من دوراته للبحث يف مؤسسة األسرة، وختصيص دورة أو أكثر للبحث 
يف العمل السياسي وهو يف جممله عمل مؤسسي إّال نتيجة لوعي مبّكر منه 
.ألمهّية التأسيس الفقهي للعمل املؤّسسي
ذكرنا سابًقا أّن املسلمني يف أوروبا باتوا : الشراكة الحضارية: رابًعا
تمع  يهدفون يف وجودهم املستقبلي إىل أن يكونوا شركاء حضاريني ملكّونات ا
م أصبحوا مواطنني من مواطنيه، وهو ما يعين أنّه كما  الذي يعيشون فيه مبا أ
تمع فإّن من حّقهم أن يستفيدوا من املقدَّرات املاّدية واملعنوية املوفورة يف هذا ا
من واجبهم أن يكونوا مسهمني فيه بالتطوير والتنمية والرتشيد وحّل املشكالت 
.ما استطاعوا إىل ذلك سبيال
وهذه الشراكة احلضارية أخًذا وعطاء إذا كانت أمًرا مطلوبًا، وهي أمر 
ا وجه شرعي  ا من حيث اإلجناز يتعّلق  ّ مقدور عليه من حيث اإلمكان، فإ
دية فعًال، إذ قد اجتهاد فقهي تستبني به الوجوه املشروعة دينً حيتاج إىل ا وا
ختتلط فيها السبل بني جائز يف الدين وممنوع، سواء يف طرف األخذ أو يف طرف 
تمع بكّل الطرق اليت هي جائزة  العطاء، وذلك مثل املضّي يف االستفادة من ا
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امالت ربوية، وتأمينات قائمة يف قوانينه وهي ممنوعة يف أحكام الشريعة من مع
تمع بذات تلك الطرق من  على الغرر وما شابه ذلك، ومثل املضّي يف إفادة ا
اخنراط يف مواقف معادية لألّمة اإلسالمية أو لغريهم من املستضعفني يف األرض، 
.أو ما شابه ذلك من القضايا
مني فيما تقتضيه السبيل للمسلريوهلذا فإّن اإلفتاء يكون مطلوبًا منه أن ين
هذه الشراكة احلضارية املطلوبة منهم يف طريف األخذ والعطاء من التزام فيها 
بأحكام الشريعة، فيجتهد إذن يف القضايا املندرجة فيها ليقّرر أحكاًما هادية 
م املستقبلية يف هذه الطريق، مفرّقًا يف وضوح بني ما  ا املسلمون يف مسري يستنري 
تمع نظاًما حلياته موافًقا ألحكام الشرع فيمارسون هو من القوانني  اليت ارتضاها ا
الشراكة احلضارية من خالهلا، وبني ما هو مناقض له فيجتهد يف التعامل معه مبا 
.ال خيّل باملقتضيات الدينية
ا ما ومن البّني أّن االجتهاد الفقهي يف هذا الشأن سوف يكون متجاوزً 
تمع األورويب بصفة فيه مصلحة املسلمني بصفة مباشرة إىل ما فيه مصلحة ا
تمعهم ما فيه صالحه، والنظر  عاّمة، إذ املسلمون مطلوب منهم أن يقّدموا 
الفقهي مطلوب منه أن يرّشد بالفتوى الفقهية ذلك العطاء، فيكون هو أيًضا 
تمع بصفة مباشرة، ورّمبا يكون  هذا منخرطًا يف التشريع ملا فيه خري لذلك ا
ا من إفتاء يتعّلق جبماعة املسلمني املنحى متطّلًبا لنظر فقهي غري ما كان معهودً 
م اخلاّصة مهما يكن من أّن ذلك يتعّدى صالحه إىل كاّفة  وحيّل مشكال
تمع األورويب، وذلك باعتبار أّن  تمع، فيكون إذن هذا الفقه معنيا مبصلحة ا ا
منهم العمل ألجل مصلحة مني املطلوبهذه املصلحة هي هّم من مهوم املسل
حضاريني فيه، واإلفتاء إمنا انتصب لرتشيد مهومهم ما شركاءَ جمتمعهم بوصفهم 
.تعّلق منها بوجودهم كمسلمني، وما تعّلق بوجودهم كمواطنني
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تمعهم األورويب يف جمال االبتكار  ماذا وكيف على املسلمني أن يقّدموا 
ل الرتابط األسري واالجتماعي، ويف جمال اإلشباع والريادة العلمية، ويف جما
الروحي، ويف جمال العالقة مع العامل اإلسالمي واالستفادة من مقّدراته، ويف جمال 
مقاومة العنف واملخّدرات واإلجرام، ويف جمال معاجلة األزمة البيئية، وفيما يشبه 
لس األورويب يف كّل دورة من دو  راته ينصح ذلك من القضايا؟ ما فتئ ا
املسلمني بأن يكونوا يف صاحل جمتمعهم، ويعظهم بذلك ويوّجههم إليه، ولكن 
األمر ينبغي أن ال يقف عند ذلك احلّد، بل ال بد أن يتعّداه إىل إفتاء فقهي 
عميق يف جوانب كثرية من تلك القضايا من شأنه أن يتأّسس عليه الوجود 
.اإلسالمي يف مرحلته املقبلة
حنسب أّن اإلفتاء لألقليات ممثًال باألخص يف ائص املنهجيةإّن هذه اخلص
لس األورويب ينبغي أن يأخذها بعني االعتبار يف خطته املستقبلية، وذلك من ا
م املستقبلية تأسيًسا إسالميا  أجل أن يساعد املسلمني بأوروبا على تأسيس حيا
والذي يقتضي منهم أن واعًيا، يستجيب لوضع املواطنة الذي هم مقبلون عليه، 
تمع تفاعًال إجيابيا، ينتفعون منه ويقّدمون له املنافع،  يكونوا متفاعلني مع ا
وذلك من خالل حياة مستقرّة يوّجهها فقه تأسيسي ال يقتصر على معاجلة 
النوازل اليومية الطارئة بإفتاء ذي طابع جزئي، وإمنا يضيف إىل ذلك إفتاء يف  
. عّلقة مبستقبل األقليات املسلمة، ودورها املستقبلي يف أوروباكربيات القضايا املت
مقتضيات الفقه التأسيسي-ج
إّن هذا الفقه التأسيسي املطلوب من اإلفتاء أن ميضي فيه يتطّلب فيما 
نقّدر من املقتضيات أكثر مما كان يتطّلبه الفقه الرتخيصي الذي كان مسة سائدة 
ظر إىل كونه يتناول قضايا ذات أبعاد متنّوعة قد يف املرحلة السابقة؛ وذلك بالن
تكون هلا صلة بعلوم أخرى غري فقهية، وهو ما يستلزم توسيًعا يف جمال البحث 
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ا أكرب مما جرى عليه العمل، وذلك اء، كما يستلزم استعداًدا ماّديمن أجل اإلفت
ملا هو آين عةباإلضافة إىل ضبط خطّة عملية لإلجناز يراعى فيها التوازن بني املتاب
.من حاجات املسلمني، وما هو مستقبلي تأسيسي منها
فحينما نتحّدث عن فقه تأسيسي لألقّليات املسلمة فإن أول ما يتبادر 
إىل الذهن هو القضايا اليت ينبغي أن يتناوهلا هذا الفقه باإلفتاء، واليت متّثل حبّق 
وبا، سواء فيما يتعّلق بالتأسيس أركانًا تأسيسية حلياة املسلمني املستقبلية يف أور 
تمع التفاعل املنتج الذي  الذايت جلماعة املسلمني، أو ما يتعّلق بالتفاعل مع ا
ونورد تالًيا مناذج من تلك . حيّقق أهداف الوجود اإلسالمي وفق رؤية شرعية
:القضايا نراها تندرج ضمن ما يستحّق أن يشملها النظر الفقهي التأسيسي
.السياسية لألقليات املسلمة يف أوروباـ املشاركة 
.ـ الدور االقتصادي لألقليات املسلمة
تمع .ـ االندماج املسلمني بأوروبا يف ا
.ـ العقول املسلمة ودورها يف التنمية بأوروبا
تمع .ـ دور املسلمني األوروبيني يف مقاومة العنف واالحنراف يف ا
.األزمة البيئيةـ دور املسلمني األوروبيني يف معاجلة
.دور املسلمني بأوروبا يف العالقات األوروبية اإلسالميةـ
.ـ املسلمون بأوروبا بني الوالء الوطين والوالء للدين واألّمة
تمع األورويب ـ كيف يستفيد املسلمون من ا
تناول مثل هذه القضايا باإلفتاء الفقهي يستلزم جهوًدا حبثية كبرية؛ ذلك إّن 
ا قض ايا ذات امتدادات متعّددة، اجتماعية وسياسية واقتصادية وثقافية، وال أل
.علمية تتعّلق بتلك اجلوانب كّلهاميكن التوجيه الفقهي فيها إال بناء على معطيات 
ولذلك فإنه ينبغي يف سبيل اإلفتاء فيها أن تتوّسع دائرة البحث املمهد لإلفتاء، 
 313
قامة لندوات ومؤمترات علمية متخّصصة استعانة بباحثني من ختصصات متعددة، وإ
ا لتوفري متطّلبات البحث ونشر نتائجه، ا ماليتتعّلق بالقضايا املطروحة، ودعمً 
.وختطيطا ملناهجه ومساراته
ومبا أّن الكثري من هذه القضايا هلا عالقة بعلوم غري فقهية، فإن ذلك 
هذا املنهج مبا قليات بعدُ وإذ مل يعتمد اإلفتاء لأل.يستلزم االستعانة خبرباء فيها
هو كاف، فإّن هذا الفقه التأسيسي يستلزم انتداب بعض اخلرباء يف جماالت 
،اهتمامه من صنف االقتصاديني والقانونيني، واالجتماعيني، واالسرتاتيجيني
، لينظموا إىل دوائر اإلفتاء بصفة ما من الصفات املؤقتة أو ياتوعلماء املستقبل
م يف املداوالت اليت تقع يف شأن اإلفتاء، فتلك ضرورة لرتشيد الدائمة، استعانة
.االجتهاد الفقهي يف مثل هذه القضايا
 
إذا كان النظر الفقهي قطع مرحلة مهّمة يف اإلفتاء لألقليات املسلمة بفقه ينحو 
يف طابعه العاّم منحى الرتخيص ملعاجلة الوضع االستثنائي هلذه األقليات، فإنّه يف
املرحلة املقبلة جيدر به أن يضيف إىل ذلك منهًجا يقوم على اإلفتاء بفقه تأسيسي 
ينحو منحى العزائم، ويتناسب مع تطّور وجود األقليات الذي أصبح يّتجه حنو 
ا، وهو ما  املواطنة املستقرّة، فيعمل على معاجلة قضايا هذه املواطنة ومقتضيا
األقليات يف وضعها اجلديد أن يكون هلا دور يتتطّلب اجتهاًدا فقهيا يؤّسس هلذه
تمع، تستفيد من   تمع األوريب، تصبح فيه شريًكا حضاريا يف هذا ا فاعل يف ا
.واهللا ويل التوفيق. كسبه، وتسهم يف تنميته وتطويره وترشيده




إن مطالبة األقليات باملساواة مع األغلبية يف احلقوق املدنية والسياسية يف العديد 
من الناحية بة بأمر غري حاصلمن دول أوروبا الغربية ليست من قبيل املطال
م، ن القوانني ال متيز بني املواالقانونية، إذ إ طنني مهما اختلفت أصوهلم وأديا
وإمنا هي مطالبة من الناحية الواقعية واالجتماعية حتتاج إليها كل جمموعة حديثة 
تمع حىت تتمكن فيه وتندمج يف نسيجه وبالتايل فإن ما جنده من نضال .يف ا
لنيل املساواة يف احلقوق ال ينطلق من منطلق األقلية، وإمنا ينطلق من منطلق 
تمع الواحدامل ومع منو . واطنة وما تقتضيه من العدل والتساوي بني أبناء ا
حجم الوجود اإلسالمي يف دول أوروبا الغربية وبروز أمهيته السياسة واالقتصادية 
يف تلك الدول بأقدار خمتلفة، فإن األقليات املسلمة وغريها من األقليات 
ال ينطلق بالضرورة من وضع باالعرتاف هلا حبق التميز يف الدين والقيم أمر
األقلية من حيث هي، وإمنا ينطلق من منطلق احلقوق املكفولة لكل مواطن يف 
احملافظة على خصوصياته الدينية والثقافية وقد أصبح اجلميع اليوم يسّلم بأن 
تمعات األوروبية احلديثة هي جمتمعات تعددية ديني . ا وثقافياا
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لضروري إعادة النظر يف مصطلح األقليات ويف ضوء ذلك فقد أصبح من ا
الذي نريد أن نعّرف به املسلمني يف أوروبا، فهم وإن كانوا أقلية من حيث العدد، 
م ال ينطلقون من منطلق األقلية للمطالبة حبقوقهم واحملافظة على  إال أ
م، فكيف ميكننا إذن أن نعّرف الوجود اإلسالمي  أوروبا اليوم؟ ميكننا بخصوصيا
لقول بأن املسلمني يف أوروبا هم مواطنون ميثلون أقلية باعتبار انتمائهم الديين، ا
م يف إطار الوحدة الوطنية اليت  وبالتايل فإن من حقهم أن يطالبوا باحرتام مميزا
وإن االنطالق من هذا املنطلق هو . تربطهم بغريهم من مواطين بلدهم األورويب
ألن األقلية اليت ترّكز يف مطالبها ؛أوروبابالتكييف األسلم للحضور اإلسالمي 
ها للمجموعة الوطنية تثري ءعلى عناصر االختالف مع األغلبية دون أن تؤكد انتما
ا أقلية تريد أن تغري  نوًعا من اخلوف والريبة لدى األغلبية اليت تنظر إليها على أ
تمع، وجيب أن  نعرتف بأن هذا املوازين وتزعزع عناصر الوحدة واالنسجام يف ا
التخوف هو أمر طبيعي يف كل جمتمع بشري تربط أفراده عناصر من التوّحد 
.ا النسجامه ومحاية لنفسه من التصدعحيرص على بقائها ضمانً 
 
إن موضوع األقليات املسلمة اليت تعيش يف جمتمعات غري إسالمية، يُعّد اليوم 
وذلك ألن ؛ديد من الباحثني والدارسنيمن القضايا اليت تستقطب أنظار الع
وجود العديد من املسلمني كأقليات يف بالد كثرية يعترب ظاهرة جديدة، ومل يكن 
هلا يف تاريخ املسلمني سوابق قدمية، إذا ما استثنينا الوجود اإلسالمي يف آخر 
ا من الناحية ولعله هلذا السبب ال جند يف كتب الفقه حبثً .العصر األندلسي
قهية يتصل بأوضاع املسلمني عندما يعيشون أقلية يف جمتمعات غري إسالمية، الف
م، مما  تمع اإلسالمي واألحكام املتعلقة  يف حني أن أوضاع غري املسلمني يف ا
.تعرض له الفقهاء يف كتبهم
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إن األقليات املسلمة يف أوروبا تبلغ يف تقدير بعض الباحثني ما يزيد عن 
ذا أصبحوا يشكلون مخسني مليون نسمة  بني مواطنني أصليني ومهاجرين، وهم 
ا هو اليوم حمل اهتمام الدارسني وأصحاب القرار وعموم الرأي العام ا اجتماعيوجودً 
تمعات األوروبية، ويعود هذا االهتمام إىل عدة أسباب من أمهها :يف ا
ّونا أن الوجود اإلسالمي مرّشح للنمو العددي حبيث أنه سيصبح مك.1
تمعات األوروبيةا هاما واجتماعيدميوغرافي .ا يف العديد من ا
أن املسلمني، مبا حيملونه من خصوصيات دينية وثقافية، ميثلون يف .2
م اليت هي جمتمعات مسيحية ا جديدً نظر األوروبيني عنصرً  ا يف تركيبة جمتمعا
.التدين والثقافة
سلمني يف العامل من اهتمام يف أن ما يشهده موضوع اإلسالم وامل.3
أوروبا من باإلعالم ولدى رجال السياسة والفكر، جتعل الوجود اإلسالمي 
تمعات األوروبية، فلم يعد اإلسالم أمرً  ا ا خارجيالقضايا احلساسة اليت تشغل ا
تمعات، وإمنا قد أصبح جزءً بعيدً  ا من واقعها، وإن االعرتاف ا عن هذه ا
مي الفعلي أصبح اليوم من املُسّلمات الواضحة اليت ال حتتمل بالوجود اإلسال
ولعله من املفيد قبل أن خنوض غمار البحث أن ُحنّدد بإجياز املقصود . اجلدل
مصطلح سياسي جرى : "مبصطلح األقليات، فهي كما عرّفها طه جابر العلواين
ول تنتمي يف العرف الدويل، يقصد به جمموعة أو فئات من رعايا دولة من الد
وتشمل . من حيث العرق أو اللغة أو الدين إىل غري ما تنتمي إليه األغلبية
مطالب األقليات ـ عادة ـ املساواة مع األغلبية يف احلقوق املدنية والسياسية، مع 
1."االعرتاف هلا حبق االختالف والتميز يف جمال االعتقاد والقيم
ّم األقليا :تحّدد هذا التعريف أربع قضايا 
.10ص،19،1999، العددإسالمية المعرفة، "مدخل إىل فقه األقليات"طه جابر العلواين، 1
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أن األقلية هي جمموعة من األفراد ينتمون إىل دولة غري بلد اإلقامة: األوىل
.أن هذه األقلية ختتلف يف العرق أو اللغة أو الدين عن أغلبية أهل البلد: الثانية
.أن األقلية تطالب باملساواة يف احلقوق املدنية والسياسية مع األغلبية: الثالثة
.حبقها يف التميز يف الدين والقيمأن األقلية تطالب : الرابعة
أوروبا الغربية ومن باب أوىل بولكن املتأمل يف واقع األقليات املسلمة 
ا، مسلمي أوروبا الشرقية، جيد أن عناصر التعريف السابق ال تنطبق عليها متامً 
:وذلك لألسباب التالية
من اجليل إن املسلمني يف أوروبا الغربية وإن كان القسم الكبري منهم هم.1
األول الذين قدموا من دول إسالمية خمتلفة، فإنه من العسري اليوم أن نربط 
ا املسلمني بدول أجنبية، وذلك ألن املهاجرين قد استوطن العديد منهم إما جتنسً 
وإما إقامة دائمة، وبذلك أصبحوا من مواطين هذه البالد، حىت لو كانوا ال 
الدول األوروبية من مينح حق االنتخاب ولذلك فإن هناك من.حيملون جنسيتها
، جانبوإن كانوا أيف االنتخابات احمللية للمقيمني حبكم إقامتهم املستمرة فيها
فإنه ال ميكن اعتبارهم بأي ،وأما األجيال اجلديدة من أبناء هؤالء املهاجرين
ألن البلد ؛حال من األحوال رعايا دول أجنبية، وإمنا هم مواطنون أوروبيون
.وا فيه ويشعرون باالنتماء إليه هو البلد األورويب الذي ينتسبون إليهألذي نشا
ا من إن االختالف يف العرق أو اللغة أو الدين ليس بالضرورة دائمً .2
ا ؛ُحمّددات األقلية تمعات األوروبية احلديثة جيد أ إذ أن الناظر يف تركيبة ا
داخلة، وهي من حيث اللغة تنتمي من حيث العرق إىل أعراق متنوعة ومت
جتمعهم لغة واحدة، وهي من حيث الدين ينقسم أهلها إىل انتماءات دينية 
وإن ما تعيشه أوروبا اليوم من انفتاح ديين . متعددة وإن وجد دين غالب بينهم
جعلها ساحة مفتوحة أمام كل األديان، وأمام تراجع التأثري الديين يف هذه 
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تمعات  انات املختلفة كلهم ميثلون أقليات، بل إن بعض أصبح أتباع الديا
األديان العريقة يف أوروبا مثل الديانة الربوتستانتية ال حتتل يف كثري من الدول 
. األوروبية إال املرتبة الثالثة بعد الكاثوليكية واإلسالم، على حداثة وجوده يف أوروبا
كن أن يُشكل كيانا فإن االختالف يف العرق أو اللغة ال مي،ومهما كان األمر
متميزا ألقلية يف جمتمعات حترص على دمج أفرادها وإن اختلفت أصوهلم العرقية 
ولكنه أمر ،وأما اختالف الدين فليس من خصوصية أقلية دون أخرى.واللغوية
تمع .يتعلق تقريبا بسائر األديان بقطع النظر عن حداثة أو عراقة وجودها يف ا
باملساواة مع األغلبية يف احلقوق املدنية والسياسية يف إن مطالبة األقليات.3
إذ ملطالبة القانونية ألمر غري حاصل؛العديد من دول أوروبا الغربية ليس من قبيل ا
م، وإمنا هي مطالبة إ ن القوانني ال متيز بني املواطنني مهما اختلفت أصوهلم وأديا
تمع حىت من الناحية الواقعية واالجتماعية حتتاج إليها ك ل جمموعة حديثة يف ا
تتمكن فيه وتندمج يف نسيجه، وبالتايل فإن ما جنده من نضال لنيل املساواة يف 
ملواطنة وما تقتضيه من احلقوق ال ينطلق من منطلق األقلية، وإمنا ينطلق من منطلق ا
تمع الواحداةساو العدل وامل .بني أبناء ا
هلا حبق التميز يف الدين والقيم، فهذا األمر وأما مطالبة األقليات باالعرتاف.4
وإمنا ينطلق من منطلق احلقوق املكفولة لكل ،ال ينطلق بالضرورة من وضع األقلية
مواطن يف احملافظة على خصوصياته الدينية والثقافية، وقد أصبح اجلميع اليوم يسّلم 
تمعات األوروبية احلديثة هي جمتمعات تعددية ديني .ثقافياا و بأن ا
من الضروري إعادة النظر يف مصطلح فإنهاهذه االعتبارات مجيعً ويف ضوء 
أوروبا، فهم وإن كانوا أقلية من حيث باألقليات الذي نريد أن نعّرف به املسلمني 
م ال ينطلقون من منطلق األقلية للمطالبة حبقوقهم واحملافظة على  العدد إال أ
م، فكيف ميكننا إذن أن ن أوروبا اليوم؟ ميكننا بعّرف الوجود اإلسالمي خصوصيا
القول بأن املسلمني يف أوروبا هم مواطنون ميثلون أقلية باعتبار انتمائهم الديين، 
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م يف إطار الوحدة الوطنية اليت  وبالتايل فإن من حقهم أن يطالبوا باحرتام مميزا
هو ه القاعدة وإن االنطالق من هذ. هم األورويبتربطهم بغريهم من مواطين بلد
ألن األقلية اليت ترّكز يف مطالبها ألسلم للحضور اإلسالمي يف أوروبا؛التكييف ا
ها للمجموعة الوطنية تثري ءعلى عناصر االختالف مع األغلبية دون أن تؤكد انتما
ا أقلية تريد أن تغري نوعً  ا من اخلوف والريبة لدى األغلبية اليت تنظر إليها على أ
تمعاملوازين وتزع بأن هذا قرَّ وجيب أن ن.زع عناصر الوحدة واالنسجام يف ا
التخوف هو أمر طبيعي يف كل جمتمع بشري تربط أفراده عناصر من التوّحد 
. ومحاية لنفسه من التصدع،ا النسجامهضمانً ،حيرص على بقائها
س بالضرورة عالمة وال بد من اإلشارة إىل أن االنتماء إىل أقلية دينية لي
ن هناك أقليات دينية هلا من النفوذ والتأثري ما يفوق األكثرية إذ إ؛ى ضعفهاعل
تمعالكاثرة  .يف ا
ا إىل أن القوانني األوروبية تتحدث عن محاية ولعله من املهم أن نشري أيضً 
ا مل حتدد تعريفً ،حقوق األقليات ا للمقصود باألقليات، وهو ما ذكره ا واضحً إال أ
موعة " تمع املفتوحمعهد ا"تقرير  الذي تناول موضوع محاية األقليات يف ا
موعة األوروبية باعتبارها منظمة تطالب بوضوح : "يقول، حيث األوروبية إن ا
باحرتام األقليات ومحايتها من قبل الدول، وتشرتط على الدول األعضاء اجلدد 
موعة يقتضي منها الرت  كيز على تعريف موّحد التعهد بذلك، فإن االنسجام داخل ا
يف الوسط األورويب، وعليها أن تشجع كل الدول األعضاء لوضع " األقلية " ملفهوم 
تشريع وسياسات حلماية األقليات، وجيب أن يكون هذا التعريف قابال للمراجعة 
الدورية، وُجترى عليه التقييمات اليت تسمح بأن يؤخذ بعني االعتبار كل جمموعات 
1."تّم على ضوء ذلك تدقيق التعريفأقلية جديدة، في
تمع املفتوحالصادر عن" محاية األقليات يف الوحدة األوروبية"تقرير 1 Open Society Institute -2002معهد ا
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أن املسلمني يف أوروبا يفوق عددهم اخلمسني إىلتشري التقديرات اإلحصائية
، ولكن هؤالء املسلمني قطنون فيهامليونا، وهم يشّكلون أقليات يف البالد اليت ي
أوروبا الشرقية، وذلك بالنظر ختتلف طبيعة وجودهم وأوضاعهم بني أوروبا الغربية و 
:تيةإىل االعتبارات اآل
م .1 املسلمون يف أوروبا الشرقية هم من سكان البالد األصليني، وبالتايل فإ
ا ليسوا وهذا اعتبار مهم من نواحي عدة، فهم يسكنون بلدً ،يتمتعون بصفة املواطنة
االندماج يف جمتمع وهم يعرفون تارخيه وظروفه، وال يُطرح عليهم أمر،غرباء فيه
كما أن املسلمني يف القسم الشرقي من . جديد خمالف ملا عهدوه يف بيئتهم األصلية
مث هي اآلن ،أوروبا يعيشون يف دول عاشت ردًحا من الزمن حتت النظام الشيوعي
.متر مبرحلة انتقالية تتحول فيها إىل النظام الليربايل على النمط الغريب
الديين للمسلمني فيما يتصل مبسألة اإلفتاء، فإن دول وإذا نظرنا إىل الوضع
د، وهي با الشرقية هلا دوائر إفتاء رمسية تشرف على الشؤون الدينية يف البالو أور 
.ا املرجعية اليت تستفىت يف الشؤون اإلسالميةاليت تعترب رمسي
أما املسلمون يف أوروبا الغربية، فهم يف أغلبهم من املهاجرين الذين .2
قدموا أو استقدموا ألوروبا من عدد من الدول اإلسالمية، ولئن كان قدومهم يف 
البداية يف إطار هجرة مؤقتة إال أن األمر حتّول بعد ذلك إىل استقرار دائم، 
ا مع نشوء األجيال اجلديدة من أبنائهم الذين وأصبح هذا االستقرار أكثر وضوحً 
هؤالء إىل وا وتعلموا فيها، ويضاف أشيعتربون أنفسهم مواطنني يف البالد اليت ن
إن طبيعة الوجود . أعداد متزايدة من املسلمني األوروبيني الذين يعتنقون اإلسالم
ا إىل هجرة أجنبية، اقتضت طرح اإلسالمي يف أوروبا الغربية الذي يعود أساسً 
ا بالنسبة املهاجرين املسلمني الذين وجدوا أنفسهم خصوصً ،إشكالية االندماج
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.جمتمعات ختتلف عنهم يف الدين والثقافة واللغة والعاداتيف 
أوروبا الغربية ما نشاهده من حتّول يف طبيعة بومن مميزات الوجود اإلسالمي 
الرتكيبة البشرية بني من يُطلق عليهم باجليل األول الذين جاؤوا ومعهم رصيد من 
م يف ذلك، وبني املعرفة بالدين وااللتزام بأحكامه األساسية على تفاوت بينه
األجيال اجلديدة اليت نشأت يف جمتمعات غري إسالمية وبالتايل جند الكثري منهم 
إال من كانت ،ا حىت إىل معرفة البديهيات من املعلوم من الدين بالضرورةمفتقرً 
. نشأته يف أسرة حمافظة أو من تيسر له تلّقي دروًسا دينية يف مسجد أو مجعية
حيث يصل تأثريه اليوم إىل ،المي يف توسع دائمولئن كان النشاط اإلس
العديد منهم يفتقر إىل املعرفة إال أن أعداد غري قليلة من أبناء املسلمني، 
ا على املؤسسات ا كبريً عن االلتزام به، وهذا يطرح حتديً البسيطة بدينه فضالً 
يل اإلسالمية وحيّملها مسؤولية ثقيلة من أجل احلفاظ على هذه األجيال وتأص
تمع .انتمائها اإلسالمي دون عزهلا عن ا
ومن املهم أن نذكر أن املسلمني يف أوروبا الغربية حيث ال توجد دوائر 
دينية رمسية يف الدولة تتوىل مسؤولية اإلشراف على الشأن الديين اخلاص، فإن 
تنظيم أوضاعهم الدينية العامة يتم من خالل هيئات إسالمية متثلية خيتارها 
ا يف مسألة اإلفتاء اليت يتوالها األئمة مون، وال تتدخل هذه اهليئات غالبً املسل
.واهليئات الشرعية
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كما - سنقصر احلديث عن مسلمي أوروبا الغربية ملعرفتنا القريبة بواقعهم، وألن أوضاعهم 
م عن أوضاع- سبق أن ذكرنا  ولنبدأ .مسلمي أوروبا الشرقيةختتلف من حيث احتياجا
اص لألقليات؟خهل هناك فقه : أوالً باجلواب عن سؤال التايل
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ألقلياتاأ ـ فقه 
برز مصطلح فقه األقليات يف السنوات األخرية لدى املهتمني بأمر الفتوى 
ا املوجهة للمسلمني الذين يعيشون أقليات يف جمتمعات غري إسالمية وخصوصً 
توقف بشأنه الفقهاء والباحثني،تبىن هذا املصطلح بعضُ ا بينممسلمي الغرب، و 
ا ا لألقليات فهم يقصدون بذلك فقهً أما الذين يرون أن هناك فقهً . آخرون
ولكن مع العناية ،ا من الكتاب والسنة ومن الرتاث الفقهي املوروثمنطلقً 
اء اليت خبصوصيات الواقع الغريب وما يقتضيه من مراعاة حلاالت الضرورة واالستثن
.قد حتكم ظروف املسلمني وهم يعيشون أقليات يف جمتمعات غري إسالمية
تهدبن قد أقروا قاعدة العرف وقرروا ،ويؤكد مشروعية هذه النظرة أن العلماء ا
.أن احلاجة والضرورة مما جيب أخذه بعني االعتبار عند الفتوى
ا غً ُمسوِّ ال يرون حرتازية لبعض العلماء الذينويقابل هذا االجتاه نظرة ا
ن الفقه اإلسالمي مبا تضمنه من أسس وقواعد إللحديث عن فقه لألقليات، إذ 
ولعلهم .وأجوبة للمسلم مهما كانت الظروف اليت يعيشهاميكنه أن يقدم حلوالً 
تهدين يقعون يف نوع من  خيشون أن التأصيل لفقه األقليات قد جيعل بعض ا
.أوضاع األقلياتالتساهل والرتخص باسم مراعاة
نه طاملا أننا نـُْعِمُل إوإذا أردنا اجلمع بني الرأيني فإنه بإمكاننا القول 
فإن املقصود مبراعاة تنزيل الفتوى ،القواعد املتصلة بالعرف وبالضرورة واحلاجة
ولكن نعتقد أن األمر ال يقتصر فقط على .على الواقع الغريب قد حصل
ملشار إليها، وإمنا يعود إىل ضرورة االنطالق من األخذ بالقواعد االجتهادية ا
نظرة كلية لواقع املسلمني يف الغرب جيب أن ُتستصحب يف الفتوى الشرعية يف 
تهد  م، وهذا ما ميكن إحلاقه مبسألة حتقيق املناط اليت جيب أن يراعيها ا شؤو
.إفتائهعنداجتهاده واملفيت يف
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:العتبار يف هذا البابومن اجلوانب اليت جيب أخذها بعني ا
تمع، ووضع األقلية خيتلف عن وضع األكثرية .1 كون املسلمني أقلية يف ا
إذ أن احلياة االجتماعية تشكلت يث ما تتعرض له من الظروف الصعبة؛من ح
ا مع املطالب الدينية والثقافية لألقلية، وقد على أسس وعادات ال تنسجم دائمً 
الذي ال يستهان ليت قد تبدو بسيطة ولكن هلا أثرهايظهر هذا يف بعض اجلوانب ا
تمعات : ، ولنضرب على ذلك مثالنيبه األول يتعلق بسماع األذان يف ا
ا على أداء اإلسالمية ووجود املساجد يف خمتلف األماكن مما جيعل املسلم قادرً 
تمعات الغربية إالصالته حيثما كان، يف حني ال يعلن األذان غالبً  داخل ا يف ا
وما لذلك من أثر يف ربط املسلم بشعرية الصالة وتعميق ذلك األثر ،املساجد
.خاصة يف نفوس الناشة
ا يف ا عامواملثال الثاين يتعلق مبسالة االحتفال باألعياد الدينية اليت تعترب أمرً 
تمعات اإلسالمية يف حني يعيش املسلمون أعيادهم يف البالد الغربية يف دائرة  ا
مخا تمع الكبري الذي حييط  م ال يشاركهم فيها ا .صة 
إن املسلمني يف أوروبا يعيشون يف جمتمعات مفتوحة حتكمها أنظمة .2
وتعترب أن الدين هو من ،مانية تقوم على فصل الدين عن شؤون احلياةلْ عَ 
وهذا قد جيعل .جيب جتنب إظهارها يف الوسط العامالشؤون اخلاصة اليت 
ا عند إبرار بعض مظاهر يواجهون صعوبات نفسية وعملية أحيانً املسلمني
املسلمات يف عدد من الدول يواجهها النساءاملشكالت اليت ما تدينهم، و 
.على هذا األمرارتداء احلجاب اإلسالمي إال مثالٌ الغربية بسبب 
عل القيام على الشؤون الدينية جتإن طبيعة النظام االجتماعي والسياسي .3
موعة الدينية منظمة عائ موعات الدينية، وبالتايل فإنه بقدر ما تكون ا دا إىل ا
وأما إذا  . ومستقرااوهلا إمكانيات مادية ُمرحية، يكون وضعها الديين منتظمً 
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موعة الدينية  تعاين من -كما هو احلال األغلب للمسلمني -كانت ا
لى ظروفها، وليست هناك ا عصعوبات مادية وتنظيمية، فإن ذلك ينعكس سلبً 
هيئات عامة جهة رمسية ميكن أن يرجع إليها عند احلاجة إال ما هو موجود من
اليت ال متلك سلطة رمسية، وما اخلالف الذي يعرفه املسلمون يف لتمثيل املسلمني 
على الصعوبات اليت تعرفها بداية الصيام وانتهائه إال مثالأوروبا عند حتديد
.عند غياب مرجعية دينية ملزمةاجلاليات املسلمة
جوانب ضعف، إال ن هذا الوضع على الرغم مما حيمله منوينبغي القول إ
موعات أ ا ا نه ال خيلو من جانب إجيايب يتمثل يف احلرية الدينية اليت تتمتع 
ا اخلاصة .الدينية بعيدا عن التدخل السياسي يف شؤو
ر يف البيئة األوروبية، واملسلمون ال يزال الوجود اإلسالمي ضعيف األث.4
م  ينتمون يف أغلبهم إىل الشرائح االجتماعية الضعيفة، وهذا ينعكس سلًبا على قدر
موعات الضاغطة دورًا  على الدفاع على مصاحلهم يف إطار جمتمعات متارس فيها ا
.واضًحا يف محاية حقوقها من خالل الثقل السياسي واالجتماعي الذي متثله
بد عند النظر للوضع اإلسالمي يف أوروبا من مراعاة التوازن ال.5
ندماج االجيايب يف الضروري بني احلفاظ على اهلوية وبني مقتضيات املُواطنة واال
تمع، إذ إ م كيان منعزل ا نه ال ميكن أن ننظر إىل املسلمني يف أوروبا على أ
تمع .وتأثريااوإمنا هم جزء منه يتفاعلون معه تأثرً ،عن ا
إذن إن املشتغل بفقه املسلمني يف أوروبا أو بفقه األقليات املسلمة يف 
ا أوروبا حيتاج إىل أن ينظر إىل مجيع االعتبارات السابقة حىت يكون فقهه منصبً 
.ا عنهعلى الوقع وليس جمانبً 
الحاجة إلى الفتوى لدى مسلمي أوروبا الغربية-ب
ا يدرك حاجتهم املاسة للفتوى لغرب عمومً واقع املسلمني يف ايفناظرإن ال
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يف شؤون دينهم املختلفة، وما نراه من إقبال هؤالء املسلمني على االستفتاء يف 
.على هذه احلاجةواضح وقوي الربامج التلفزيونية املخصصة للفتاوى دليل 
:وميكننا أن نفّسر هذا األمر بعوامل عدة، نذكر من بينها
إسالمي املسلم الذي يعيش يف جمتمع غريال شك أن: اختالف الواقع
لذين سالمي، ولذلك فإن املسلمني ااإلتمع يتعاطى مع واقع خمتلف عن واقع ا
ا من الثقافة اإلسالمية  وا هلذه البالد وهم حيملون زادً هاجروا من بالد إسالمية وجاؤ 
ا مما حيوجهمكثريً  إىل ا ما جيدون أنفسهم أمام مشكالت جديدة ال عهد هلم 
من . فيها، وقد ال يدرك البعض اختالف الظروف فيصطدم بالواقعطلب الفتوى
ن يكون على قدر  من أبد للمتصدي للفتوى يف البالد الغربية هذا املنطلق كان ال
كاف من اإلملام بالواقع وخصوصياته حىت ال تكون فتاواه حتمل من التعسف أو 
.سوء التقدير ما جيعلها مستحيلة التنزيل
إن من خصوصيات الواقع اإلسالمي يف أوروبا أنه يف حالة : واقع متغّير
ن تركيبة اجلالية املسلمة نفسها ختتلف طبيعتها من جيل إىل إإذ ؛حتّول دائم
ففي حني كان أبناء اجليل األول من املهاجرين تكثر أسئلتهم يف باب .جيل
ن األجيال اجلديدة، املتصلة الفتوى عن املسائل املتعلقة بالشعائر التعبدية، جند أ
تمع أكثر من جيل اآلباء، تتعلق أسئلتهم مبا ينتج عن احتكاكهم بغري  با
على اختالف املستوى التعليمي املسلمني يف جمال الدراسة والعمل، هذا فضالً 
.واختالف طريقة التلقي للفتوى بني اجليلني
يال القادمة مشكالت وإمنا ستكون لألج،ولن يتوقف التغري عند هذا احلد
أخرى قد ختتلف عما هو مطروح اليوم، وهذا التحول هو سنة اهللا تعاىل يف 
تمعات عمومً  تمعات األوروبية أكثر سرعة، وهذا ا ا، ولكن وترية التغري يف ا
سواء ،ملا جيري حوله من التغرياتمدرًكا ا ا يقظً يستدعي من املفيت أن يكون فطنً 
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تمعات اليت يعيشون فيها، إذ إيف واقع يف واقع املسلمني أو ن العالقة بني ا
.اجلانبني عالقة وطيدة
إن من أهم اإلشكاالت اليت يتعرض هلا املسلمون : قلة المؤهلين للفتوى
لني للفتوى ممن درسوا العلوم الشرعية وأحاطوا مبعرفة الواقع، املؤهّ يف أوروبا قلةَ 
ولئن كان . تفتني فيما يعرض هلم من قضاياوأصبحوا بذلك قادرين على إجابة املس
هناك حتسن نسيب بسبب وجود عدد من ذوي الكفاءة يف العلوم الشرعية يف 
السنوات األخرية، إال أن عددهم ال يكافئ احلاجة املتزايدة لدى املسلمني للتعليم 
وهذا الوضع جيعل الناس يتجهون إىل من يتوقعون منه العلم والتفقه وهو . والفتوى
ليس بكفء، فيجيب عن أسئلتهم ويفتيهم على غري صواب، كما أن بعض 
املسلمني يلجأون يف طرح أسئلتهم إىل الربامج التلفزيونية أو االتصال ببعض 
وقد ال يكون املفيت .األرقام اهلاتفية لبعض املفتني، أو من خالل شبكة اإلنرتنت
ليت استفادها من السؤال، ولكن فيجيبه بناء على املعطيات ا،ا بواقع املستفيتملم
.لو توفرت له معرفة بالواقع رمبا كان جوابه خمتلفا
من هم المتصّدون لإلفتاء في أوروبا؟-ـج
:تيةميكننا أن نصنف املتصدين لإلفتاء يف أوروبا الغربية إىل الفئات اآل
: ينقسم األئمة الذين يؤّمون الناس يف الصالة إىل قسمني: أئمة المساجد.1
فمنهم أئمة متطوعون ليسوا متفرغني لإلمامة وإمنا حيضرون إىل املسجد يف أوقات 
1.فراغهم ويقومون خبطبة اجلمعة، وهناك مساجد أخرى توظف أئمة متفرغني
ولكن األئمة عموًما منهم الذي له دراسة للعلوم الشرعية متكنه من أن يفيت الناس 
معيات ليس توظيًفا جمزيًا من حيث الراتب الذي يدفع لإلمام مع مالحظة أن توظيف األئمة من قبل اجل1
واحلقوق االجتماعية اليت حيصل عليها عادة العامل واملوظف يف ميادين العمل املختلفة، وهذا يعود من 
.جانب إىل ضعف إمكانيات اجلمعيات اإلسالمية وإىل عدم الوعي بأن اإلمامة جيب أن تكون وظيفة تامة
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فإذا عرض لإلمام سؤال .العاديةخاصة يف مسائل العبادات ومسائل املعامالت 
فإنه يعتذر عن اإلجابة وحيّول السائل على اجلهة ،صعب حيتاج إىل نظر واجتهاد
ولكن هناك ممن يقحم نفسه يف الرد على كل ما يسأل .املؤهلة اليت ميكنها أن جتيبه
.فيه ولو كان علمه حمدوًدا، وُخيشى أن يكون بذلك ممن يضلون الناس بغري علم
هناك يف عدد من الدول األوروبية : ون في العلوم الشرعيةلمختصا.2
بعض اخلرجيني من اجلامعات اإلسالمية من الذين وفدوا إىل أوروبا، إىل جانب 
ولدوا يف أوروبا والذين درسوا يف بعض نبعض اخلرجيني من الشباب الذي
سات التعليم اجلامعات اإلسالمية يف العامل اإلسالمي، أو الذين ختّرجوا من مؤس
ن للفتوى جييبون على أسئلة و ومن بني هؤالء هناك مؤهل.الشرعي يف أوروبا
ؤمل أن يزداد عدد املؤهلني بزيادة أعداد اخلرجيني ينادرة، و هماملستفتني، ولكن
.من مؤسسات العليم الشرعي
توجد يف بعض الدول األوروبية مثل بريطانيا : مجالس محلية لألئمة.3
كا وهولندا جمالس حملية لألئمة، أو جمالس شرعية تسهم يف الفتوى وفرنسا وبلجي
مثل حتديد مسألة حتديد أوقات الصلوات، أو موضوع ،خاصة يف األمور العامة
إىل غري ذلك مما حيتاج فيه املسلمون إىل رأي ،بدء الصيام، أو مسألة األضاحي
م ويوّحد مواقفهم الس أمرً ويعترب وجود هذه .فقهي عام ينظم شؤو ؛اا مهما
ألنه يساعد على السداد يف الفتوى وعلى احلّد من دائرة اخلالف يف املسائل 
.العامة اليت يتعرض هلا مجيع املسلمني
المجلس األوروبي : على طريق التعاطي المنهجي مع قضايا الفتوى. 4
م املختشديدةملسلمني الاأمام حاجة : لإلفتاء والبحوث يف لفةللفتوى يف شؤو
يف العلم الشرعي، ونظرًا قلة أهل االختصاص بسببو مواطن وجودهم بأوروبا،
قد يصدر بعضها هي آراء و ،القضاياغري قليل منحول الفقهية تعّدد اآلراء ل
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عن أشخاص غري املؤهلني، ومع احلاجة إىل اجتماع املسلمني يف القضايا العامة 
لكل تلك وحتديد بدء الصيام، على رأي موّحد مثل حتديد أوقات الصلوات 
ا من أصحاب كان ال بد من التفكري يف جملس عام جيمع عددً االعتبارات  
.رصينةمنهجيةليتعاطوا مع هذا الوقع مبعاجلات شرعيةاالختصاص الشرعي 
1997نت مبادرة احتاد املنظمات اإلسالمية يف أوروبا يف سنة لذلك كا
لس األورويب لإلفتاء وا لبحوث، الذي يتخذ من املركز اإلسالمي يف لتأسيس ا
لس دورات سنوية يتناول فيها ما يُعرض عليه .ا لهدبلن يف ايرلندا مقر ويعقد ا
من قضايا وما يصله من أسئلة، إضافة إىل املسائل الشرعية املهمة اليت حيتاج 
لس أكثر من ث.فيها املسلمون يف أوروبا إىل فتوى وتوجيه شرعي الثني ويضم ا
ا بعضهم من العلماء املعروفني يف العامل اإلسالمي وعدد من الشرعيني عضوً 
لس بيانً .املتصدرين للفتوى يف البالد األوروبية املختلفة ا يف ا ختاميويصدر ا
اية كل دورة يتضمن ما اختذه من قرارات وفتاوى، كما يقوم بطبع الفتاوى يف  
لغات األوروبية تعّمم على املساجد واملراكز كتب باللغة العربية وبعدد من ال
فصلية تتضمن بعض البحوث علميةلس جملة ويصدر. اإلسالمية يف أوروبا
تم إعدادها للمجلس وكذلك ما يكتبه بعض الباحثني من غري أعضاء ياليت 
لس حول القضايا اليت يتناوهلا بالدراسة، كما أن للمجلس موقعً  الشبكة ا على ا
ا جلان للفتوى عرب اهلاتف يتضمن قراراته وفتاواه، وللمجلس أيضً تيةالعنكبو 
. تتلقى أسئلة املستفتني يف أوقات حمددة وجتيب عليها
امع الفقهية وهيئات الفتوى الرمسية يف  لس على التواصل مع ا ويعمل ا
ا أن بعض ا ما يتبىن ما يصدر عنها من قرارات، خصوصً العامل اإلسالمي، وكثريً 
امعتلكأعضاء يف هأعضائه هم يف الوقت نفس لس خالل . ا وقد استطاع ا
ا للعديد من اهليئات تأسيسه أن يصبح مرجعً منذالسنوات العشر اليت مرت 
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اإلسالمية ولعموم املسلمني، كما أنه أصبح حمط اهتمام الدارسني والباحثني من 
، كما ُقّدمت حوله املسلمني وغري املسلمني، وصدرت بشأنه كتب ومقاالت
. رسائل جامعية يف عدد من اجلامعات األوروبية
لمسائل التي يكثر فيها االستفتاءا- د 
ا على  من خالل التتبع ألسئلة عموم املسلمني يف أوروبا الغربية اليت يطرحو
االت التالية :املُفتني، ميكننا أن نصنف هذه األسئلة حبسب كثرة ورودها على ا
إن العديد من املستفتني تشغلهم أسئلة تتعلق :ائل األسرةمس: أوالً 
باألحوال الشخصية، ورمبا يعود ذلك إىل إحساسهم بأمهية األسرة املسلمة يف 
جمتمعات غري إسالمية، وإدراكهم أن خصوصيات األسرة املسلمة مما جيب أخذه 
عية الغربية، ومن ا يف املؤسسات االجتمابعني االعتبار، وهو أمر ال يلتفت إليه كثريً 
ال :القضايا اليت تثار يف هذا ا
ا عند اعرتاضه على زواجها ممن سلطة الويل على البنت، وخصوصً .1
ترغب يف الزواج منه بسبب يعود إىل اختالف اجلنسية األصلية لألسرتني، وهل 
جيب على البنت أن تلتزم بطاعة الوالدين أم أن اإلسالم يعطيها احلق يف الزواج 
ملسلم الكفء ولو اعرتض الويل؟با
الزواج "حكم الزواج العريف، أو ما يسميه الشباب املسلم يف الغرب بـ . 2
اإلمام، دون اللجوء إىل من قبل" الفاحتة"ـبقراءة قصدون به الزواج وي" احلالل
ا بإبرام عقود الزواج، ويظن البعض املدنية املُخولة رمسياألحوالالبلديات ودوائر 
مع أن كل أركان ،الدوائر الرمسية إلجراء عقود الزواج ال جيوزإىلذهاب أن ال
الزواج معتربة ما عدا تسمية املهر الذي ميكن أن يتم حتديده بني الزوجني، ولو  
.كان القانون ال يلزم بذلك
اخلالفات الزوجية وما تؤدي إليه من خصومات تصل إىل احملاكم املدنية .3
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إلصالح، ويف حال تعذره تصدر احلكم بالطالق، وقد يستغرق اليت تتدخل حملاولة ا
ذلك سنوات عديدة، وخصوًصا إذا مل يكن الطالق بالرتاضي بني الزوجني، وهو ما 
ا من الزواج لفرتة طويلة انتظارً ةصايؤدي باملرأة خ ا لصدور حكم الطالق إىل حرما
.ا بغريهاعرفيزواًجا تزوج فيأو يُفَىت له املدين، يف حني أن الزوج قد يفيت لنفسه 
:فقه العبادات: ثانًيا
ال فيما يتصل بأداء العبادات املفروضة،  تأيت أسئلة املستفتني يف هذا ا
:وتربز بعض األسئلة مما يعرتض املسلم يف حياته اليومية، مثل
كيفية أداء الصالة يف العمل ملن ال تتهيأ له الظروف ألدائها بالشكل .1
ا أو جالسا؟هل حيل له أن يؤديها واقفً املعتاد، و 
.مسألة اجلمع بني الصلوات ملن يتعذر عليه أداؤها يف الوقت.2
مسالة االختالف يف بعض البالد يف بعض أوقات الصالة بسبب .3
.اختالف االجتهادات بني الرزنامات
:فقه المعامالت: ثالثًا
ال :من القضايا اليت يكثر فيها السؤال يف هذا ا
ت اجتماعية حمفزامن أجل شراء منزل السكن لوجود صرفيةالقروض امل.1
ال، مع صعوبة حتصيل السكن أحيانً  .ا وارتفاع اإلجارات العقاريةيف هذا ا
وكذلك القروض االستثمارية ملن يريد إقامة مشروع اقتصادي يكون مورد رزقه، 
.خصوصا مع انتشار البطالة يف أوساط املسلمني
اة وما يتصل بأحكامها وتقديرها وإخراجها يف مصارفها يف داخل الزك.2
.أوروبا أو نقلها خارج أوروبا
ا مع وجود أحكام االستثمار يف األسهم وقواعده وضوابطه، خصوصً .3
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شركات تعرض على العاملني فيها احلصول على أسهم فيها بامتيازات خاصة؟
كالعمل يف مطاعم تقدم ا،العمل يف مؤسسات تتعامل باحلرام جزئي.4
ا إىل نقل بضاعة احملرمة، أو العمل يف جمال النقل والتعرض أحيانً طعمةبعض األ
.حمرمة كاخلمر
:مجال العالقات االجتماعية: رابًعا
ال :من القضايا اليت تطرح يف هذا ا
ا أولئك الذين تربطهم خصوصً و ،مسألة التهنئة بأعياد غري املسلمني.1
.قات زمالة يف العمل أو صداقة يف الدراسةباملسلم عال
لبعض معتنقي اإلسالم الذين هلم ةصاخ،حضور جنازة غري املسلم.2
أقارب غري مسلمني، وكذلك لبعض املسلمني الذين تربطهم عالقات صداقة مع 
م أو زمالئهم .غري املسلمني من جريا
.لى معتنقي اإلسالمحكم التوارث بني املسلم وغري املسلم، وهو ما يطرح ع.3
تناول طعام غري املسلم، ومدى انطباق صفة أهل الكتاب عليه، .4
ا حلرج وجود اخلمر على مائدة الطعام للمسلم الذي يزور أهله أو والتعرض أحيانً 
أصدقاءه غري املسلمني؟
لس  هذه القضايا وغريها مما يكثر طرحه يف أسئلة الناس، وقد أجاب ا
ومع صدور فتاوى .والبحوث على العديد من هذه األسئلةاألورويب لإلفتاء 
وتستوجب ،بد من تقدير احلاالت اخلاصة اليت تعرتض األفرادإال أنه ال،عامة
.أخذها بعني االعتبار عند إفتائهم
 
ال بد أن جيمع بني إن املفيت عند تناوله للمسائل والنوازل الفقهية اليت تعرض عليه 
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مراعاة قواعد الفتوى من حيث النظر الفقهي ومناهج االستدالل وفق ما هو مقّرر 
يف قواعد اإلفتاء، وبني مراعاة خصوصيات الواقع األورويب وما يستلزمه من تقدير 
يستصحب املآالت ويتجنب مواطن احلرج والضيق على املستفتني فيما مينحهم فيه 
وهذا الذي نقصده باملوجهات املقاصدية يف التعامل مع . الشرع فسحة وتيسريًا
قضايا املسلمني يف أوروبا يف جمال االجتهاد التنزيلي يف تقدير الفتوى، وهي 
. العامةاومبادئهيعةموّجهات تنطلق من رعاية الواقع يف ضوء مقاصد الشر 
دي اليتمن املوجهات املقاصدية العامة عدًدا نذكر يليفيماو  نرى اليت 
ا ضرورية لرتشيد الفتوى وجعلها أجنع يف معاجلة مشكالت الوجود  أن مراعا
.املسلم يف البلدان األوروبية
الموازنة بين مقتضيات الضرورة والحاجة ومقتضيات التأسيس لوجود :أوالً 
إسالمي يحافظ على هويته ويقّدم القيم اإلسالمية للمجتمع
لس األورويب إن من األمثلة اليت ميكن أن نذك رها يف هذا الباب ما أصدره ا
، وتوصيته صرفيةلإلفتاء والبحوث خبصوص شراء البيوت عن طريق القروض امل
للمسلمني باالجتهاد يف إجياد مؤسسات إسالمية متويلية تتعامل وفق الضوابط 
ميكن اللجوء استثناء ،هذه املؤسساتمثل ولكن يف حال تعذر وجود .الشرعية
.تمويل السكن الرئيسي مراعاة للحاجةلصرفيةوض املإىل القر 
ولقد ظهر يف واقع املسلمني يف أوروبا اليوم توجه حنو إنشاء مؤسسات 
مالية إسالمية أصبحت اليوم حمّط أنظار املهتمني بالشأن االقتصادي يف ظل 
لتملك اا كبريً ويف نفس الوقت رأينا توجهً .هذا االهتمام املتزايد باملالية اإلسالمية
ا إىل أن يصبح البديل اإلسالمي منتشرً  ا ا وميسرً البيوت بالقروض املعمول 
بني فقه الرتخيص فيما املعادلة الدقيقة للجميع؛ إنه من الضروري أن نراعي 
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ا للمصلحة، وبني تأسيس التجارب ا للحرج وحتقيقً حيتاج إىل الرخصة رفعً 
ان إسالمي حيمل إضافة اإلسالمية اليت ستساهم مع الوقت يف صياغة كي
.للمجتمع يف اجلوانب املختلفة
الموازنة بين المحافظة على الهوية والمواطنة واالندماج اإليجابي في المجتمع: ثانيًا
إن املفيت تتنازعه يف كثري من القضايا مراعاة احلفاظ على اهلوية اإلسالمية 
دم انعزال املسلم، وبني عوتأكيد عناصر التمّيز العقدي والسلوكي من جانب
ن حمافظة املسلم على إإذ على خصوصيته؛عن حميطه االجتماعي باسم احملافظة
تمعقتضي أن يكون له وجود فاعلتدينه حقوقه يف االلتزام ب .يف ا
ال الفتاوى الصادرة خبصوص  وإن من األمثلة اليت ميكن إيرادها يف هذا ا
هل الكتاب مع مراعاة الضوابط الشرعية جواز التهنئة بأعياد غري املسلمني من أ
ا إال بأعياده دينييف ذلك، مع تأكيد أن املسلم ال ميكن أن حيتفل احتفاالً 
اإلسالمية، فمن ناحية ال بد من تأكيد التمّيز يف االحتفال بأعيادنا وعدم 
مراعاة ما من شأنه ال بد من ومن ناحية أخرى ،التساهل يف االحتفال بغريها
تمع بتهنئة غري املسلم ِبِعيِدهِ أن حيقق .التواصل االجتماعي يف ا
الموازنة بين إظهار شعائر الدين وعدم مصادمة الذهنية العامة في المجتمع: ثالثًا
تمعات األوروبية يف عمومها إىل الدين باعتباره شأنً  ا جيب على ا خاصتنظر ا
وهذه النظرة للدين .للدعاية الدينيةاالفرد أن ال يتعمد إظهاره أمام اآلخرين جتنبً 
ا لالفلسفة العلمانية اليت من آثارهي أثر إمنا  تضيق مساحات يسعى أصحا
تمع؛ وإن   يف هذا الشأن تباين الدول األوروبية تكانت ظهور الدين يف حياة ا
ا الحبسب  .فيهاالسائدةالثقافةو يةتارخيجتار
مثل ،ر شعائر دينه فيما ال ميلك إخفاءها بأن يظهولئن كان املسلم مطالبً 
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ا  ا، ومثل حرص املسلم على أداء صلواته اليومية يف أوقا التزام املسلمة حبجا
قدر اإلمكان، وكذلك امتناعه عن مقاربة احملرمات يف األكل والشرب وغري 
التوسع يف إظهار املخالفة حىت فيما مل يلزمناسوغإال أن هذا االلتزام ال ي، ذلك
إذ أن توسيع دائرة التميز مع اآلخرين فيما هو غري مطلوب ؛الشرع فيه باملخالفة
.من شأنه أن يباعد بني املسلمني وغريهم
تمع، مثل  ومثال ذلك احلرص على منط معني يف اللباس املغاير لعادات ا
ة ملا هو سائد حرص بعض الرجال املسلمني على ارتداء أمناط من اللباس مغاير 
أو حرص بعض املسلمات على منط معني من اللباس الشرعي منقول تمع، يف ا
من بيئات خمتلفة بينما هناك إمكانية يف أن تلبس املسلمة لباًسا تتحقق فيه 
. املواصفات الشرعية مما هو متوافر يف بلدها األورويب دون أن تصادم مشاعر غريها
لتزم بدينه من الوضع وهذا التصرف من شأنه أن يقرب هيئة املسلم وهو ي
يراعي ولقد وجدنا يف اهلدي النبوي كيف كان رسول اهللا .االجتماعي املألوف
.أعراف الناس، وال يتعمد خمالفتهم فيما مل يأيت األمر الشرعي فيه باملخالفة
مراعاة مقتضيات تنظيم الحياة في مجتمعات ال تراعي الدين في نظمها: رابًعا
تمعات األورو  ا قائمً إن ا ا على مراعاة قواعد عامة، بية قد جعلت تنظيم شؤو
دينية ولكنه ال يأخذ مرجعيته العملية من اهليئات جذورٌ قد يكون لبعضها 
فإن العديد من .الدينية، مثل ما يتعلق بتحديد أيام العطل للموظفني والطالب
تمعات تراعي إىل جانب العطل الرمسية العامة جلميع املوا طنني هذه ا
اخلصوصيات الدينية للمجموعات الدينية املختلفة فيما يتعلق بأعيادهم املهمة، 
وإمنا من قبيل متكني أصحاب ،ليس من قبيل التسليم بالبعد الديين للعيد
.األديان من حرية ممارسة شعائرهم
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م على التحديد املسبق ثورولكن الذي ي خبصوص املسلمني هو عدم قدر
دهم على رؤية اهلالل يف حتديدها، ومن هنا كانت الفتوى يف ألعيادهم باعتما
ترجيح األخذ باحلساب مما يساعد على حتديد مسبق لألعياد وبالتايل متكني 
املسلمني يف وظائفهم ومدارسهم من التمتع بعطلهم، ولكن اإلصرار على األخذ 
.ياد مسبقايؤدي إىل صعوبة اعتماد هذه األعقد بالرؤية إلثبات الشهور القمرية 
مراعاة مقصد الحفاظ على كيان األسرة في فتاوى األحوال الشخصية: خامًسا
تمعات األو  ن إذ إ؛يف غاية األمهيةأمرٌ روبية إن الدور املناط باألسرة املسلمة يف ا
األسرة توكل إليها مهمة رعاية األجيال والقيام على تنشئتها وحتصينها وبناء 
ا هلا إال ما تقوم به جتد على أداء هذه املهمة مساعدً شخصيتها، وهي ال تكاد 
وما دامت األسرة تواجه .تعليمية وتربويةأنشطةبعض املؤسسات اإلسالمية من 
يف فتواه ما يساعد على املفيت أن يراعيَ الواجبفإن،هذه التحديات الكبرية
،ود الزواجالتأكيد لضرورة توثيق عقمن ذلك مثالً .على حتقيق مقصد استقرارها
وعدم التساهل يف الزواج العريف الذي ميارسه اليوم عدد من املسلمني يف أوروبا 
.الزواج الذي يكفل احلقوق هو الزواج املدينبينماحبجة أنه الزواج احلالل، 
وقد رأينا اآلثار السلبية للزواج العريف الذي كثريًا ما يعّرض العالقة الزوجية 
يارإىل االختالل وكذلك فيما يتعلق بأمر الطالق وضرورة ضبطه منًعا ،واال
للتساهل والفوضى يف هذا اجلانب، كاألخذ بالرأي الفقهي الذي يشرتط 
اإلشهاد يف إيقاع الطالق وضرورة صدور الطالق املدين من اجلهات القضائية 
اء الزواج .املُخولة بذلك إل
لمسائل التي تتناولها الفتوىمراعاة ما تقتضيه القوانين الجارية في ا: سادًسا
قد تُعرض على املفيت مسائل يكون للفقه اإلسالمي فيها رأي، وللقانون الوضعي 
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والبد للفقيه أن جيد للمستفيت قدر اإلمكان خمرًجا . املعمول به يف البلد رأي آخر
جيعله يلتزم باألمر الشرعي دون الوقوع يف مصادمة القوانني، كالسؤال املتعلق مثالً 
مبسألة التأمني، وكثري من أنواع التأمني كالتأمني على السيارات وعلى البيوت يُعّد 
من التأمني اإلجباري، ومع وجود الرأي الفقهي الذي مينع التأمني التجاري، فإنه من 
الضروري مراعاة ما تُلزم به القوانني، ولعل الفتاوى اليت ترشد املسلمني إىل التعامل 
1.لتعاوين هي حماولة إلجياد خمرج يف هذا البابمع شركات التأمني ا
مراعاة األثر الدعوي فيما يصدر من فتاوى للمسلمين: سابًعا
من املراقبني والباحثني من كثريلقد أصبح اإلسالم يف أوروبا اليوم حمطَّ أنظار ال
غري املسلمني، وبالتايل فإنه من الصعب اعتبار أمر من األمور اليت ختص 
م وال يهّم غريهماملسلمني  نعم إن . فيما يتصل بشؤون الدين خمصوص 
املسلمني ميلكون حرية ممارسة الدين كما ميلكها غريهم، ومن حقهم أن يسألوا 
ولكن املسلم يهمه أيًضا أن ال تكون . عما يبدو هلم من القضايا اليت تعرض هلم
تمع ُمؤّدية  ا أمام ا .إىل االلتباس وسوء الفهمالصورة اليت يعّرب عنها، أو يظهر 
من ذلك مثًال أن العديد من الدارسني من غري املسلمني الذين اطلعوا 
يستغربون أحيانًا من تناول 2ودرسوا ما يصدر من فتاوى للمسلمني يف أوروبا
ا من قبيل احلريات الشخصية وليس  الس الفقهية ملسائل جزئية يعتربو بعض ا
وقد وجدنا مثًال لبعضهم هؤالء . مناقشتهالس فقهي أن يصرف وقته يف
استغرابًا لفتوى صدرت لإلجابة عن سؤال يتعلق باحلكم الشرعي يف قّص املرأة 
.ك رأيًا فقهيا جييز التأمني بسائر أنواعهمع أن هنا1
لس 2 لقد تناول العديد من الباحثني يف اجلامعات األوروبية يف نطاق أحباثهم اجلامعية بالدراسة والتحليل ا
األورويب لإلفتاء والبحوث وما أصدره من قرارات وفتاوى فقهية، وقد أصبحت مادة الفتوى مادة تدّرس 
ولندالطالب الدراسات الع .ليا يف قسم الدراسات اإلسالمية يف جامعة ليدن 
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شعرها دون إذن زوجها؛ حيث رأى أن مثل هذه األمور ليس من شأن جملس 
. فقهي أن خيوض فيها وهي مسائل يف ظّنه ينبغي أن ال يسأل فيها
لس األو  رويب لإلفتاء والبحوث قد أصبح من منهجه أن ال ولذلك فإن ا
وإمنا ُحييلها على جلان الفتوى الفرعية حىت يصرف 1يتناول بالبحث املسائل اجلزئية،
اهتمامه للقضايا الكلية والنوازل املهّمة؛ وقد يكون من املناسب أيًضا يف صياغة 
.فهمها يف إطارهاالفتوى ربطها بالسياق العام الذي تتنزل فيه، مبا يساعد على 
م باملسائل اجلزئية على حساب 1 م كثريا ما ينشغلون يف استفتاءا مما يالحظ على العديد من املسلمني أ
ا أمهية .القضايا الكلية، وقد يكون أحدهم مقصرا يف أمور هامة ويتساءل عن أمور أخرى دو
CHAPTER 13
عبد دي ز املجيدمحمود
 
يتناول هذا املقال موضوع فقه األقليات لينظر من خالله إىل التجربة املاليزية 
باعتبارمها " فقه األقليات"و" األقليات"فبعد استعراض مصطلحي . حتليًال وتقوميا
يناقش املقال أوًال . صطلحات احلادثة يف اخلطاب الفقهي اإلسالميمن امل
املعايري واالعتبارات املعتمدة يف حتديد معىن األقلية، مث يبني قصورها من حيث 
ا تقف عند املظاهر اخلارجية  كالقلة العددية وما إليها من اخلصائص اليت (أ
) االجتماعية عن األقلياتها شائًعا يف الكتابات السياسية و ليأصبح الكالم ع
فضًال عن أن تكون عادلة يف ،وال تعكس صورة واقعية متكاملة عن األقلية
. توصيف عالقات القوة بني األقلية واألغلبية
ويف ضوء ذلك يقدم املقال رؤية جديدة أو قراءة مغايرة ملفهوم األقلية 
ب إىل مالمسة الواقع واألغلبية من خالل التجربة املاليزية يسعى من خالهلا الكات
العيين املتشخص لألشياء الذي يقتضي مراجعة ما هو سائد من معايري 
واعتبارات يف حتديد معىن األقلية واألغلبية باعتبارمها طريف املعادلة االجتماعية 
والسياسية للمجتمعات اليت تتعايش فيها جمموعة ذات كثرة عددية وجمموعة أو 
مث يقرتح املقال ضرورة مراعاة اجلوانب النوعية ومن. جمموعات ذات قلة عددية
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اليت قد جتعل األغلبية ) كالنفوذ االقتصادي والسيطرة اإلعالمية(أو الكيفية 
.العددية يف مقام املغلوبية
  
من املصطلحات احلديثة يف الفقه "فقه األقّليات"و" األقّليات"إن مصطلحي 
. رواجهما وشيوعهما يف اخلطاب اإلسالمي إىل عهد قريباإلسالمي، ويعود 
ومها مصطلحان حمّمالن بدالالت سياسية، واجتماعية، وقانونية نامجة عما 
حدث يف الواقع اإلنساين العاملي يف العصر احلديث بصورة خاصة من اختالط 
بني األمم والشعوب نتيجة هجرات كثيفة لألفراد واجلماعات عرب البلدان 
تمعات األصلية يف والقا رات، وما حصل بسبب ذلك من تشارك الوافدين مع ا
يف أثناء تلك املشاركة وال شك أن حتدث. جوانب احلياة ومرافقها املختلفة
تنتج عنها اضطرابات وتوترات يف العالقات واملعايشة صور من االحتكاك
تتحول إىل اجتماعية، وسياسية، واقتصادية، لكي الو تتطلب حلوًال قانونية، 
.صراع واحرتاب بني اجلماعات املختلفة
ونظرًا حلداثة مثل هذه املصطلحات يف اخلطاب العلمي للفقهاء واملفكرين 
كما يقول –املسلمني، فإّن احلوار حول األقّليات مصطلًحا ومفهوًما ال يزال 
يد النّجار  م بينة، بل يف قائًما يف سبيل االنتهاء فيها إىل مفاهي"–الدكتور عبد ا
فيتوارد عليها . سبيل االنتهاء فيها إىل إقرار مبشروعيتها مبحثًا علميا ذا خصوصية
النظار والباحثون إذن على سواء يف البسط واالحتجاج، ويتقدم العلم فيها درجات 
1."مثمرة ال ينقض بعضها بعضا
ضوع ويف هذا املقال حماولة لرصد بعض أهّم اآلراء واملواقف بشأن مو 
يدعبد1 http://www.onislam،"الغربيفاملسلمةلألقّلياتفقهيتأصيلحنو"النجار،ا
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ستوجبه من نظر فقهي ملعاجلة ما يتصل به وينشأ عنه من قضايا ياألقّليات وما 
ومشكالت، متهيًدا لتناوله يف سياق واقع ماليزيا، وجتربتها يف ترتيب العالقات 
.بني املسلمني وغري املسلمني
موعات البشرية اليت  يراد مبصطلح األقّليات عند الفقهاء املعاصرين ا
تمع تكون فيه أقّلية من حيث العدد يف مقابل األغلبية اليت تفوقها تعيش يف جم
تمع اآلخرين من حيث هذا االعتبار، وتكون متميزة من بني سائر أفراد ا
ببعض اخلصوصيات اجلامعة بينها، كأن تكون عرقية، أو ثقافية، أو لغوية، أو 
ر يوسف يقول الدكتو . دينية، وقد جتتمع هذه اخلصائص كلها أو بعضها
ويراد باألقّليات كل جمموعة بشرية يف كّل قطر من األقطار، تتميز : "القرضاوي
عن أكثرية أهله يف الدين، أو املذهب، أو العرق، أو اللغة، أو حنو ذلك من 
موعات البشرية بعضها عن بعض ا ا 1".األساسيات اليت تتمايز 
ة العددية هي املعتربة، وأنه ال ويظهر من كالم القرضاوي أن األقّلية أو األكثري
ومعىن ذلك أن األقلّية ينظر إليها دائًما من . دخَل لألمور السياسية واالقتصادية فيها
حيث العدد، وال يلتفت إىل ما وراء ذلك من االعتبارات سياسية كانت أم 
وبذلك يظهر أّن هذا املصطلح يشري إىل عنصرين . اقتصادية أم اجتماعية أو ثقافية
موعة ما تعيش يف جمتمع : اسيني يف حتقق وصف األقّلية، مهاأس القّلة العددية 
تمع خبصوصيات أصلية من الدين، أو الثقافة، أو أوسع، والتميز دون سائر ذلك ا
. العرق، أو اللغة، سواء حتققت فيها كل تلك اخلصائص أم بعضها فقط
اعي، واالقتصادي، ويرى القرضاوي أّن القوة والضعف باملعىن االجتم
ا تكون عادة ضعيفة : "والسياسي هي من اللوازم، حيث يقول ومن لوازم األقّلية أ
.15ص،)2001دار الشروق،: القاهرة(في فقه األقّليات المسلمةيوسف القرضاوي،1
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ويستدّل على 1."فالكثرة تنبئ عن القوة، والقّلة تنبئ عن الضعف. أمام األكثرية
ن القرآن حيدثنا عن الكثرة يف معرض ه هذه بالقرآن الكرمي حيث يقول إمقالت
: الذي قال لقومهالنعمة، وذلك على لسان شعيب االمتنان والتذكري ب
{|}~)وحنو ذلك قوله ). 86: األعراف
!  "  #  $  : تعاىل يف االمتنان على املهاجرين بعد غزوة بدر
.  -  ,  +  *  )   (  '  &  %
2).26: األنفال(
قّلية إىل أن ويعّلق القرضاوي على ذلك بأن القّلة العددية كثريًا ما تؤدي باأل
تلقى الظلم واالضطهاد من األكثرية، وخصوًصا إذا غلب على األكثرية 
وبناء على ذلك فهو يصنف املسلمني من . التعصب واالستعالء على اآلخرين
:حيث األكثرية واألقّلية إىل صنفني
األكثرية، وهم الذين يعيشون داخل ما مساه الفقهاء بدار :الصنف األول
تمعات اإلسالمية، أو البالد اإلسالميةتعبرينااإلسالم، أو ب . املعاصر داخل ا
ا ا مسلمون معلنون إسالمهم، على األقل يف : ويعين  البالد اليت أغلبية سكا
إقامة الشعائر الدينية مثل األذان، والصالة، والصيام، وتالوة القرآن، وإقامة 
هلم الشخصية من الزواج املساجد، والسماح باحلج وحنو ذلك، وميارسون أحوا
.والطالق وحنومها وفق أحكام دينهم
بعيًدا " دار اإلسالم"األقّلية، وهم الذين يعيشون خارج :الصنف الثاني




ولكنهم يتمثل أوهلما يف أهل البالد األصليني الذين أسلموا من قدمي، : نوعني
أما الثاين فيتمثل يف . يعتربون أقّلية بالنسبة ملواطنيهم اآلخرين من غري املسلمني
املهاجرين الذين قدموا من البالد اإلسالمية إىل البالد غري اإلسالمية للعمل فيها 
أو لإلقامة، أو للدراسة، أو غري ذلك من األسباب املشروعة، وحصلوا على 
ذه البالد ، وبعضهم حصل على جنسيتها، وأصبح له حق املواطنة إقامة قانونية 
1.واالنتخاب وغري ذلك مما تقرّه دساتري هذه األقطار
ويف مقابل ذلك يعتقد األستاذ عمر عبيد حسنة أن الكالم عن قضايا 
ا إزاء األكثرية، أو احلديث عن فقه األقّلية واألكثرية، أمر حتتاج  األقّليات ومشكال
فكم من أكثرية ال قيمة : "عاٍل من الضبط والدقة، ولذلك يقولمعاجلته إىل قدر 
فالقضية . وكم من أقلّية متتلك ادارة األمور والتشريع هلا. هلا، وال نفوذ، وال قرار
قضية واقع، أو حالة حضارية، أو ثقافية ميكن أن تلحق باألكثرية أو باألقّلية، حتتاج 
2."ة بفقه األقّلية بالشكل املطلقإىل فقه ونظر واجتهاد، وليست قضّية حمصور 
وزيادة على ذلك يرى األستاذ حسنة أن موضوع األقّلية وما يتصل به 
قضية نسبية ختتلف فيها معايري النظر واحلكم، ومنطلقات التقومي، وما ينجم عن 
ذلك من نتائج، ومن مث فاألمر ال ميكن القول إن احلكم فيه مبّين على جمرد 
كم املهمل أو ما ميكن أن يسّمى الكّل املعطل الذي ال عدد الرؤوس، أو ال"
3."يأيت خبري أينما توجهه، مبقدار ما حيكمه الكيف والنوعية والفاعلية
وبناء على ذلك يوّكد األستاذ حسنة أّن معيار التفاضل والكرامة واإلجناز مل 
.17-16املرجع نفسه، ص1
:الدوحة(من فقه األقّليات المسلمةد القادر،عمر عبيد حسنة يف تقدميه لكتاب خالد حممد عب: انظر2
.22ص،)1،1418/1998وزارة األوقاف والشئون اإلسالمية، ط
.16املرجع نفسه، ص3
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لعطاء ونوعية يكن أبًدا منوطًا بالكم من حيث الكثرة والقّلة، وإمنا يتحقق مبقدار ا
والتقوى املقصودة يف . فاألكرم هو األتقى، وليس األكرم األقل، وال األكثر. العطاء
ذلك أن التقوى بأبعادها املتعددة . اآلية بوصفها معياراً للتفاضل هي مجاع األمر كّله
ا  تعين امتالك امليزان احلّق والتحلي بالقيم الصحيحة؛ الستيعاب احلياة بكّل جماال
فقد تكون احملصلة فرًدا يعدل أمة كاملة، ويكون أمة فعًال مبا . يات التعامل معهاوكيف
، والرسول )120:النحل(8  7    6  5: قال اهللا تعاىل. ميثل، وما حيقق
1».جتدون الناس كإبل مائة، ال جيد الرجل فيها راحلة«: يقول
والسنة، حيث قرر أن وقد اسنتد األستاذ حسنة فيما ذهب إليه إىل القرآن 
القرآن الكرمي حيذر من االخنداع بالغثاء، والكثرة القائمة على غري احلّق والعدل، "
واليت ميكن أن تشكل عبًئا يسوده روح القطيع الذي حيرك اإلنسان دون دراية 
̄   °  ±  ³  ²: وإرادة، يقول تعاىل  ®  ¬  «  ª   ©
ع وعدمية احلياة، وغياب املقاصد، واالنسالك والضالل يعين الضيا ). 116: األنعام(
فقد حذر من وأما الرسول . يف القطيع دون فحص واختبار ومعرفة للوجهة
ا إىل مرحلة الوهن الذي يصيب األمة اإلسالمية بسبب من احلالة الغثائية املؤدية 
القصعة اليت تسود مراحل النكوص، والتخلف فيتحول الناس إىل مستهلكني بدالً 
يوشك األمم أن تداعى عليكم كما تداعى األكلُة «: من أن يكونوا منتجني، فيقول
بل أنتم يومئذ كثري ولكنكم «: فقال قائل، ومن قلة حنن يومئذ؟ قال. »إىل قصعتها
».غثاء كغثاء السيل، ولينزعّن اهللا من صدور عدوكم، وليقذفّن يف قلوبكم الوهن
القشريي النيسابوري، أبو . واحلديث أخرجه مسلم عن عبد اهللا بن عمر. 17- 16املرجع نفسه، ص1
كتاب "،)1،1421/2001العلمية، طدار الكتب: بريوت(صحيح مسلماحلسني مسلم بن احلجاج، 
.988ص،2527، احلديث"فضائل الصحابة 
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فاملعيار 1.»حّب الدنيا، وكراهية املوت«: ن؟ قالفقال قائل، يا رسول اهللا، وما الوه
يبقى دائًما هو الكرامة املتولدة عن التقوى والعطاء والفاعلية، وليس عدد الرؤس أو 
2.مساحة القطيع املتحرك بال رؤوس أو ذي الرأس الواحد
  U  T: ويضيف األستاذ حسنة أنه ميكننا أن نفهم من قوله تعاىل
[  Z  Y  X   W  V\)أنه ال ينبغي االقتصار ) 249: البقرة
ذلك أن ميدان الغلبة والظهور، والصراع . يف تقدير الغلبة على اجلانب العسكري
واحلوار احلضاري ليس فقط ساحة املعارك العسكرية، وإمنا هو احلياة بكّل 
ا العسكرية، والسياسية، واالقتصادية، والثقافية، واالجتماع ا ومستويا ية، جماال
فلئن كان سبب نزول هذه اآلية هو ذكر معركة طالوت مع جالوت . والتنموية
اليت قص اهللا تعاىل علينا حكايتها لتحقيق العربة من تاريخ النبوة، إال أن العربة 
إمنا هي بعموم اللفظ ال خبصوص –كما قرر علماء األصول والفقه والنظر –
-يؤّكدان يف أكثر من مناسبة أمهية ولذلك جند القرآن الكرمي والنيب . السبب
العنصر النوعي أو الكيفي يف مقابل اجلانب العددي وكيف أن - بل أولوية 
احمليط سياقويف هذا الصدد يذكرنا األستاذ حسنة بال. األول يكون هو احلاسم
- يف السنة التاسعة من اهلجرة - بنزول سورة التوبة عندما كان املسلمون 
غزوة تبوك اليت مسيت بغزوة العسرة ومسي جيشها جبيش يستعدون ملواجهة
العسرة، وكان وقوعها يف أشد الظروف الطبيعية قسوة وزادها شدة ختاذل من 
ختاذل من املسلمني عن املشاركة يف اجلهاد، ومع ذلك كان النصر والغلبة للقلة 
، نشرة بعناية حممد سنن أبي داودالسجستاين، أبو داود سليمان بن األشعث، . أخرجه أبو داود عن ثوبان1
.675ص،4297، احلديث"كتاب املالحم"،)4،2010دار الكتب العلمية، ط: بريوت(عبد العزيز اخلالدي 
.18- 17حسنة، مرجع سابق، ص2
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مبا توفر هلا من خصال يف العطاء والتضحية، ضاعفت آثار العدة املادية
. »سبق درهم مائة ألف درهم«: بقولهاحملدودة، وهو ما عرب عنه الرسول 
رجل له درمهان فأخذ أحدمها فتصّدق به، «: يا رسول اهللا، وكيف؟ قال: قالوا
فاألمر ال 1،»ورجٌل له مال كثري فأخذ من عرض ماله مائة ألف فتصّدق به
2".يعاير بالقلة والكثرة
سنة أنه مهما كانت املواقف من مسألة ويف ضوء ذلك يقرر األستاذ ح
ا من األمور االجتهادية"األقّليات،  اليت حتتاج إىل حبث ونظر للوصول إىل " فإ
فضًال عن فقه النّص وحتديد –وهذا يتطلب . احلكم الشرعي املناسب هلا
النظر إىل الواقع البشري وتقوميه من خالل النظر "–دالالته ومعانيه يف ذاته 
ويضيف الكاتب نفسه 3".كيفيات تنزيله يف ضوء هذا الواقع البشريللنّص، و 
أن الدقة والتحري يف بيان احلكم، وحتقيق صوابيته يف عصر معني، أو يف واقع 
معني، وتنزيله على موضوعه يف ظل ظروف ذلك العصر أو الواقع ومشكالته 
قه الواقع بكل وذلك أن ف. ال يعين بالضرورة صوابيته لكل واقع متغري"ومعطياته 
مكوناته وتعقيداته واستطاعاته هو أحد أركان العملية االجتهادية إىل جانب فقه 
فتغري الواقع وتبدل احلال يقتضي بالضرورة . النص املراد تنزيله على هذا الواقع
وال ضري يف ذلك، بل الضرر . إعادة النظر باالجتهاد أو باحلكم االجتهادي
، نشرة بعناية سنن النسائيأبو عبد الرمحن أمحد بن شعيب النسائي، . أخرجه النسائي واحلاكم عن أيب هريرة1
،2525- 2524، احلديثان"كتاب الزكاة"،)2،1426/2005دار الكتب العلمية، ط: بريوت(أمحد مشس الدين 
،1دار احلرمني، ط: القاهرة(المستدرك على الصحيحيني، أبو عبد اهللا احلاكم النيسابور ؛415ص
.575ص،1ج،1519، احلديث"كتاب الزكاة"،)1417/1997
.19- 18حسنة، مرجع سابق، ص2
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. كام االجتهادية مهما تغريت وتبدلت الظروفوالضري يف اجلمود على األح
ا حال للمشكالت ليصبح تطبيقها وبذلك تتحول األحكام االجتهادية من كو
1".وتنزيلها على غري حملها هو املشكل احلقيقي
وبناًء على ذلك خلص األستاذ حسنه إىل أن الكثري من األحكام 
عصور السابقة ملواجهة االجتهادية اليت توصل إليها العلماء يف عصر من ال
ا "مشكالت معينة  ليست ملزمة لسائر العصور إذا تبدلت تلك املشكالت، وأ
يف معظمها قابلة للفحص واالختبار والنظر يف مدى مالءمتها للواقع الذي عليه 
رد عن حدود  الناس، حيث ال بّد من العودة والتلقي من النص األصلي اخلالد ا
وهذا أمر تقتضيه ." يف كيفية تنزيله علي الواقع واحلالالزمان واملكان، والنظر
الفقه الشرعي، حيث إننا جند كثريًا من الفقهاء أصول سنن التطور االجتماعي و 
قد غريوا أحكاًما اجتهدوا يف استنباطها هم أنفسهم وليست من اجتهاد غريهم، 
كان، أو وذلك بسب ما الحظوه من تغري األوضاع والظروف عرب الزمان أو امل
بسبب ما اطلعوا عليه من نصوص ووقائع جديدة مل تكن معلومة لديهم يف 
اجتهادهم األول، أو ملا أدركوه من حكم األحكام وعللها الدقيقة وعدم 
ا من قبل، أو ملا قدروا أن  ة اليت اجتهدوا بشأ انطباقها على احلاالت املشا
دي إىل فوات مصلحة شرعية قد يؤ "تطبيقه بنفس الصور القدمية املعهودة هلم 
االجتهادات "ولذلك فإن . حىت وإن احتد املوضوع" وحصول مفسدة حمققة
الكثرية التارخيية واليت ميكن تصنيفها يف إطار املوروث أو الرتاث هي اجتهادات 
ا غري ملزمة ا ومشكالته وأ وال يعين ذلك إلغاؤها أو عدم معاودة اإلفادة . لزما
ا منها عند تشابه احل ا واالستئناس  ؛ لتكون [...]ال، وإمنا يعين استصحا
.14-13املرجع نفسه، ص1
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1".عونًا على النظر الذي يقتضيه تبدل العصر وتغري مشكالته
الفقه االجتماعي والدويل "وتصدق هذه االعتبارات أكثر ما تصدق على 
الذي شهدت جماالته وموضوعاته تغريًا كبريًا وتطورًا " واالقتصادي والدستوري
ا ما يشبهها من املسائل اليت واسًعا ال ن كاد جند للقضايا والنوازل اليت يواجهنا 
ويعترب موضوع األقّليات وما . عاجلها الفقهاء القدامى يف عصورهم املختلفة
يتصل به من القضايا واملشكالت وما يتطلبه من نظر لتكييفه واستنباط ما 
يشكل "من مث فهو يناسبه من أحكام من أبرز مظاهر ذلك التغري والتطور، و 
لتنزيل األحكام خمتلًفا كثريًا عما سبق أن اجتهد فيه العلماء القدامى من  حمال
2.قضايا الفقه االجتماعي والسياسي
يد النّجار مع القرضاوي وحسنة كثريًا فيما ذهب  وال خيتلف الدكتور عبد ا
حينما "ات املسلمة إليه من حتديد عام ملعىن األقّلية، فهو يقرر أن مصطلح األقّلي
على مدلول عددي، ومدلول متيز  يندرج يف املصطلح العام لألقّليات يكون داال
موعة من الناس اليت . ثقايف فيصبح املعىن املقصود باألقّليات املسلمة تلك ا
تشرتك يف التدين باإلسالم وتعيش أقّلية يف عددها ضمن جمتمع أغلبية ال يتدين 
أن النجار يثري مجلة من األسئلة املهمة اليت ال بّد من الوقوف إال 3".ذا الدين
عندها إن كنا نريد أن تكون معاجلتنا إلشكالية األقّليات متكاملة النظر شاملة 
هل تعترب من األقّليات املسلمة تلك األقّليات العددية : "ومن تلك األسئلة. الرؤية
يكون بيدها السلطان يثاليت قد تكون هي النافذة يف جمتمع غري مسلم، حب
.15- 14املرجع نفسه، ص1
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تمع؟ وهل تعترب  السياسي الذي حتقق به سيادة القانون اإلسالمي على عموم ا
موعة املسلمة اليت هي من حيث العدد أكثرية  من األقّليات املسلمة تلك ا
ولكنها تعيش يف جمتمع تكون فيه جمموعة أخرى غري مسلمة هي النافذة حبيث 
تمع؟تسيطر على احلكم وتطبق م 1"ن خالله قانونًا غري إسالمي على سائر ا
إن هذه األسئلة تضع املعيار العددي يف حتديد معىن األقّلية أمام إشكال  
كبري ال جمال للفرار من مواجهته، وهو إشكال يتعلق بأحواٍل أو صفات يف 
ولذلك يرى األستاذ النّجار .لعوارضإىل ااألقّليات هي إىل اللوازم أقرب منها 
أن اإلجابة عن هذه األسئلة بالنسبة لألقّليات املسلمة تقتضي األخذ بعني 
؛ ذلك "طبيعة الصفة اإلسالمية يف خصوصيتها من بني سائر األديان"االعتبار 
أن املسلم لكي تتحقق صفته اإلسالمية ال بد له من حتكيم اإلسالم يف جوانب 
ثري مسألة أساسية بشأن عالقة وهذا االعتبار ي. حياته الفردية واالجتماعية كلها
املسلم بالقانون العام الذي ينظم احلياة وجيعل مدى توافق ذلك القانون مع 
ميزانًا أصليا يف حتقق الصفة اإلسالمية أو عدم "القيم والتعاليم اإلسالمية 
حتققها، بينما غري املسلمني ميكن أن يتحققوا بصفة دينهم إذا ما تدينوا به يف 
2".فس مهما يكن القانون العام الذي يطبق عليهمخاصة الن
وبناًء على هذا االعتبار للقانون املنظِّم للحياة العامة معيارًا يف النظر إىل 
تمع الذي تعيش يف كنفه خيلص النّجار إىل  األقّلية وتقدير وضعها يف إطار ا
جمتمع خيضع يف] اليت تعيش[تلك األكثرية املسلمة "أنه يدخل يف مفهوم األقّلية 
لقانون وثقافة غري إسالمية إذا كانت تلك األكثرية مغلوبًة على أمرها يف ذلك 
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النمط من احلياة، ومن باب أوىل أن تدخل فيه األقّلية اخلاضعة لنظام غري 
مفهوم األقّلية املسلمة تلك األقّلية وعلى هذا االعتبار أيًضا خيرج من. إسالمي
تمع اليت اليت يكون هلا نفوذ يسود ب ه القانون اإلسالمي والثقافة اإلسالمية يف ا
كما خيرج منه أيًضا املسلمون األكثرية إذا كانوا خيضعون حلكم من . تعيش فيه
كما 1،"قبل أنفسهم، ولكن ال يطبق فيهم القانون اإلسالمي إن جزئيا أو كليا
.هي أوضاع الكثري من البالد اإلسالمية الىوم
 
حديثًا يف اخلطاب الفكري –كما سبق أن ذكرنا –إذا كان مصطلح األقّليات 
والفقهي اإلسالمي، فإن مصطلح فقه األقّليات هو اآلخر أكثر حداثة يف ذلك 
فال يكاد تاريخ استعماله ألول مرة يتجاوز اخلمسة عقود، أما شيوعه . اخلطاب
بوصفه تعبريًا عن جمال حمدد من القضايا والنوازل اليت بني العلماء والباحثني 
حتتاج إىل اجتهاد خاص فرمبا امتد إىل عقدين ونصف أو ثالثة عقود على أكثر 
ويتفق الكثريون على أن نشأة هذا املصطلح ترجع إىل بروز اجلاليات 2.تقدير
به عن اإلسالمية يف البلدان الغربية بوصفها جمموعات ذات كيان مجاعي تتميز
فلّما تكاثرت هذه اجلاليات يف أوروبا وأمريكا، . األغلبية السائدة يف تلك البلدان
ا  ا يف التشعب، وبدأت تشعر بكيا ا يف التوسع وعالقا وأخذت مظاهر حيا
اجلماعي ذي اخلصوصية الدينية والثقافية اإلسالمية اليت متيزها عن جمتمع 
ثقافة وقوانني غري إسالمية، عندها بدأت األغلبية غري املسلم الذي تسود فيه
.178-177املرجع نفسه، ص1
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ا الفردية واجلماعية على أساس من  تلك اجلاليات تتوق وتسعى إىل تنظيم حيا
.قيم اإلسالم وتعاليمه
ويف إطار هذا الوعي لدى اجلاليات املسلمة هلويتها اخلاصة، وسعيها إلدارة 
ا وفق مقتضيات الشريعة اإلسالمية، تبني هلا أو للكثريين من أبنائها أن شؤون حيا
يد النجار –املشكالت اليت تواجهها كثريًا من ال "- كما يقول األستاذ عبد ا
يفي بتوفيقها إىل أحكام الدين ما هو متداول معروف من الفقه املعمول به يف البالد 
اإلسالمية، إما ألنه ال يناسب أوضاًعا خمالفة لألوضاع املوجودة بالبالد اإلسالمية،
م باملهجر، فأصبحت هناك ضرورة لفرع  ا حيا أو ألنه ال يغطي أوضاًعا انفردت 
1."فقهي جديد خيتّص يف معاجلة حياة هذه األقّلية أطلق عليه اسم فقه األقّليات
وهذه املشكالت اليت تواجه األقّليات املسلمة كثرية ومنتوعة، بعضها 
منها ذو طابع فقهي ناشئ سياسي، وبعضها اقتصادي، وبعضها ثقايف، وكثري
ويتها الدينية، وعقائدها اإلسالمية، وشعائرها "من رغبتها  يف التمسك 
التعبدية، وأحكامها الشرعية يف الزواج والطالق وشؤون األسرة، ومعرفة احلالل 
واحلرام يف أمور املطعومات، واملشروبات، وامللبوسات، وسائر املعامالت وشىت 
هل ينعزلون عنهم أو يندجمون : وخصوًصا غري املسلمنيالعالقات بني الناس 
2"فيهم؟ وإىل أي حد جيوز االندماج؟
وبعبارة أخرى إّن القضية الكربى اليت تتشعب منها املشكالت اليت تواجه 
ميكن صياغتها كما ااألقّليات املسلمة يف جمتمعات األغلبية اليت تعيش بني ظهرانيه
م وفق أحكام - ًدا ومجاعات أفرا- كيف حييا أبناؤها : يلي م ويديرون شؤو حيا
.178، ص"مآالت األفعال وأثرها يف فقه األقّليات"النجار، 1
.24، صفي فقه األقّليات المسلمةالقرضاوي، 2
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شريعتهم وتعاليم دينهم، وحيافظون على عقائدهم الدينية وهويتهم اإلسالمية يف 
إطار عالقات طبيعية مع حميطهم اإلنساين واالجتماعي مبعطياته الثقافية، 
؟ )من األحوالوالالدينية يف كثري (والسياسية، والقانونية ذات املرجعية غري اإلسالمية 
لقد سبق أن ذكرنا ما الحظه النجار من قصور يف الفقه اإلسالمي 
املوروث والسائد يف البلدان اإلسالمية عن الوفاء مبا تتطلبه معاجلة مشكالت 
إّن جانب . األقّليات املسلمة من حلول شرعية، ونزيد األمر هنا بيانًا وتوضيحا
ذلك الفقه على الرغم مما يتسم به من التنظري للعالقة بني املسلمني وغريهم يف
قد ارتبط أغلبه بالواقع التارخيي الذي أنتج فيه، "غناء وتنوع يف االجتهاد، إال أنه 
" وصار جزًءا من ذلك الواقع التارخيي حبيث يتعذر تطبيق جزئياته على واقع آخر
1.خيتلف عن ذلك الواقع التارخيي اختالفًا نوعيا
وحتليًال مهمني إلدراك هذه الظاهرة اليت ال بّد من ويقدم النجار شرًحا
ا عند النظر إىل الفقه وحركة االجتهاد، حيث يرى أن الفقه اإلسالمي  مراعا
عندما نشأ وتوسع وتطّور انبىن بوجه عام على معاجلة احلياة الواقعية للمسلمني 
اهلا فيما كان يسعى إليه من تدبريها يف مستجدات أوضاعها ومنقلبات أحو 
جاء يف أنواع "بأحكام الشريعة املنصوص عليها، أو املستنبطة باالجتهاد، لذلك 
قضاياه ومستنبطات أحكامه ويف منهجه وروحة العامة يعكس إىل حّد كبري واقع 
احلياة اإلسالمية فيما يطرأ عليها من أطوار، وما تنقلب فيه من األحوال، فيصوغ 
شرعية من صريح النّص، أو من أصول لكل تلك األطوار واألحوال أحكاًما 
ومل تكن األحكام االفرتاضية فيه إال جارية على سبيل املران التعليمي، . االجتهاد
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تهدين 1".بل كانت منكرة عند بعض أمية الفقه من كبار ا
وفضًال عن ذلك، فإن واقع الوجود اإلسالمي خالل العهود اليت ازدهرت فيها 
مجاعات واسعة من "جماالت احلياة املختلفة مل يعرف حركة االجتهاد الفقهي يف 
م االجتماعية العامة  ا يف عالقا املسلمني تعيش يف جمتمعات غري إسالمية خيضعون 
وقصارى ما كان حيصل يف هذا الشأن وجود أفراد من . لسلطان غري سلطان دينهم
يف الغالب عارًضااملسلمني أو مجاعات صغرية منهم يف جمتمعات غري إسالمية وجوًدا 
بسبب ضرب يف األرض أو إميان بالدين ناشئ مل تتوسع دائرته؛ ليصبح سلطانه 
غالبًا، فلم يكن إذن ذلك الوجود لألقلّيات املسلمة ظاهرة بارزة ضمن الوجود 
وبسبب هذا السياق التارخيي الذي نشأ فيه الفقه، وتبلورت مدارسه ." اإلسالمي العام
حلّل مستجدات الواقع بأحكام "هاد الفقهي خالل تصديه ومذاهبه جند أن االجت
الشريعة مل يتناول بشكل عميق موسع هذه احلال من أحوال الوجود اإلسالمي مبا 
غري ذات شأن بني يف واقع املسلمني، ورمبا تناول قضايا جزئية حمدودة هي ظاهرة
ى وأحكاًما يف منها، كانت تعرض للمجتهدين بني احلني واآلخر فيصدرون فيها فتاو 
ا كحالة من أحوال املسلمني ذات الوزن الواقعي املهم 2".غري ما اهتمام مشويل عام 
وهذا يعين أن التصدي لواقع األقّليات املسلمة واستيعاب قضاياها كما ونوًعا 
يف نظام القيم واألحكام الشرعية ال ميكن االقتصار فيه على نادر السوابق الفقهية، 
اوى النوازل وتطبيقها على جمرد احلاالت الفردية ألعيان األشخاص ومتفرقات فت
الذين تتكون منهم تلك األقّليات، وإمنا ال بد فيه من رؤية كلية لواقعها الذايت 
يد النجار، 1 لس األورويب لإلفتاء : بريوت(فقه المواطنة للمسلمين في أوروباعبد ا إصدارات ا
.132، ص)الكتاب الرابع، بدون تاريخ–والبحوث 
.133-132املرجع نفسه، ص2
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ا أن هناك حاجة إىل فقه خاص كذلك وهذا يعين  1.وللواقع العام الذي حييط 
جتهاد يراعيان ظروفها واجتهاد جديد يعاجلان مشكالت تلك األقّليات، فقه وا
ويتوخيان ما حيقق مصاحلها ويدرأ عنها املفاسد 2وأوضاعها اخلاصة زمانًا ومكانًا،
يف ظّل الواقع الذي تعيش فيه على حنو ميكنها من حتقيق املعادلة الدقيقة يف 
3."املواءمة بني التمسك بقيمها والتكيف واالنسجام مع حميطها"
فقه األقّليات وتطويره إىل أنه ليس فقًها تأسيسويؤّكد العلماء الداعون إىل
منقطع الصلة بالفقه اإلسالمي العام أو خارًجا عن مرجعية القرآن والسنة أو 
وإمنا هو فرع من فروعه يشاركه ذات "مستمدا من مصادر أخرى غريمها، 
املصادر واألصول، ولكنه يبين على خصوصية وضع األقّليات فيتجه إىل 
معاجلتها يف نطاق الفقه اإلسالمي وقواعده، استفادًة منه وبناء التخصص يف 
عليه وتطويرًا له فيما يتعلق مبوضوعه، وذلك سواء من حيث مثرات ذلك الفقه 
امن األحكام أو من حيث األصول والقواعد اليت بنيت عليها . 4"واستنبطت 
عي قومي، يراعي يقوم على اجتهاد شر "إن هذا الفقه اخلاص باألقّليات املسلمة 
تمع  ا ال متلك أن تفرض أحكام شريعتها على ا ا وظروفها اخلاصة، وأ زما
تمع وقوانينه،  ا مضطرة أن تتعامل وفق أنظمة ذلك ا الذي تعيش فيه، وأ
وتصويرًا لواقع األقّليات . 5"وبعض هذه األنظمة والقوانني ختالف شريعة اإلسالم
اإلسالمي املوروث باملعاجلة الناجعة لكل مشكالته، املسلمة الذي ال يفي الفقه 
.72، صفقه المواطنة للمسلمين في أوروباالنجار، ؛52، ص"مدخل إىل فقه األقّليات"لواين، الع1
.30، صفي فقه األقّليات المسلمةالقرضاوي، ؛53، ص"مدخل إىل فقه األقّليات"العلواين، 2
.164، صصناعة الفتوى وفقه األقّلياتابن بيه، 3
.178، ص"قّلياتمآالت األفعال وأثرها يف فقه األ"النجار، 4
.30، صفي فقه األقّليات المسلمةالقرضاوي، 5
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أوضاع األقّليات املسلمة يف ديار غري "ذهب بعض العلماء إىل حد القول بأن 
ا أوضاع ضرورة باملعىن العام للضرورة . 1"املسلمني ميكن أن توصف بأ
ويف ضوء ما سبق أّكد غري واحد من املهتمني بفقه األقّليات ضرورة تأصيل 
الفقه وبيان منهجيته وتقرير أصوله، لكي ال يكون قائًما على جمرد الفتاوى هذا 
يد النجار –فهذا الفقه . االنتقائية واملعاجلات اجلزئية ال بّد أن -كما يبني عبد ا
منهج علمي هو منهج التأصيل الذي تُبىن فيه األحكام "يكون مستنًدا إىل 
كي يثمر مثاره اخلرية على ] لألقّليات املسلمةاملتعلقة بالوجود اإلسالمي [والفتاوى 
أصول وقواعد من أصول االجتهاد وقواعده، توجهها وتسددها حنو أهدافها على 
اعتبار خصوصية الوضع الذي تعاجله بالنسبة لعموم الوضع اإلسالمي الذي جاء 
ولذلك2."النظر الفقهي العام يعاجله وفق األصول والقواعد العامة يف االجتهاد
- فإن هذا الفقه أو االجتهاد اجلديد اخلاص باألقّليات املسلمة جيب أن ينطلق 
من كليات القرآن وغاياته وقيمه العليا "–حسب الدكتور طه جابر العلواين 
يف ومقاصد شريعته ومنهاجه القومي، ويستنري مبا صح من سنة وسرية الرسول 
أما ما جاء يف . 3"قع عصر النبوةتطبيقاته للقرآن وتنزيله لقيمه وكلياته يف وا
مدونات الفقه اإلسالمي من أحكام واجتهادات ذات صلة بقضايا األقّليات، 
ا والعمل على جتاوزها، " فال بد من اعتباره سوابق فقهية يتم النظر فيها، واستيعا
بعد أخذ الدرس منها والبناء على األصول اليت ساعدت فقهاء األمة يف املاضي 
، ذلك أن تلك السوابق الفقهية اليت اجتهد يف بيان "ما أنتجواعلى إنتاج
ا أن  تثري قدرات الفقيه وتنمي ملكته الفقهية، "أحكامها أولئك الفقهاء من شأ
.165، صصناعة الفتوى وفقه األقّلياتابن بيه، 1
.136، صفقه المواطنة للمسلمين في أوروباالنجار، 2
.53، ص"مدخل إىل فقه األقّليات"العلواين، 3
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وتريه جوانب قد ال تظهر له بغري ذلك، ولكن ال ليأخذ الفتوى حرفيا منه فيقع 
1."يف خطأ القياس على الثابت بالقياس أو االجتهاد
وإذا كان فقه األقّليات املسلمية إمنا يستند بصورة عامة إىل األصول اليت 
بين عليها االجتهاد الفقهي عرب أطواره املختلفة كسائر فروع الفقه وجماالته، فقد 
حاول عدد من العلماء إبراز القواعد واألسس املنهجية اليت يقوم عليها هذا 
: الفقه، واليت ميكن أن نلخصها فيما يأيت
ا"قاعدة :أوالً  اليت تقتضي مراعاة األوضاع " تغري الفتوى بتغري موجبا
والظروف احمليطة باملكلف وما ينجم عنها من أثر يف تشخيص موضوع احلكم، 
.وحتقيق مناطه، وكيفية تنزيله على موضوعه مبا حيقق املقصد منه
اجات على الكليات الشرعية القاضية برفع احلرج وتنزيل أحكام احل:ثانيا
أحكام الضرورات، ومراعاة التيسري والتخفيف مبا يناسب أحوال األقّليات 
ا  ا، وما يكتنفها من مظاهر الضعف، وعدم التمكني يف جمتمعا وخصوصيا
اون أو تفريط يف ثوابت الشرع .الكليةومقاصده األساسيةدون 
قّليات حسب مراعاة سنة التدرج يف تطبيق أحكام الشريعة على األ:ثالثًا
م مبا ال يؤدي إىل  ما تطيقه أوضاعهم وتسمح به ظروفهم وفق أولويات حيا
.خلق توتر بينهم وبني حميطهم
الرتكيز على فقه اجلماعة، وعدم اإلغراق يف الفقه املنحصر يف قضايا :رابًعا
ا  األفراد من منطلق رؤية كلية حلاجات األقّليات املسلمة، ومصاحلها، وعالقا
تمعات اليت تعيش فيهامبك .ونات ا
عدم االنغالق يف مذهب معني من املذاهب الفقهية املعهودة يف :خامًسا
.املرجع نفسه1
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تاريخ الفقه اإلسالمي والرتكيز على األسس الكربى اجلامعة، والقيم العليا اليت 
.تشمل املسلمني مجيًعا يف كيان واحد يتجاوز احلدود الضيقة للمذاهب املختلفة
ة اعتبار املآالت يف األفعال والتصرفات أداًء، ويف األحكام قاعد:سادًسا
ا من املصاحل واملفاسد عند التزاحم والتعارض  إجراًء وتطبيًقا، واملوازنة بني متعلقا
ا منوُّ  على أساس مراعاة القضايا اإلسرتاتيجية، واملقومات الكربى اليت يرتبط 
ث تكون تلك األقّليات قوة فاعلة، الوجود اإلسالمي واستمراره يف املستقبل حبي
1.ومؤثرة يف واقعها االجتماعي وبيئتها احلضارية
ا من قواعد أخرى، يسعى فقه  وبناًء على هذه القواعد وما ميكن أن يلحق 
األقّليات إىل حتقيق مجلة من املقاصد اليت متكن األقّليات املسلمة من حتقيق 
ا و  قيمها وهويتها اإلسالمية من ناحية معادلة املواءمة بني مقتضيات عقيد
ومتطلبات واقعها ذي املرجعية الثقافية والقانونية غري اإلسالمية من ناحية أخرى، 
:وميكن حصر تلك املقاصد يف النقاط اآلتية. دون توتر وال تفريط أو إفراط
متكني تلك األقّليات املسلمة على أن حتَيا بإسالمها حياة ميسرة بال :أوالً 
.الدين وال إرهاق يف الدنيا، على مستوى الفرد واجلماعة سواء بسواءحرج يف
ا الثقايف واالجتماعي :ثانًيا مساعدة األقّليات املسلمة على احملافظة على كيا
ا  وشخصيتها اإلسالمية املتميزة بعقائدها وشعائرها وقيمها وأخالقها وآدا
.ومفاهيمها املشرتكة
ا املختلفة؛ الدينية والثقافية إعانة األقّليات :ثالثًا املسلمة على أداء واجبا
؛60- 40، صفي فقه األقلّيات المسلمةالقرضاوي، : ا يفانظر تفاصيل القواعد املذكورة وشروط إعماهل1
فقه : وله كذلك؛200- 187و176- 175، مرجع سابق، ص"مآالت األفعال وأثرها يف فقه األقلّيات"النجار، 
.268- 173، صصناعة الفتوى وفقه األقلّياتابن بيه، ؛180- 155، صالمواطنة للمسلمين في أوروبا
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. واالجتماعية وغريها دون عوائق ذاتية أو خارجية
متكني األقّليات املسلمة من القدرة على أداء واجب تبليغ رسالة:رابًعا
م الذي يفهمونه انطالقًا من  اإلسالم العاملية ملن يعيشون بني ظهرانيهم بلسا
م، ، وبناء جسور فهم علمي دقيق م، ومشكال م، وثقافا ألوضاع جمتمعا
.الثقة والتواصل والتفاهم بينهم وبني مواطنيهم من ذوي األغلبية
متكني األقّليات املسلمة من جتاوز حالة االنشطار النفسي، والعقلي، :خامًسا
ا وتتفاعل مع واقع ها واالنكماش على الذات اليت تعيشها؛ لتنفتح على جمتمعا
تمعات تسهم يف إصالحها  تفاعًال إجيابيا حبيث تتحول إىل شريك فاعل يف تلك ا
.وتوجيهها حنو ما هو أفضل يف جماالت القيم، واملصاحل والسلوك
أن يسهم يف تثقيف هذه األقّليات وتوعيتها، حبيث حتافظ على :سادًسا
ا الدينية والثقافية واالجتماعية واالقتصا دية والسياسية، حىت حقوقها وحريا
1.املشروعة دون ضغط وال تنازلمتارس هذه احلقوق
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اليزية يف ضوء ما سبق تقريره بشأن فقه األقّليات وحاولنا املتجربة الإذا نظرنا إىل 
تطبيق بعض مفاهيمه وقواعده على وضع املسلمني فيها، فإن هناك بعض األسئلة 
ألساسية اليت تواجهنا بشأن املعيار العددي يف حتديد معىن األقلّية وحجمها، وهي ا
يد النجار يف مناقشته للموضوع ا اليت أثارها الدكتور عبد ا وال . ذات األسئلة ذا
ا هنا هل تعترب من األقّليات املسلمة تلك األقّليات العددية ":بأس من التذكري 
يكون بيدها السلطان يف جمتمع غري مسلم، حبيثاليت قد تكون هي النافذة
في القرضاوي، ؛40، ص"مدخل إىل فقه األقّليات"العلواين، : ذه املقاصد يفانظر مزيًدا من التفصيل هل1
.169- 168، صصناعة الفتوى وفقه األقّليات؛ ابن بيه، 35- 34، صفقه األقّليت المسلمة
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تمع؟ وهل تعترب  السياسي الذي حتقق به سيادة القانون اإلسالمي على عموم ا
موعة املسلمة اليت هي من حيث العدد أكثرية،  من األقّليات املسلمة تلك ا
ولكنها تعيش يف جمتمع تكون فيه جمموعة أخرى غري مسلمة هي النافذة حبيث 
تمع؟ت "سيطر على احلكم وتطبق من خالله قانونًا غري إسالمي على سائر ا
مام إشكال كبري بشأن تضعنا أ–كما سبق أن ذكرنا –إن هذه األسئلة 
اعتبار اجلانب العددي اإلحصائي معيارًا يف حتديد معىن األقّلية، وهو إشكال ال 
يف اجلوانب فليست مظاهر القوة أو الضعف. جمال للفرار من مواجهته
االجتماعية واالقتصادية والسياسية جمرد عوارض كما ذهب إىل ذلك الشيخ 
ا قد تكون حامسة ال فقط بالنسبة للمجموعات الصغرية  القرضاوي، بل إ
احلجم القليلة العدد يف مقابل األغلبية العددية، وإمنا كذلك بالنسبة 
جيعلها يف احلقيقة يف موضع للمجموعات اليت تكون أغلبية باملعيار العددي مما 
. املستضعف املهيَمن عليه إزاء األقّلية النافذة املسيطرة
ويف ضوء ذلك نرى أن الوضع الراهن للمسلمني يف ماليزيا الذين يشكلون 
األكثرية من الناحية اإلحصائية، وميسكون بزمام احلكم والسلطة السياسية، إال 
م أضعف ما يكونون يف جمال االقتصاد فعلى الرغم من بلوغ عدد . واالجتماعأ
من احلجم الكلي للسكان، إال أن %60.4املسلمني يف البالد نسبة السكان
، ومل تصل وضعيتهم يف األمور %30نفوذهم يف عامل االقتصاد ال يكاد يبلغ 
ذلك أن التأثري والنفوذ 1.االجتماعية إىل مستوى مرٍض يناسب حجمهم العددي
إن . يف أيدي جمموعات هي أقّلية باملعيار العددي اإلحصائياحلقيقيني يقعان 
املواطنون املاليويون : يتكون من أربعة طوائف أساسيةجمموع السكان يف ماليزيا
”,Demografi Malaysia“:انظر1 http://ms. Wikipedia.org/wiki.pp.1-2
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املسلمون وهم األغلبية وتنضم إليهم جمموعات صغرية من املسلمني اهلنود 
نود اهلندوسيني، وإىل والصينيني، واملواطنون غري املسلمني من الصينيني البوذيني واهل
وبذلك يكون . جانب هاتني الطائفتني جمموعات من املسيحيني هي أقل حجما
موعات هي األقّلية 1.املسلمون من الناحية اإلحصائية هم األغلبية، وتلك ا
وتبًعا للنظام الدميوقراطي الليربإىل املعمول به يف ماليزيا، واملؤسس على 
عامة، فإن املسلمني هم الذين ميسكون بزمام التصويت يف انتخابات دورية
السلطة السياسية وإدارة احلكم يف إطار حتالف يضم قوى سياسية من الطوائف 
األخرى، على أساس من املشاركة يف توزيع املناصب، وتقاسم السلطة بينهم 
أما القانون العام الذي حيكم شؤون البالد أفراًدا . بنسبة معينة حسب الظروف
ا من الشرع اإلسالمي، بل هو قانون ذو ومجاعا ت ومؤسسات فليس مستمد
2.مرجعية علمانية واضحة
هذا من ناحية، ومن ناحية أخرى فإن القدر األكرب من الثروة يف البالد ليس 
يف أيدي املسلمني، بل يف أيدي غري املسلمني والصينني منهم على وجه التحديد، 
أما 3.لوطين، وخصوًصا القطاع اخلاص منهفهم الذين ميسكون زمام االقتصاد ا
املسلمون فال يزالون يف بداية الطريق حياولون اخلروج من بقايا املرياث االجتماعي، 
واالقتصادي الذي ورثهم إياه عهد االستعمار اإلجنليزي عندما كان املستعمرون 
ل وخاصة من الصني واهلند، للقيام باألعما–يفضلون جلب العمال من اخلارج 
.املرجع نفسه1
:انظر مزيًدا من التفاصيل يف2
Nik Abdul Rashid: “The Malaysian Parliament”, in Tun Mohamed Suffian et al., The
Constitution of Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 136-162.
:انظر يف ذلك مثالً 3
Kerajaan Malaysia, Rancangan Malaysia Ke Sembilan 2006-2010, Kuala Lumpur: Percetakan
Negara, p. 11.
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يف الصناعة والتجارة بدًال من التعامل مع املواطنني اليت هلا عالقة باالقتصاد
وقد نتج عن تلك السياسة االستعمارية أن . األصليني، أعين املسلمني املاليويني
املستجلبون من الصينيني واهلنود غري املسلمني على أفضل السبل يف احلصول تدرب
املسلمون على أوضاعهم يف حني بقيلصناعة، و على الثروة يف جماالت التجارة وا
.البدائية القدمية يف الفالحة والزراعة دون إرشاد أو تطوير يذكر
وقد مشلت تلك السياسة االستعمارية كذلك احلرَف وملهن املختلفة، ففي 
عهود االستعمار وبضعة عقود بعد االستقالل كان التفوق يف اجلامعات والنسبة 
لغري املسلمني، وخصوًصا يف جماالت العلوم املهنية كالطب، األكرب من خرجييها
واهلندسة، واحملاسبة، واحلقوق، األمر الذي أدى إىل قلة عدد املسلمني بصورة 
1.ملحوظة حىت اليوم مقارنة بغريهم من الطوائف األخرى
، وهو ما بحثالومن هنا تظهر أمهية اإلشكال الذي سبق أن أثرناه يف هذا 
سلمون بالنظر إىل كثرة عددهم وغلبتهم اإلحصائية يعتربون أغلبية أم أن إذا كان امل
م يف حكم األقّلية واقًعا بسبب ما هم عليه من  األمر على العكس من ذلك، أي أ
ال االقتصادي وما ينتج من إمكانات التوجيه والتأثري يف جماالت  ضعف وقلة يف ا
ال السياسي وا رأيناه من وبقطع النظر عما. لقانويناحلياة األخرى، وخاصة ا
اختالف بني الفقهاء املعاصرين بشأن املعيار األول يف حتديد معىن األقّلية، فإن ما 
يهمنا هنا هو النظر يف التجربة املالىزية يف حماولتها التغلب على هذا الوضع الذي 
ة األساسية اليت نعتربه خمالًفا للعدالة االجتماعية اليت تعترب من املبادئ اإلسالمي
.تستند إىل نصوص الشريعة ومقاصدها
إال أن معناه ومفهومه 2غريب النشأة،" العقد االجتماعي"لئن كان مصطلح 
.354املرجع نفسه، ص1
".عقد اجتماعي"على الشبكة العنكبوتية حتت العنوان موسوعة ويكيبيديا الحرة: انظر2
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أصيل يف الشريعة اإلسالمية والتجربة التارخيية للمسلمني، وقد جسدته خري 
؛ لتحقيق التوافق والتوازن بني جتسيد صحيفة املدينة اليت وضعها النيب 
متع املدينة من مسلمني، ويهود، ومشركنيا ويعتقد 1.موعات املكونة 
الكثريون يف ماليزيا أنّه قد حصل فعًال ما ميكن اعتباره عقًدا اجتماعيا بني 
القاطنني فيها، سواء كانوا مواطنني أصليني أو غري مواطنني، مسلمني وغري 
ختلفة يف احلياة السياسية، مسلمني، فكان ذلك أساًسا للتشارك بني الطوائف امل
.2واالجتماعية، واالقتصادية فيها
م ما كان هؤالء الصينيون واهلنود 1957ذلك أنه قبل االستقالل عام 
م كانوا عنصرًا . وغريهم من النازحني من اخلارج مواطنني يف هذه البالد إال أ
االت االقتصادية، واالج تماعية، أساسيا من واقع احلياة، وخصوًصا يف ا
االت منذ أيام االستعمار  وكذلك السياسية، وذلك نظرًا لتأثريهم يف تلك ا
.وحىت أثناء الكفاح من أجل االستقالل
ذا الدور واألثر، قبول املواطنني األصليني يف  فكان من باب االعرتاف 
مبنح هؤالء النازحني حق املواطنة بشرط أن يكون هلم - وهم املسلمون - البالد 
مقابل ذلك بعض احلقوق اخلاصة للمسلمني وخصوًصا فيما يتعلق بوضع 
وكون السالطني املاليويني حكاًما على 3اإلسالم بوصفه الدين الرمسي للدولة،
م، واللغة املاليوية باعتبارها اللغة الرمسية للدولة، إىل جانب بعض 4واليا







قوق كلها سواء أكانت للمسلمني أو لغري املسلمني، فقد وضمانًا هلذه احل
وتبًعا لذلك فقد 2.تضمن الدستور املاليزي فصوًال واضحة تقرها وتؤكدها
للتغلب على الضعف االقتصادي متخصصةأنشئت مؤسسات عامة
ا  واالجتماعي للمسلمني، وقد أمثر ذلك الكثري من اإلجنازات اليت أمكن 
تصادية واالجتماعية بني املسلمني وغريهم، مما يستطيع تضييق الفوارق االق
إال أن هذه اإلجنازات ال ميكن اعتبارها كافية، نظرًا إىل 3.الدارس مالحظته اليوم
.أن الفوارق، وخصوًصا االقتصادية، ما زالت قائمة وقد تزيد اتساًعا
ق إال أنه يف اآلونة األخرية ظهرت بعض األصوات اليت تعارض هذه احلقو 
ا تتعارض مع مبدأ املساواة يف تاخلاصة للماليويني املسلمني و  عرتض عليها حبجة أ
اإلسالم، وأن غري املسلمني يف هذه الدولة باعتبارهم من أهل الذمة يستحقون 
احلصول على احلقوق املقررة لألقّليات غري املسلمة كما هو مبني يف الكتب 
اصة باملاليويني املسلمني، تبًعا هلذه وبناء على ذلك فإن احلقوق اخل4.الفقهية
الفكرة ما هي إال نتيجة للعصبية العنصرية اليت تتعارض متاًما مع فكرة الوحدة 
5.واملساواة اإلنسانية يف اإلسالم
وبدًال من ذلك فقد دعا أصحاب هذا الرأي إىل االعتماد على مبدأ اجلدارة، 
ال أمام كّل فرد مسلًما أكان أ ، ماليويا أم صينيا أو هنديا غري مسلمو حيث يفتح ا
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الذين ما زالوا 3إّال أن احملافظني2.»فلهم ما لنا وعليهم ما علينا«1أو غري ذلك،
يدافعون عن الفكرة القدمية ال يسعهم إال أن يتمسكوا باملبادئ العامة كالسياسة 
ضّد مبدأ اجلدارة ومن بني احلجج اليت استندوا إليها 4.الشرعية ومقاصد الشريعة
احلجة القائلة بأن املسلمني يف هذه البالد وإن كانوا أغلبية من حيث العدد والكم، 
م من حيث القوة االقتصادية واالجتماعية  يعتربون - أي من حيث الكيف - إال ّ ا
5.أقلّية يسري حبقهم ما ينطبق على األقلّيات املسلمة
 
ينبغي أن تكون هلا أمهيتها ي أو النوعيالكيفبعدالاألقّلية من حيثمسألةإّن 
ًعا فر يف فقه األقّليات املسلمة الذي حياول الفقهاء املعاصرون إرساءه بوصفه 
فهي قضية تواجهها . من جماالتهمتخصًصا الفقه العام وجماًال فروعخاصا من 
أو جمموعات كثرية من األمة اإلسالمية يف العامل تبًعا لوضعهم السياسي 
أو االجتماعي، فهم وإن كانوا كثريين عدًدا وأغلبية من الناحية االقتصادي
م واقعون حتت سيطرة أنظمة سياسية وقانونية غري إسالمية،  اإلحصائية، إال أ
م يعانون القلة يف الشؤون االقتصادية واملالية والضعف يف  فضًال عن كو
.األحوال االجتماعية والثقافية
وإن كان يف نشأته األوىل نابًعا من ظروف اجلاليات إن هذا الفقه
http://kidpieces.wordpress.com/a-life-in-your-hands/melayu-usman-awang/meritokrasi:انظر1






وخاصة يف أوروبا وأمريكا، إّال أن املقاصد الشرعية اليت تدور حوهلا اإلسالمية
تمعات اإلسالمية ذات  األحكام املقررة يف هذا الفقه تنطبق كذلك على ا
االت السياس ية األكثرية العددية ولكنها تعاين من القلة والضعف يف ا
فإذا كانت األقّلييات املسلمة اليت تعيش يف . واالقتصادية واالجتماعية والثقافية
البلدان غري اإلسالمية حتتاج إىل شيء من التكييف اجلديد إلزالة الضغط على 
ا، فإن األكثرية املسلمة اليت تعيش يف جمتمع يسيطر فيه غري املسلمني على  حيا
. لك إىل شيء من ذلك التكييف الفقهيكذمرافق احلياة األساسية حتتاج
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